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Preface
The success of concepts in the social sciences is often measured by the
number of academic publications referring to them, by their capacity to
cross the boundaries of disciplines and by their penetration into mass
media and wider public discourses. If, however, we take qualitative cri-
teria such as the explanatory power of a concept and its precision in dis-
tinguishing different social phenomena as indicators for its usefulness
in social theory and research, then successful proliferation may dimin-
ish academic value. This diagnosis seems to apply to the concepts of
transnationalism and diaspora. Both have become extremely popular
since the 1990s and are today applied to much broader classes of phe-
nomena. This widening of empirical scope has also led to increasing
conceptual overlap so that diaspora and transnationalism have become
increasingly difficult to distinguish from each other. Yet even in their
multifaceted contemporary meanings, each concept still shows the
birthmarks of distinct imaginaries, research puzzles and disciplinary
styles of reasoning. The danger is that the broadening of conceptual
scope will not only result in conceptual inflation, but also in conceptual
flattening in the sense that concepts lose their capacity to drill deeper
and connect the multiple layers of socially constructed realities in ways
that enhance our understanding.
The goal of this book is not to settle once and for all the conceptual
debate by proposing coherent and authoritative definitions. We have in-
stead come to the Wittgensteinian conclusion that the meaning of trans-
nationalism and diaspora must be inferred from their actual uses. This
pragmatic attitude suggests also that the best test for the present aca-
demic value of these concepts lies in their capacity to trigger new re-
search perspectives and questions. This is the test that we wanted to ap-
ply in this volume. And we think that the result is positive.
The chapters of this book are grouped loosely into three sections. In
the first part, the emphasis is on the variety of interpretations of the
two concepts (chapters 2 – 5). The second part deals with new theoreti-
cal approaches and research questions (chapters 6 – 10). And the third
part addresses methodological problems and innovations with respect
to the study of boundary-crossing activities and affiliations (chapters 11
– 14). The book is framed by an introductory essay that connects the
strands of the debate (chapter 1) and concluding reflections on how em-
pirical research perspectives may enhance our understanding of the
evolution of transnational membership norms in democratic polities
(chapter 15).
A multidisciplinary book project like this one always risks ending up
as a compilation of disconnected essays. We have attempted to reduce
this danger by engaging all authors in an intensive process of debate
during an initial conference as well as in subsequent rounds of elabora-
tion and revision of the chapters. The project started with an IMISCOE
theory conference hosted at and co-organised by the European
University Institute (EUI) in Florence from 10-12 April 2008. A call for
papers was launched within the IMISCOE network and the EUI, and
was eventually also circulated within other networks. Altogether 40 ex-
tended outlines of papers were submitted. A programme committee in-
volving seven IMISCOE members invited 28 scholars to submit full ver-
sions of their papers at the conference. Apart from Nina Glick Schiller’s
chapter 6, all contributions in this book were presented in initial draft
versions at the conference. And all essays, apart from Valentina
Mazzucato’s chapter 11, are original contributions that have not been
published before. A full draft version of the book was reviewed by three
anonymous peer reviewers, whose detailed suggestions were extremely
helpful for the last round of extensive revisions. This project has also re-
sulted in an IMISCOE policy brief ‘Ties across borders: the growing sal-
ience of transnationalism and diaspora politics’ by Rainer Bauböck,
which is available at www.imiscoe.org/publications/policybriefs.
Apart from the authors and editors, several other persons have been
involved in this project and have contributed to its successful conclu-
sion. Listing them and their locations shows how producing this book
on transnationalism was itself a transnational process. Wiebke Sievers,
based at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and long-term administrator
of the IMISCOE thematic cluster on migration and citizenship, was pi-
votal in the administration of the conference and its follow-up. At the
EUI in Florence, Eva Breivik provided secretarial support and Eduardo
Romanos’ editorial assistance was crucial for preparing the book publi-
cation. In Toronto, Edith Klein carefully edited the manuscript for book
publication. The IMISCOE Network Office in Amsterdam and the
IMISCOE Editorial Committee, spread across Europe, have consistently
supported the project. Karina Hof’s patient assistance and professional
advice deserve to be specially mentioned here. The Amsterdam
University Press team (Erik van Aert, Jaap Wagenaar and Christine
Waslander) has also been very supportive. We are grateful to all of
them.
Rainer Bauböck and Thomas Faist
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Chapter 1
Diaspora and transnationalism:
What kind of dance partners?
Thomas Faist1
1.1 Introduction: Diaspora and transnationalism as awkward
dance partners
Over the past decades, the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism
have served as prominent research lenses through which to view the
aftermath of international migration and the shifting of state borders
across populations. The research has focused on delineating the genesis
and reproduction of transnational social formations, as well as the parti-
cular macro-societal contexts in which these cross-border social forma-
tions have operated, such as ‘globalisation’ and ‘multiculturalism’.
Although both terms refer to cross-border processes, diaspora has been
often used to denote religious or national groups living outside an (ima-
gined) homeland, whereas transnationalism is often used both more nar-
rowly – to refer to migrants’ durable ties across countries – and, more
widely, to capture not only communities, but all sorts of social forma-
tions, such as transnationally active networks, groups and organisations.
Moreover, while diaspora and transnationalism are sometimes used in-
terchangeably, the two terms reflect different intellectual genealogies.
The revival of the notion of diaspora and the advent of transnational ap-
proaches can be used productively to study central questions of social
and political change and transformation.
The goal of this volume is to bring together these two awkward dance
partners, which talk about similar categories of persons involving forms
of forced and voluntary migrations. In contrasting and comparing these
two concepts across a range of social science disciplines – sociology, po-
litical science, geography and anthropology – the book is meant to be
theoretical in the wide sense of the term. The aim is not to develop a
comprehensive theory or a synthesis of a theory, nor to apply a distinct
set of theories to cross-border social phenomena. The term ‘theory’ here
relates to theoretically guided empirical propositions, ranging from
thick descriptions aiming at particular events and sites, on one end of
the continuum, to grand general theory at the other end. Neither is this
an effort to develop an integrated theory of diaspora and transnational-
ism. To avoid conceptual confusion and talking past one another across
academic disciplines, the chapters contained herein are organised ac-
cording to three clear-cut tasks, and the volume is accordingly struc-
tured in three sections.
Part 1 Concepts
We need to study the history and evolution of the two concepts
and attempt to clarify their uses for theoretical purposes across
different disciplines and research traditions. This part of the vo-
lume explores whether and, if so, in what ways diaspora and
transnationalism are useful concepts guiding systematic empiri-
cal analysis in order to avoid the danger of conceptually rich but
proposition-poor research.
Part 2 Theory
We need to compare how different social, cultural and political
theories explain the formation of diasporas and the emergence of
transnationalism and what weight these phenomena are given in
broader theoretical accounts of change in contemporary society.
This part of the volume develops theoretically informed proposi-
tions that can be used to explain certain phenomena, or identify
the causal mechanisms and processes that can be seen in their
effects.
Part 3 Methods
We need to develop methodological toolboxes and innovations
for studying transnational and diasporic phenomena empirically,
without falling into the traps of methodological nationalism or
essentialising groupism. This part of the volume engages in re-
flections on how to conduct research and assess evidence. Our
endeavour here also includes discussion and application of rele-
vant research techniques.
Before embarking on a more detailed description of these three tasks, it
is necessary to sketch the public and academic relevance of the debates
in which the terms ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ are used.
1.2 The state of the debate(s)
Diaspora and transnationalism are important concepts in both political
and policy debates and academic research – diaspora even more so than
transnationalism. Diaspora has become a politicised notion while
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transnational approaches have not yet found entry into public debates
to the same degree. While diaspora is a very old concept, transnational-
ism is relatively new. Not only in public debates but also in academic
analysis, the terms have fuzzy boundaries and often overlap. This im-
mediately raises the question of why we should be interested in study-
ing these concepts.
Quite strikingly, over the last decade, the term ‘diaspora’ has become
popular in both academic literature and public discourses. Nationalist
groups or governments often use the concept of diaspora to pursue
agendas of nation-state-building or controlling populations abroad. The
concept is invoked to mobilise support for a group identity or some po-
litical project, sometimes in the service of an external homeland, such
as the protection of ethnic minorities living in another state (i.e. kin
state protection). Recently, even source countries of migration have
used ‘diaspora’ to encourage financial investments and promote politi-
cal loyalty among economically successful expatriates. Because it has
been politicised in multiple ways, scholars have argued that the term
should be used with care and not regarded as an innocuous analytical
concept (Brubaker 2005). Yet, simply doing away with the term alto-
gether would be throwing the baby out with the bath-water. It is impor-
tant to study how diasporas are constituted, with which consequences
for the various agents and institutions involved and how the boundaries
of the concept have changed.
Does ‘transnationalism’ offer more analytical purchase than diaspora?
The former term – and its derivatives, such as transnational social
spaces, fields and formations – have been used to connote everyday
practices of migrants engaged in various activities. These include, to
give only a few examples, reciprocity and solidarity within kinship net-
works, political participation not only in the country of emigration but
also of immigration, small-scale entrepreneurship of migrants across
borders and the transfer and re-transfer of cultural customs and prac-
tices. Though not used as widely as diaspora, nor as politicised, the con-
cept is hardly devoid of political connotations. After all, the pioneers of
the transnational turn in the early 1990s coined it as a concept with an
approach that brought migrants ‘back in’ as important social agents
(Glick Schiller, Basch & Szanton-Blanc 1995) – in contrast to large orga-
nisations such as multinational companies and political parties that had
been the object of earlier research of a transnational vein (Faist 2009a).
An agenda prioritising the empowerment of migrants is reflected in ti-
tles such as Transnationalism from Below (Smith & Guarnizo 1998). And
indeed, the ‘-ism’ in transnationalism suggests an ideology. Yet, it is not
clear who would adhere to such an ideology: researchers, migrants or
other political agents. Above all, since its introduction to migration stu-
dies in the early 1990s, transnationalism has sparked discussions on
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the integration of immigrants. Are migrants’ transnational orientations
at odds with their social integration in societies of settlement? Or is
there complementarity – and, if so, in what circumstances?
These brief references already suggest that diaspora and transnation-
alism are both at the cross-roads of academic research and public de-
bates. It is therefore of great importance to get a better sense of the
uses of the terms, their similarities and differences. As the contribu-
tions to this volume make clear, the two concepts cannot be separated
in any meaningful way. To do so would be to neglect the rich panoply
of definitions and meanings that constantly overlap. Nonetheless, since
Wittgenstein (2009), we have known that meanings of concepts can be
inferred from how they are used. In a Wittgensteinian spirit that does
not rely too much on definitions, this introductory chapter poses the
following questions: what do the two concepts have in common? What
distinguishes them thus from other branches of globalisation studies,
and what distinguishes transnationalism from diaspora studies? And to
what ends can they be fruitfully used?
Diaspora is an old concept whose uses and meanings have recently
undergone dramatic change. Originally, the concept referred only to the
historic experience of particular groups, specifically Jews and
Armenians. Later, it was extended to religious minorities in Europe.
Since the late 1970s, ‘diaspora’ has experienced a veritable inflation of
applications and interpretations. Most definitions can be summed up
by three characteristics. Each of these can be subdivided into older and
newer usages. The first characteristic relates to the causes of migration
or dispersal. Older notions refer to forced dispersal, and this is rooted
in the experience of Jews, but also – more recently – of Palestinians.
Newer notions of diaspora often refer simply to any kind of dispersal,
thus including trade diasporas such as that of the Chinese, or labour
migration diasporas such as those of the Turkish and the Mexicans
(Cohen 1997). The second characteristic links cross-border experiences
of homeland with destination. Older notions clearly imply a return to
an (imagined) homeland (Safran 1991): an example is homeland-
oriented projects meant to shape a country’s future by influencing it
from abroad or by encouraging return there. By contrast, newer uses of-
ten replace return with dense and continuous linkages across borders,
as in the migration-development nexus (Faist 2008). Such newer mean-
ings do not remain bound in the imagery of origin and destination but
include countries of onward migration, and thus emphasise lateral ties.
Even wider uses speak of a diasporic experience of all mobile persons
as ‘trans-nation’ (Appadurai 1996). In some cases, the imagined home-
land can also be a non-territorial one, such as a global Islamic umma.
This latter interpretation highlights the fact that, even in its earliest his-
toric uses, diaspora refers not only to ethnic but also to religious groups
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or communities. The third characteristic concerns the incorporation or
integration of migrants and/or minorities into the countries of settle-
ment. Older notions of diaspora implied that its members do not fully
integrate socially – that is, politically, economically, culturally – into the
country of settlement, making and maintaining boundaries vis-à-vis the
majority group(s). This notion of diaspora is also often associated with
boundary maintenance by a dominant majority through discrimination
against diaspora groups. Assimilation would mean the end of diaspora,
whether ethnically or religiously defined. Newer notions of diaspora
emphasise cultural hybridity in the wake of ‘dissemi-nation’ (Bhabha
1994). In line with older notions, it seems that diaspora implies some
sort of cultural distinctiveness of the diaspora vis-à-vis other groups.
Clearly, the older and newer usages of diaspora are not always compa-
tible. Yet, this tension may also constitute an opportunity to raise ques-
tions for further analysis. First, newer usages refer to any kind of dis-
persal and thus blur the distinctions between various kinds of cross-
border mobility. For example, for analytical and political reasons, differ-
ences between more voluntary and more forced forms of migration
may be crucial. Second, the emphasis on return has been replaced by
circular exchange and transnational mobility. This development raises
important questions about changing forms of migrant membership in
communities of origin and destination. Third, while both older and
newer usages emphasise the fact that diasporic groups do not assimilate
in regions of immigration, more recent discussions go beyond the idea
of cultural distinctiveness and focus upon processes of cultural innova-
tion. This raises the question of whether migrant integration, on the one
hand, and cultural distinctions, on the other hand, may coexist. In sum,
the questions raised are also to be found in discussions about the second
term central to this book, ‘transnationalism’: changing forms of cross-
border mobility, membership and citizenship and the compatibility – or
incompatibility – of migrant integration and cultural distinctions.
While the term ‘diaspora’ always refers to a community or group and
has been heavily used in history and literary studies, concepts such as
transnationalism – and transnational spaces, fields and formations – re-
fer to processes that transcend international borders and therefore appear
to describe more abstract phenomena in a social science language. By
transnational spaces we mean relatively stable, lasting and dense sets of
ties reaching beyond and across borders of sovereign states.
Transnational spaces comprise combinations of ties and their sub-
stance, positions within networks and organisations and networks of or-
ganisations that cut across the borders of at least two national states
(Faist 2000b). In migration research, the concept of transnationalism
was coined to focus on the grassroots activities of international mi-
grants across borders as being something distinct from the dense and
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continuous relations of macro-agents such as multinational or transna-
tional companies. In this sense, the term ‘transnationalism’ builds
upon – yet is distinct from – transnational relations in the political
science sub-discipline of international relations, and differs from that
usage in its focus on non-state actors (Portes 1996). In transnational-
ism, non-state agents, among them prominently but not exclusively mi-
grants, are defined as crucial agents. Country of origin, country of desti-
nation and migrants (plus their significant others who are relatively im-
mobile) thus create a triangular social structure, which can be expanded
through the inclusion of countries of onward migration. In this multi-
angular structure, the element of migrant formations covers a host of
organisations and groups, including migrant associations, such as
hometown associations, religious communities and employer
organisations.
1.3 Part 1 – Concepts: Defining diaspora and transnationalism
Striving for exact definitions of terms such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘transna-
tionalism’ may seem a futile exercise. Diaspora, in particular, has
become an all-purpose word. It may therefore be more meaningful to
look at its uses. As the uses of these terms often overlap and are some-
times even interchangeable, no clear separation is to be expected.
Nonetheless, a close conceptual comparison is an opportunity to bring
to light crucial questions about cross-border processes. Towards this
end, it is useful to compare the two concepts first to globalisation stu-
dies. While the impact of globalisation is often assumed to be universal
and worldwide, approaches linked to the concepts of diaspora and trans-
nationalism refer to phenomena that occur within the limited social
and geographic spaces of a particular set of regions or states.
Globalisation approaches and world theories differ from diasporic and
transnationalist approaches in at least three respects.
First, all cross-border concepts refer to the importance of cross-border
or even ‘deterritorialised’ politics, economics and culture. Yet, diaspora
and transnational approaches emphasise intense connections to na-
tional or local territories, especially in the case of migrants. For exam-
ple, the lobbying that Kurdish migrant organisations do may take place
at the European Parliament in Brussels, but its focus is on ‘local’ issues,
such as Kurdish autonomy in Turkey or the right to organise in
European Union member states. In this way, cross-border social phe-
nomena have a clear territorial reference and are thus also local or na-
tional in their focus and goals (see Lyons 2006).
Second, there is also no claim that a global or world consciousness is
evolving in a linear way. The broad definition of transnational spaces,
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fields and formations as sets of dense and continuous social and sym-
bolic ties encompasses all kinds of social phenomena. These definitions
apply across the board, from the cross-border activities of non-
governmental organisations and social protest movements, through the
migration flows that link specific sending and receiving countries, to
the ongoing ties migrants retain with their countries of origin.
However, in diaspora and transnational approaches, the intensified
cross-border transactions are not necessarily connected to a global con-
sciousness, a global horizon of world society, global justice and cosmo-
politanism (Beck 2006) or the growing importance of universal norms
in the world polity approach (Meyer, Boli, Thomas & Ramirez 1997). In
particular, migration is a case where there is no neat coincidence of
‘globalisation from below’ (Portes 1996), no growing awareness of ‘one-
worldness’, on the one hand, and universal ideas, on the other.
Moreover, diaspora and transnationalism – as concepts and observable
phenomena – are not necessarily coterminous with what is called global
or transnational civil society in the form of ‘transnational advocacy net-
works’ (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Transnational advocacy networks are of-
ten portrayed as promoting universal values, such as human rights, de-
mocracy and gender equity. Similarly, transnational social movements
are studied as an instance of globalisation and the universalisation of
practices and rights from below (Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & Reiter
2006). By contrast, diaspora and transnational concepts often relate to
the observation that, when it comes to understandings of the political,
human mobility may reinforce and recreate all kinds of beliefs and –
isms, including nationalism, patriarchism, sexism, sectarianism and
ethno-nationalism.
Third, terms such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ or ‘transnatio-
nalisation’ do not suggest a (linear) progression of the universalisation
of rights, as world approaches do. For example, post-national ap-
proaches posit that migrants’ ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt 1973 [1959])
has led to the evolution of post-national membership, which – in liberal
democracies – guards essential social and civil rights of migrants,
though falls short of full political rights and citizenship (Soysal 1994).
According to this view, the ultimate source of this tendency is to be
found in a diffusion of Western norms of human rights into the regula-
tions and constitutions of national states. While considerations attached
to terms such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ do not provide com-
prehensive theories on rights and citizenship, there are no clear-cut as-
sumptions about the global spread of norms. Instead, the focus is
usually on contentious struggles around issues such as rights in both
national and transnational arenas (Faist 2010). Diaspora and transna-
tional concepts, in contrast to global and world theory concepts, often
start from the observation that, while there is less of a requirement of
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physical or geographical proximity for social life, there is still no clear
tendency towards universalisation. Instead, the emphasis is placed on
the co-presence of universalising and particularising processes. Thus,
universal norms – such as collective self-determination, democracy and
human rights – may enable local or national claims. For example, de-
mands for political autonomy or multicultural rights of cultural groups
often refer to global norms such as the right to collective self-determina-
tion. In this way, the concepts of diaspora and transnationalism are clo-
sely related to ‘glocalisation’, which combines the notions of globalisa-
tion and localisation (Robertson 1995).
While the conceptual differences between globalisation, on the one
hand, and diaspora and transnationalisation, on the other hand, may
seem rather straightforward, it appears more difficult to distinguish the
latter set of terms. The extent to which the literature on diaspora and
transnational studies overlaps and intersects can be discerned from
Tölölyan’s (1991: 5) memorable remark that contemporary diasporas are
‘the exemplary communities of the transnational moment’. Diaspora
mixes, and overlaps with, meanings of words like ‘expatriate’, ‘mi-
grancy’ and ‘exile’ to form ‘an unruly crowd of descriptive/interpretative
terms’ that ‘jostle and converse’ in the modern lexicon of migration stu-
dies (Clifford 1994a: 303).
The contributions to the conceptual part of this volume focus on the
origins of the two concepts, their expanding interpretation and applica-
tions to novel phenomena and the links between academic and wider
public discourses. Some of the contributions focus on the history of the
concepts and discourse analyses of their present uses, while others pro-
pose definitions of the two concepts and identify their various dimen-
sions and contextual specifications. The general perspective of the con-
tributions in this section is interdisciplinary in that the authors draw on
insights from a variety of social science disciplines to advance their ana-
lysis. Nonetheless, the authors of the chapters are firmly rooted in spe-
cific disciplines: Bruneau in human geography, Dahinden in sociology,
Weinar in political science and Paerregaard in cultural anthropology.
The concepts of diaspora and transnationalism can be usefully grouped
into three realms of meaning: descriptive-analytical notions, references
to the social constitution of diasporic and transnationalist phenomena
and references to a socio-cultural condition.
1.3.1 Diaspora and transnationalism as descriptive analytical notions
The use of diaspora as a descriptive and analytical category has a strong
tradition. Examples in this volume include Safran’s and Cohen’s taxo-
nomies of diaspora and Sheffer’s effort to systematically analyse dia-
spora politics (Sheffer 2006). Making frequent references to family
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trees, roots, replanting and ancestral soil, such taxonomies often use
agrarian or gardening tropes – a trend Cohen (1997: 177-178) has noted
in diaspora studies overall. Sometimes these definitions border on es-
sentialist notions of organic social development. By contrast, conceptua-
lisations of transnationalism are more rooted in geographic and sociolo-
gical images such as ‘space’ and ‘field’, which are often either used
heuristically, or associated with claims towards applying key notions of
social theory (Khagram & Levitt 2008). On the whole, while diaspora
studies have mainly spoken to issues of cultural distinctiveness and its
relevance for religious communities, nationhood and also social prac-
tices such as entrepreneurship, transnational studies have come to fo-
cus on issues of mobility and networks. In short, the former term takes
broad concepts such as ‘community’ and ‘dispersal’ as a point of depar-
ture, and the latter term is related to social science ideas. Bruneau and
Dahinden in this volume use typologies of diaspora and transnational-
ism, respectively, as broad categories to discuss questions regarding
mobility and social integration.
1.3.2 Diaspora and transnationalism as socially constituted formations
Bruneau’s contribution attests to overlap in diaspora and transnational
approaches. Bruneau distinguishes among different types of diasporas,
which refer to entrepreneurship, politics, religion and ethnicity or race.
He goes beyond notions of community and a categorisation of diasporic
groups through firmly embedding his inquiry in a categorisation of
spaces. Hence, his juxtaposition of ‘transnational communities’ and ‘ter-
ritories of movement’. While the former consist mostly of labour mi-
grants who establish groups in the immigration region, the latter are
composed of mobile traders who connect emigration and immigration
states. And while transnational communities have their focus on the
emigration country, territories of movement are characterised by an em-
phasis on the regions of origin (see also the notion of ‘trading diasporas’
in Rauch 2001). Bruneau’s approach raises important questions for
further conceptual work: how is ‘de-territorialisation going with or fol-
lowed by re-territorialisation’? One may surmise that re-terrritorialisation
brings the local rootedness of most diasporists and migrants’ agency
back into the picture.
Through her conceptual and empirical analysis on transnationalism,
Dahinden also distinguishes between more sedentary and more noma-
dic forms of cross-border movements and ties. She looks at ‘diasporic
transnationalism’ and ‘transnationalism through mobility’, using the ex-
ample of cabaret dancers. Departing from Bruneau, Dahinden does not
contrast diaspora with transnationalism, but builds on the sedentary/
nomadic distinction within transnational studies. In her approach,
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diasporic transnationalism refers to the ties of migrants and their col-
lectives who entertain sustained social formations across borders while
being settled in countries of immigration, thereby forming transna-
tional fields or spaces. Transnationalism through mobility, by contrast,
is characterised by circulation and thus perpendicular movement across
borders.
Comparing Dahinden’s and Bruneau’s contributions shows how the
transnationalist literature seeks to incorporate issues raised by diaspora
approaches, such as incorporation or the lack thereof, but also tries to
speak to concerns raised by time-space compressions, such as distinct
forms of geographic mobility. Diaspora studies, moreover, have also
moved beyond traditional concerns in looking at social forms such as
‘mobile traders’. One of the interesting research questions emerging
out of Bruneau’s and Dahinden’s analyses is to what extent diaspora
and migrant transnationalism are characterised by a distinctive set of
identities and practices vis-à-vis their country of settlement, and to what
extent incorporation is required in order to engage in certain transna-
tional practices, such as involvement in democratisation (Koinova in
this volume) and nation-building (Waterbury in this volume).
Bruneau’s and Dahinden’s analyses are fine examples of how the for-
mations of the terms ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnational’ can be used fruit-
fully to think about mobilities in the contemporary world. Nonetheless,
it is also obvious that diaspora is an opalescent concept, especially given
its ubiquitous politicisation. Yet, even if we reject ‘diaspora’ as an analy-
tical term, it does not follow that we should give it up wholesale. At the
very least, we need to look into the making and unmaking of diasporas.
Waterbury’s chapter in this book argues that while using the term ‘dia-
spora’ for defining a population beyond the border may be problematic,
adopting the phrase ‘diaspora politics’ to describe state action and the
contention around those policies may be useful. More generally, in the
contemporary world, diasporas are constantly under production, thus
creating ‘new diasporas’. They may also undergo new phases of scatter-
ing or ‘rediasporisation’, as was the case with the Jewish and Greek dia-
sporas. Van Hear (1998: 6) notes that if diasporic formation has acceler-
ated in recent times so, too, has the ‘unmaking of diasporas, seen in
the regrouping or ingathering of migrant communities’. Examples in-
clude the ‘return’ of ethnic Germans to unified Germany from the
USSR, Poland and Romania after 1989, the large-scale influx of
Russian Jews to Israel in the 1990s and the ‘return’ of the Pontic
Greeks from various parts of the USSR in the same time period.
Here, the making of new diasporas and their efforts to be recognised
as diasporas are at the centre. Two contributions look into the constitu-
tion of a diaspora’s boundaries through the diasporas themselves and
external agents, and into how those calling themselves diasporas
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negotiate their ways. To this end, Weinar’s contribution looks into the
constitution of diaspora in policy discourses within international and
supranational organisations, and Paerregard follows with an analysis of
how political elites negotiate and constitute what one may call
‘diasporaness’.
Weinar is mainly concerned with understanding how diaspora is con-
strued as a migration policy agent. Looking at the EU and the debate on
a European comprehensive immigration policy, Weinar finds that the
term ‘diaspora’ figures prominently in officially issued EU documents
and that the concept has evolved along with efforts at migration control.
In EU documents, diasporas are portrayed as networks of migrants with
various legal links to the home country. By contrast, the language of
UN documents revolves around ‘transnational communities’ as main
actors in development policy. Yet, oddly enough, when referring to
transnational communities, UN documents speak of individuals (as an
unconnected bunch), not of collectives. In the EU, diasporas, as prover-
bial ‘seeds in the wind’, are thought to contribute to development in the
countries of origin, without being burdened by the experience of trau-
matic dispersal. Attributing ‘groupness’ (Brubaker 2004) to diasporas
enables them to form a body eligible for projects. In all the policy docu-
ments analysed by Weinar, diasporas and migrant communities are dis-
cussed as emerging agents of development in their own right – point-
ing to the increased significance of migrant categories and collectives
for cross-border policymaking. In sum, the analysis suggests that policy
debates often conflate terms such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnational
community’.
1.3.3 Diaspora and transnationalism as socio-cultural conditions
A social constructivist perspective implies a shift from focusing on
transnational communities to transnational practices in order to avoid
essentialised conceptions of migrant groups as being, for example, in-
herently national or transnational. In his interrogation of diaspora,
Paerregaard focuses on the political constitution of diaspora using the
case of Peruvian migration and efforts to establish diasporas in the
United States, Argentina and Spain. His is an inquiry into the question
of how diasporic political mobilisation and solidarity are created and
maintained and thus how the boundaries of diaspora are constructed or
constituted. Paerregaard integrates elements of older, more traditional
definitions emphasising communal autonomy and a distinctive collec-
tive identity with more recent research on transnational ties, which
highlights sustained cross-border mobility and continuous exchange of
ideas and goods as a defining criterion (see also Bruneau). Both aspects
are summed up succinctly in Clifford’s (1994a) metaphor of ‘roots and
DIASPORA AND TRANSNATIONALISM 19
routes’. Using Clifford’s metaphor, Paerregaard takes care to look at
both bilateral ties between emigration and immigration states and lat-
eral ties between groups in immigration countries. Within this concep-
tual apparatus, he focuses on the ‘negotiation of diaspora’ in the three
fields – politics, solidarity and social class. He identifies members and
groups of the Peruvian upper classes as the main movers and mobili-
sers of the Peruvian diaspora. This finding opens up diaspora studies
for interesting comparisons with the role of key groups in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century nationalism when intellectuals prepared the way
for the legitimation of nationalist ideologies (e.g. Greenfield 1992). The
implication is that we should avoid peremptorily attributing a single
shared or dominant identity to all members of a group. In political prac-
tices, identities must be constructed discursively and mobilised by elites
to become salient for larger groups of persons.
1.3.4 Diaspora and transnationalism: Differences and similarities
The contributions to this volume and the literature overall reveal simila-
rities as well as differences between the concepts of diaspora and trans-
nationalism. A crucial similarity is that both are extremely elastic terms
and, in one way or another, usually concern sustained cross-border ties
including regions of origin, destination and lateral ties to other regions
in which migrants reside. Both diaspora and transnationalism deal with
homeland ties and the incorporation of persons living ‘abroad’ into the
regions of destination. Diaspora approaches usually focus on the rela-
tionship between homelands (‘referent-origin’) and dispersed people
(Dufoix 2008), but also on destination countries. For example, accord-
ing to Safran, diasporas exist in a triangular socio-cultural relationship
with the host society and the homeland (1991: 372). In postmodern ap-
proaches, it is above all the ties among dispersed people with each other
that have significance. Empirical research in a transnational vein places
somewhat more emphasis than does the diaspora literature on issues of
incorporation and integration in immigration countries (e.g. Morawska
2003b on assimilation and transnationalism). The diaspora literature
usually emphasises the cultural distinctiveness of diaspora groups,
while parts of the transnational literature have started to look more ex-
tensively into migrant incorporation and transnational practices. This is
perhaps related to the fact that most scholars following a transnational
approach are situated in immigration countries and frequently also take
their cues from public policy debates characterised by keywords such as
‘integration’ and ‘social cohesion’. Overall, the link between integration
and cross-border engagement has been pried open by transnational stu-
dies. Similarly, diaspora studies have posed questions about the link be-
tween the cultural autonomy of minority groups and integration. The
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jury is still out on what the operative social mechanisms are. Both set
of approaches need to take seriously ‘community without propinquity’,
that is, the genesis of sociality not tied to geographical but mainly
rooted in social proximity (see Faist 2009b).
There are also three noteworthy distinctions that merit mention
although, as will become apparent, they differ in emphasis, not in
theory.
First, ‘transnationalism’ is a broader term than ‘diaspora’ in two re-
spects. One concerns the scope of groups. Diaspora relates most often
to religious, ethnic and national groups and communities, whereas
transnational approaches connect to all sorts of social formations, in-
cluding the ones already mentioned, as well as to phenomena such as
networks of businesspersons and social movements. The other respect
concerns the even narrower term ‘transnational community’.
Postmodern conceptualisations aside, ‘diaspora’ most often relates to a
form of transnational organisation spanning a specific country of origin
and a set of host countries. In contrast, ‘transnational community’ en-
compasses a broader range of phenomena, such as cross-border village
communities or borderland communities. Thus, transnational commu-
nities encompass diasporas, but not all transnational communities are
diasporas.
The second dimension concerns identity and mobility. Diaspora ap-
proaches focus on aspects of collective identity, while transnational ap-
proaches take their cue from cross-border mobility. Although both dia-
spora and transnational approaches use both concepts, there are some-
times differences in emphasis. This difference is clearly borne out by
the contributions by Bruneau and Dahinden in this volume. While the
former starts from questions of identity and later brings in mobility, the
latter contrasts diasporic and circular transnationalism. In general, con-
cepts of diaspora deal with dispersal, whether traumatic or not, and the
resulting emergence and reproduction of some sort of collective iden-
tity, with varying intensities of ties to the country of emigration and the
countries of immigration. In those cases when dispersal occurred not
because of persons who migrated but because of borders migrating over
people (as in many parts of Eastern Europe), the focus of the term is on
common identity despite dispersal (see Waterbury in this volume).
Sometimes the ‘construction of shared imagination’ (Kissau & Hunger
in this volume) is intricately connected to nation-building projects of so-
called ‘stateless diasporas’. Issues of collective identity do also matter
from a transnational perspective; for example, many analyses of cultural
aspects of transnationalism build upon notions of mélange, hybridity or
cultural ‘translations’ in which mobile persons are engaged. From a
transnational perspective, however, these identity changes are regarded
as being derived from cross-border mobility of persons, which is in
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itself always embedded in other flows of ideas and goods. The transna-
tionalist concern with mobility is also reflected in the concept of net-
work – though often more strictly applied metaphorically rather than
methodologically. In this way, the transnationalism literature links up
with the ‘new mobilities paradigm’ that posits geographical mobility as
a ubiquitous phenomenon of general societal importance (Sheller &
Urry 2006).
A third difference in emphasis between the use of the diaspora and
transnationalism approaches concerns the time dimension. Scholars
using the term ‘diaspora’ often refer to a multi-generational pattern,
while transnational analysts deal with recent migrant flows. Diasporas
have often been defined as formations reaching across generations, if
not a generational longue durée. The prototypical examples of the Jewish
and Armenian diasporas, and even newer examples such as the
Palestinian one, speak to this proposition. As King and Christou argue
in this volume, the long time horizon distinguishes diaspora from
transmigration but also from transnational communities. Indeed, trans-
national approaches have dealt only very sparsely with aspects of histori-
cal continuity since most of the empirical research has focused on more
recent migration flows (for an exception see Foner 2001) and on one
generation only. As to the generational issue, there are a few counterex-
amples, such as explorations of ‘second-generation transnationalism’
(e.g. Levitt & Waters 2006).
1.4 Part 2 – Theories: Explaining the emergence and
reproduction of transnational formations and diasporas
Where the literature on diasporas and transnational social formations
has dealt with the politics, economics and culture of cross-border life, it
has tended to either reflect national container framings, on one ex-
treme, or rely on theories altogether occluding the role of national
states, on the other extreme. And while early transnational writings
have largely neglected the role of national states, later studies have ac-
knowledged their crucial role in regulating not only international migra-
tion, but also flows within transnational social formations (Kivisto &
Faist 2010: ch. 5). Analysis along diasporic and transnational perspec-
tives has become more sophisticated so as to navigate a course through
the manifold collective actors involved in transnational formations. Both
diaspora and transnational perspectives acknowledge that social pro-
cesses are spread among multiple localities across the borders of na-
tional states. And while the agendas and goals of the agents involved
– be they international organisations, non-governmental organisations
or national governments – are still often defined in national terms, the
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modes of organisation and activism defy rigid concepts of state contain-
ers. The world polity or world society approach has served as a useful
lens. Examples include the spread of transnational linkages of organisa-
tions (Boli & Thomas 1997) and the importance of meta-values such as
democratisation in legitimating cross-border engagements.
While the world polity approach looks at the national state as one ele-
ment in the diffusion of Western-style norms, other approaches either
discuss diaspora exclusively as a nation-state phenomenon or dichoto-
mise the nation-state and diaspora. Many studies with a diaspora or
transnational approach are clearly using a national lens. The focus then
is on diaspora and immigrant communities that lobby host states to
adopt particular stances and policies towards political conflicts in the
homeland. This approach centres on the role of national states as inter-
mediary agents between diaspora or transnational communities, on the
one hand, and the various political groups in the ‘home country’, on
the other (Shain 2007). By contrast, postmodern approaches that con-
ceive of diaspora as ‘ethnoscapes’ (Appadurai 1996) often verge on an
oppositional juxtaposition between national states and more post-na-
tional projects. Leaving aside these simplistic notions, one may usefully
start with the observation that diasporas and transnational societal struc-
tures can be cast as formations sui generis. These formations cannot be
thought of as independent from states and non-state actors. To the con-
trary, they are constituted by these agents. This move opens up venues
for analysing different realms, such as the political one, and questions
relating to the architecture of transnational political engagement
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c), as well as an often neglected question
about the relationship between political institutions and migrant trans-
national practices in crucial fields such as citizenship (Bauböck 2003).
The contributions in this book that provide theoretically guided de-
scription and explanation are grounded in a variety of social science dis-
ciplines: Glick Schiller in social anthropology, Waterbury in political
science/comparative politics, Koinova in political science/international
relations, King and Christou in cultural anthropology and Boccagni in
sociology. Moreover, the contributions deal with social structures (Glick
Schiller), large actors such as states and diaspora organisations
(Waterbury and Koinova) and small groups (King & Christou and
Boccagni).
Glick Schiller’s contribution starts with the observation that the field
of migration studies is often unconnected to broader developments in
social theory, most notably reflections on the boundaries of social for-
mations. She illustrates this curious disconnect with the empirical puz-
zle that transnational migrants are depicted both as criminals and as sa-
viours in the form of agents who develop their regions of origin. She
starts by taking a critical stance with respect to methodological
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nationalism, which posits national borders as borders of society, a pre-
sumption that is reflected in the tendency of migration scholars to con-
flate a nation-state with a concept of society. Methodological nationalism
is thus connected to essentialising migrants as the ‘other’, being per-
ceived as not fitting in and threatening social solidarity. The trend to-
wards essentialisation, according to Glick Schiller, is visible in much of
the research on ‘transnational community’, which has reified national
state borders by focusing on national or ethnic categories. Glick Schiller
offers an alternative to methodological nationalism, something she calls
‘global power perspective’. She claims that this perspective helps eluci-
date the mutual constitution of the local, national and global, and to
analyse both the efforts of agents to implement more circulatory migra-
tion regimes and the role migrants play as challengers or re-enforcers
of neo-liberal restructuration. An interesting question compelling
further research then is how migrants themselves – beyond the inter-
ests of states of immigration and emigration and powerful lobby
groups – negotiate their ways within and across the boundaries of na-
tion-states and groups.
The studies by Waterbury and Koinova that follow are examples of
politics under conditions of the increasingly blurring distinction be-
tween internal and external affairs of states. In general, the literature on
diaspora and transnationalist practices almost exclusively defines a dia-
spora by its migrant origins or the far-reaching dispersal of an ethnic
community to multiple points, reflecting classic cases of diaspora such
as the Jewish or Armenian ones. This type of definition tends to exclude
cases of trans-border ethnic groups created from the shifting of borders
or the dissolution of states and empires. A case in point is ethnic
Hungarians in East Central Europe. Waterbury considers the relations
of states to populations abroad regarding both migrants and kin (ethnic,
national) minorities. This broader comparative framework is geared to
overcome the prevalent analytical separation between studies of ‘kin
state’ and ‘migrant-sending state’ politics and policies towards external
national populations. Waterbury argues how, specifically, the kin state
literature can help those focused on emigration policies analyse the
‘dark side’ of trans-state activity, such as the instrumental use of ties to
those abroad to justify irredentist ambitions and exclusionary, nationalist
politics. Conversely, an engagement with migrant-sending cases helps
kin state analysts find a framework for understanding action on behalf
of co-ethnics that goes beyond irredentism and assumptions of ethnic
affiliation as deterministic and conflict-producing factors, and may even
consider multicultural rights as an alternative to secession. In particular,
Waterbury strives to understand the conditions under which states en-
gage populations abroad and the impact on national institutions such as
citizenship. She finds that while diasporic states utilise the rhetoric of
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engaging the ‘global nation’, their policies are often targeted to specific
populations abroad, depending on what these populations can offer the
homeland state. This finding confirms the utility of the third way of-
fered by diaspora studies in between national and globalist approaches.
Waterbury’s analysis offers a fruitful venue for further questions about,
above all, which particular policies are chosen in what circumstances.
While Waterbury focuses on the state side, be it emigration or kin
state, and on the conditions under which diaspora politics emerges,
Koinova focuses on the diaspora side and its impacts on domestic poli-
tics and democratisation, in particular. She inquires about diasporas as
being ‘agents of democratisation’. This is not to disregard the observa-
tion that, in some contexts, we find that it is the diaspora that decides
to ‘go political’ and seek some intervention in homeland politics,
whereas, in other situations, the homeland state reaches out to pull dis-
tant constituents into its political affairs and agendas. Her main ques-
tion is why some diasporas engage in pro-democratisation behaviour re-
lated to their homelands – some embracing merely a thin procedural
conception of democracy, others more substantive liberal features –
against the backdrop of existing nationalist practices. From an interna-
tional relations perspective, she aims towards a comparative explanatory
framework for under-researched cases linked to the post-communist
world in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, namely the Ukrainian,
Serbian, Albanian and Armenian diasporas. Koinova argues that the po-
litical power of diasporas lies in challenging the sovereignty of their
homelands. Overall, she finds that the diasporas analysed did not act in
exclusively nationalist ways, for they were also involved with efforts on
behalf of democratisation. In particular, if diasporas are linked to (newly
established) states that enjoy both international legal and domestic so-
vereignty, they have a chance to focus on substantive elements of de-
mocracy, such as the liberal values of substantive political equality. If
they are not, they will be prone to engage with only the procedural as-
pects of democracy, such as institutionalising voting rights. In this latter
case, procedural aspects go in tandem with a focus on nationalist pro-
jects. Koinova adds a caveat: although diasporas are not the most likely
agents of democratisation in the post-communist world, they do contri-
bute. Her findings also indicate that beyond a close analysis of home or
kin state and diasporas, we need to pay attention to international poli-
tics. Like Waterbury, she also contributes to the methodology of dia-
spora and transnational approaches. In a field dominated by single-case
studies or sweeping guesswork, comparative studies can be helpful as a
first step towards more systematic theorising.
The contributions by Waterbury and Koinova mean that the rise of
transnational practices has implications for nation-building and demo-
cratisation and, though yet to be explored, for the international system
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of states. Migrant or diaspora organisations certainly are influenced by
global meta-norms and yet remain embedded in local discourses. All of
this also raises the question of how consequential diaspora politics and
extraterritorial voting and the extension of citizenship rights across bor-
ders of national states actually are, and in what way they may contribute
to the ongoing transformation of national citizenship (see Fitzgerald
2006a).
The next two contributions, by King and Christou on second-genera-
tion return and by Boccagni on the distinction between private and pub-
lic transnationalism, take the meso- and micro-levels of the ‘private’ as
a point of departure. King and Christou’s chapter explores the notion of
return, even physical return, to a homeland whose returnees were not
born there. Again, as in the conceptual discussions on the difference
and similarity between diaspora and transnational approaches, this is-
sue brings together aspects of both identity and mobility as well as their
combinations under conditions of ‘time-space compression’. King and
Christou start by contrasting short-term mobility, which separates work
and family life and which does not question identity, with the seemingly
opposite case of second-generation returnees. They characterise the lat-
ter case as an instance of ‘counter-diasporic migration’. Questions of
‘home’, ‘place’, ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ generate perspectives on how
they are constituted. One remarkable question they raise is whether the
cases they study – Japanese Brazilians, British-born Caribbeans and
Greek-Americans – constitute mainly an issue of hypermobility or the
very essence of diaspora, thus fulfilling a prominent criterion often
mentioned by diaspora theorists, namely eventual return to the ances-
tral homeland. King and Christou refuse to choose between these two
options, arguing that their cases are neither instances of global mobility
nor the simple fulfilment of parental wishes but ‘rather … an act of re-
sistance against hypermobility and dislocation’. In a way, it is mobility
not as shuttling back and forth but as exploiting knowledge and ties in
order to settle or resettle for a meaningful period in life. The second
generation can be seen to have accrued a better preparation for moving
to the ‘homeland’. First, most of the persons involved have high educa-
tional credentials, including many with university degrees. Second, they
are bilingual – their knowledge of the language of the ancestral country
having been nurtured within the close-knit family circle and at special
after-school classes. King and Christou see identity in migration as rela-
tional, processual and situational. Their study opens up intriguing ques-
tions about how generational, gender and class differences figure into
these and other types of ‘return’. Seen in this way, this research line is
a potential future contribution to the literature on the intersection of ca-
tegories such as class, race, gender and other forms of heterogeneity
(see Collins & Andersen 2007).
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Boccagni’s chapter can be read as a supplement to analyses of trans-
nationalism and diasporic activities focusing on formal organisations,
which partake in the public spheres of the immigration and/or emigra-
tion states. Boccagni consciously focuses on family, kinship and friend-
ship ties among Ecuadorian migrants in Italy. They are mostly recent
migrants and are thus expected to have stronger active transnational ties
centring on families. This ethnographic study reflects on ‘private trans-
nationalism’, in this case the ongoing kinship-based relationships
reaching into the migrants’ country of origin. In the public sphere, in
contrast, the immigrants’ life is increasingly rooted in the local Italian
receiving contexts. What we encounter in the case of recent Ecuadoran
migrants in Italy is, according to Boccagni, an instance of private trans-
nationalism and public localism. The two forms of transnational social
ties – private or public – are distinct in terms of their extent, sustain-
ability and impact. Of broader interest here is less the fact that one does
not find public transnationalism in this case: after all, one could argue
that the case selection committed sampling on the dependent variable.
Instead, the case study alerts us to avoid a frequent conceptual confla-
tion in studying private and public aspects in transnational formations.
In sum, these contributions offer a rich variety of different ap-
proaches. A systems-oriented approach to the political economy of capi-
talist relations can be found in Glick Schiller’s analysis. Institutionalist
and variable-oriented small-N studies are characteristics of the chapters
by Waterbury and Koinova. While all these studies are macro-oriented,
the contributions by King and Christou and Boccagni not only focus on
the meso-level of family groups and the micro-levels of persons, but
also engage in a processual approach. King and Christou, for example,
analyse the social constitution of identity in mobility processes. For fu-
ture research, it may seem worthwhile to attempt analyses that pay at-
tention to both the socio-cultural constitution of schemas and routines,
on the one hand, and the use of resources, material or otherwise, by
the individual and collective actors involved, on the other. In this way,
diaspora and transnationalism studies could profit from more general
approaches in the social sciences that call for a link between agency and
structure (e.g. structuration theory in Giddens 1984).
1.5 Part 3 – Methodology and methods: How to study
transnational phenomena
The key question raised in the methodological part of this volume is
how transnational perspectives can overcome methodological national-
ism in the social sciences. Methodological nationalism in the social
sciences marks the tendency to treat the container of the nation-state as
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a quasi-natural social and political configuration (Wimmer & Glick
Schiller 2003 based on Martins 1974). Going beyond container studies
may be easier in some disciplines – for example, social and cultural
anthropology – than in others – for example, comparative political
science where the sovereign national state is defined as the basic unit
of analysis. Within transnational studies, an alternative methodological
trap of ‘groupism’ (Brubaker & Cooper 2001) may arise. This charge re-
fers to studies that treat diasporic and transnational communities as
units that are stable over time, and are held to be of overriding impor-
tance for the individual identities and social practices of their members.
How do we take into account the fluidity and malleability of transna-
tional structures, relations and identities in empirical research and in
the theories that guide such research? Can we study transnational phe-
nomena while avoiding the traps of both methodological nationalism
and groupism? The contributions introduced so far have self-con-
sciously started to address these challenges: as seen, for example, in
King and Christou’s discussion of the relationship between global mo-
bility and non-essentialised identity, Boccagni’s analysis of the differ-
ence between private and public transnationalism and Glick Schiller’s
analysis of methodological nationalism.
The contributors to the section on methodology are again rooted in
various disciplinary traditions: Glick Schiller in social anthropology,
Mazzucato in social geography, Jonkers in biotechnology and political
science, Kissau and Hunger in communication studies and political
science, respectively, and Morales and Jorba in political science and so-
ciology. The chapters connect methodological considerations to specific
methods addressing as well as using systematic multi-sitedness, the use
of network methodology, the value of internet research (as a potential
complement to fieldwork) and quantitative surveys as a means to gauge
the relation between local and transnational political engagement of mi-
grant associations. The contributions come from very different disci-
plinary traditions – multi-sitedness from geography and anthropology,
network analysis from sociology, internet research from communication
studies and survey research from, among others, political science and
sociology. While the methodological approaches and methods presented
do not constitute an exclusive domain of any single social science disci-
pline, there are certain proclivities to be observed. Generally, a central
question raised concerns the potentials of indicators, quantitative and
qualitative, for measuring and evaluating migrant transnational and dia-
sporic activities.
Multi-sited research has been somewhat hampered by the fact that in-
dividual researchers usually cannot capture the simultaneity of transac-
tions. To overcome this obstacle, Mazzucato suggests a simultaneous
matched-sample methodology (SMS), used in a study of two-way flows
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between Amsterdam and various sites in Ghana. In essence, this meth-
odological tool covers transnational flows across localities. Mazzucato
insists that studies need not measure financial remittances in only one
direction – sent by migrants to people back home – and the kind of de-
velopments following out of this flow. She highlights flows engendered
by migration as being two-way: they also involve flows, especially of ser-
vices, from so-called developing countries to developed countries.
Resources from sending regions are instrumental in setting up mi-
grants abroad, for example, by obtaining a legal status. Mazzucato’s con-
tribution constitutes an insightful application to the micro- and meso-le-
vels of what world systems theory described on a macro-level: asym-
metric two-way flows between different regions of the world (see
Wallerstein 1983).
The idea of two-way flows, albeit asymmetric regarding the types of
resources exchanged and power applied, is also helpful in understand-
ing networks among scientists. In his analysis of ego-centred networks
among individual overseas Chinese scientists, Jonkers considers ties be-
tween ethnic Chinese scientists working outside China and their part-
ners in mainland China. This is a reference category different from as-
sociations of scientists, such as ‘scientific diasporas’ (Meyer 2001).
Jonkers raises the question of whether and, if so, to what extent the mo-
tivations for the formation of such ties, the barriers and stimuli affect-
ing their formation and intensity, as well as the distribution of the ma-
terial and cognitive resources, are grounded in specific forms of reci-
procity. In order to shed light on this question, he uses a network
approach that is built on selecting the scientists involved by their sur-
names. While this method may be peculiar to his case and would not
work to uncover similar phenomena such as European scientists in the
US, he can show that there is clear evidence for a specific phenomenon
he calls ‘transnational research collaboration’. As in many fields of
transnational studies, including diaspora studies, the next step would
be to unearth not only the existence of such cross-border networks, the
kinds of resources exchanged and the direction of flows, but also the so-
cial mechanisms operative in the functioning of scientists’ networks
(Faist 2009c).
Following the lines of network analysis, Kissau and Hunger address
the question of how the internet can be used to study developments in
migrants’ networks and thus differentiate between transnational online
communities, virtual diasporas and ethnic online public spheres. They
define transnational communities as being characterised by particular
sets of reciprocal ties. For diaspora groups, the internet is a significant
instrument, if not the central instrument, used in what the authors call
the ‘construction of shared imagination’. The constitution of shared
imagination is also crucial to sustaining ethnic communities.
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Kissau and Hunger categorise the cases analysed according to three
distinct types: Russian migrants as transnational online communities,
Kurds as virtual diasporas and Turks as ethnic online public spheres.
The clearest case seems to be Kurdish websites that espouse – much
more than Russian and Turkish websites – images of a common and
yet-to-be-realised state-based homeland, origin, tradition and history.
These images portray messages to define Kurdishness in contrast to
other migrant groups in Germany, most prominently Turks. The lateral
links of this virtual diaspora are evidenced by the fact that many web-
pages are multilingual, being in French, German, Kurdish, Turkish and
English. By contrast, the Turkish online spaces constitute a ‘national
public sphere with an ethnic imprint’. It is not Turkey that most com-
ments are focused on, but Germany. However, Turkish migrants using
these websites prefer to discuss political topics within their differen-
tiated sphere. Such a sphere is not to be mistaken for an ethnic enclave
that severs all connections with the general public sphere. The focus of
Russian websites can be characterised as somewhere in between: the
contributors are politically involved online both in immigration and
emigration regions. Connecting their findings to issues of migrant col-
lective social integration, Kissau and Hunger argue that ethnic, diaspo-
ric or transnational internet spaces cannot serve as a substitute for full
inclusion into national public spheres. A future research question to be
tackled then is the potential linkages between these three types of
spheres and national spheres, also perhaps including transnational
spheres in the EU (Eder & Trenz 2004). Here, their methodological ca-
veat needs to be taken seriously: Kissau and Hunger add that online
analysis does not replace fieldwork. After all, online and offline worlds
interact, not being independent of one another.
The study by Kissau and Hunger raises the crucial question of how
to conceptualise what is called the integration or incorporation of mi-
grants and minorities into social and political structures. Clearly, the no-
tion of diaspora as an intergenerational social formation implies that as-
similation in a national state would be the end of cultural distinctive-
ness. Transnational approaches, by contrast, do not call for such clear-
cut distinctions. This can also be seen in the case study on transna-
tional ties of migrant organisations. Morales and Jorba deal with the re-
lationship between transnational ties and the political incorporation of
migrant organisations and groups, seeking to apply quantitative indica-
tors. In broader terms, theirs is a contribution to a methodologically so-
phisticated understanding of ‘organisational transnationalism’. Several
scholars in the past have argued that migrants’ organisations are crucial
in fostering migrants’ political incorporation into the host society (Rex,
Joly & Wilpert 1987). Yet, few studies have systematically analysed the
role of migrants’ organisations in promoting that dual process of
30 THOMAS FAIST
sustaining political action ‘here and there’ as a simultaneous venture –
simultaneity being one of the main characteristics of transnational ap-
proaches. According to Morales and Jorba, shortcomings in the existing
literature are due to the methodological approach, which usually tends
to either concentrate on the associations exclusively engaged in transna-
tional activities (‘sampling on the dependent variable’), or study a lim-
ited number of organisations with ethnographic methods that do not
lend themselves to generalisable conclusions (see Portes 2003).
Representativeness is the goal of this study. The empirical questions
posed concern the number of organisations engaged in transnational
fields, the prevailing practices and the impact of the settlement context
on migrants’ transnationality. The findings from a study of migrant as-
sociations in Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia suggest that transnational
engagement is by no means universal among migrant organisations in
Spanish cities. Yet, a majority of them is engaged in some form of
transnational links. The authors touch upon the important linkage of
transnational ties to immigrant incorporation: transnational activities do
seem to foster overall political incorporation into the Spanish body poli-
tic, and this is especially the case for the more politically oriented form
of transnational links – that is, engagement in the homeland electoral
arena. A question for future research then is to define the conditions
and mechanisms under which this occurs. Again, as in Kissau and
Hunger’s study, the relationship between transnational ties and integra-
tion into national structures comes to the fore. The two orientations –
integration into immigration states and engagement in emigration re-
gions – are not found to constitute a zero-sum game but could even
mutually reinforce each other.
Overall, the methodological part of this book opens at least three win-
dows for further explorations. First, all chapters speak indirectly to the
different theoretical conceptions of the relationship between territorial
and social space and the methodological implications of these concep-
tions. From the work presented here, it is clearly evident that the re-
spective societal spaces cannot be regarded as equivalent to territorial
spaces. Examples are plentiful, ranging from virtual diasporas over
scientific networks to transnationally active migrant organisations. The
next question to be addressed then is: how do territorial and social
spaces connect with each other? Future work could profit by distin-
guishing the transnational answer from other approaches, such as the
cosmopolitan one. In general, the transnational approach emphasises a
constructivist view on territorial space. In this regard, transnational so-
cial formations – i.e. transnational networks, kinship groups, migrant
organisations and diasporas – cross and overlap territories of national
states without necessarily achieving a global reach. By contrast, the cos-
mopolitan approach (Beck 2006) a priori presupposes the existence of a
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global societal space and thus a global horizon of observation by agents
and researchers, described as a ‘global cosmopolitan condition’, which
is primarily organised in national states and constantly criss-crossed by
transnational networks. Thus, a crucial difference between transnational
and cosmopolitan methodologies is a global horizon of observation and
the relevance thereof for cross-border exchange. Nonetheless, despite
this crucial difference regarding a cosmopolitan outlook, there are also
important similarities. The methodological consequence of both the
transnational and the cosmopolitan approach is a distinction between
multi-level modes of observation – transnational or global, national and
local – and actors’ strategies that are calibrated along multiple scales.
Second, the methodology of cross-border analysis, whether steeped in
transnational studies or diaspora studies, needs to be distinguishable
from comparative research that focuses on entities such as national
states as exclusive and bounded units of analysis. One of the currently
most prominent answers is ‘multi-sited ethnography’, that is, carrying
out research in the sites of agents’ practices in various countries (Marcus
1995). It has been touted as a panacea. As Mazzucato (in this volume)
suggests, the challenges of capturing simultaneity through other multi-
sited research methods are tremendous but manageable. The chapters
presented here also offer additional methods appropriate to transnation-
ally informed methodology, such as online analysis or an application of
representative survey research. It stands to reason that more work is
needed to systematically develop various forms of multi-sited research.
Third, diaspora and transnationalism studies can learn a lot from
each other regarding historical contextualisation and the effects of trans-
national ties and processes. As to historical contexts, diaspora studies
are much more oriented towards the long term than are transnationalist
analyses (e.g. Dufoix 2008). Diaspora studies may therefore offer cues
to transnational studies. Diaspora studies easily connect to the historio-
graphy of nations (via stateless and state-sponsored diasporas) to border-
lands and even to intercivilisational studies (on the latter see Eisenstadt
2006). These transnational effects are not only conditioned by conflicts
between nation-states and economic and political cooperation between
states or organisations, but also by waves of international migration
(see Chakrabarty 2000). Looking to the other direction, transnational
studies may inform diaspora studies by pointing to research methods
beyond historical narrations. Taken together, the methodological reflex-
ivity inherent in both diaspora and transnational studies could be useful
for the wide-ranging literature on ‘globalisation’. Posing methodological
questions guided by historical sociological insights may contribute to
overcoming a generalising momentum within theoretical and methodo-
logical discourses on globalisation and open ways for processual ap-
proaches that pay attention to both agency and structure.
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1.6 Conclusions: Diaspora and transnationalism as dance
partners
One may debate endlessly about the exact status of diaspora and trans-
nationalism as so-called dance partners. In a very fundamental way, are
they useful paradigms or optics, or primarily politicised terms that de-
scribe claims? They are certainly part of a growing array of concepts
that strive to deal with time-space compression across the borders of
states. The meanings of diaspora and transnationalism overlap (e.g.
‘second-generation return’), espouse similarities (e.g. ‘diasporic transna-
tionalism’) or sometimes even refer to divergent perspectives (e.g. dia-
spora as simply one form of transnational social formation). While the
usages of the terms often overlap, diasporic phenomena can be con-
ceived as a subset of transnational social formations that have broader
scope. In a crucial similarity, uses of the two supple terms in the social
sciences have in common an agency-oriented, processual view of cross-
border social phenomena. The challenge that all the contributions to
this volume take up is to account for the impact of states, migrant orga-
nisations and other organisations and small groups such as kinship
groups, on societal processes, institutions and structures of migrant in-
corporation in immigration as well as emigration contexts.
As such, diaspora and transnationalism are clearly distinct from the
broad category of globalisation studies. Diaspora and transnationalism
pay more attention to agency and processes within global structures
and thus are less prone to sweeping generalisations. It is also essential
to study the boundaries of groups, communities and organisations that
are labelled by members or external observers by attributing trans-
national or diasporic characteristics to them. Diaspora and transnation-
alism are also lenses not antithetical to, yet also different from, ‘metho-
dological cosmopolitanism’ in that they do not presume the ‘global’ as a
horizon of perception, interpretation, analysis or moral evaluation.
Nevertheless, transnationalism in the field of migration, in particular,
may link up to broader concerns of transnational studies, such as trans-
national organisations (e.g. multinational companies), transnational pro-
test movements, transnational expert circuits and global macro-fields of
economy, politics and wealth. In this way, diaspora and transnational-
ism are crucial elements for questioning and redefining essential terms
of the social sciences, for example, ‘community’, ‘social space’ and
‘boundaries’.
Yet, what constitutes one of the great strengths of diaspora studies
and migrant transnationalism, namely its reflexivity of agency and pro-
cesses, also needs to be brought to bear upon the understanding of
broader issues of social change and transformation. Take the changing
landscape of organisational and institutional structures guiding societal
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change. A transnational or diaspora perspective should be able to deal
with both new social formations sui generis, such as transnational so-
cial spaces, and how ‘old’ national, international and local institutions
such as citizenship or local policies acquire ‘new’ meanings and func-
tions in the process of cross-border transactions. Moreover, such an ap-
proach should be able to address the life-world implications of emer-
ging supranational structures such as the EU. By now, there is volumi-
nous literature dealing with the emergence and forms of transnational
activities of migrants and their consequences for the social integration
of immigrants. If cross-border social formations are consequential for
social processes, we also need to examine indications about changing
institutions in the national, international and local realms of transna-
tional spaces.
Finally, we need to go beyond purely variable-oriented analysis and
probe into the social mechanisms operative in transnational social for-
mations, such as social closure, exploitation or opportunity hoarding
(see Tilly 2004). From this perspective, it is essential to look not only at
transnational ties and formations across the borders of national states –
with various types, such as diffusion, families, associations, (issue) net-
works, organisations and communities, such as diasporas – but also the
repercussions for national and local institutions. While transnational or
diasporic ties and structures may not be the sole or most important
causes of transformation, they constitute strategic research sites. For ex-
ample, while the toleration of dual citizenship in both emigration and
immigration states is ascendant, its spread is not primarily attributable
to collective action by emigrants and immigrants (Faist & Kivisto 2008).
Nonetheless, it has repercussions for the continuous flows of resources
across borders, e.g. financial investments and knowledge transfer. The
contributions to this volume are a small but decisive step in the direc-
tion of setting an agenda that strives for a processual and mechanismic
understanding of transnationalisation.
Note
1 I am indebted to Rainer Baubo¨ck, Anna Ame´lina, Margit Fauser, Juergen Gerdes,
Eveline Reisenauer and Nadine Sieveking for helpful criticism and suggestions.
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Chapter 2
Diasporas, transnational spaces and communities
Michel Bruneau
The term ‘diaspora’, long used only to describe the dispersion of Jewish
people throughout the world, has in the last 30 years elicited unprece-
dented interest, attracting the attention not only of the academic world
but also of the media. In everyday language, the term is now applied to
all forms of migration and dispersion of a people, even where no migra-
tion is involved; this corresponds not only to the development and gen-
eralisation of international migrations throughout the world, but also to
a weakening, or at least a limitation, of the role played by nation-states
at a time when globalisation has become a dominant process. I have
chosen here to address the concept of diaspora from a geographical
standpoint, taking into account its materiality in terms of space, place
and territory.
In this chapter I shall try first to differentiate the concept of diaspora
from that of others such as migration, minority, transnational commu-
nity and territory of movement, and then complement the resulting de-
finition with a typology of diasporas. My hypothesis is that the related
concepts of diaspora and transnational community could be applied to
different types of trans-border or transnational societies and thus help
improve our understanding of the different spatial and temporal pro-
cesses involved.
2.1 The concept of diaspora
A community diaspora first comes into being and then lives on owing
to whatsoever in a given place forges a bond between those who want
to group together and maintain, from afar, relations with other groups
which, although settled elsewhere, invoke a common identity. This
bond can come in different forms, such as family, community, reli-
gious, socio-political and economic ties or the shared memory of a cata-
strophe or trauma suffered by the members of the diaspora or their
forebears. A diaspora has a symbolic and ‘iconographic’ capital that en-
ables it to reproduce and overcome the – often considerable – obstacle
of distance separating its communities (Bruneau 2004: 7-43). Members
of a diaspora coalesce in their present place of settlement the whole set
of micro-places (e.g. city neighbourhoods or villages) occupied or
crossed by those whom they recognise as their own. Each of these
places acts as a centre in a territory where social proximities suppress
spatial and temporal distances (Prévélakis 1996). All diasporas are so-
cio-spatial networks necessarily undergoing territorial expansion be-
cause they aggregate both places of memory and places of presence
(Offner & Pumain 1996: 163).
Diaspora areas and territories must be assessed in steps: first in the
host country, where the community bond plays the essential role; then
in the country or territory of origin – a pole of attraction – via memory;
and, finally, through the system of relations within the networked space
that connects these different poles. It should, however, be borne in
mind that the term ‘diaspora’ often plays more of a metaphorical than
an instrumental role. The different criteria suggested by most authors
(Cohen 1997; Sheffer 2003) can be narrowed down to six essential ones
focused around dispersion under pressure, choice of destination, iden-
tity awareness, networked space, duration of transnational ties and rela-
tive autonomy from host and origin societies as indicated below.
1) The population considered has been dispersed under pres-
sure (e.g. disaster, catastrophe, famine, abject poverty) to sev-
eral places and territories beyond the immediate neighbour-
hood of the territory of origin.
2) ‘The choice of countries and cities of destination is carried
out in accordance with the structure of migratory chains
which, beyond the oceans, link migrants with those already
installed in the host countries, the latter thought of as con-
veyors towards the host society and the labour market, and
guardians of the ethnic or national culture’ (Dufoix 2000:
325). Such a choice may, however, also be determined by the
conditions of traumatic dispersal, in which case, even though
there may be far less choice, previous migratory routes can
be used.
3) The population, integrated without being assimilated into the
host countries, retains a rather strong identity awareness
– which is linked to the memory of its territory and the so-
ciety of origin – with its history. This implies the existence of
a strong sense of community and community life. As in the
case of a nation, it is an ‘imagined community’, relying on a
collective narrative that links it to a territory and to a memory
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(Anderson 1983). Intergenerational transmission of identities
is also at work.
4) These dispersed groups of migrants (or groups stemming
from migration) preserve and develop among themselves and
with the society of origin, if one still exists, multiple exchange
relations (people, goods of various natures, information, etc.)
organised through networks. In this networked space, which
connects essentially non-hierarchical poles – even if some are
more important than others – relations among groups dis-
persed over several destinations tend to be horizontal rather
than vertical.
5) These diasporic migrants have an experience of dispersion in-
cluding several generations after the first migration. They
have transmitted their identity from one generation to the
other in the longue durée.
6) A diaspora tends to be an autonomous social formation from
the host and the origin societies thanks to its numerous cul-
tural, political, religious, professional associations. Lobbying
in favour of their origin society is not uncommon among dia-
sporas, but neither is resistance against instrumentalisation
by the homeland.
Against this concept of a ‘community’ diaspora (Jewish, Greek,
Armenian or Chinese diasporas, for example), Chivallon (2004) posits a
‘hybrid’ diaspora, distinguished very clearly from any ‘centred model’.
This ‘hybrid’ model has been defined by Anglo-American authors on
the basis of the black diaspora of the Americas, using the approaches of
post-modernist cultural studies. These authors, Hall and Gilroy espe-
cially, refer to the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari and to the image
of the rhizome as opposed to that of the root – i.e. to a world of disse-
mination and hybridisation, as opposed to a world of filiation and heri-
tage. There is no hard core of identity – nor continuity nor tradition –
as in the community model, but a variety of formations. This hybrid
diaspora rejects all reference to the nation and to nationalist ideologies.
However, albeit for a relatively limited period of time (1919-1945), a
minority of intellectuals gravitating around Garvey and Du Bois did pro-
mote a pan-African nationalist ideology.
For a diaspora to be able to live on by transmitting its identity from
one generation to the next, it must as much as possible have places for
periodic gatherings of a religious, cultural or political nature, in which
it can concentrate on the main elements of its ‘iconography’. The
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concept of iconography, introduced in the 1950s by Gottmann (1952:
219-221), shows the importance of visible and palpable symbols, such
as the monasteries that the Greeks of Pontos (the Black Sea region in
Turkey) reconstructed in Northern Greece. Such symbols contribute to
consolidating social networks and to preserving them during the hard
times of exile. The symbols that make up an iconography are akin to
three main fields, religion, political past (memory) and social organisa-
tion: ‘Religion, great historical recollections, the flag, social taboos, in-
vested and well grounded/ anchored interests are all part of what is
called iconography’ (Gottmann 1952: 136). Those symbols are the object
of a virtual faith that singularises a people as different from its neigh-
bours, who are attached to other symbols. The rooting of national icono-
graphy in the minds of citizens is all the deeper as it is transmitted to
children very early by the family and the school. It unquestionably con-
stitutes the main factor of socio-political partitioning in space. It is also
what allows a diaspora not to become diluted into the host society and
to keep its distinct identity. This concept particularly applies to ‘nations’
or, more exactly, to nationalities within great multi-ethnic empires, such
as the Ottoman or the Russian. Their territorial inscription is neither
continuous nor homogeneous, unlike what is implied by the ideal terri-
tory of a contemporary European nation-state. The case appears very
close to that of the diasporas, to which it can apply with equal
relevance.
These ‘places’, where we can find the main components of the icono-
graphy, include sanctuaries (churches, synagogues, mosques), commu-
nity premises (conference rooms, theatres, libraries, sports clubs) and
monuments that perpetuate memory. They also include restaurants and
grocery shops, newsagents and the media (newspapers, community ma-
gazines, local radio and television stations, websites). These various
places may be concentrated in the same ‘ethnic’ neighbourhood, the
same locality, or be dispersed throughout a city or some bigger territory.
Since ‘iconography’ – in the Gottmannian sense – is the material and
symbolic condensation of the intricate web of linkages between the
members of a community and their territory, a perfect reproduction of
its elements (e.g. reconstructing the Pontic monasteries in mainland
Greece) is simply not possible: territory cannot be moved from one loca-
tion to another. The material aspects of social networks depending on
locations, territories, landscapes or monuments that are usually asso-
ciated with rootedness, immobility and autochthoneity have, in the
course of time, become mobile. The fact that members of a diaspora
create ‘places of memory’ in the host country gathering the icons make
it possible.
By introducing the spatial and temporal dimensions of territoriality
into the concept of diaspora, it can be shown how the reproduction of
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memory goes hand in hand with the construction of monuments and
other symbolic and sometimes also functional places that constitute the
instruments for a re-rooting in the host country.
2.2 Four major types of diasporas
Different diasporas are distributed unequally throughout the world at
the beginning of the twenty-first century, with a generally confirmed
tendency for them to be found on one or several continents. In every
diaspora, culture in the widest sense – folklore, cuisine, language, litera-
ture, cinema, music, the press as well as community life and family
bonds – plays a fundamental role. Family bonds, in fact, constitute the
very fabric of the diaspora, particularly in the case of diasporas stem-
ming from Asia and the eastern Mediterranean, with their well-known
extended family nature; similarly, the community link is always present
in, and constitutive of, all types of diasporas. What distinguishes dia-
sporas, however, is the unequal density of their organisational structure,
and the greater or lesser influence exerted by, if it still exists, their na-
tion of origin. Religion, enterprise, politics and a combination of race
and culture are the four major domains in which these two discriminat-
ing features manifest themselves. The combination of these criteria al-
lows a typology of diasporas to be sketched out here, as four types, and
illustrated with a few examples.
1) A first set of diasporas is structured around an entrepreneur-
ial pole; everything else is subordinated to it or plays only a
secondary role: the Chinese, Indian and Lebanese diasporas
are the best examples of this. Religion here does not play a
structuring role, essentially because of its very diversity:
Christians, Muslims, Hindus or Buddhists. Nor does the na-
tion-state of origin exercise any decisive influence, for a vari-
ety of reasons: there may be several such states instead of
one homeland clearly defined (Hong Kong, Taiwan, mainland
China, South-East Asia for the Chinese); it may be deliber-
ately disengaged and intervene only in case of extreme diffi-
culties (India); it may be too weak and divided (Lebanon).
Entrepreneurship constitutes the central element of the repro-
duction strategy of these diasporas, most of them emerging
from a colonial context in which the ruler assigned their var-
ious commercial and enterprise activities (Indians and the
Lebanese in Africa, the Chinese in South-East Asia).
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2) Another set of diasporas is that in which religion, often asso-
ciated with a particular language, is the main structuring ele-
ment: this is the case of the Jewish, Greek, Armenian and
Assyro-Chaldean diasporas. In these cases the religion is
monotheistic, and the language of a holy script or a liturgy
may itself be regarded as essential. Greek and Armenian are
taught alongside religion in diaspora schools. Synagogue and
church, each with their pronounced ethnic hue, are constitu-
tive places for these diaspora communities. Where nation-
states have been formed, they have exercised an increasingly
stronger influence on these diasporas. Nevertheless, even
where this influence is greatest, as is the case for the Greek
diaspora whose cohesion is secured by the Orthodox Church,
the diaspora has managed to preserve relative independence.
When the Holy Synod of the Athens Church (1908-1922)
tried to take over control of the Greek Orthodox Church in
the United States, strong resistance led to restoring the juris-
diction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
3) A third set of more recent diasporas is organised chiefly
around a political pole. This is particularly so when the terri-
tory of origin is dominated by a foreign power, and the main
aspiration of the diaspora population is the creation of a
nation-state. An example of this is the Palestinian diaspora:
having succeeded in setting up a real state-in-exile, the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), whose objective of
establishing a nation-state next to the state of Israel has al-
ready been partially achieved by the creation of the
Palestinian Authority, which has been endowed with terri-
tories that it has administered since 1994. The Palestinian
diaspora’s collective memory is rooted in the historical events
that mark the trauma of dispersal and occupation, especially
the catastrophe (nakba) of 1948. This is ‘the core event of
their imagined community, the criterion of its alterity and the
main founder of the diaspora’ (Kodmani-Darwish 1997: 194).
4) A fourth set is organised round a racial and cultural pole.
This is the case, for example, of the black diaspora, which has
been shaped by several attempts at defining a shared identity.
Centred on the ‘negro race’, what separates it from the other
types is, first, the fact that this diaspora has no direct refer-
ence to definite societies or territories of origin. The black
diaspora is defined first and foremost by socially constructed
‘race’, and only subsequently by culture. Whereas the
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definition of race is, of course, contested and subject to var-
ious debates and interpretations, as is the very conception of
African Americans as a diaspora, collective memories refer to
the traumatic experiences under which this diaspora formed:
the slave trade and the slave economy of the plantations. Few
contemporary African Americans define their identity in rela-
tion to ancestral African homelands. We can also include the
European Roma in this category, as they share many of the
same characteristics. One commonality with the black dia-
spora is a decentred community structure, not unified by the
transmission of a codified tradition or by political organisa-
tion, but characterised by the non-hierarchical proliferation of
community segments, that is, small groups not organised as
a structured society. The logic of cultural hybridisation, which
implies borrowing from the host society, comes into full play
in both cases amidst highly diverse host societies, even if
Roma society is characterised by high degrees of endogamy
and very low rates of mixed marriages. Racial discrimination
and a strong tendency towards ghettoisation are also common
features, as is the great difficulty of upward social mobility to
escape poverty (Cortiade, Djuric & Williams 1993).
The concept of diaspora cannot be used to describe all types of scattered
populations issued from a migration process: other types of social for-
mations were to emerge in the post-colonial period and societies within
migration fields. Concepts other than that of diaspora – like those of
transnational communities and territories of movement – can be in-
voked; although they do share some characteristics with diasporas, they
also have their own, specific features.
2.3 From migration field to transnational space: The Turkish
example
An international migration field results from the ‘structured coupling
of the places produced by the flows between the different points of the
migration system’ (Faret 2003: 283). Such a field comprises places of
departure, route, settlement, re-settlement and even places of return.
This concept applies particularly well to Turkish migration in Central
and Western Europe.
In the second half of the twentieth century (1957-2000), more than
three million Turks migrated to Western Europe, with two thirds going
to Germany (De Tapia 1995: 187). This was essentially an international
labour migration, often the subject of agreements between states.
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Nevertheless, further analysis reveals this field to be relatively complex,
because the subsequent migration of shopkeepers, carriers and various
investors – not to mention social migrations such as family reunifica-
tions, second- and third-generation marriages as well as collective soli-
darities – all superimpose themselves on labour migrations. In a subse-
quent phase, political migrations by asylum seekers – for example,
Kurds, Assyro-Chaldeans, Armenians and Alevis as well as refugees of
leftist parties – have acquired ever increasing importance. There is, con-
sequently, great diversity in the reasons for, and causes of, Turkish mi-
gration. The migration movement inside this field is intense, owing to
the road, sea-going and air network forms of transport that Turks them-
selves use and run, largely based within their own travel agencies, trans-
port companies and communication satellites.
In the case of Turks, the diaspora does not precede the emergence of
the nation-state, but comes after it. Is it therefore a diaspora or, rather,
a transnational migration field that favours the emergence of a transna-
tional community? The Turkish nation-state is recent (1923); it has not
completely succeeded in unifying the national identity of the different
segments of society round a Sunni and Kemalist hard core. The high
segmentation and internal disparities of Turkish society appear more in
dispersion and migration than they do in the national territory where
the minorities are not fully recognised and are hidden by an apparent
national homogeneity. This society is a community composed of differ-
ent socio-cultural milieux that, though they do interact, have also ac-
quired their own organisational and social networks. The divisions are
not only ethno-cultural, but also religious or ideological. The Kurds,
whose migrations – owing to the repression directed against them since
the 1980s – are increasingly political in the current period, find them-
selves increasingly distinguished from other Turks and it is they, more
than other Turkish-speaking Muslims, who come under the heading of
diaspora (Wahlbeck 2002).
It is therefore difficult to differentiate a diaspora from the economic
and political migration of a people stemming from a socially segmented
society and comprising notable differences of identity. The recent char-
acter of migration (since 1957) and the segmented type of society consti-
tute obstacles to the recognition of a real diaspora. To take better ac-
count of these phenomena, researchers such as Vertovec (1999) and
Kastoryano (2000) have suggested the concept of transnational
community.
42 MICHEL BRUNEAU
2.4 Transnational communities
In the 1990s, a new concept emerged in academic discourse: ‘transna-
tional community’. Countries at the edge of the industrialised and ter-
tiarised world of the North’s major powers (the US, Canada, Western
Europe, Japan), often former colonies or old countries of the Third
World, send more and more migrants in search of employment and re-
mittances to their families in the ‘place of origin’. These rural, mostly
unskilled economic migrants set off from a village, a basic rural com-
munity to which the migrants remain strongly attached and to which
they return periodically. The family structure, more than the village
community of origin, is essential in explaining the cohesion of these
networks. Those from a rural community in a Latin American country
or the Philippines, for instance, increasingly migrate to urban centres
of various sizes in the US, with a migration movement being estab-
lished between the place of origin and the places of settlement and
work. The migration territory also comprises relay places, most often a
large city, which serve as hubs for a migratory route network: for exam-
ple, Dallas and Chicago for Mexicans from Ocampo (Faret 2003) and
Buenos Aires for Bolivians from the Cochabamba region (Cortes 1998).
The strong association with these different places, based upon the
movement of the population of one village, where the dominant activity
is migration in a variety of forms, constitutes a transnational migration
territory.
A transnational community is based on specific mobility know-how,
‘migration expertise’; the inhabitants of these places, so strongly
marked by migration, have made it their essential activity. Some mobi-
lity may be based on the experience of mountain husbandry, which has
always had to adapt to the seasons – whether for transhumance in cer-
tain cases or, in the case of Andean peasants, because several distinct
ecological mountain levels are concerned. Peoples with a long nomadic
tradition, like the Turks or Mongols, can also be moulded more easily
in these transnational spaces (De Tapia 1995). A transnational commu-
nity links the global to the whole range of greatly different local, net-
working places, without hierarchy between these different hubs. The
role of the border is very much curtailed by a migrant population whose
essential element of identity is knowing how to first cross the border it-
self, pass through the border area and then live outside it, whilst avoid-
ing expulsion.
These migrants come from a nation-state, where they have lived for a
relatively long time, returning periodically, and then investing part of
their income in their village of origin, which they, or at least part of
their family, do not plan to quit for good. The members of a transna-
tional community seek to acquire the citizenship of their host country,
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while retaining that of their country of origin. This double affiliation is
not only a question of facility, but also a chosen way of life. However,
there is no uprooting from the territory and society of origin, nor trau-
ma, as in the case of diasporas. There is no strong desire to return, be-
cause transmigrants never actually leave their place of origin, with
which they retain family and community ties that are greatly simplified
thanks to the growth, regularity and safety of communications.
As Foner (1997) has shown for immigrants in New York, both today
and at the turn of the twentieth century, modern-day transnationalism
is not altogether new but instead has a long history. Russian Jews and
Italians maintained family, economic, political and cultural links to their
home societies at the same time as they developed ties within their host
land. Expecting to return home one day, they sent their savings and re-
mittances homeward and kept up their ethnic allegiances. A transna-
tional social space already existed but it may have been harder than it is
now to maintain contacts across the ocean. Today technological changes
have made it possible for immigrants to maintain closer and more fre-
quent contact with their home societies. International business opera-
tions in the new global economy are much more common. Telephones,
emails and internet-based telecom allow immigrants to keep in close
touch with the family members, friends and business partners they left
behind in the home country. With greater US tolerance for ethnic plur-
alism and multiculturalism, maintaining multiple identities and loyal-
ties is now seen as a normal feature of immigrant life. Nowadays, too, a
much higher proportion of these immigrants (e.g. Indians and
Chinese) arrive with advanced education, professional skills and some-
times substantial amounts of financial capital that facilitate these trans-
national connections (Foner 1997: 362-369).
The concept of transnational community is also used by researchers
who have studied transnational nationalism. According to Kastoryano
(2006), for example, Turkish transnational communities live in a four-
dimensional space: that of the immigration country, the country of ori-
gin, the immigrant communities themselves and the transnational
space of the European Union. The concept of ‘long-distance national-
ism’ (Anderson 1998) refers to the nation-state of departure, Turkey,
which acts on its exiled population by way of language, religion and
dual nationality. This nation-state tries to reinforce as much as possible
the loyalty of its nationals residing outside its frontiers. But the transna-
tional networks of migrant associations can bypass the states by acting
directly on transnational European institutions. We can observe the
emergence of a transnational space, characterised by the dense interac-
tion of actors belonging to different traditions (e.g. Islamist and secular
Turks, Alevis, Kurds, Lazes). It is a new space of political socialisation,
one of identification beyond that of national societies. The EU has
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created a transnational civilian society in which national, provincial, reli-
gious and professional networks compete and interact among them-
selves, thereby promoting the logic of supranationality.
For Kastoryano (2006: 90), the concept of diaspora is more aptly ap-
plied to populations scattered prior to the making of their nation-state,
such as Jews and Armenians, for whom nationalism refers to a mythi-
cal place, a territory to be recovered, a future state-building project. This
more restricted meaning takes into account the extended history of dia-
sporas who may have built their own nation-state after a lengthy period
without a state, which is exactly the case of the Jews, Greeks and
Armenians. Nation-states emerged only in nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Europe, and these diasporas were already in existence a long
time before that. Migrations occurred often after this state-building
within the former reticular space of their diaspora. But diasporas may
also have emerged from the forced exile of religious or national minori-
ties of a nation-state after its creation (e.g. the Tutsis of Rwanda,
Assyro-Chaldeans or Kurds of Turkey, Tamil of Sri-Lanka, Tibetans of
China). Such diasporas are organised around an unsettled nation-state
problem; this is not the case of transnational communities that do not
contest the home or host nation-state. A transnational community is
economically oriented, and its political interest is restricted to the mi-
gration policies of both its home and host country. There is, equally, an-
other form of transnational community in which cross-border migrants,
using a network of acquaintances, are continually circulating between
their home place and a variety of host places to sell goods; this kind of
quasi-nomadism requires the use of another concept, as discussed
below.
2.5 Territories of movement
In the name of an anthropology of movement, Tarrius works in the tra-
dition of analysing the emergence and development of new migratory
forms in Europe, which have been studied by researchers since the
1980s. Marseille is the observation site for the construction of these un-
derground international economies dealing with licit or illicit products.
A world of ‘small migrants’ – i.e. ‘merchandise/goods conveyers’ – is
devoted to the transportation and trade of goods imported outside offi-
cial EU quotas of forgeries and smuggled goods, between the North
African countries and France via Spain. They take advantage of the spa-
tial, economic and social closeness that exists between the south and
the north of these Mediterranean countries due to the colonial and mi-
gratory past of those spaces. Localist analysis must be overcome to
study those migrant societies that generate ‘new cosomopolitisms’,
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which are now invisible or hidden or displayed in mixity. They result in
encounters between mobile, more or less steady and enduring groups.
New forms of identities then occur, founded on the capacity of multiple
belonging.
‘Territories of movement’ (Tarrius 2001) link the place where goods
for consumption are shipped out (for instance, in the Maghreb) to the
places they are delivered in Western Europe, within which there are
further underground economy networks. They may seem to resemble
transnational communities, in so far as they link the formerly colonised
country where the migrants’ community of origin is situated with the
migrants’ current residence. They are, however, actually very different.
The transnational community essentially moves people who are going
to ‘sell’ their labour and send part of their wages back to their commu-
nity of origin in the form of remittances. Conversely, in the territory of
movement, the cross-border entrepreneurs and nomads move with
goods they loaded up on in their place of origin to sell in different cities
of the host country that they are familiar with. Having in some cases
lived in the latter for a lengthy period, they have been able to establish a
helping network of acquaintances and support – the ‘informal notaries’
of Tarrius (2001: 52-56).
These intermediaries take commercial advantage of the wealth differ-
ential between their place of origin and their host place, circulating
goods between poor and rich countries. Their expertise in moving – in
moving goods especially – by crossing borders and circumventing taxa-
tion mechanisms of the states is as important for them as the expertise
of a Mexican or Bolivian is within the migration field of a transnational
community. Their host places are only points of passage or way stations,
not places of settlement and integration. The only essential place for
them is the one of their origin, whence they leave with their goods; they
return regularly, and invest their earnings there. They never actually
leave: it is their only base. Their identity is not a diasporic one: it is a
‘nomadic identity’ based on ‘partial and short-lived hybridisation
[métissage]’ acquired in the course of the selling activity through which
they socialise. In their place of origin, the link is based on family and
community ties, whereas in the host and transit places, well-established
local intermediaries – informal notaries (Tarrius 2001) with diaspora ex-
perience – are needed:
Those informal notaries are interlocutors who are very much va-
lorised by regional and local, political and police authorities who
actively take part in the life in emerging mosques in large
Southern cities. They contribute to institutionalising uncon-
trolled areas, of land’s ends within Schengen space, such as
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those identified by Italian researchers around Trieste, or Bari,
Sicily, in Naples and in Milan’s suburbs. (Tarrius 2001: 55)
Without their intermediation nothing is possible and the smuggler can-
not maintain his activity and presence on the selling places. These bro-
kers maintain relationships with local, political and police powers, with
official representatives of the migrants’ home states as well as with their
religious representatives, open trading and various underground net-
works. They sit astride numerous borders of norms and interests.
The territories of movement and transnational communities are pro-
duced by globalisation and result from socioeconomic inequalities,
which tend to increase, such as differences in the price of goods and
wages between countries of the North and of the South. They lock na-
tion-states into an asymmetrical situation, one of dominating and being
dominated. The base in the host country, although weak for territories
of movement (in the transit place), can, on the contrary, be strong for
transnational communities (in the host place); in both cases, however,
the rooting in the community of origin remains very significant and
may prevail over that in the country of settlement or transit.
2.6 Originality and value of the concepts of diaspora and
transnational community
The value of the diaspora concept is that it shows sedimentation over
time, often a long period of time, of communities dispersed throughout
the world, which vary considerably from one diaspora to another. These
diasporas are characterised by the search for a certain cultural or reli-
gious – at times even political – unity. They have been formed, over the
course of time, by several waves of migration, each of which could have
different or several causes at once. It is this long-term sedimentation
that makes a diaspora. This is not the case either for transnational com-
munities, which have been formed recently in response to a call for la-
bour, or for smugglers depending on an underground economy. Each
diaspora member, wherever he or she may be, adjusts his or her own
cultural and social unity to the local and national features, with integra-
tion characterising intergenerational trajectories: he or she produces
métissages. For instance, Greek-Americans are different from those liv-
ing in Canada or Australia because their various migration trajectories
combine with the integration policies of these different states. The first,
second or third generations, in turn, produce their own different types
of ‘mixities’ within each of these host countries. There are several ways
to keep one’s identity in exile and dispersion, as diasporas firmly rooted
in their various places of settlement have taught us. They have an
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exceptional symbolic and ‘iconographic’ capital that enables them to re-
produce and then overcome the obstacle of the – often considerable –
distance that separates their communities. This symbolic capital lives
on, particularly in shared memory.
So the relationships between diasporas and space or territories have
their own specificities. Belonging to a diaspora implies being able to
live simultaneously on the transnational world scale, the local scale of
the community and the scale of the host or home country, thereby com-
bining the three scales whilst privileging one or two of these. This com-
bination differs from one individual to another, according to their posi-
tion in the genealogy of generations. For instance, the first generation,
those who were born and have lived in the society of origin, tend to pri-
vilege the local scale of the host country and the national scale of the
home country where they lived before their migration. The second gen-
eration takes into account more often the local and national scales of
the host country, where they were born and have lived and, sometimes,
the transnational scale; the third generation, in search of its origins,
moves on two or three of these scales.
A diaspora is a patchwork of families, communities and religious net-
works integrated in a territory by a nation-state, within its borders.
These patchworks of families, clans, villages, cities, etc., are contained
inside the borders of this nation-state where circulation, and exchanges
are easier inside than with the outside. The nation-state creates an arbi-
trary limit between the networks inside it and those that are outside.
Diasporas, however, cannot benefit from this extraordinary tool of inte-
gration. They function, as previously mentioned, as a hinge between
different spaces and different geographical scales. Their networks be-
long to each of the host countries as well as to a trans-state diasporic
network. Their global network, with its economic, cultural, social and
political functions, can play the stabilising role that nation-states cover
less and less.
Through migration, diaspora members have lost their material rela-
tionship to the territory of origin, but they can still preserve their cultur-
al or spiritual relationship through memory. Territory or, more precisely,
territoriality – in the sense of adapting oneself to a place in the host
country – continues to play an essential role. Memory preserves part of
territoriality, whilst the trauma of uprooting creates conditions of mobi-
lisation that can play a substantial role in integrating and unifying var-
ious family, religious or community sub-networks into a real diaspora.
The construction of commemorative monuments, sanctuaries, monas-
teries and other symbolic (and sometimes functional) places is an es-
sential means, for the members of a diaspora, of a re-rooting in the
host country.
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Unlike people of the diaspora, transmigrants and cross-border entre-
preneurs or smugglers do not seek to establish a social network des-
tined to last or a transnational social group based on the richness of a
symbolic capital and a memory transmitted from one generation to the
next. They seek first and foremost to build a house in their home vil-
lage and climb the social ladder there, and then to do so in their place
of settlement if such a place exists. Transmigrants are far too dependent
on their community of origin and on their host country to become as
independent as people of the diaspora are. The social group to which
they belong often does not exceed the community of origin and the net-
work of its migrants, whereas the people of the diaspora have the feel-
ing of belonging to a nation-in-exile, dispersed throughout the world,
bearing an ideal. But transnational communities, like the Turkish one,
are sometimes the bearers of a transnational nationalism, which ap-
pears with the interactions of their different actors and tries to influ-
ence the nation-state of their origin and that of their settlement. Dual
nationality and migratory circulation within the framework of a transna-
tional region like the EU favour the emergence of new trans-border
communities differing from the long-term diasporas.
It is, in my view, this relationship to places and territories that en-
ables us to distinguish between diasporism and transnationalism.
Diaspora implies a very strong anchoring in the host country and some-
times, when the home country is lost or is not accessible (as with the
Greeks of Asia Minor, Armenians or Tibetans), a clear-cut break with it.
This is compensated, in the host country, by the creation of territorial
markers, places of memory, favoured by an ‘iconography’ fixing the link
with the home country. That gives some kind of autonomy from host
and origin societies to the diasporic social formation compared to the
transnational community. In transnational spaces and territories of mo-
bility, this break does not take place, nor is there the need to be re-
rooted elsewhere on the host territory. Any particular family has two
parallel lives in two or more nation-states: the home country is domi-
nated and the host countries, where the family has migrated, are domi-
nant. In the autochthonous model, the fact of having ‘always been
there’, on which the nation-state is based, means that identity is con-
structed in close connection with place over a greater or lesser period of
time. On the contrary, in a diaspora, identity pre-exists place and tries
to re-create it, to remodel it, in order to reproduce itself. Individuals or
communities in diasporas live in places that they have not themselves
laid out and that are suffused with other identities. As such, they will
try to set up their very own place, one that is redolent of their home
place within the bosom of which their identity, that of their kinfolk, of
their ancestors, has been formed. De-territorialisation goes with, or is
followed by, re-territorialisation.
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Chapter 3
The dynamics of migrants’ transnational
formations: Between mobility and locality
Janine Dahinden
3.1 Mobility and its effects: Different forms of transnational
formations
Since the early 1990s, studies on transnationalism have proliferated
and transnationalism has become one of the fundamental ways of un-
derstanding contemporary practices taking place across national bor-
ders, especially when speaking of migrants. There are a number of
ways to classify or systematise the vast body of work discussing the
transnational practices or belongings of migrants (for an excellent re-
cent overview see Levitt & Jaworsky 2007). Following Vertovec and
others, one can systematise this body of knowledge as a function of di-
mensions or domains of transnationalism, such as the economy, poli-
tics, culture or religion (see e.g. Vertovec 1999). One can also distin-
guish between occasional and durable transnational practices, or be-
tween different generations of migrants (Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt
1999). Or again, one can differentiate the various types of transnational
social spaces developed by migrants (Faist 1999; Pries 2008).
For the purpose of this chapter, I propose another way to look at
transnational formations: migrants’ transnational practices, spaces and
ways of being will be analysed by taking into account mobility and local-
ity. My central argument is that transnational formations result from a
combination of transnational mobility, on the one hand, and locality in
the sending or/and receiving country, on the other. Mobility is to be under-
stood here as the physical movement of people in transnational space.
Locality means being rooted or anchored – socially, economically or poli-
tically – in the country of immigration and/or in the sending country; it
means developing/having a set of social relations at specific places.
Looking at transnational formations as the effect of the combination of
these two dimensions – mobility and locality – provides interesting in-
sights into the multiplicities of forms of existence.
To date, social scientists have not, I maintain, sufficiently incorpo-
rated the concepts of mobility and locality into their analyses of
transnational arrangements. Degrees of mobility have an important im-
pact on the different ways in which one can be a transnational migrant:
migrants settled in their new country develop forms of transnational
space that are different from those of migrants engaged in continuous
transnational circulation. However, transnational practices are also
linked to the constraints and opportunities of the contexts, the localities
in which they find themselves. The contextual conditions that influence
the emergence of specific transnational spaces depend on social, politi-
cal and legal factors, and this at both ends of the chain – in the immi-
gration as well as the emigration context (see e.g. Al-Ali, Black & Koser
2001). Cultural, socio-economic and political constraints block certain
possibilities for transnational action and foster others.
I further maintain that aspects of locality in mobility – or mobility in
locality – have not been sufficiently theorised. In fact, we might be
faced here with a kind of paradox: in order to be able to stay mobile it is
necessary for migrants to develop some local ties and to be embedded
in specific localities. That is an important element of what Tarrius
(2002) calls ‘savoir bouger’. Circulating business persons as well as so-
called ‘suitcase traders’, for example, need to know where to buy and
sell their products; they need to establish local links in order to be able
to circulate again in the future. In a similar vein, sedentarisation does
not mean that migrants stop moving altogether, as they might go back
regularly for holidays or family obligations. Thus, transnational arrange-
ments are maintained or even enforced through mobility. In this sense,
‘roots and routes’ (Clifford 1994b) are both present in different transna-
tional formations, but they may appear in different combinations.
Finally, it is important to note that migrants can and often do change
their transnational ways of being over the course of time: mobile mi-
grants can settle down or vice versa, and these changes affect the ways
in which they are transnational.
Clearly, the appearance of transnational formations depends not only
on the physical mobility of the migrants. People who are not physically
mobile can develop transnational practices as well, as with the example
of transnational social movements (Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca &
Reiter 2006). And we know that the mobility – or better, circulation –
of representations, ideas, goods and services across and within national
boundaries is of great importance for the production and reproduction
of transnational spaces. These forms of mobility are of special interest
when we analyse the type of, and motivations for, transnational actions
and subjectivities.
This chapter starts with a discussion of ideal types of transnational
practices as a function of the combination of different forms of physical
mobility and locality. I then take three concrete examples from
Switzerland – cabaret dancers, Albanian-speaking migrants and
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Armenians – to analyse how different transnational formations have
changed and evolved over the years and to illustrate the ways mobility
and locality play a crucial role. In the final section, I present conclu-
sions of a more general nature.
3.2 Mobility and locality: Investigating the articulations
Using the dimensions of mobility and locality, four different ideal types
of the transnational are identifiable. Following Weber (1991 [1904]), I
understand them as a means for both grasping and conceptualising so-
cial phenomena. An ideal type here is thus intended as an abstract
model, constructed for the purpose of theory-building. Furthermore, it
is important to stress that the differences between the ideal types are
gradual. The first type I will call localised diasporic transnational forma-
tions: it is characterised by low physical mobility and a high degree of
local ties. The second type is called localised mobile transnational forma-
tions, combining high physical mobility and high locality. My third type
I will call transnational mobiles, concerning people who are highly mo-
bile but have a low degree of local anchorage. Finally, I will call transna-
tional outsiders that group of migrants who display both low mobility
and low degree of local anchorage. The main features of these ideal
types are illustrated in Table 3.1.
It is necessary to add some words about this typology. Other scholars
have developed ideal types of transnational formations, too. Faist (1999,
2000a), for instance, presented three types of transnational social
spaces and distinguished between transnational kinship groups, transna-
tional circuits and transnational communities. His typology provides inter-
esting insights into the production of transnational spaces by focusing
on primary resources embedded in social ties (such as reciprocity, ex-
change or solidarity) and by showing their different outcomes. Faist did
not, however, consider mobility and locality and their impact on the ap-
pearance of transnational social spaces. Furthermore, it is one of the
main arguments of this chapter that the dynamics of transnational for-
mations merit more attention. For our purposes, we will concentrate on
the processual dimensions of transnational pattern. And again, we focus
on mobility and locality, dimensions of high relevance in these
processes.
3.2.1 Localised diasporic transnational formations
This first type combines low levels of transnational mobility with high
levels of local anchorage in the receiving and low levels of local ancho-
rage in the sending country. Groups of people who develop this kind of
THE DYNAMICS OF MIGRANTS’ TRANSNATIONAL FORMATIONS 53
transnationality have experienced one-way migration in their family
from a place of origin to a new country, and perhaps also a secondary
migration to a third or fourth country. However, they do not circulate
between the new country and the homeland; they – and their offspring
– are settled in the new host country and may have been there for gen-
erations. They have become citizens (with all the rights attached to this)
and they are socially and economically integrated in the new country.
For this reason, I will call them ‘localised’.
Furthermore, this ideal type is labelled ‘diasporic’ because it incorpo-
rates different core elements identified in the literature on diasporic
transnational formations (Brubaker 2005; Clifford 1994b; Cohen 1997;
Dufoix 2005; Tölölyan 1996). First, ‘diasporic’ can be used to signal
one of the possible ways of feeling transnational and acting as such.
Second, one can use the term ‘diasporic’ when actors consciously per-
ceive and define themselves subjectively as a group of spatially dis-
persed persons. They speak of themselves as ‘diasporas’, meaning that
they have developed a ‘diasporic subjectivity’ or a ‘diasporic way of be-
longing’, and are characterised by an orientation to a real or imagined
homeland, while maintaining their ethnic, national or religious bound-
aries over generations.
The time factor is important here; we are talking about longue durée
boundary maintenance. The idea of ‘boundaries’ has come to play a key
role in important new lines of scholarship across the social sciences
and has been theoretically elaborated and empirically tested in relation
to different categorical groups: class, gender or ethnicity, for example
(see Lamont & Molnàr 2002). For our purposes, it is important to note
that the result of physical mobility might be dispersion, but that this
does not automatically lead to the formation of so-called transnational
ethnic or religious communities with a homeland orientation, nor to
boundary maintenance (Barth 1969) involving the preservation of a dis-
tinctive identity vis-à-vis the host society and a subjective belief in a
common origin (Weber 1996 [1922]). Migrants can be transnational
without participating in ethnic or religious boundary-making or mainte-
nance. ‘Bounded’ groups or ‘groupness’ (Brubaker 2004) come into
being through conscious and organised efforts by generations and net-
works of people, and especially by their cultural, social and political
elites. Such efforts involve an attachment to place and a grounding in
place: they also require necessary resources in terms of linguistic, finan-
cial and other forms of capital.
In order to develop and maintain such diasporic ‘groupness’, the
main actors of the diaspora must interact closely with institutions, gov-
ernments, networks and key persons in the host country. Sometimes
they also build up networks with international or transnational institu-
tions in order to lobby and do other political work. Everyday networks
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may be much diversified in terms of ethnicity or religion, as they are in-
tegrated into the local social structures. This does not, however, prevent
them from being transnationally active through the mobilisation of
collective representations based upon symbolic ethnicity (Gans 1979) or
religion, thereby embedding themselves within institutionalised trans-
national networks. As contemporary examples we could cite the
Armenian diaspora, but also Kurds in Germany, Tamils in Europe and
Palestinians.1
At this point in my argument, it might make sense to distinguish be-
tween symbolic and social boundary-making, as Lamont and Molnàr
(2002: 168) have proposed. Symbolic boundaries are categorisations
made by social actors to distinguish objects, people and practices. They
are tools that individuals and groups struggle over and use to agree
upon definitions of reality. Social boundaries are objectified forms of so-
cial differences manifested in unequal access to, and unequal distribu-
tion of, resources (material and non-material) and social opportunities.
While transnational formations of diasporic character imply symbolic
boundary-making and maintenance on the basis of ethnicity or religion,
they do not involve social boundary-making. Everyday networks are not
characterised by ethnic or religious social boundaries. As we will see,
this is an important difference between this and the next ideal type.
3.2.2 Localised mobile transnational formations
The second ideal type is characterised by more elements of mobility,
although the sedentary aspects remain highly relevant. We are faced
with simultaneously high levels of mobility and high levels of local an-
chorage in receiving and sending countries. Migrants representing this
ideal type have themselves experienced migration or may be second-
generation migrants. They move regularly back and forth between the
new country and the place of origin: for holidays, family obligations,
business and so on. In the European context, we can think of the so-
called guest workers who arrived after World War II. Generally speak-
ing, they are immigrants who maintain ties with their countries of ori-
gin, making home and host society a single arena for social action by
moving back and forth across international borders. These migrants
participate in, and create a specific type of, transnationality by exploiting
social capital (Bourdieu 1980) based mainly on the principle of family –
or, to a lesser extent, ethnic – solidarity and reciprocity.
This moving back and forth is one of the criteria that distinguish this
ideal type from the previous one. Often the migrants have a house or
land (or both) in the country of origin. Unlike in the first ideal type,
these transnational activities have a distinct family character. Yet, these
transnationals are locally anchored in the immigration country, as they
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have their principal residence mainly in the new country. Often they
are naturalised in the new country, they earn their money there and
their children grow up with them in the new place. Locality is an impor-
tant resource for building up a transnational project; in order to do
business in transnational spaces one needs resources, so resources are
a sign of being ‘rooted’ in the new country (as important as financial
start-up capital). Their locality, however, compared to the first type, is
less long-lived. Their transnational patterns are built upon the simulta-
neity of mobility and sedentariness in two different geographical spaces.
We could also say that they are integrated in networks within both send-
ing and receiving countries. However, here transnational actions are
less conditioned by collective representation of ethnicity or religion, and
conducted mainly through the family networks: remittances, but also
other goods and services circulate through these social networks be-
tween the receiving and sending countries. Sometimes we can find col-
lective ethno-nationalist boundary-making, for instance, through partici-
pation in migrant associations. But while symbolic boundary-making
based on ethnicity may be present, social boundaries are almost always
evident: domestic networks are often constrained by ethnic and/or class
boundaries. This is a phenomenon that is sometimes referred to in the
literature as ‘ethnic stratification’, meaning that specific ethnic groups
are placed in the lowest strata in the new society.
3.2.3 Transnational mobiles
With our third ideal type, we have people who are more or less perma-
nently on the move, with low levels of local anchorage in the receiving
country. In this case, we are no longer dealing with long-term, settled
migrants in the Simmelian tradition (1908) – ‘The stranger who comes
today and stays tomorrow’ – but a constant and continuous form of cir-
cular mobility. The central element here is that mobility becomes an in-
tegral part of migrants’ life strategies. This type of migrant does not
leave his or her country with the aim of settling in another country, but
tends to stay mobile in order to maintain or improve his or her quality
of life. One may think here, first of all, of highly skilled professionals –
executives, international officials, managers in multinational compa-
nies, the ‘transnational elite’ (Sklair 2001) for whom the willingness to
move frequently can be viewed as a professional asset. But this type of
mobility is also widespread among people who are by no means highly
skilled and do not hold highly skilled jobs. Tarrius (2002) speaks of the
new nomads who, by creating circular territories, can simultaneously
belong here and there. He describes, for example, how Algerians contri-
bute to a thriving economic exchange between Marseille, France, and
Belgium, Italy and Spain, involving a wide variety of goods, notably
56 JANINE DAHINDEN
household electrical appliances or electronic equipment. They are not
ethnic entrepreneurs in the sense of transnational sedentarised mi-
grants, but nomadic entrepreneurs. They are not aiming for success
away from their native town, nor do they want to settle in France, Italy,
Switzerland or anywhere else. Mobility is precisely the capital that is
needed for transnationalism of this kind to develop. Practices of ‘shuttle
migration’ among Polish women (Morokvasic 2003), or ‘suitcase trad-
ing’ (commerce à valise) of Tunisian women (Schmoll 2005) follow the
same principle: a commercial activity that basically depends on these
women’s mobility skills and physical movement. To take another exam-
ple, Moroccan women (Peraldi 2007) cross the Ceuta enclave to
Morocco in order to sell garments made in China, while also carrying
cosmetics, household goods and food items, and selling them
elsewhere.
The distinctive thing about this model of transnationalism is the im-
portance of what we can call ‘mobility capital’ for the people involved.
Notably, their social capital is not based on strong family or ethnic rela-
tions but on weak relations (Granovetter 1973): trust and solidarity are
built up with friends and acquaintances rather than close relatives. To
stay mobile, however, the migrants have to develop networks with local
actors or institutions within their circulatory spaces. In this way, mobile
and circulating migrants also need to create local footholds to some ex-
tent. Some develop a collective ethno-nationalist consciousness, as with
some ‘traditional’ nomadic groups, such as the Roma (who could be
classified within this ideal type). Others, however, do not participate in
ethnic or religious boundary-making. Here we find orientations that are
marked by the professional activities conducted in transnational space,
with any boundary-making (symbolic or social) taking place more along
professional lines.
3.2.4 Transnational outsiders
The last ideal type is characterised by low transnational mobility and, at
the same time, a low degree of local anchorage. Typically in Europe, asy-
lum seekers, recently arrived migrants from non-EU countries and
sometimes even legal refugees represent this type. These migrants do
not circulate between their country of origin and the immigration coun-
try, often because circulation is cut off due to persecution in the home
country and, more generally, because they do not have the right to travel
due to their legal status as asylum seekers. Simultaneously – and again
because of their legal status – their often limited access to jobs or other
resources in the immigration country forms an obstacle to local em-
beddedness. Studies from Switzerland, for instance, show that asylum
seekers are often not integrated within Swiss society, even though they
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have lived there for years. At the same time, they are also cut off from
their transnational families (Kamm, Efionayi-Mäder, Neubauer, Wanner
& Zannol 2003), with their daily networks consisting mainly of people
living in the same legal situation or of local ethnic or family relations.
Transnational ethnic and family relations are important; however, peo-
ple characterised by this type of weak transnationalism cannot build up
stable transnational fields between the country of origin and the new
country, as they have neither the resources nor the capital to do so, and
sometimes they are not even in a position to send remittances.
Other groups that could be included in this ideal type are some undo-
cumented migrants, at least those who live in an immigration country
and are integrated into its (informal) labour market. We can think, for
instance, of domestic workers, who possess low degrees of local ancho-
rage because they do not hold a residence permit. They might circulate
more often between their country of origin and the immigration coun-
try than the asylum seekers – with spouses and children often staying
behind – but circulation is not a form of capital they can rely on, as it is
in the case of the third ideal type discussed above. We might speak in
this case of weak transnational arrangements, mainly related to the fact
that the migrants either have no legal right to reside in the immigration
country or else only a precarious one. This highlights an important dif-
ference with regard to the other ideal types considered in this chapter
and reminds us that the dynamics of transnationality are always inti-
mately related to the migration policies of European states.
3.3 The dynamics of transnationalisms
Having introduced the typology, it can now be illustrated by means of
three case studies. The first involves a professional group, cabaret dan-
cers, while the second concerns Albanian- speaking migrants from for-
mer Yugoslavia and the third, Armenians in Switzerland. The aim is to
bring to light the processual dimensions of transnationality by asking
the following: how does each ideal type evolve and which factors influ-
ence the emergence, installation and disappearance of the populations
under study? Also of interest here is how mobility and locality shape
these different transnational formations.
3.3.1 Cabaret dancers in Switzerland
In Switzerland today, we can find virtually no Swiss citizens dancing in
any of the 350 cabarets throughout the country; cabaret dancers are ex-
clusively migrant women. Around 6,000 cabaret dancers enter (and
leave) the country each year. Whereas in the 1980s, half the dancers
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came from countries in Western Europe, by 2005 this figure had de-
clined to 2 per cent. Today, about three quarters of the young women
come from Eastern Europe and the rest from Central and South
America and Asia. These dancers represent a heterogeneous group and
embody a particular form of female mobility that corresponds in our ty-
pology to the transnational mobiles. However, as we will see, there are
some women who could be considered transnational outsiders, and
others who could be viewed as moving towards other transnational
forms.2
Let us first turn to the question of how the dancers become – and
stay – mobile. Three elements can be highlighted: the dancers’ econom-
ic motivations, specific characteristics of the transnational sex industry
and dancers’ legal situations in Switzerland. I would like to discuss
each of these factors in detail.
The reasons motivating dancers to become mobile are without excep-
tion economic, and their mobility can be considered as an economic
strategy. These women’s economic aspirations can be put into practice
and implemented thanks to transnational networks and people already
involved in the transnational sex industry. The women who come to
work as nightclub dancers in Switzerland are mainly recruited by
friends or acquaintances who already have some experience in the sex
industry; in migration terminology, we are talking about a kind of chain
migration (Fawcett 1989). Acquaintances play an important role as go-
betweens to the agencies that find jobs for the dancers. No dancer is di-
rectly engaged by a cabaret in Switzerland; the cabarets work through
agencies that present them with photos and short descriptions of the
prospective dancers. Cabaret owners then choose the women they want
to hire and it is the agencies that arrange the papers and contracts, also
taking care of visas for the women.
Placement agents – the second link in the chain after acquaintances
– are embedded in transnational networks of nightclubs (and perhaps
other services within the sex industry), and can therefore place the wo-
men in different countries. We should note that this explains how some
of the dancers become transnational players through mobility. A good
third of the women interviewed had already worked as dancers in an-
other country – many in Japan, others in Lebanon, South Korea,
Bulgaria, Italy or Australia – so they are, in a sense, ‘world travellers’. It
should be further noted that it is not only the networks of placement
agencies that give the sex industry its transnational character, but also
the local demand for migrant sex workers. In our interviews, nightclub
owners mentioned that there was a specific demand by clients for wo-
men from Eastern Europe because they are well educated,3 tall and
blonde. They are regarded as the ‘upper class’ among sex workers.
Ethnicised and ‘racialised’ gender representations circulate worldwide
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and create a demand for women with specific ‘looks’, and these ethnic
and racial imaginaries make up part of the transnational character of
this industry.
Finally, the legislation in Switzerland with regard to permits for these
types of dancers forces the women to be continuously on the move and
thereby contributes to the mobile character of their transnationality.
These dancers receive specific short-term residence permits, commonly
known as a ‘dancer’s permit’. At present, this permit is granted for a
maximum of eight months a year, after which time the dancer has to
leave Switzerland for four months before she can come back to work in a
cabaret. Often women come to Switzerland for several years, returning
home or travelling elsewhere for a few months, thus circulating around
the globe. In addition to this global circulation, these women move every
month to a different cabaret within Switzerland as the contract tying
them to one particular cabaret generally lasts for only one month.
An in-depth analysis reveals how, in order to be able to continue to
move, the dancers develop local footholds, at least sporadically, in the
Swiss context. Dancers are in very precarious situations because of their
migratory trajectories – limitations imposed by their residence status,
lack of knowledge of the national languages and of their rights – and
the entrepreneurial transnational operating space available to them is
restricted; this leaves them constantly on the boundary between legality
and illegal exploitation. After various cases of exploitation were publicly
exposed in Switzerland, regulations were put into place to spell out the
employment and residence conditions for cabaret dancers, aimed at
protecting these women from illegalities and exploitation. These regula-
tions notwithstanding, however, almost all cabaret dancers engage, at
least from time to time, in activities that do not appear in their work
contract, or that are explicitly forbidden. They work longer hours and
more frequently than their contract allows; they break the rules by en-
couraging customers to drink alcohol (chiefly champagne), as they are
often given a percentage of the café owner’s margin on alcohol sales;
and they offer sexual services both during working hours and in their
free time, something they are also not allowed to do. The dancers thus
find themselves in a legal vacuum that places them beyond the reach of
controls or legal protection and in the informal sector of the economy.
It is important to note, however, that dancers make their principal fi-
nancial gains through the additional services that they offer illegally.4 In
short, this is where these women’s economic incentives often lie, for in
fact these activities are undertaken to some extent on their own initia-
tive, demonstrating the economic nature of their mobility and their en-
trepreneurial ethos.
We should bear in mind, however, that the story is more subtle than
it may seem. The discrepancy between law and practice in the dancers’
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work may also be the result of coercion – whether stemming from out-
side pressures or a situation of dependency or exploitation in relation to
cabaret managers, placement agencies or even clients. When this is the
case, the dancers find themselves in an inextricable situation and these
conditions are a serious barrier to their mobility. Most of the dancers
are, so to speak, walking a tightrope. This is particularly true for women
who come to Switzerland for the first time. A considerable portion of
the dancers come to Switzerland just once and never return. These wo-
men do not develop along the transnational mobiles type, but rather, in-
tersect with the fourth type: transnational outsiders. Finally, some of
them simply fall outside the transnationalism paradigm: they move
once, they stay once, return and then stop circulating.
We might ask, then, what are the conditions that enable some wo-
men to profit from a situation that we could label ‘opportunist capital-
ism’? In order to be able to exploit these opportunities in this legal grey
area, women must establish a whole series of vertical, locally anchored
relations. The women who are able to exploit the uncertainties of their
situations and achieve their economic ambitions are the ones who, in
the course of their stay in Switzerland, manage to create and build up
social capital consisting mainly of weak ties with (good) agencies, (de-
cent) cabaret owners, clients, non-government organisations and other
dancers. This allows them to access a wide range of important informa-
tion, and their various contacts help them increase their income and
deal with the precarious nature of their situations. They can avoid ex-
ploitation and stay mobile, and they get to know where they can earn
the most money with the fewest risks. These dancers come back again
and again to Switzerland, while also leaving to go dance in other coun-
tries. In other words, this kind of local anchorage is a condition for stay-
ing mobile; their ‘savoir bouger’ is conditioned on getting to know the
right people in the immigration country.
As we have noted, however, not all women circulate and none of
them circulates forever, as cabaret dancing is a job that can be done
only by younger women. While some women go back, others try to set-
tle in Switzerland through marriage (the only way open to them). Some
of those interviewed in our study were married in Switzerland, and
may well have been in the course of developing different relations to
the country of immigration that would place them within another trans-
national pattern.
In further specifying the transnational mobile type, it is important to
state that while they establish local footholds in Switzerland, they must
at the same time maintain transnational ties in order to be able to con-
tinue to circulate. Dancers return home on a regular basis, and some
dancers regularly send remittances to their children or to their families
at home. We could speak in this case of transnational families dispersed
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in space, emphasising the fact that this ideal type, like type number
two, can and usually will include transnational kinship obligations.
Other dancers with more individualised projects also send their money
home, but they intend to invest it later in their country of origin, mostly
with the idea of building up a small business. Again, what counts is
that mobility is used here in order to improve lifestyle and social stand-
ing at home.
Finally, it is important to note that we did not find any kind of ethnic
group formation processes taking place among the women interviewed.
Ethnicity can be important for these women, but it is expressed on an
individual level and there was no collective ethnic group-making among
the Russians or the Ukrainians or other dancers on nationalist grounds.
Daily contact in Switzerland was essentially professional in nature and
took place with other dancers, clients and so on. Transnational net-
works, on the other hand, were either of a family character or estab-
lished with other actors embedded in the transnational sex industry.
3.3.2 Albanian-speaking migrants in Switzerland
Taking a historical perspective on the migration processes of Albanian-
speaking migrants from former Yugoslavia, it is interesting to note that
we can observe different types of transnationality that have developed
over the course of this group’s migration to Switzerland. In fact, we can
identify several of the ideal types discussed above. In a first phase,
Albanians arrived as temporary and seasonal workers, circulating be-
tween Switzerland and their places of origin, as in the third ideal type
discussed above. Later on, they settled down, brought their families to
Switzerland and developed a localised mobile transnational type. Finally,
over the last few years, we have witnessed the emergence of elements
of localised diasporic transnational formations.
Until the 1980s, Albanians who arrived in Switzerland from former
Yugoslavia as seasonal workers were mostly young men. They came
from rural and poor regions, worked mainly in unskilled jobs and often
lived in barracks with other foreign workers. Their objective was to earn
money to overcome economic hardship at home and to return after a
few years to their families. At that time, their transnational way of being
was marked by mobility in many ways. First of all, they had a seasonal
permit that forced them – like the dancers – to circulate between
Switzerland and their homeland; after nine months of work in
Switzerland, they had to leave the country for at least three months.
Second, the migrants often did not migrate only to Switzerland, but
worked in other countries as well (e.g. Germany) or in the northern re-
publics of former Yugoslavia (e.g. Slovenia). Their radius of circulation
included thus different regions and/or countries (Schierup 1995; Mesic
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1992). Third, they arrived in Switzerland mainly through acquaintances,
neighbours or other family members who arranged jobs for them.
Again, as in the case of the dancers, they often came back to work for
the same enterprise the following year, having established local foot-
holds that allowed them to stay mobile while maintaining the epicentre
of their life in Kosovo. Fourth, we are dealing here with transnational
families, as the wives or the children of the workers stayed behind
(Dahinden 2005a, 2005b; Von Aarburg 2002).
A fifth and final element deserves special attention. In the first phase
of migration, no strong Albanian ethnic or national group formation
could be identified, nor were these workers categorised by the Swiss po-
pulation as ‘Albanians’; they were seen simply as Yugoslavs. This is mir-
rored, for instance, in the fact that it was not until 1979 that the first
Albanian association, Perparimi, was founded as a section and its meet-
ings were held in the already existing premises of the Yugoslav
Association in Zurich.
Soon, however, the transnational formations of the group in question
started to change. From the 1980s on, the political and economic situa-
tion in former Yugoslavia overall, and specifically in Kosovo, deterio-
rated drastically. In the aftermath of Tito’s death in 1981 and the aboli-
tion of Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989, the ensuing political un-
rest directly increased emigration pressures. At the same time, with the
shift in immigration policies in Switzerland, and specifically with the
implementation of the ‘three circles’ model in 1991,5 the recruitment of
workers from former Yugoslavia was no longer possible. These immi-
grants were now categorised as members of the third circle and had no
right to obtain work permits. As of that moment, immigration to
Switzerland from former Yugoslavia was possible only through seeking
asylum or through family reunification. Confronted not only with eco-
nomic hardship, but also with increasing political unrest at home, the
Albanian workers slowly abandoned their plans for returning and
decided instead, whenever possible, to bring their families to
Switzerland. Meanwhile, many of these workers had experienced a kind
of ‘permit career’; after a few years as seasonal workers, they received
an annual permit that entitled them to bring their wives and children to
Switzerland and, later on, a residence permit, a mechanism that has
been very accurately labelled ‘the seasonal “open sesame”’ (Leuenberger &
Maillard 1999: 22). As a consequence, since 1989 there has been a stea-
dy increase in the Albanian population from former Yugoslavia in
Switzerland through chain migration, and a feminisation of the migra-
tion flow has been observed (Piguet 2005).
This was thus the first sign of the development of a localised mobile
transnationality. Albanians did not stop circulating between their place
of origin and Switzerland; such movements were interrupted only by
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the outbreak of the war later on. Indeed, Albanian migrants built their
houses in Kosovo, sent remittances and went there regularly on holidays
and to fulfil family obligations towards their parents and siblings. This
transnational field relied mainly on family relations and mutual support
and reciprocity. This support turned into an obligation as the situation
in Kosovo increasingly deteriorated after 1995. In addition, from 1980
onward, politically motivated immigration could be observed. Members
of the nationalist elite among Albanian students were increasingly per-
secuted and forced to leave Kosovo (Malcolm 1999). Europe, and espe-
cially Switzerland with its already established Albanians workers, wit-
nessed the first asylum seekers arriving from former Yugoslavia. Civil
wars within the different republics of former Yugoslavia and the out-
break of the war in Kosovo in 1998 led to a phase of mass emigration.6
The developments in the 1990s triggered new (symbolic and social)
boundary-making processes among the former Yugoslav migrants along
ethnic lines and we saw the appearance of a strong Albanian national-
ism (as well as a strong Serbian one). Ethnicity was now the language,
currency and category used to legitimate action by the migrants with re-
gard to their lives in Switzerland, but also with regard to the events in
their homeland. A new form of solidarity based on ethnic criteria – a
bounded solidarity of destiny – developed and culminated in the mass
mobilisation of Albanian migrants in hometown association projects,
collective remittances and humanitarian projects, long-term nationalist
actions as well as lobbying and political work. During this time, a part
of Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK was exiled and resided in Switzerland, and
the political actors worked between Switzerland and Kosovo through
networks of the Albanian associations.
In short, over this period, two elements that are part of a localised dia-
sporic transnational formation clearly emerged. First, we witnessed the
rise of ethnic consciousness (which was dialectic, in the sense that the
Kosovo Albanians were now also identified by the Swiss as ‘Albanians’),
along with the appearance of ethno-politics and nationalism and the de-
velopment of an ethnic ‘groupness’. Second, these processes were ac-
companied by an institutionalisation of transnational networks, also an
important feature of diasporic transnational arrangements. The Kosovo
Albanians formed local and international networks with humanitarian
institutions, development agencies and so on (Iseni 2008). A decisive
moment in the crystallisation of the ‘diasporic’ aspect was without a
doubt the lobbying of Swiss and international organisations for the in-
dependence of Kosovo. A further illustration is to be found in a cere-
mony to which I was recently invited by the ‘Kosovar Diaspora’ – as
they identified themselves in their invitation letter. This ceremony was
organised by the elite representatives of the Kosovo Albanian population
in Switzerland and the Republic of Kosovo, who wished to express their
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thanks to the city of Zurich for supporting the independence of the
Republic of Kosovo. During this event, Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu
presented the Zurich city council and the Swiss minister for foreign af-
fairs with a memorial tablet in the name of the Kosovar Diaspora.
We should note, however, that while ‘diasporic’ elements can be iden-
tified in the discourse of Kosovars, particularly in regard to political
transnational practices, in other realms we observe fewer transnational
practices. Many of the Kosovo Albanians in Switzerland are affected by
economic marginalisation as well as discrimination. Despite an increas-
ing number of targeted integration measures, this migrant population
and their children are affected by strong discrimination in the labour
market (Fibbi, Kaya & Piguet 2003). Some live in precarious circum-
stances and many are unemployed, especially women. Furthermore,
although more and more Albanians from former Yugoslavia are being
given citizenship, a large segment still lacks Swiss nationality. In this
sense, we could speak of the absence of ‘sedentarising’ capital that
might be responsible for the fact that transnational fields are being
somewhat hesitantly developed in only a few domains by Albanians.
For instance, in the economic realm, aside from remittances, we find
only a very few specifically transnational and ethnic businesses, whether
in the Swiss or in transnational contexts. These immigrants often do
not have the resources (financial, rights, etc.), locally or transnationally,
to build up such transnational fields (Dahinden 2005b). We might even
say that the most marginalised of them have developed no more than a
form of weak localised mobile transnationality: they are neither well inte-
grated into the local structures nor, most importantly, do they circulate
between the two countries. They are transnational kinship groups as de-
scribed by Faist (2000a), but they do not build up stable transnational
fields, and lack local anchorage that could explain the ‘absent transation-
alism’ in, for instance, the economic realm.
In sum, this example points to the possibility that different ideal
types can coexist simultaneously or can, over the course of time, replace
each other. What the future will bring – assimilation, long-term bound-
ary maintenance or something in between – is not yet known.
Furthermore, the example of Kosovo Albanians in Switzerland shows
that persons do not ‘naturally’ form a ‘group’ in a sociological sense just
because they come from the same country of origin.. This case study
also highlights the fact that it is not only the context of immigration
that shapes transnational formations, but also the locality of the country
of origin. For instance, so-called ethnic conflicts in Kosovo had their ef-
fects in the Albanian community in Switzerland and contributed to the
development of diasporic elements in the transnational arrangements.
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3.3.3 The Armenian diaspora and new Armenian migrants in Switzerland
The third example highlights another aspect of the processual character
of transnational formation, an aspect that is related to a time dimension
and questions of mobility and locality. Migrants arriving consecutively
from one and the same region develop different kinds of transnational
formations, which can cause tensions within these same groups.
In the case of Armenians, migration is far from being a new phe-
nomenon. The events that took place during World War I not only led
to the tragic death of approximately 1.5 million Armenians, but also re-
sulted in the formation of a global Armenian diaspora, which today en-
joys ‘classic’ diaspora status. Ironically, the most recent migration move-
ments from Armenia have coincided with the creation of an indepen-
dent Armenian state in the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR in
1991. Since the independence of Armenia, approximately a quarter of
its population has left the country (Bachmann, Dahinden, Kamm,
Neubauer & Perrin 2004).
In Switzerland, a significant group of Armenians also arrived from
Turkey during the 1920s, seeking to escape the brutal events of the war.
A second group of Armenian migrants arrived over the course of the
1960s and 1970s. This group was part of the flow of Turkish migrant
workers looking for employment in Europe. The third movement of
Armenian migrants to Switzerland is composed primarily of citizens
from the newly independent Republic of Armenia. Unlike the
Armenians who reached Switzerland as Turkish guest workers in the
1960s and 1970s, the most recent or ‘new’ Armenian migrants were
confronted with the increasingly restrictive immigration policies of
European countries. Switzerland replaced its relatively liberal admission
policy in 1989, as mentioned earlier, and the new policy offered educa-
tional and work opportunities almost exclusively to highly qualified for-
eigners. Consequently, since 1989, Armenian immigrants have been
either members of a professional elite or a quite dissimilar type of mi-
grant: asylum seekers who live under very different conditions in
Switzerland. It is now possible to distinguish three groups of
Armenians living in Switzerland, mirroring three different types of
transnationality: Armenians belonging to and identifying themselves
with the Armenian diaspora; a group of highly qualified professionals
working or studying in Switzerland – IT specialists, musicians, artists,
biologists – and a group who arrived as asylum seekers (Dahinden
2008).
In the case of Armenian asylum seekers, the first element to be noted
is the type of permit with which they are admitted to Swiss territory.
This has important effects on the activities they are allowed to under-
take in Switzerland as well as on their transnational way of being and
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acting. The Armenian asylum seekers we spoke to in a study conducted
in 2003 (Bachmann et al. 2004) suffered from the uncertainty of their
situation, which in some cases had lasted for years. They often ex-
pressed a feeling of shame, inferiority and isolation. It was not because
of their ‘Armenianness’ that they felt inferior and uneasy, however, but
because of their legal status as asylum seekers. They had no profes-
sional or other prospects in Switzerland, they were not locally anchored,
they could not circulate or be internationally mobile and, at the same
time, they did not develop stable transnational relations with their coun-
try of origin. We might speak in this case of transnational outsiders.
The type of transnational pattern developed among young, highly
skilled Armenians was different. They defined themselves first as pro-
fessionals and it was their professional networks that were of relevance
for their daily activities, as well as for their identity classifications and
symbolic boundary work. They spoke several languages, had well-paid
jobs and, should the job require it, were willing to move to other coun-
tries – as some had already done. They worked on multinational teams
and could be called highly skilled globetrotters. Their aspirations for
staying in Switzerland were professional in nature and based on a de-
sire for professional qualifications and self-realisation. The capital in
question here is educational, but also the potential for being mobile.
We could say that they represent the transnational mobile type.
Finally, we have the so-called Armenian diaspora that in our typology
represents the localised diasporic transnational type. These Armenians
make considerable ideological efforts in order to conceive of their com-
munities as ideally continuous with the populations of diasporas in
other nation-states and with the homeland. They lobby the Swiss gov-
ernment on behalf of their homeland (for instance, for official recogni-
tion of the genocide), and they devote funds and human resources to
assist or influence the economy, culture and politics of the homeland.
The actors of this diaspora are embedded in an institutional network
that is very different from the one in which the highly skilled are in-
volved. Not unlike the dancers and their placement agencies, the latter
rely on different sources for recruitment and placement, whereas the
institutional network of the diasporic actors is more governmental in
character. In other words, they actively engage in symbolic boundary
work based on ethnicity, despite the fact that their daily networks are
not characterised by ethnic homogeneity. They are locally integrated
into the social structure; mostly they are Swiss citizens or second- or
third-generation migrants.
This example thus not only shows the possibility of different transna-
tional morphologies existing simultaneously within one and the same
group of citizens, but also how these forms can become contradictory.
First of all, as Björklund (2003) has written, Armenians in the diaspora
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(like many other diasporic people) are tempted to think of their disper-
sion as acceptable in the short run but untenable in the long run. Only
an Armenian Armenia will be able to guarantee the survival of the
Armenians. ‘Emigrant Armenians’ arouse therefore mixed feelings, as
Armenians are not ‘supposed’ to be emigrants. Second, it can be stated
that the established diaspora has but little in common with the new
Armenian migrants, both historically and with regard to their contem-
porary life abroad. Few close contacts exist between the diaspora and
the new immigrants from Armenia. What Ishkanian (2002) points out
for major cities with huge Armenian communities, such as Los Angeles
or San Francisco, also applies to Switzerland. Although new Armenian
migrants live in places hosting established diaspora communities and,
at times, benefit from established diaspora institutions and organisa-
tions, they generally remain on the margins of these communities as
genuine outsiders rarely, if ever, participating in communal life. The
ones who are new to the host country are sometimes disappointed to
have to admit that cultural distance from contemporary Armenia is
even higher among members of the diaspora than among new immi-
grant communities. As the Republic of Armenia was part of the USSR
prior to becoming independent, those who lived in Armenia experi-
enced more than 70 years of communist rule, whereas Armenians liv-
ing in the diaspora were not exposed to Soviet influence. Armenians
subjectively perceive this factor to be one of the causes for the differ-
ence in ‘culture’ or ‘mentality’.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter’s attempt to establish four ideal types of transnational for-
mations based on the dimension of mobility and locality is intended to
address what strikes me as a pressing problem in contemporary migra-
tion and mobility studies. Migration studies too often focus either on
mobility or on locality, but forget to look at both dimensions simulta-
neously and at their articulations. The typology I propose here might
allow us to think through ‘mobility lenses’, in line with the ideas of
Urry (2007) and his new mobility paradigm emphasising the complex
relations between different mobilities. However, we also need constantly
to bear in mind that locality is as important in analysing these transna-
tional formations as is mobility. Mobility ends in the development of
specific transnational forms after or during migration, but in order to
become ‘transnational’, migrants must touch down somewhere. From
the case studies, it appears that transnational practices and formations
cannot develop separately but are linked to the constraints and opportu-
nities imposed by specific contexts. Not having a residence permit, for
THE DYNAMICS OF MIGRANTS’ TRANSNATIONAL FORMATIONS 69
example, might allow an ethnic group consciousness to develop, but
could hinder the development of stable transnational fields in other
realms. Transnational migrants are, so to speak, unable to escape their
local contexts.
By reminding us to track mobility and locality simultaneously, the ty-
pology can provide concrete ideas about the articulation between trans-
nationality and integration. For example, in the current debate over how
processes of migrant incorporation in the host country and the estab-
lishment of transnational spaces are related, transnationality is often
seen either as an alternative to integration or as the condition of being
‘integrated’ in the host country and the country of origin at the same
time (e.g. Dahinden 2009; Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). The typology
reveals that we are in fact not dealing here with a zero-sum game: the
best-anchored social actors in our analysis – for instance, ‘diasporic’
Armenians – provide evidence of a high transnational engagement even
while they are themselves not particularly mobile at all. Another telling
example is the case of localised mobile transnational formations that
display a contemporaneous and double integration within two contexts
simultaneously.
My final remark concerns the regulatory power of the state. The
case studies reveal that the state is a principal actor for all of the ideal
types examined. The conditions attached to the ‘dancer’s permit’ are
not only a result of Switzerland’s ethnicised and gendered migration
policy; they are simultaneously crucial for the formation of the specific
transnational arrangements of the dancers. The same can be said of
Armenian asylum seekers, but also of the Albanians. While I do not
mean this result to be interpreted as confirmation of romantic primor-
dialism, or as a sign of long-lasting or dormant ethnic or national feel-
ings, it is important to note that the state and related ethnic and ‘ra-
cial’ categories (still) possess considerable power to inflect hetero- and
auto-identification processes in the modern globalised world and to
produce processes of exclusion and inclusion. States may be losing so-
vereignty with regard to their ability to regulate socio-economic reali-
ties or social networks, but when it comes to membership and identifi-
cation (and access to territories as well as the rights that go with this),
they remain determinant. Likewise, nation-state and ethnic categories
are not things of the past, but play a major role in shaping the con-
temporary world, even under contemporary conditions of globalisation.
This means that we have to take the ‘nation’ in transnationalism very
seriously indeed.
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Notes
1 There is another type that arises from a combination of low transnational mobility
and high levels of local anchorage in the receiving country. However, it is not related
to a strong collective ethnic and/or religious consciousness, but to a low or altogether
absent one – or to identification with ethnic categories of the new country. This case
could be considered as the ideal typical form of assimilation according to the dimen-
sions developed by Gordon (1964). Here we do not speak of a ‘transnational
formation’.
2 This section is based on a study carried out in Switzerland in 2005 (Dahinden &
Stants 2006), in which we conducted 70 interviews with cabaret dancers and twenty
with key persons from federal and cantonal authorities, employment agencies and
nightclubs. The dancers came from eleven different countries, with 49 being from
Eastern Europe.
3 The interviews did in fact reveal that, in contrast to the dancers from Latin America
and Thailand, dancers from Eastern European countries have an above-average level
of education; some even had a university degree. This means that most of the
Eastern European women working in cabarets in Switzerland come from a middle-
class background, i.e. from families with high cultural capital.
4 Our interviews reveal that through these services, they earn an extra CHF 1,000 a
month on average (approximately E 600).
5 The three circles model established regional priorities in the admission of immi-
grants as follows: from EU and EFTA states as the ‘first circle’, from the US, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand as the ‘second circle’ and from all other countries of ori-
gin as the ‘third circle’.
6 It should be noted that after the war and in the context of return programmes, a sig-
nificant number of Kosovo-Albanian asylum seekers did return home.
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Chapter 4
Instrumentalising diasporas for development:
International and European policy discourses
Agnieszka Weinar1
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, politicians from many countries have seized upon dia-
sporas as a migration policy actor. The recent upsurge of research evi-
dence showing the policy relevance of the nexus between migration and
development has contributed to this trend. A growing body of official
documents of United Nations agencies, policy recommendations of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Bank studies on
remittances, OECD work and research conducted by numerous aca-
demic institutes has turned the attention of policymakers to the role
that migrant and ethnic communities and individual migrants play in
the development of countries of origin.
The High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development
in September 2006 allowed the UN to play the role of facilitator between
home and host countries. Discussions were then moved forward by the
Global Forum on Migration and Development (2007 in Brussels, 2008
in Manila). This, in turn, has generated a world process for regularly dis-
cussing the ways and means to maximise migration’s development bene-
fits and minimise its negative impacts. Diaspora actors perceived as orga-
nised entities are partners in this debate, although their representation
and legitimate definition still pose a challenge.
A recent IOM survey (IOM 2006) meant to help governments of de-
veloping countries identify weak points in their diaspora policy demon-
strated how the governments often had difficulties determining who
‘their’ diasporas were, and were thus unable to put successful targeted
policies in place. From a policy perspective, there is no homogenous de-
finition that could be translated into a statistical toolbox and support the
creation of a socioeconomic profile of a diaspora. Unfortunately, in the
policy realm, diasporas tend to be identified with ancestry, without re-
gard to existing academic definitions. Moreover, it seems that diaspora
has gradually come to be identified with transnational community. The
discussion about the blurred borders between transnationalism and
diaspora is addressed in several other contributions to this book (for
summaries see the chapters by Faist and Bauböck), yet lies beyond the
scope of the present chapter. It is important, however, to refer to the
place these concepts hold in the discourse on migration and develop-
ment policies and to observe the complex interests that lead to the pre-
valence of one over the other.
To grasp its full meaning we need to see the concept of diaspora as a
category of practice (see Brubaker 2005). The perspective often applied
– i.e. the practice of the given group creating itself through practices –
needs to be reversed here, however. International and supranational or-
ganisations have offered themselves as entrepreneurs framing ‘dia-
spora’ in several ways that challenge the academic discourse. They have
been shaping the image of migrant and ethnic groups as actors of de-
velopment policy. This creative input of international and supranational
organisations is inscribed in their perceived role as producers and guar-
dians of a norm in various areas of public policy (see Barnett &
Finnemore 2004).
In this chapter I will analyse the emerging functional definitions of
diaspora against the policy-based indicators that help set its boundaries
within the field of policy practice. My objective is to understand how
diaspora is framed as a migration policy actor, and the EU case serves
as an example. The migration and development agendas have been only
recently drawn together in the European policy context. The new com-
ponents of the comprehensive European immigration policy, tradition-
ally associated with restrictive measures, include a number of elements
linked to the development agenda, such as mobility partnerships and
circular migration, in which diaspora plays an important role. It re-
mains to be determined, however, which policy actors are needed to
meet the policy ends, and thus how diaspora is defined.
As such, this chapter will look into exemplary documents produced
by international and supranational organisations to see how they frame
the actors of development policy. My discussion will focus on different
uses of the terms ‘transnational community’ and ‘diaspora’. I will also
examine several European Community documents pertaining to the
subject and analyse the role that diasporas have in the European com-
prehensive migration policy.
4.2 Diaspora as the emerging policy actor
For many decades, diaspora was typically defined as something of a con-
text in which a people lived ‘scattered as a result of a traumatic histori-
cal event’ (Cohen 1993: 5). The notion of violence as a traumatic collec-
tive experience was an inescapable element of the definition (and
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exemplified by the Jewish and Armenian diasporas), as were the senti-
mental and emotional links to the home country and a strong sense of
belonging. Most definitions also suggested that populations were dis-
persed between two or more host countries. When discussed in this tra-
ditional sense, diaspora refers to all extreme cases of dispersion, e.g.
Palestinians, Tamils and Kurds, but does not include other forms of the
contemporary migratory experience, such as economic migrants or
students.
Despite the impressive broadening of this definition over the last
twenty years – from the particular paradigmatic experience of a few eth-
nic groups to an expanded and more flexible understanding of the term
(see Brubaker 2005; Faist in this volume; Bruneau in this volume) –
none of the existing definitions could meaningfully inform public pol-
icymaking to help define the functional boundaries of diaspora. The in-
dicators proposed by many scholars are not easily translatable into pol-
icy terms. The classic definition of diaspora rests basically on Sheffer’s
(1986) three proposed criteria: the dispersed group must hold a distinc-
tive collective identity across international locations; the group must
have some internal organisation of its own; the group in dispersion
must keep ties with the homeland, be it symbolic or real. Adjustment
to changing realities allowed for modifications of this understanding of
diaspora, first, by introducing a notion of voluntary migration as in the
case of Sheffer’s ethno-national diasporas (1995: 9) or Cohen’s diasporic
communities (1997); and, second, by easing the requirement of internal
organisation, as proposed by Cohen, for whom it is a collective identity
that keeps diasporas together in contemporary times. It was still un-
clear, however, whether migrants involved in transnational practices can
be seen as members of diasporas. Safran (1991) defined diasporas as
ethnic minority communities, as opposed to migrant communities, focusing
thereby more on the degree of settlement of the group. He proposed a
number of indicators to define diaspora including the triadic relation-
ship of the communities to a homeland, a host country or other coun-
tries of diaspora settlement (see also Vertovec 1999) as well as a shared
memory/vision/myth of the homeland, alienation from the host country
and permanence of the ‘myth of return’.
Recently, however, a growing body of literature succeeded in reformu-
lating the definition, framing diaspora as almost any population on the
move and no longer referring to the specific context of their existence
(see Schnapper 1999; Vertovec & Cohen 1999; Castles & Miller 2003).
There is thus less reference to, for example, the Chinese in the diaspora,
yet we can read more often about the Chinese diaspora. Van Hear, Pieke
and Vertovec (2004: 3) provide an all-encompassing definition of
diaspora:
INSTRUMENTALISING DIASPORAS FOR DEVELOPMENT 75
populations of migrant origin who are scattered among two or
more destinations, between which there develop multifarious
links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: be-
tween the homeland and destination countries, and among desti-
nation countries.
This formulation makes diaspora hardly distinguishable from a transna-
tional view of migrant communities (see Vertovec 1999; Faist in this vo-
lume). Following the observations of Glick Schiller (1999), transna-
tional community can be seen as a migrant community whose mem-
bers engage freely in real networks linking them to their home country.
This relationship is neither mythical nor visionary; it is lived through
practices of everyday life.
In the field of political science, it is the term ‘diaspora’ that has been
used often to refer to the political engagement of certain groups and
the process of their re-identification (see Koinova this volume). In the
sphere of political practices, diaspora is presented as an overarching
cognitive frame of sometimes very diverse groups (see Brubaker 1996,
2005). It seems that ‘diaspora’ has moved out of the realm of abstract
nouns and become a mot-clé to indicate quite concrete, albeit diverse,
concepts, such as diasporic communities, diaspora organisations and
individual members of diasporas – possibly all at the same time (see
Brubaker 2005; De Haas 2006).
This personified diaspora can act as an agent of development policy.
The personification brings to the forefront people who have a migration
history or memory thereof, as they constitute the basic link between de-
velopment and migration policy. In the logic of migration policy, it is
only the inflow of foreigners that matters, and thus only non-nationals
can create the nexus between the two policies. Nationals of ethnic origin
are subject to the same policies as non-ethnic nationals but none of
these groups can be the object of a migration policy. Consequently, the
nexus between migration and development policies might not be neces-
sarily defined as a diaspora. The fine line between transnational com-
munities and diaspora is thus again blurred by addressing as diasporas
the very same groups of first-generation migrants who have been identi-
fied as transnational in much of the academic literature.
Current policymaking calls for functional and mostly under-theorised
ideas that are elaborated in many competing discourses by international
organisations. The recent rise of diaspora as an actor within migration
policy is a prime example of this trend. There is thus a practical ques-
tion to ask: what are the boundaries of this instrumentalised diaspora?
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4.3 Method of research and analysis
The methodology followed in my research involved a combination of
approaches. The main focus was on qualitative analysis of documents2
pertaining to the European migration policy. The material consisted of
the relevant preparatory documents from the years 2000-2007 (i.e.
European Commission proposals and opinions, initiatives by member
states, EU Council common positions, legislative resolutions of the
European Parliament, opinions of committees, other opinions and re-
commendations) and relevant EU Council conclusions. Supporting
documents include decisions issued by the Executive Council of the
African Union, UN resolutions on international migration and develop-
ment, UNDP project descriptions and IOM policy recommendations.
The analysis is based on the assumption that the ‘migration and devel-
opment nexus’ really means that migrants or people with migrant ori-
gins participate in implementing development policy. This participation
makes them actors of development policy. I was interested to see, first,
how these actors were defined in migration policy terms, and I thus
looked for indicators based on the standard migration policy categories:
legal status, citizenship, ethnic or national origins, duration of stay in
the host country, access to legal employment, level of skills, remittances.
Second, I assessed the extent to which the above-mentioned documents
respected the classic academic definitions. In the texts I thus looked for
specific indicators, such as membership in a diasporic organisation,
subjective feeling of belonging and ‘triadic’ relations.
The basic research material was supplemented with information on
EU assistance to migration and development (e.g. an AENEAS report,
Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum official guidelines). To
get a better understanding of the institutional and social context of dia-
spora engagement in the framework of the European migration policy,
several targeted expert interviews were conducted3 and supported by ad-
ditional questionnaires.
4.3.1 The definition of diaspora for public policy purposes in the
international arena
It is difficult to agree upon who first used the term ‘diaspora’ in rela-
tion to the development agenda, especially given that international mi-
gration and development have been joined in the discourse of interna-
tional organisations for well over a decade now. There is no doubt that
the UN, in particular, made an effort to intensify debates on these is-
sues. In their numerous resolutions,4 international migration has been
consistently linked to the development agenda.
INSTRUMENTALISING DIASPORAS FOR DEVELOPMENT 77
Surprisingly, and contrary to expectations raised by public discourse,
the language of UN documents revolves around ‘transnational commu-
nities’ as the main development policy actors, not diasporas.5 The
Report of the Secretary General 60/871 of 18 May 2006 on interna-
tional migration and development devotes several sections to ‘transna-
tional communities’, which are referred to as the actors for develop-
ment policy with an important impact on the home countries. The re-
port does not provide any straightforward definition of the term.
Nevertheless, by giving examples of successful members of transna-
tional communities, it describes a development policy actor as a long-
term legal resident of the host country, with ethnic and/or national ties
to the home country, who is employed legally and possesses funds or
skills to offer for its development. The actor’s citizenship or member-
ship in a diasporic organisation or subjective feelings of belonging are
not mentioned.
If the UN has been prudent in avoiding multiple terminology in its
official texts, other organisations have used the terms ‘transnational
communities’ or ‘migrant communities’ and ‘diaspora’ interchangeably
and abundantly in their policy documents.6
The IOM has been the most vocal advocate of widening the definition
of diaspora. Ionescu (2006) offers an exhaustive discussion of the term
based on the IOM report ‘Survey on engaging diasporas for develop-
ment’ completed in 2006. When delineating the concept, Ionescu uses
several indicators based on the migration policy statistical toolbox. She
argues ultimately for the utilitarian criterion: diaspora is a resource and
thus the ultimate defining indicator is whether the actors engage in de-
velopment policy. Diaspora includes practically anybody with a migrant
background who contributes to the development of the home country.
Such a person can be included regardless of his or her legal status and
country of birth,7 does not need to be established in the host country as
a permanent resident, does not need to have citizenship of the country
of origin, does not need to be involved in any migrant association
(although it helps, as collective bodies can be most easily be engaged as
partners for policy projects), but should maintain primarily economic,
not necessarily political or sentimental, ties with the home country.
Consequently, she defines diaspora as ‘members of ethnic and national
communities, who have left, but maintain links with, their homelands’
(Ionescu 2006: 13).
It is noteworthy that the UN and IOM approaches define actors in de-
velopment policy as individuals – the notion of collective identity is less
important, a community member acts on a voluntary basis, following
his or her own values. Both see these individuals as linked no longer by
traumatic experience or symbolic ties, but by a pure and positive readi-
ness to act in economic terms.
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These deliberations on the level of international organisations had an
impact on national governments, e.g. the Philippines and India, which
have become increasingly interested in the link between migration and
development. However, it is the African Union (AU) that offers arguably
the best example of an organised response to the issue of definition.
Sub-Saharan African countries, the major target of development poli-
cies, responded to UN calls for a migration and development nexus by
launching a process to define an African diaspora. In its decision,8 the
AU Executive Council called for an elaboration of the definition by ex-
perts from the AU member states and ‘Diaspora’ (the AU always capita-
lises the word in this context). The definition was then elaborated dur-
ing a series of expert meetings and consultations, and eventually offi-
cially adopted.9
The debates were focused on four principles: African diaspora must
be defined by bloodline or heritage (African, not country-specific), must
be linked to the processes of migration and must be historically inclu-
sive but exclusive of people not committed to the development goals.
The definition finally agreed upon states the following:
The African Diaspora consists of peoples of African origin living out-
side the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and
who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and
the building of the African Union.10 The definition is very broad, in the
spirit of the one proposed by international organisations. Moreover, it
dismantles another classic element of academic definitions – the link to
a nation or ethnicity. A pan-African approach is a basic feature of the
diaspora with which the AU would like to work.
This wide approach is not necessarily shared by members of diaspo-
ric organisations, who would prefer to see the pool of participants re-
stricted – mostly to people who feel a genuinely strong link with their
origins (they indicate a threshold up to the third generation) and who
have a strong national or ethnic identity. Pan-Africanism is not always
present in this discourse.
To debate these issues and also to determine further steps, the AU
has held a regional consultative process in various parts of the world
(including Europe). The AU’s current efforts are focused on shaping
the regional representation of the African diaspora. The search for an
interlocutor who would fit the definition has proved to be challenging,
yet necessary for progress on the migration and development agenda.11
The AU has also concretely translated this commitment by having dia-
spora representatives elected as members of its Economic, Social and
Cultural Council.
Interestingly enough, in the international arena, the distinction is
made between, on the one hand, diaspora as an actor of development
policy and, on the other, diaspora as a potentially destabilising factor or
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element undermining peace in the country of origin, as studied by com-
parative political scientists and international relations scholars (see
Collier 2000; Collier & Hoeffler 2000; Koinova in this volume). The in-
strumentalisation of diaspora as an actor of development policy ignores
security issues and the historical record of diaporas engaging in con-
flicts in the home country. Such an approach is a consequence of the
fact that the discourse has been framed mainly by development and mi-
gration specialists. Focusing on the positive side of diaspora interven-
tion, they largely ignore its possible negative impact.
The discourse of international organisations has blurred the meaning
of diaspora and merged it with the characteristics ascribed to transna-
tional communities. The UN’s initial attempt to use the term ‘transna-
tional community’ to describe migration and development policy actors
has not been taken up by the growing number of policy initiatives.
Most interestingly, it is now quite accepted that the term ‘diaspora’ re-
fers to both migrant and ethnic communities. Diaspora has thus be-
come an all-encompassing concept, the boundaries of which are still
being negotiated by various policy actors. International organisations
acting as policy entrepreneurs favour a broadening of the scope of
‘diaspora’.
4.3.2 Diaspora as an actor in European comprehensive migration policy
The EU entered the field of migration and development policy only re-
cently. Its position has been influenced strongly by development dis-
course. The largest group of migrants from developing countries in the
EU are from Africa; they also have the strongest visibility due to media
focus on human trafficking via the Mediterranean Sea. The tragic
events in Ceuta and Melilla in 200512 have opened up discussions with
African countries on migration issues and, given the strong develop-
ment context of the root causes of migration, have pushed the EU to-
wards a policy approach that would acknowledge the importance of the
migration and development nexus. Thus, the need to actively involve
diasporas came to the forefront.
The problem with this engagement lies in a clear division within the
European comprehensive migration policy between an internal and an
external dimension. Both focus, to an important extent, on migrant and
ethnic communities and involve them as European policy actors, but
their scopes differ. Moreover, they use different terminology when ad-
dressing the respective target groups. This divide is especially visible in
the relation between integration policy and the migration and develop-
ment field of the so-called ‘global approach to migration’.
Integration of admitted immigrants (though not refugees) has been
the hallmark of more consolidated European responses to immigration,
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in response to the acknowledged failure of integration of migrants in
the EU, their social alienation and potential for radicalisation. In the
early days, the non-integrated, discriminated and vulnerable groups of
migrants and groups of migrant origin were seen as potential security
threats (Huysmans 2000). The integration project, therefore, was a re-
action to the perceived danger of disrupting allegedly stable and homo-
genous societies. Though not directly anchored in the Amsterdam
Treaty or the Hague Programme,13 two directives especially strengthen
harmonisation in this area of intergovernmental policymaking: those on
family reunification14 and those on the rights of long-term residents.15
Moreover, legislation prohibiting discrimination and promoting equality
has also been high on the agenda.16
On 19 November 2004, on initiative of the Dutch presidency, the EU
Council adopted its set of Common Basic Principles on Integration,
which were later elaborated in the Common Agenda for Integration.17
A number of practical tools, such as the network of National Contact
Points on Integration and the Handbook on Integration, promote a con-
solidated agenda in this field, and the Integration Fund provides finan-
cial support for the implementing actions.
The Common Agenda for Integration addresses in many of its propo-
sals the members of migrant communities, i.e. people with direct mi-
grant experience. Ethnic communities made up of EU nationals of eth-
nic background are not included in this perspective. The most impor-
tant feature of the EU approach is thus a distinction between EU
citizens and non-EU citizens. The dividing line is the legal status of an
individual in the host country, so that, as a result, migrants are defined
as third-country nationals within this framework. The term ‘migrant
community’ as used in this document is thus significantly narrower
than an ethnic community (the former includes only migrants and their
descendants who are non-EU citizens, while the latter includes both).
The integration of EU nationals of immigrant origin is not a matter for
EU immigration policy but for EU social policy (hence social cohesion
policies). Thus, the public policy response to potentially threatening dia-
sporic communities is distributed across different fields.
The documents pertaining to integration policy usually focus on indi-
vidual rights and individual efforts to integrate. Migrant communities
as collective units are not presented as the policy’s principal addressees.
In the recent Report on Integration,18 which lists successful pro-
grammes on integration in the member states, immigrant communities
are explicitly mentioned only twice.19 They are, however, implicitly indi-
cated as partners more often, e.g. with regard to initiatives concerning
religious communities.
Since this policy targets internal actions, it does not deal with mi-
grants as purely transnational individuals. There is no clear interest in a
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diasporic potential, thus home country loyalties are not highlighted in
this frame. The focus is on the cultural and racial distinctiveness that
may precondition inclusion in the host society. Only the link between
an individual or his family and the destination country is of importance.
Where it exists, the community in which migrants participate can be-
come an important interlocutor of integration policy, as integration is
defined as a two-way process.
Diaspora emerges only in the context of the external dimension of
European migration policy. It becomes a real policy actor in the Global
Approach to Migration, defined as ‘a balanced, global and coherent ap-
proach, covering policies to combat illegal immigration and, in coopera-
tion with third countries, harnessing the benefits of legal migration’.20
The policy, which has been developed since 2006, aims to formulate
comprehensive and coherent mechanisms that address a broad range of
migration-related issues, enriching the justice and security policies with
a development and external relations angle to enhance dialogue and co-
operation on migration with third countries. In the first stage, it fo-
cused on the countries of Africa and the Mediterranean. As of its July
2007 conclusions, the EU Council under the German presidency ex-
tended this policy approach to the eastern and south-eastern regions of
Europe. The approach encompasses three dimensions: cooperation with
third countries in migration management, supporting the fight against
illegal migration and migration and development.21
Diaspora is perceived as a crucial element of the third dimension.
Prior to 2002, in the EU documents, the term ‘diaspora’ was used in
so-called Country Strategy Papers or specific country reports, primarily
on economic subjects. There, diaspora was mentioned as a source of
revenue and an important factor for stabilising local and regional
growth.22 The nexus with the development agenda, however, brought
the notion of diaspora to European comprehensive migration policy.
Diaspora became an important policy actor and its representation
shifted from a mere mention to actual offers of involvement.
A mantra of EU-level documents for several years now has been to
create a triple-win situation: the host country gains through labour, the
home country gains through co-development and the migrant gains
through support for individual initiatives.23 A focus on the development
agenda as a major innovation to the traditional restrictive approach has
been further pursued in a communication on circular migration and
mobility partnerships between the EU and third countries.24
The 2002 communication25 mentions diaspora in the context of its
possible role in development. But only in the September 2005 commu-
nication on migration and development26 is diaspora fully present and
its meaning circumscribed for European policy use.
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The definition of diaspora given in footnote 17 of this communication
is broad and is in the spirit of the ideas presented by Ionescu (2006). It
focuses merely on the question of birthplace and nationality (although
it also underlines the importance of an individual’s emotional link to
the homeland). It does not directly address questions of legal status,
employment, skills, duration of stay or belonging to an organisation.
Nevertheless, the actions proposed in the text to mobilise diaspora for
development delineate the concept and give quite precise characteristics
of the new policy actor.
First, the diaspora is seen as a transnational community, and it is this
transnational character that guarantees the success of development in-
itiatives. Such an approach echoes the traditional triadic relationship.
Moreover, the transnational character of diasporic organisations is
further accentuated when it is a matter of their political engagement in
the development strategy of the home country at three levels: the coun-
try of origin, the EU country of destination and the EU. The members
of such a diaspora need to be recognised in the EU legal system to be
able to get through to the EU level. They would therefore generally have
to be EU citizens or long-term residents, not temporary or circular mi-
grants who are third-country nationals.
Second, according to the text, diaspora members are not necessarily
migrants themselves. People with a migration history are framed as
members of migrant communities; and people of ethnic background
are labelled as members of ethnic communities. Still, it is not entirely
clear in the text whether migrants are considered something truly dif-
ferent from diaspora members. In some parts of the communication, it
is stated that currently active migrants and diaspora members could be
considered as development policy actors so long as they are active.
Third, legal status and resident status, in particular, is introduced as
an indicator of membership in a diaspora. Among other initiatives, the
European Commission proposes mapping and mobilising diasporas.
Thus, it must be understood that it refers only to those staying and
working legally. The proposed data collection on diasporas implies ac-
tual counts rather than estimations. Interestingly enough, there is no
discussion of how to define diaspora in order to gather the relevant
data, or even from where the data can be gathered. When discussing
‘migration profiles’ (a proposed data gathering tool described in Annex
8), the communication does not put forward any proposal to this end
either.
The fourth trait of diaspora is the organisational side. The constant
use of the term ‘member of diaspora’ juxtaposes individual and ato-
mised migrants with the diasporic community. This is an important as-
pect, as the European Commission invites member states to identify re-
presentative interlocutors in the diaspora to engage in development
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projects. They must represent an organisation that is eligible, and has
enough authority, to be a partner in the development policy of its coun-
try. Such organisations should be trustworthy and well established, for
partnership in projects usually means managing funding.
Fifth, the diaspora members are seen as a source of contributions to
their countries of origin. A substantial part of the text is devoted to fi-
nancial remittances, associated with first generations (i.e. migrants),
but also with the transfer of skills and productive investment, which ap-
plies to second and third generations as well. In this context, the
European Commission promotes the idea of temporary return of quali-
fied diaspora members. Although the communication points out the vo-
luntary character of diaspora members’ contributions, it is implied that
the emotional link to the country of origin and the readiness to contri-
bute are the key elements of diaspora identification.
In all other relevant EU documents, these characteristics of diaspora
members are implicit, especially in discussions of the instruments of
migration and development policy, i.e. circular migration and mobility
partnerships.27 In the case of circular migration, diaspora members (de-
fined as long-term residents or members of ethnic communities) are
supposed to work for the development of the country of origin through
temporary outward migration from the EU, while temporary migrant
workers (who are not seen as diaspora members) engage in inward mi-
gration. By contrast, mobility partnerships28 propose to mobilise conso-
lidated diasporas for development policies.
Still, it is not entirely clear who will be the final user and implement-
ing actor of the policy. Rooted and established diasporas very often have
nothing in common with newly arrived migrants, and subsequent
waves of migration create distinct and closed communities. It seems
the idea for the migration and development agenda is to overcome
these differences, to have a less diverse set of interlocutors on the other
side, united by a common goal.
The main problem with the way in which diaspora is conceived in
these documents is that this ideal type applies to very few migrant and
ethnic groups in the EU. The conditions of high levels of internal organi-
sation and regularised legal work and residence status are probably met
by only a few settled communities (e.g. the Turkish diaspora and also
some well-established groups within the African diaspora). Restrictive
immigration policies encourage undocumented migration from faraway
countries or the pendular (shuttle) migration of legal visitors from neigh-
bouring countries who engage in undocumented work. The real chal-
lenge lies in reaching out to these people to foster migration and devel-
opment and to create an interlocutor (in a process similar to what the
AU is pursuing). Another difficulty is the apparent focus on the nation-
state as the unit of analysis, and consequently a necessary condition for
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diaspora-building. This might pose a problem in the case of recent mi-
grants from extremely weak or very new multinational states who do not
necessarily see themselves as members of the national community asso-
ciated with their home country (Schwartz 2007). EU support for dia-
spora within the boundaries circumscribed by the indicators discussed
above could influence directly the self-identification of diasporas and
their members. It is probable that as a result of this process there will be
a proliferation of more or less standardised organisations competing for
the financial support, as has happened in several other policy areas.
It remains to be seen how the availability of funding and the impor-
tance given to the role of diasporas can change the existing diaspora
groupings into fully fledged actors of European migration policy who
serve the migration and development goals. A recent EU-funded project
implemented by UNDP focuses on strengthening diaspora as an actor
of development in sixteen countries included in the European
Neighbourhood Policy and in sub-Saharan Africa. Not many of them
have clearly defined diaspora communities in the EU, and those who
do have so far not engaged in a process of defining representatives and
legitimate interlocutors. The incentive to organise can have positive im-
pacts on many migrant communities that, to date, do not perceive
themselves as diasporas and have weak internal structures.
Inevitably, the divisions not only between internal and external di-
mensions but also between migration policy and social policies are
blurred, since diaspora as defined and used in the documents consists
to a great extent of EU citizens. Most prominently, for policies within
the external dimension, the same migrant or ethnic groups are no long-
er perceived as a security threat, but as a valuable asset. The 2005 com-
munication on the external dimension of migration policy29 stresses
the importance of recognising the link between members of the dia-
spora and their country of origin. Similarly, the communication on mi-
gration and development30 of the same year indicates integration as a
part of a diaspora mobilisation policy.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has explored the current use of the term ‘diaspora’ in EU
documents in its most common public policy context: the development
and migration agenda. This discourse shapes the understanding of the
term by policymakers and average citizens alike. Diaspora is seen here
a category of practice that can reorient existing self-identification of the
relevant groups.
In the scholarly literature, the paradigm of diaspora as nation-in-exile
went through several transformations. This has left us with a set of
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ambiguous characteristics, including the dispersion of a group sharing
a common national or ethnic origin across two or more places, the
maintaining of a network linking all destinations, symbolic or real links
to the home country and emotional identification with it. The common
complaint of academics and researchers is that a definition encompass-
ing all these aspects is too vague to be useful for theoretical purposes or
for empirical operationalisation. It also overlaps too broadly with cur-
rent approaches in the field of transnational studies.
Policy documents adopted at the international level have an impact
on how the distinction between transnational community and diaspora
is framed in public discourse. In fact, their impact seems to be the
elimination of any such analytical distinction, as ‘transnational commu-
nity’ is not a part of the discursive game. It is the ‘diaspora’ that has
been assigned all transnational traits and characteristics. This concep-
tion of diaspora is inclusive and refers to migrant and ethnic commu-
nities. In general, it also establishes only three important conditions for
becoming a diasporic actor of development policy: first, an ethnic or na-
tional origin; second, a capability to contribute to development in the
country of origin; and, third, a readiness to do so. The most important
dimension of diaspora is the economic one. The ties to the homeland
can no longer be symbolic or purely political: they need to be beneficial,
first of all, for the country of origin and, secondly, to the diaspora mem-
bers themselves. Such an approach brings to light the importance of
transnational networks and everyday transnational practices of indivi-
duals and groups. This treatment of diaspora as a resource may seem
limiting, as the central values of cultural identity, symbolic belonging,
sentimental ties, etc., are not accentuated.
In European migration policy, the migration and development nexus
has been recently promoted as an important area of intervention. The
tools of the Global Approach to Migration, including circular migration
or mobility partnerships, focus on diaspora as a policy actor. In this con-
text, diaspora is defined more narrowly than by international organisa-
tions: apart from the importance of national or ethnic origins, and the
capability and readiness to contribute, membership in diaspora organi-
sations is required. On this basis, European policymakers can define
their target group and provide support for its activities. It is quite im-
portant to understand, though, that while diaspora is welcome as a
European migration policy actor in its external dimension, in the con-
text of cooperation with third countries, it remains marginal – or is per-
ceived as a problem – in the European discourse on the integration of
third-country nationals.
What must be stressed is that the division between migrant commu-
nities and diaspora that is present in some academic discourses, as well
as in EU migration policy, has been blurred in the context of the
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migration and development agenda. Given the framing power of inter-
national organisations and their role in norm diffusion, the increasingly
vague or unclear division between diaspora and transnational commu-
nities could soon overtaken by a process of essentialisation that is
policy-driven. Governments eager to follow the highly political and sub-
sidised migration and development agenda have recently embarked on
identifying and delineating the target groups. More research is needed
to see if the norms created at the policy level will have a real impact on
the self-identification of diaspora organisations and their members.
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Chapter 5
Interrogating diaspora: Power and conflict
in Peruvian migration
Karsten Paerregaard
‘Diaspora’, ‘diasporic’ and ‘diasporisation’ have become trendy terms
among anthropologists, sociologists, migration scholars and advocates
of multiculturalism in the past fifteen years. Among the most promi-
nent thinkers within this trend are Gilroy (1993) and Clifford (1994b),
whose influential works from the early 1990s triggered a wave of new
migration studies with a focus on the transnational and diasporic di-
mensions of contemporary migrant populations.1 The contention of
these authors is that culture cannot be examined as a geographically
confined construct but must be studied as a dispersed phenomenon, a
view that leads to the argument that all people are diasporic, at least po-
tentially. Truly, diaspora ‘has become a global word that fits the global
world’ (Dufoix 2008: 108). Such use of the concept of diaspora offers
new possibilities for understanding contemporary social change in an
increasingly globalising world. But it also raises important methodologi-
cal and conceptual questions concerning the definition of the terms we
employ in our analyses and the many political and moral agendas they
propel. In effect, migration scholars face the predicament of addressing
a concept that, in the real world, is often employed in divergent and he-
gemonic ways and, within academia, is associated with emancipation
and diversity. As Amit and Rapport state:
If primordialism and essentialism are key elements in the efforts
to define the ideological rationale and boundaries of diaspora, it
is ironic to see cultural theorists, who have so denounced the
exoticisms of the colonial and orientialist gaze, now embrace
them as vehicles for subaltern political liberation. (2002: 54)
When using the concept of diaspora, migration scholars consequently
must be explicit about how they employ the term analytically and, at the
same time, distance themselves from its use by other people for politi-
cal and other purposes. In Brubaker’s (2005: 12) words ‘we should
think of diaspora in the first instance as a category of practice’ that
redefines and remakes the world and ‘only then ask whether, and how,
it can fruitfully be used as a category of analysis’, that is, to describe the
world.
The aim of this chapter is to scrutinise the predicaments that the
scholar faces when applying the concept of diaspora by discussing its
usefulness in the study of global migration. My suggestion is that dia-
spora serves as an analytical category to study particular aspects of mi-
gration processes rather than as a general term for all forms of hybrid-
ity and mobility in the contemporary world. More specifically, I propose
that we use diaspora to explore migrant populations as communities
that are constantly negotiated and contested and that exclude as much
as they include, rather than as entities that are bounded and homoge-
neous and that automatically embrace all migrants from a particular na-
tion. To illustrate this, I draw on my own Peruvian migration data ex-
ploring how diasporic networks and ties shape the conflicts, commit-
ments and organisations in which migrants living in the United States,
Spain and Argentina engage. I develop this analysis by first discussing
the analytical problems of using diaspora as a general concept to under-
stand social fluidity and identity construction in a globalising world and
suggesting an analytical framework to explore global migration. I then
investigate three kinds of power struggles and contestations among
Peruvians in the US, Spain and Argentina. My particular focus is on
the role that the bilateral ties, which migrants in the three countries cre-
ate with Peru, and the multi-sited ties, which they establish with
Peruvians in other parts of the world, play in these power struggles and
contestations. Finally, I discuss the possibilities of using the concept of
diaspora to understand Peruvian migration. I conclude by proposing
that it is primarily the Peruvian migrant elite who claim to belong to a
diasporic community and that well-off migrants construct such an iden-
tity by excluding large numbers of working-class and less privileged
Peruvian migrants.
My data indicate that diasporic populations often are very heteroge-
neous and that diasporic activities tend to be based on social class.
These insights resonate with a recent study by Waldinger, Popkin and
Aquiles, who found that the hometown associations of Salvadoran mi-
grants living in Los Angeles are torn by a double loyalty to both the
sending and receiving society and are therefore ridden by conflict
(2007). My data complement these findings, however, by showing that,
whereas the transnational dilemma of belonging to two places at one
and the same time tends to generate stress within small cross-border
migrant communities, such as the Salvadorans, class and ethnic con-
flicts within the migrant communities – as well as between these com-
munities and the state of the sending country – are the main source of
conflict in larger diasporic populations.
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5.1 Diaspora as an analytical concept
‘Diaspora’ is not limited to academic use, unlike its twin concept of
transnationalism, a term coined by US scholars whose main research
interest lies in migration processes between the US and Central
America, Mexico and the Caribbean. Quite the contrary, diaspora has a
long tradition in European political and cultural history, and it is only
recently that migration scholars have taken an interest in the concept
(Dufoix 2008: 4-34). Semantically, the two concepts refer to different
yet overlapping social phenomena and processes, which explains their
often inconsistent and confusing use in migration studies.
Transnationalism, on the one hand, indicates the links that migrants es-
tablish to their country or region of origin, which allows them simulta-
neously to create new lives in the receiving society and maintain strong
identity relations to the sending society (Portes, Guarnizo & Landolt
1999). Although it is true that transnational links are far from new in
the history of international migration, modern technology makes it pos-
sible to make more systematic use of such ties and maintain them
much longer than previously (Smith 2000).
Diaspora, on the other hand, means dispersion and indicates the
many bonds that – in response to either discrimination or assimilation
in the receiving societies – bring together people who share the same
migration history but are scattered in different locations. In its classic
definition, diaspora implies a people retaining a collective narrative of
suffering based on an experience of persecution and dispersion in their
mythical homeland that continues to make up a central point of refer-
ence in their creation of identities (Safran 1991). Moreover, diaspora is
commonly understood as a people or historical collectivity defined in
terms at once historical and religious, such as the Jews, the Greeks and
the Armenians. Typically, they themselves refer to an origin myth vested
with an almost sacred value, which gives the term a strong ethnic con-
notation (Stratton 1997). Diaspora has also conventionally been asso-
ciated with certain economic and social activities in the host society.
One was that of the merchant and another was that of the intellectual,
both giving rise to the image of diasporic minorities as intermediaries,
also labelled ‘middleman minorities’ (Bonacich 1973; see Schnapper
1999).
After 1968, the meaning of diaspora was broadened to include com-
munities that scholars had once labelled immigrant, nomadic or exilic.
In the words of Tölölyan: ‘Where once were dispersions, there now is
diaspora’ (1996: 3). On the one hand, this change in use of the term is
partly the result of a reorientation of identity from within the commu-
nities themselves that increasingly embrace the diasporic discourse. As
Clifford (1994b) reminds us, membership in a diaspora is now viewed
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as a strategy of empowerment because it entails the mobilisation of inter-
national support and influence both in the homeland and the host so-
ciety. On the other hand, this new proliferation of the term ‘diaspora’ is
also due to a shift in paradigm that took place in the 1990s, instigating
scholars to explain ethnic relations and identity processes as the outcome
of globalisation and transnationalisation. In effect, a growing number of
scholars exploring migration, multiculturalism and ethnicity have recast
their work as diasporic studies; this simultaneously allows them to cap-
ture the deterritorialised and fluid nature of modern life and account for
the local embeddedness and particular circumstantiality continuing to
shape people’s lives in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, precisely
because diaspora is associated with origin and primordialism as much
as with mobility and hybridity, it implies an immanent tension between
belonging and travel. The concept has therefore erroneously compelled
many scholars to study migrants, refugees and exiled people through the
same analytical lens that anthropologists, sociologists and other scholars
conventionally used to explore small-scale and marginal population
groups (Amit & Rapport 2002).
As a result, diaspora has become a new buzzword for culture and
identity as well as a conceptual vehicle to claim rights on behalf of peo-
ple who suffer from oppression or discrimination. Indeed, unless we
want to lump together in one category all forms of migrant commu-
nities and identities, we need to be more specific when labelling global
movements and networks as diasporic. Does doing so actually help us
understand the changes that take place within the migrant communities
we study? Or, does it lead to reification of transnational migrant groups
as homogenous or static social units and representation of their engage-
ments and concerns as the mere replication of national and ethnic iden-
tities on a global scale? This again raises critical questions regarding
the definition of our analytical unit and, more importantly, how we
study the process through which societies and communities emerge
and evolve into self-conscious constructions. As Amit and Rapport point
out, collective identities ‘whether defined in terms of nation, ethnicity,
occupation or political movement, are all too often invoked to fill the va-
cuum of location once filled (literally) by place’ (2002: 3). Thus, when
labelling particular emigrant groups as diasporic, we need to ask
whether we are referring to the mere demographic fact that a certain
fragment of a national population lives within a territory controlled by
other nation-states. Or, are we implying that this group has developed
its own political and cultural communities and created its own form of
identification (Vertovec 1997)?
In this chapter, I argue that although modern technology prompts a
growing proportion of the world’s population to move – making travel-
ling and migration a dominant dimension of modern life – this does
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not imply that all societies are diasporic or that all nations or cultures
generate diasporic identities. Rather than employing the notion of dia-
spora indiscriminately to all kinds of transnational networks and identi-
ties, I propose we follow Butler, who identifies an isolated set of cate-
gories for analysis applicable to all diasporas so as to help us not only
distinguish diasporas from other movements of people, but also consid-
er them a framework for the study of a specific process of community
formation (Butler 2001: 194). In Butler’s definition the following di-
mensions of diasporic research are particularly relevant as analytical ca-
tegories: the reasons for the dispersal, the relationship with the home-
land and the host lands, interrelationships with other communities in
the diaspora and comparative studies of different diasporas (2001: 195).
I suggest we use Butler’s approach in a slightly revised and reduced
form. In my approach, to be diasporic implies that a migrant population
consists of communities in several countries or cities outside the home-
land and that these communities, on the one hand, maintain a degree
of economic and political autonomy as an immigrant community in the
host societies and, on the other, create networks and ties to not only the
country of origin, but also migrants in other parts of the world.
Essentially, this makes the global web of relations linking migrants in
multiple destinations together the glue of diasporic populations. Hence,
in contrast to the notion of transnationalism, which I use to explore the
bilateral connections migrants construct to their country of origin, I un-
derstand diasporic networks and engagements as the multilateral net-
works and ties migrants create across regional and national boundaries
outside their homeland (Faist 1999: 46-47).
But how do we operationalise such an approach and apply it in em-
pirical research? Moreover, how do we identify those aspects of a mi-
grant population that actually are diasporic and those that are non-
diasporic? To answer these questions, I shall try to apply this approach
in my own study of Peru’s migrant population and discuss to what ex-
tent the ties and networks Peruvian migrants create are diasporic. I
therefore devote the remaining part of the chapter to the analysis of
three cases of power struggles that have instigated Peruvian migrants to
create and engage in multilateral networks and ties. The first case,
which I label ‘diaspora and politics’, involves a political conflict caused
by a labour migration chain to the US, stretching back more than three
decades. The second case, ‘diaspora and solidarity’, deals with a sense
of commitment that propels migrants to collect and remit money to
help their fellow countrymen in Peru. The third case, ‘diaspora and
class’, examines the networks and institutions that migrants create in
the US, Spain and Argentina. Although the data I draw on were col-
lected several years ago, the three cases shed light on ongoing processes
of power struggles in Peruvian migration that continue to cause conflict
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and tension among migrants (see Altamirano 2006; Berg &
Paerregaard 2005; Berg & Tamagno 2006; Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores del Perú 2005).2 A common theme running through my ana-
lysis is the fragmented nature of Peruvians’ diasporic relations and the
practices that tend to divide migrants anywhere they settle. More speci-
fically, the three cases show that, on the one hand, migrants’ attempt to
construct a unifying identity as Peruvians is ridden by ongoing ethnic
and class tensions and, on the other, their transnational engagement in
their homeland reproduces old political conflicts with the Peruvian
state, and generates new ones. In effect, the case studies prompt us to
ask: politics for whom? Solidarity for whom? Diaspora for whom?
5.2 Diaspora and politics
Over the past 30 years, over 3,000 Peruvians have worked on US sheep
ranches on the basis of an H-2A visa. Currently, almost 2,000 are work-
ing as sheepherders in the US for the Western Range Association
(WRA) and other agencies. Many of them have worked on as many as
five contracts each lasting three years. Their labour migration meets dif-
ferent economic needs and links distinct lives between the First World
and the Third World. At one end of the migration chain, the economic
and political crisis in Peru generates a constant supply of rural workers
in desperate search for alternative sources of income. At the other end,
the sheep ranching industry in the US looks for cheap labour to do
work North Americans will not accept. The two ends are connected
through a network of Peruvian herders who travel repeatedly between
the US and Peru. In the North, the ranch owners, the WRA and US im-
migration authorities control the flow of Peruvians who enter and leave
the US on H-2A visas; in the South, an informal network of family and
household relations assures the reproduction of the labour force and
provides new recruits (Paerregaard 2002). A critical aspect of this mi-
gration chain is a patron-client relationship between the herders and
their employers. Not only does it spur Peruvians to continue working in
the US and call upon new family members, but the dynamics are used
by US ranch owners and the WRA to discipline the herders to endure
harsh working conditions in the mountains and the desert and to deter
them from running away. Although this relationship creates anxiety
about upsetting the ranchers – who often exploit the herders’ fear to
scare them from complaining about their conditions, quitting the job or
returning to Peru before the contract expires – it also instigates some
herders to protest.
In 1995, a group of Peruvians living in Bakersfield, California, were
led by ex-herder Victor Flores to create the Unión de Pastores
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Ovejeros,3 an organisation for defending the rights of herders and dis-
seminating information about their situation in the US and Peru. The
union received public attention in Los Angeles the same year it was
formed because Peruvian newspaper Perú de los 90 began publishing a
series of articles about the herders’ situation.4 The news caused an in-
tense discussion within the Peruvian community in California about so-
lidarity among fellow migrants and the moral and legal rights of immi-
grants in the US.5 To many of them, it came as a surprise that herders
from remote villages in the Peruvian highland were working as legal
immigrants in the US in human conditions worse than they were used
to in Peru.
The scandal widened when Perú de los 90 reported that the Peruvian
consul in Los Angeles previously had ignored the herders’ complaints.
The news also reached one of Peru’s major dailies, La República,6 while
Caretas,7 a weekly magazine in Lima, reported on ill-treated Peruvian
herders in the US. Lima television channel Canal 4 produced a docu-
mentary on Peruvian herders in California in which two reporters inter-
viewed a Basque ranch owner who revealed the conditions in which his
Peruvian employers were living. The documentary sparked yet another
scandal among politicians in Lima, where President of Congress
Martha Chávez referred to the herders’ situation in a heated debate
about human rights in Peru. Similar reports on Spanish-language televi-
sion channels in the US caused moral indignation among Hispanic
minority groups. In 1996, the Peruvian ambassador, together with offi-
cials from the US Department of Labor, paid a personal visit to several
ranches employing Peruvian labourers.
The debate about economic exploitation and human rights abuses of
Peruvian herders in the US that emerged in the wake of the Bakersfield
herders’ union formation and Flores’ accusations against the WRA re-
flects the economic and social complexity of global migration networks.
Once the Peruvian community in Los Angeles, the media in Peru and
the US and politicians in Lima engaged in the controversy, the herders’
situation became the concern of economic, ethical and political interests
of very different kinds. Whereas the Peruvian consul in Los Angeles
was superseded, the editor of Perú de los 90 won an award for its cover-
age of the conflict. Meanwhile, Chávez played on national sentiments in
Peru, accusing the US government of double standards because it criti-
cised the human rights politics of the Fujimori government while ac-
cepting sheep ranchers’ abuses against Peruvian herders. For its part,
the political opposition in Peru traced the cause of the tragedy to the
failure of the Peruvian government in solving the country’s economic
problems.
Although Flores received the most attention, he was not the only ex-
herder to articulate the interests of the herders in public. In 1989,
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Teodocio returned to Peru after having completed a three-year work
contract in the US. Unlike Flores, who called on the US and Peruvian
authorities to keep a close eye on American sheep ranchers’ use of
Peruvian labour and, if necessary, bring it to a halt, Teodocio has argued
in favour of Peruvians taking work as sheepherders in the US, which
he thinks represents a unique opportunity for them to earn American
dollars. In Lima, he made friends with the Peruvian engineer in charge
of recruiting herders and occasionally offered him advice and support
in selecting new candidates. As the public debate of the herders’ situa-
tion in the US became more heated in the late 1990s, Teodocio and a
group of ex-herders in Huancayo warned that Flores’ critique of the
WRA and the sheep ranchers eventually would encourage them to look
for herders in other countries. Together they formed an association of
former WRA workers, the Asociación de Ex-Trabajadores de la Western
Ranch Association, with the aim of speaking in defence of the WRA
and the ranchers. In 1997, Teodocio was invited to present his view-
points at the committee for human rights formed by Peru’s congress.
He also met with Flores and representatives from the Peruvian govern-
ment to discuss the future of the migration programme. At the meet-
ing, an informal agreement was made among the WRA, the engineer
and the Peruvian government to respect the herders’ rights, and it was
decided to allow the migration programme to continue with few
changes.8 Within a short time, the public and political interest in the
herders’ situation faded away and the number of herders travelling to
the US continued to increase.
The labour conflict and the scandal it caused involved a broad range
of actors including migrants, journalists, officials and politicians out-
side as well as inside Peru. At one point, the conflict also caught the at-
tention of other Hispanics, which prompted Peruvians in California to
create multilateral ties outside Peru and think of themselves as belong-
ing to a wider immigrant community in the US. Once Peruvian journal-
ists and politicians engaged in the dispute, however, the matter was
transformed into a national issue of contention in Peru. In effect, it
changed meaning from being a multilateral engagement concerning all
migrants to a bilateral affair between the herders and the Peruvian
state.
5.3 Diaspora and solidarity
Many Peruvians feel obliged to contribute to the material wealth of their
countrymen in times of scarcity and crisis. This is expressed in their or-
ganised attempts to collect financial and material help from the
Peruvian government or from public or private institutions in Peru.
98 KARSTEN PAERREGAARD
This became evident in 1998 when El Niño hit Central and South
America, causing huge human losses and material damage in Peru.
Road connection between cities of the northern coast and the rest of
the country was interrupted, leaving thousands of people whose homes
and fields had been flooded beyond the reach of emergency assistance.
The disaster caused by El Niño also jeopardised the government’s policy
to spark economic growth, and created uncertainty about whether the
country’s recent economic recovery and its emergence from a recession
could be sustained. News about El Niño and images of its devastating
effect rapidly reached Peru’s emigrant population around the world and
stirred many migrants. Peruvian associations in the US began to collect
aid on behalf of Peru’s victims of El Niño. Initially, individual migrants
reacted in an ad hoc way, encouraging friends and neighbours to join
their efforts to help countrymen in Peru, but soon Peruvian associations
throughout the US followed their example. In Miami, a number of
Peruvian migrant associations organised a collection of clothing, food,
medicine, tools and money that was sent via the country’s national car-
rier at the time, Aeroperú, and several private Peruvian freight compa-
nies. During the collection, which took place on 14 and 15 February
1998 at a small plaza in front of a shopping centre in Kendall, Western
Miami, known among Peruvians as Plaza Perú, representatives from
different Peruvian associations and the Peruvian consulate in Miami
were present. To attract the attention of the Peruvian community in
Miami, several celebrities were brought in – including a famous
Peruvian model. According to one local Peruvian newspaper, more than
twenty tonnes of clothing and other items were collected over the two-
day affair.9 Other newspapers labelled the collection a success because
it encouraged cooperation in a common cause by a broad variety of
Peruvian associations and institutions in Miami, which might otherwise
have acted on their own and with different agendas.10 Likewise, many
participants also expressed their satisfaction that Peruvians in Miami
had managed to arrange a collection of such dimensions in collabora-
tion with the Peruvian consulate.
Migrants in other parts of the US also planned collections to aid the
victims of El Niño. On 22 March 1998, the Asociación de Instituciones
Peruanas en los Estados Unidos y Canadá (AIPEUC), an umbrella orga-
nisation encompassing all Peruvian institutions in the US and Canada,
arranged a nationwide telethon. It was organised locally by each of
AIPEUC’s chapters, in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, New York,
Chicago and Montreal. The president of the Los Angeles chapter, which
represents one of the largest Peruvian organisations in the US, invited
a variety of Peruvian artists, musicians and dance groups to entertain
guests at a rented banquet hall in Hollywood. Alongside the mandatory
entrance fee of twenty dollars, participants were encouraged to make
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donations. A majority discreetly dropped ten- or twenty-dollar bills in
collection boxes, but a few participants were invited up on the stage to
hand over their donations in public. These contributors were all suc-
cessful businesspersons, professionals and known members of the Los
Angeles Peruvian community who each donated up to a thousand dol-
lars. Simultaneously, other collections were arranged by independent
Peruvians associations in the area, such as the Arequipa Club in
Orange County. To stimulate competition between Peruvian commu-
nities across North America, the leaders of the AIPEUC updated organi-
sers and participants on the results of the campaign in other areas, thus
fostering a sense of simultaneity and shared commitment among
Peruvians in North America. The outcome of the many contributions
was later communicated to Peruvians in different parts of the US and
Canada through local newspapers.11
The migrants’ sense of solidarity, however, was directed towards not
only their countrymen, but also Peruvians living outside Peru.12
Periodically, this concern would trigger debates and campaigns within
the migrant communities as they sought to demonstrate solidarity with
Peruvians who suffer social injustice and discrimination in the host so-
ciety or otherwise fall victim to misfortune. In January 1998, a group of
Peruvians in Miami formed a committee with the aim of supporting
countrymen who struggle to regularise their undocumented status in
the US. The committee was founded by the editor of Miami’s Peruvian
newspaper El Chasqui and the leader of the Peruvian American
Coalition which, inspired by the success of the Cuban community in
Florida, urged Peruvians in the US to use their right to vote to elect a
countryman to congress.13 The committee’s political message was that
legal immigrants have a moral obligation to help undocumented immi-
grants because illegality is a universal condition that may affect the lives
of all immigrants. By the same token, some of the organisers who use
local immigrant newspapers in Spanish to communicate their message
contend that such a sense of solidarity should transcend national identi-
ties and include immigrants from all Latin American countries.14 So
far, however, the resonance of these attempts to create horizontal ties
across social classes and ethnic groups and incite the formation of a na-
tional identity among Peruvians immigrants in different parts of North
America has been limited.
In other parts of the world, similar movements have been formed
among Peruvian migrants to create a collective consciousness of them-
selves as a separate demographic unit and to mobilise for political pur-
poses. In Argentina, the Movimiento de Peruanos en el Exterior
(‘Movement of Peruvians Abroad’) was established in 1999. In colla-
boration with other emigrant communities in the US and Canada, its
aim was to promote the candidacy of an emigrant in the 2001 elections
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for Peruvian Congress.15 The movement’s political message is that be-
cause of migrants’ contributions to Peru’s economy through remit-
tances, the Peruvian government has a moral obligation to support
struggles against discrimination and marginalisation suffered by immi-
grants in their new countries of residence. Such a message encourages
migrants to think of themselves as a politically homogenous group who
share the same interests regardless of where they live or who they
are.16 Other Peruvian organisations in Argentina are also concerned
with the welfare of their countrymen, though for very different reasons.
In the 1950s and 1960s, hundreds of young Peruvian males went to
Argentina to study. Many returned to Peru, but others stayed and either
married Argentine women or brought their wives from Peru to settle in
Argentina. Some of these women who today are well established and in-
tegrated in Argentine society have formed an institution called the
Asociación de Damas Peruanas, which does charity work for newly ar-
rived Peruvians in need of help.17
Migrants’ efforts to collect aid on behalf of the victims of El Niño in
Peru and support their country of origin in time of war and interna-
tional conflict recurrently encourages them to come together and create
links to Peruvians in other cities and countries, thus forging multilat-
eral ties outside Peru. These attempts, however, often cannot be sus-
tained for very long, partly because migrants are internally divided and
partly because they distrust the Peruvian state. Furthermore, although
migrants’ engagement in Peruvian domestic politics has prompted
Peruvians in some countries to establish connections across national
boundaries, these ties are ridden by class conflict and focused on mi-
grants’ involvement in Peru rather than in the countries where they
live. Hence, rather than compelling migrants to create diasporic net-
works and ties, their sense of solidarity makes them turn attention to-
wards their country of origin.
5.4 Diaspora and class
In many of the communities that Peruvians establish outside Peru, mi-
grants reproduce the power relations and ethnic tensions that divide
Peruvian society into economic and social classes. This is evident from
the many migrant organisations and associations that Peruvians create
in their new countries of residence. Whereas some of these institutions
are open for all Peruvians who want to come together – to play football,
dance or watch folklore shows – others recruit their members according
to either regional origin or socio-economic class. The latter are therefore
more exclusive, which has important implications for their capacity to
forge diasporic networks and ties. In cities such as Miami, Los Angeles,
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New York and Paterson, New Jersey, migrants often form organisations
based on their regional attachment in Peru. Associations may be di-
vided along two lines: those based on migrants’ attachment to their na-
tive village and those based on attachment to their home province or de-
partment. Village-based associations are, above all, committed to the mi-
grants’ place of origin, often being engaged in an intense relationship
of economic and social exchange with their fellow villagers in Peru.
Organisations based on migrants’ attachment to their home province or
department, on the other hand, tend to attract a more heterogeneous
group of migrants of both urban and rural backgrounds.18
In contrast to social, cultural and regional institutions, class-based or-
ganisations normally recruit their members from Peru’s urban middle
or upper classes, being of mostly mestizo or European descent from
Lima and other major cities in Peru. These institutions can be of various
kinds, though are usually private clubs, professional organisations,
chambers of commerce or charity organisations. They exist in places
with more established Peruvian communities such as New York, Miami,
Los Angeles, Barcelona, Buenos Aires and Santiago, places that have
been the destination of Peruvian emigration for almost half a century.
Thus, during the 1950s and 1960s, hundreds of young men from
Peru’s middle- and upper-class families travelled to Spain and Argentina
to study medicine, law, agriculture, etc., at universities there. Many
decided to stay. They eventually married local women, got good jobs as
lawyers, physicians or veterinarians and became part of Spanish and
Argentinean society. However, most of them maintained their Peruvian
identity by forming associations. During the late 1980s and early 1990s,
Spain and Argentina received a new wave of Peruvians headed by a large
number of working-class migrants from Peru’s urban shantytowns emi-
grating at a time of economic and political crisis. Today, many of those
once newly arrived live on the margins of the host society, forming an
emergent proletariat of immigrant workers in Spain and Argentina.
Hence, their migration and livelihood experiences are radically different
from those of their predecessors, a difference that often leads to strife
within Peru’s immigrant communities in these countries.
This variety of migrant organisations reflects Peruvians’ possibilities
for creating multilateral networks. Thus, migrants from Peru’s rural
areas and urban shantytowns tend to organise in regional and ethnic as-
sociations, which serve as vehicles to sustain ties to their place of origin
and engage in transnational relations of exchange with their relatives in
Peru. Rarely, however, do they develop links to migrant communities in
other parts of the world. If they do, these bonds are usually not only
secondary to the relations that link them to the homeland, but also take
the form of trans-state rather than transnational connections (Waldinger
& Fitzgerald 2004: 1182). Migrants from Peru’s better-off strata, on the
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other hand, are more likely to establish relations with other migrant
groups because their social and professional status in Peru eases the
problems of obtaining stay and work permits in host countries and be-
cause they suffer less from social and cultural prejudices than other
Peruvians. Their privileged position enhances their mobility and allows
them to create migrant institutions, based on class and profession, and
form networks with Peruvians from their own strata in other parts of
the world. This is clearly evident in the Peruvian American Medical
Society (PAMS), one of the oldest migrant institutions in North
America, founded by Peruvian medical doctors who migrated to the US
to work during the Vietnam War.19 Today this association has around
1,500 members with its own office in Chicago and a number of local
chapters in the US.20 Similar institutions were created by Peruvians
who studied at Spanish and Argentinean universities in the 1950s and
1960s and ultimately stayed abroad to establish families. In Spain, mi-
grants formed an organisation called Convención Nacional de Médicos
Hispano-Peruanos, which comprises approximately 800 Peruvian doc-
tors and has seven chapters in Spain’s major cities. In Argentina,
Peruvian doctors are organised in the Asociación Peruano-Argentina de
Médicos, which is also divided into local chapters. The main chapter in
Buenos Aires represents between two and three thousand Peruvian doc-
tors. Apart from the annual meetings these institutions organise nation-
ally for their members, a global gathering for all Peruvian doctors living
outside Peru has been arranged on a number of occasions.21
In several North American cities, an exclusive group of male
Peruvians has formed associations for former students of the Leoncio
Prado Military Academy, Peru’s most respected military school in
Lima.22 These associations function as institutional anchors of a global
network of ex-students of Leoncio Prado – so-called Leonciopradinos –
who today are architects, engineers, doctors, bank directors, business-
men, etc., living in the US, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and different
parts of Europe. They also help Leonciopradinos who want to emigrate in
finding jobs and getting adjusted to their new environment. Thanks to
the support they receive from the network and their frequent communi-
cation on the internet and by email, many former Leonciopradinos feel
as much at home in their new countries of residence as in Peru. As
one such graduate explained it:
We are very well organised because we are all professionals with good
jobs. We use the internet and communicate by email. We help each
other whenever there is need. They help me finding a job and later I
help somebody else.
Truly, this exclusive sector of Peru’s emigrant population has created
a stable network of diasporic connections that allow migrants to feel
Peruvian without sustaining active ties to their homeland.
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5.5 A Peruvian diaspora?
This chapter has explored how Peruvian migrants negotiate and engage
in three types of conflicts and power struggles and investigated how
these negotiations and engagements compel them to forge diasporic
networks and ties. The first case examined a political conflict that
emerged because of the economic exploitation and physical abuse of
Peruvians who work as sheepherders in the US. It discussed how the
conflict caused a scandal within the Hispanic media in the US and a
critique of the Peruvian state because it failed to provide the herders le-
gal and moral assistance. However, even when the scandal reached its
peak and became an issue of contestation – first, between the Peruvian
consulate, the press in Los Angeles and media in Lima and, later, be-
tween the Peruvian and the US governments – the networks and ties it
activated were mainly bilateral. Rather than mobilising Peruvians in
other parts of the world and thus prompting migrants to engage in mul-
tilateral networks across regional and national boundaries, the conflict
became a tense issue between migrants and the Peruvian state, thereby
forging transnational ties at the cost of diasporic ones.
The second case focused on Peruvians’ commitment to help their
countrymen in Peru and other places. This commitment prompts them
to organise collections of aid to help the victims of natural disasters in
Peru and to arrange campaigns to support fellow migrants struggling to
regularise their illegal status in a host society. Such activities generate a
feeling of solidarity with Peruvians not merely in Peru, thus reinforcing
ties to the homeland, but also in other parts of the world. As such, they
provide migrants with a notion of simultaneity in time and homogene-
ity as a social group. Peruvians’ awareness of constituting a global social
unit, however, is susceptible to the vicissitudes of politics and dominat-
ing rhetoric of nationalism in the homeland. During times of political
conflict in Peru, the Peruvian government often plays on the patriotism
of the country’s migrant population and its loyalty to the homeland,
which tends to lead to its division, rather than unification. In effect, mi-
grants’ feelings of unity and shared national identity seldom last long.
Although many support with great enthusiasm the humanitarian assis-
tance campaigns that Peruvian organisations launch from time to time,
tensions often break out once the aid and solidarity become an object of
political controversy.
The third case examined migrant institutions and the social class re-
lations that transcend them. Whereas some social and cultural organisa-
tions are open to all migrants, others recruit Peruvians according to
class, ethnic and regional affiliation and therefore divide rather than
unite them. In fact, the only groups of migrants that have developed
multilateral networks linking Peruvians in several locations across
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regional and national boundaries are the associates of professional mi-
grant organisations, such as medical associations in the US, Spain and
Argentina and the more confined and exclusive networks of former stu-
dents of Peru’s elite schools and military academies. In Peruvian migra-
tion, then, diasporic networks and ties emerge from the same conflicts
and struggles that divide Peruvians in Peru into social classes and eth-
nic groups and remain a privilege in the hands of the most powerful
sectors of the country’s migrant population. Indeed, to this small group
of trained professionals and economically well-off Peruvians, it may be
argued that the idea of diaspora exists in the form of a cosmopolitan
identity (see Hannerz 1996: 102-111). This notion of a dispersed ethnic
community united by a shared loyalty to the homeland is based, how-
ever, on the exclusion of the vast majority of fellow migrants. In other
words, it is the identity of an urban elite from upper-class neighbour-
hoods in Lima who often claim descent from European immigrants. As
indicated in this chapter, their success in mobilising other social classes
and ethnic groups has so far been limited.
The fact that only a small group of Peruvians has created multilateral
networks and ties and engaged in diasporic activities can be attributed
to several factors. First of all, Peruvians tend to disperse across many
countries and cities, which undermines their ability to establish orga-
nised migrant communities in the receiving countries and to create
firm economic, social and political ties with their country of origin or
between different migrant settlements. A second factor is that, with the
exception of the US, which has been the destination of Peruvian mi-
grants since the mid-1950s, it is only twenty years ago that Peru’s exo-
dus gained momentum. In addition, Peru’s migrant population is extre-
mely heterogeneous and includes migrants of both sexes, as well as of
almost all social strata and ethnic and regional groups. Moreover, unlike
some governments in the Caribbean, Mexico and Central America that
put migration on the top of their political agenda, the Peruvian state
has only recently begun to show concern for its emigrant population
(Berg & Tamagno 2006), a concern that makes it into the headlines of
Peru’s public media only rarely. In fact, the flow of information between
the country and its migrant population is surprisingly thin and, except
for recurrent estimates of migrants’ remittances and their impact on
the country’s development, the only news that appears in the Peruvian
media are occasional reports about migrants who have been caught by
the police or immigration authorities because they have broken the law
or travelled illegally.
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5.6 Conclusion
It is now pertinent to return to the opening question of this chapter: to
ask what kind of networks and ties Peruvian migrants forge when they
engage in conflicts and power relations. The material discussed indi-
cates that Peruvian migration is characterised by few, if any, diasporic
aspects and that these are restricted to the exclusive activities and repre-
sentations of a small group of migrants. Considering that the majority
of Peruvians who have emigrated in the past twenty or 30 years belong
to an emergent working class of immigrants in the First World, this ob-
servation underscores Schnapper’s (1999: 33) point that ‘proletarian po-
pulations are undoubtedly less likely to maintain themselves as a dia-
spora’. Moreover, my material demonstrates that migrant communities
often constitute extremely heterogeneous populations divided by class,
ethnicity, education, gender and age, which provides support for
Brubaker’s (2005: 12) suggestion that rather than essentialising the
term ‘diaspora’ by giving it a specific meaning, ‘we should think of dia-
spora not in substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but rather as an
idiom, a stance, a claim.’ Finally, the material reminds us that, as scho-
lars, we should be careful not to use the term ‘diaspora’ to portray the
life of contemporary migrants in ways that pull the wires of a political
discourse to serve the interests of exporting companies, remittance
agencies, politicians, development planners and journalists rather than
those to whom the term actually refers: the vast majority of migrants
struggling daily to cross national boundaries, legalise their papers, find
jobs and create new lives in foreign places.
Notes
1 Ong states that diasporic studies ‘look at the subjective experience of displacement,
victimhood, cultural hybridity, and cultural struggles in the modern world’ (1999: 12).
2 I collected the bulk of data between 1997 and 2001, with supplementary data gath-
ered between 2003 and 2005. I used a multi-sited strategy to conduct field research
among Peruvians in the US, Spain, Italy, Argentina, Chile and Japan. The multi-sited
approach allowed me to explore global relations and diasporic identities through in-
depth ethnographic studies in selected countries and research sites.
3 The union is associated with the United Farm Workers of America (UFWA) of the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).
4 Perú de los 90 Vol. 9: 2, 3, 4 (February, March, April 1998). See also Los Angeles Times
17 August 2000: A3+A23; Oregon & The West 15 July 2001: A21 + A24.
5 Many Peruvians living in the US have either entered the country illegally or over-
stayed a tourist visa and live and work as domestic servants, gardeners, waiters, con-
struction workers, etc., in the big cities.
6 La República 16 August 1996: Local.
7 Caretas 20 June 1996: No. 1419.
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8 Whereas Flores was successful in calling the public’s attention to the matter, he
failed to mobilise the support of herders in the US and Peru. Though many agreed
that the ranch conditions were reprehensible, they also shared Teodocio’s concern
that the controversy jeopardised their future prospects for working on labour con-
tracts in the US, to thus save capital and create an alternative source of income. The
dispute, then, not only disclosed the predicaments inherent in Flores’ strategy
– through media attention and with the help of Peruvian politicians, to organise the
herders in fighting the WRA and, in so doing, to fight the US sheepherding industry
on the whole – but also demonstrated the complexity of economic, social and political
interests involved in global migration practice.
9 El Chasqui No. 3: 98 (February 1998).
10 Peru News No. 2 (March 1998).
11 Última Hora Vol. 1: 5 (April 1998); El Panamericano Vol. 5: 72 (April 1998); Actualidad
Vol. 6: 82 (April 1998); Peruvian Times Vol. 7: 13 (March 1998).
12 Peruvians also showed concern for their home country during the 1995 war Peru
briefly fought against Ecuador over the border separating the two countries. Rather
than uniting migrants, as happened in 1998 when Peruvians collected money to aid
the victims of El Nin˜o, however, the conflict with Ecuador tended to divide Peruvians
into two groups: those supporting President Fujimori in his martial rhetoric against
neighbouring Ecuador and those in favour of a pan-American – rather than national –
identity, seeking a peaceful solution of the conflict.
13 A similar movement, called La Plataforma Socio-Polı´tica Peruana Americana
(‘Peruvian American Socio-Political Platform’) was created in California in 1998 (Perú
de los 90 Vol. 9: 2 (February 1998)).
14 La Crónica No. 5: 42 (January 1998), El Chasqui No. 3: 98 (February 1998); Peru News
No. 2 (March 1998).
15 El Heraldo del Perú No. 3 (October 2000); Gaceta del Perú No. 217 (October 2000).
16 One of the movement’s leaders is brother to former Peruvian President Alejandro
Toledo. The candidate promoted by the movement as candidate for Peruvian
Congress was the owner of the biggest Peruvian remittance agency in Argentina,
Argenper.
17 Similar institutions exist in most US cities with a major concentration of Peruvian
immigrants.
18 This division of regional associations is reflected in migrant institutions that evolve
from rural-urban migration practice in Peru (Paerregaard 1997: 65-70).
19 PAMS also has a few Peruvians dentists in its membership.
20 Some members of PAMS deplore the fact that the institution attracts few new mem-
bers. This can be attributed to the growing difficulties encountered by Peruvian doc-
tors who have studied in Peru and later emigrate as they try to revalidate their aca-
demic degrees in the US. In effect, PAMS is increasingly becoming an institution for
middle-aged or senior doctors that in time will fade away.
21 On several occasions, the global gathering of Peruvian medical doctors in the US has
been held in Lima to support the development of medical science in Peru.
22 In Los Angeles there are two such institutions: Asociacio´n de Ex-Cadetes de Colegios
Militares del Peru´ and Asociacio´n L
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Chapter 6
A global perspective on transnational migration:
Theorising migration without methodological
nationalism
Nina Glick Schiller
6.1 Introduction
There is currently a large and growing body of descriptive studies of
transnational migration. These studies document the many ways in
which migrants and their descendants live their lives both within and
across the borders of multiple nation-states. Often these studies seem
curiously disconnected from both social theory and a series of powerful
and contradictory narratives about migration and its consequences. In
these narratives, migrants appear as destabilising or even criminal in-
truders into nation-states, or as coveted global talent, or as the last best
hope of homelands whose development depends on migrant generated
remittances. Rather than addressing these contradictions within the
realm of social theory, mainstream migration scholars, especially those
concerned with public policy, respond to contemporary attacks on mi-
grants and migration by adopting the perspective of their respective na-
tion-states. Arguing for the need for, or providing evidence of, the long-
term trends towards integration, they accept national borders as the bor-
ders of society and as the necessary institutional nexus for citizenship,
democratic rights or a social welfare state (Alba 2003; Esser 2001). For
their part, many scholars of transnational migration, despite their de-
scriptions of cross-border processes, have also displayed what Wimmer
and I (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002) have called a ‘methodological
nationalist’ approach. They have responded to critiques of dual national-
ities and transnational social fields by assurances that migrants with
such ties and loyalties can and will rapidly assimilate (Portes 1999;
Morawska 2002). In so doing, scholars of transnational migration con-
tribute to the assumption – which has been foundational for much of
migration scholarship – that the migrant/native divide is the fundamen-
tal challenge to social cohesion and the stability and welfare of the
states in which migrants settle.
Meanwhile, politicians and journalists to an increasing extent directly
defend the migrant/native divide by projecting an image of their
nation-state as a normative cultural community. For example, in the
United Kingdom, former Financial Times journalist and founder of the
current affairs monthly Prospect David Goodhart, argues the following:
The justification for giving priority to the interests of fellow citi-
zens boils down to a pragmatic claim about the value of the
nation-state. Without fellow-citizen favouritism, the nation-state
ceases to have much meaning. And most of the things that liber-
als desire – democracy, redistribution, welfare states, human
rights – only work when one can assume the shared norms and
solidarities of national communities.1
In this chapter, I argue that if migration scholars set aside their metho-
dological nationalism, transnational migration studies can contribute to
social theories that elucidate the mutual constitution of the global, na-
tional and local. Migration scholarship can provide a global perspective
on power that explains the relationship between the contemporary con-
tradictory narratives about migrants that either demonise them or cele-
brate them. Rather than being evaluated as either good or bad, migra-
tion can be discussed as part of broader transnational processes within
which nation-states are enmeshed and to which they contribute.
In the first section of this chapter, I elaborate a critique of the taken-
for-granted use of the nation-state as a unit of analysis that underlies
much of migration scholarship including that which addresses transna-
tional migration. In the next section, I look to the literature on neo-
liberal restructuring of capital accumulation within specific places. I ar-
gue that by highlighting transnational processes past and present and
addressing institutionalised power, this literature can serve as a concep-
tual starting point for new perspectives on migration. Finally, I sketch
some of the ways in which a new perspective, which I call a ‘global
power analysis of migration’, can bring together the various apparently
contradictory trends within migration discourses and scholarship, as
well as explain their simultaneous emergence and relationships.
6.2 Weaknesses of migration scholarship
Building on several decades of scholarship around the construction and
naturalisation of ‘national communities’, I use the term ‘methodological
nationalism’ to critique the tendency of migration scholars to conflate
the nation-state with a concept of society. By methodological national-
ism I mean an ideological orientation that approaches the study of
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social and historical processes as if they were contained within the bor-
ders of individual nation-states. Members of those states are assumed
to share a common history and set of values, norms, social customs
and institutions (Beck 2000; Chernilo 2007). Taking state borders as
societal boundaries creates a mode of logic that makes immigrants the
fundamental threat to social solidarity; natives are assumed to share
uniformly common social norms. Because methodological nationalists
project each state as not only historically discrete sovereign states but
also separate societies, they portray migrants as arriving with particular
distinctive national norms. Much of migration theory consistently disre-
gards both the social and cultural divisions within each nation-state, as
well as the experiences, norms and values migrants and natives share,
because they are embedded in social, economic and political processes,
networks, movements and institutions that exist both within and across
state borders.
Because many migration scholars accept this kind of bounded think-
ing and employ a container approach to society, our relationship to mi-
gration debates often leads to an unquestioning acceptance of the un-
derlying premises of a politics and public policy of exclusion. Migration
scholars speak as though there are discrete national economies and as
if what happens on state territory were a product solely or primarily of
state policies. More fundamentally, as Castles notes (2007), migration
theory stands apart from more general developments in social theory. It
is for this reason that migration studies that examine global movements
of people have been strangely silent with regard to recent developments
in social theory. Such developments include an increasingly sophisti-
cated scholarship about past and present periods of globalisation, a the-
orisation of a global network society, discussions of a second modernity,
critiques of methodological nationalism and advocacy for methodologi-
cal cosmopolitanism (Beck 2000; Castells 2000; Latour 2004; Massey,
Arango, Hugo, Kouaouci Pellegrino & Taylor 1998; Sassen 1991).
Even scholars of transnational migration or diaspora have often
bound their unit of study along the lines of national or ethnic identities.
They have generally failed to link their descriptions of migrant local
and trans-border connections to analyses of new flexible modes of capi-
tal accumulation and the contemporary neo-liberal restructuring of
space, self and modes of social legitimation. The end result is that their
unit of analysis – often described as a ‘transnational community’ – be-
comes a migrating population defined and delimited by communal cul-
tural identities that define a ‘transnational space’. It is for this reason, I
believe, that so much of the scholarship about transnational migration
is about identity formation or its persistence across borders (Levitt
2001; Pries 2001; Faist 2000b). These weaknesses have led scholars of
transnational migration into two contradictory, equally untenable and
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sometimes simultaneously held positions: the celebration of migrant-
built remittance economies and the description of migrant transnation-
alism as an ephemeral first-generation phenomenon that portends
eventual assimilation. It is no wonder, as Bauböck (2008b: 8) has noted,
that policy discourses recognising transnational migration are so
contradictory:
There seems to be little reflection on the diversity of orientations
within migrant groups that do not identify themselves as dia-
sporas. Moreover, there is little awareness of the tension between
testing individual efforts at cultural integration as a condition of
admission to long-term residence or citizenship and the hope
that transnational ties can be instrumentalised for co-develop-
ment and reducing emigration pressure. Frequently, ministries
in charge of foreign relations and development pursue agendas
that conflict with policies promoted by ministries of justice and
home affairs.
In building a global power perspective on migration, the concept of
transnational social field allows for more conceptual clarity.
Transnational social fields are networks of networks that link indivi-
duals directly or indirectly to institutions located in more than one na-
tion-state. These linkages are part of the power dynamics through
which institutionalised social relations delineate social spaces (Basch,
Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc 1994; Glick Schiller 2003, 2004, 2005).
The term ‘field’ is used not metaphorically but, rather, as a means of lo-
cating individual migrants within territorially situated social relation-
ships: taxation, employment, education, policing, property ownership,
law and public policy, for example. The transnational social fields of mi-
grants can contribute to, be shaped by or contest the local or transna-
tional reach of various states’ military, economic and cultural powers.
The concept of transnational social fields I am advocating does not uti-
lise Bourdieu’s notion of fields as discrete domains of power. Instead,
building on classic social anthropology and geographers’ recent interest
in networks, I focus on social relations that intersect and transform dis-
crete territorially based and historically specific social spaces of local
community, village, city or state (Epstein 1958; Mitchell 1969).
Geographers have theorised the social construction of space in relation-
ship to transnational networks, but their work has not been adequately
utilised by migration scholars despite the popularity of spatial meta-
phors in transnational studies.
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6.3 The constraints of current theoretical frameworks
To make sense of the contradictory policies that highlight and yet im-
pede transnational migration, as well as to place migration within social
theory in a way that is conceptually unconstrained by borders of nation-
states, we need a global power perspective on transnational migration.
A transnational perspective on migration that discards methodological
nationalism and begins from a theorisation of global power has the fol-
lowing merits. First, it situates migration as one of numerous processes
that both cross state borders and contribute to the constitution or re-
striction of state powers. Second, it recognises the continuing impor-
tance of states as actors within and across state borders. We cannot cur-
rently dispense with states as instruments to create and protect rights,
to redistribute wealth and to protect public goods and services. The le-
gal regimes, policies and institutional structures of power must be ac-
knowledged in our scholarship and examined within a global power per-
spective. Third, this perspective recognises that states constitute only
one set of institutions of power that extend transnationally. Financial
conglomerates, NGOs, religious organisations, treaty-based organisa-
tions and corporations are also institutions of power that work across
state borders. Finally such a perspective builds on, yet also critiques,
theorisations of global networks positing that the world has been trans-
formed into a space of flows.
To date, the theoretical frameworks used by migration scholars have
been lacking in one or more of these four domains. Many fail to ad-
dress power. It is strange that migration scholarship has had so little to
say about the global exercise of power, since the question of power
structures whether or not we even define a person who moves across
state borders as a migrant. Clearly, those who have rights as citizens in
states or confederations of states that dominate the world militarily and
economically – namely the United States and the European Union –
have been able to move to the rest of the world with few barriers.
People from the rest of the world have not been able to return the fa-
vour. This makes them migrants and the subject of migration scholar-
ship. It would seem, therefore, that migration scholarship requires a
global perspective on power beginning with this basic disparity between
states to examine what combination of forces fosters and maintains this
inequality (Grosfoguel & Cervantes-Rodríguez 2002; Cervantes-
Rodríguez 2009; Castles 2007; Mittleman 1994).
Even migration theorists who specifically acknowledge theoretical fra-
meworks that look beyond the nation-state – world systems, world so-
ciety or Braudelian world-scale theories – approach the global in ways
that ultimately negate a global perspective on migration (Wallerstein
2004; Luhmann 1997; Braudel 1980). They negate this perspective by
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maintaining distinctions between levels of analysis. A distinction be-
tween levels of analysis is conceptually inadequate for migration studies
for several reasons. It perpetuates migration scholarship’s penchant for
discussing the connection between states and migrants as one of push-
pull rather than as a single set of globe-spanning processes. A concept
of levels of analysis ultimately reintroduces methodological nationalism
and, with it, the assumption that processes within the boundaries of the
nation-state can be analysed without reference to globe-spanning insti-
tutions of power.
For example, by arguing in terms of levels of analysis, Massey ulti-
mately dismisses a global perspective from his multi-factorial effort to
synthesise contradictory migration theories (Massey et al. 1998).
Massey focuses on a ‘migration process’ with internal dynamics that
constitutes a discrete field of study. Rich in data and insights into pro-
cess, his approach encourages migration scholars to disregard the ways
in which global institutions of power shape, and are shaped by, social
relationships in specific localities.
Employing a similar logic Portes (2006: 8), a pre-eminent US migra-
tion scholar, in a recent paper on migration and development states:
At a higher level of abstraction, we find world-systems and other
neo-Marxist theories that view labour migration as a natural re-
sponse to the penetration of weaker societies by the economic
and political institutions of the developed world. The concept of
‘structural imbalancing’ (Portes and Walton 1981) was introduced
to highlight this process that takes multiple forms – from direct
recruitment of workers to the diffusion of consumption expecta-
tions bearing little relation to local lifestyles and economic
means.
If looking beyond the nation-state is conceptualised as a higher level of
abstraction – that is to say, a macro-level analysis – then we are unable
to observe and theorise the interpenetration between globe-spanning in-
stitutions that structure imbalances of power and migrant experiences
within and across states borders. Yet, this imbalance of power both
shapes the circumstances that compel people to migrate and simulta-
neously constitutes the conditions under which migrants attempt to set-
tle and develop transnational social fields. The signing of NAFTA,
which Portes (2006) in the same paper consigns to the macro-level, is
not an abstraction. It represented the power of an imperial state – the
US – instituting its agenda through its control of finance capital and
military force. Capital is at its core a social relationship that links people
together unequally within and across national borders. Notions of levels
of analysis obscure this basic transnational aspect of daily life around
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the globe, which not only penetrates states but also shapes distinct mi-
grant social fields across and within states.
Even those social theorists who speak of world society have tended to
focus their concerns about migration on their own nation-state and its
institutional nexus in ways that make that state their unit of analysis.
For example, Bommes (2005) claims that, following Luhmann, he is re-
placing ‘a concept that understands society as a big collective/collectivity
by a concept of modern world society’. The relationship between these
nation-state systems and the world society, however, remain under-deli-
neated and unclear in Bommes’ migration theory, leaving the door open
to a continuation of methodological nationalist framing of debates on
immigration. For example, Bommes’ arguments about migrant assimi-
lation are accompanied by a list of institutions, many of which – even
in the context of the EU – can only be sensibly read as remaining em-
bedded in national regulatory systems such as the welfare system of in-
dividual states.
The main point of reference for assimilation is differentiated social
systems:
organisations and functional realms like the modern economy,
law, politics, science, education or health but not groups of (ma-
jority) societies. (Bommes 2005)
The weakness in Bommes’ theorisation is not his insistence on the con-
tinuing significance of nation-states and national institutions. Rather,
the problem is a failure to address the way local and national govern-
ance and the workforce have been reconstituted within a transnational
institutional nexus to serve the broader needs of finance capital.
Even those social theorists who begin by embracing methodological
individualism privilege the nation-state as their unit of analysis when
they discuss migration. For example, Esser (2004) champions a rational
choice framework that builds on methodological individualism.
However, Esser places the onus of assimilation on the rational choice of
the individual migrant who must come to terms with the structural con-
ditions of the societies he or she faces. Generally, ‘societies’ for Esser
are discrete countries that he describes as sending and ‘host’ societies.
Hence, transnational ties are simply a sign of ‘ethnic capital’. As Esser
(2004: 1135) argues:
Immigrants have (or should have) an objective interest in assimi-
lative actions and investments in receiving country capital, like
formal education or the acquisition of the host society’s lan-
guage, and one would expect the same investment strategies to
apply as for the indigenous population. The problems migrants
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(and their offspring) face (in relation to most sections of the indi-
genous population) are obvious: what they mainly have at their
disposal is ethnic group capital, like the sending country’s lan-
guage or ethnic social capital. However, ethnic group capital is
clearly less efficient than receiving-country capital. By compari-
son, it is, in most cases, specific capital, because its usability de-
pends on special circumstances, such as the existence of an eth-
nic community or a transnational network.
‘Transnational’ for Esser is simply another term for segregation because
he cannot conceive of incorporation ‘beyond’ the nation-state.
Simultaneous incorporation in more than one nation-state and society
build on transnational social fields that connect various scales of gov-
ernance (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004).
6.4 Towards a grounded global power framework for migration
studies
There are several bodies of literature from which to draw in order to de-
velop a global perspective on transnational migration. They can illumi-
nate the current contradictory narratives on migration, but have not
been used to address transnational migration within global fields of un-
equal power. Scholars such as Castells (2000) and Latour (2004), who
trace networks of interconnections that are not confined to nation-
states, provide the basis for an analysis of migrants’ transnational social
fields within the current historical conjuncture and their transforma-
tions of human relations. However, neither has addressed migration or
migrants’ encounters with regimes of borders, racialisation and dehu-
manisation. Beck (2007) provides a critique of methodological national-
ism that privileges a global perspective and the role of migrants as
transnational actors. He assumes that transnational migrants are cos-
mopolitan actors who necessarily and properly destabilise nationalist
projects. Beck homogenises migrants and echoes the opponents of mi-
gration who argue that migrants’ transnationality threatens the regime
of nation-states. Migrants are not necessarily transgressive in their
transnational social fields. They may engage in nation-state-building in
one or more nation-states. They may reinforce or contribute to, rather
than contest, neo-liberal projects. A global power perspective on migra-
tion must address the various positionalities migrants have assumed
within attempts to implement neo-liberal capitalism and the types of
contradictions these positions are currently engendering.
There is a scholarship that addresses unequal power and connects so-
cial forces that extend beyond individual states to the experience of
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people in particular places as they contribute to the substantiation of
both locality and nation-states. This literature emerges out of the analy-
sis of uneven globalisation. It has been led by geographers concerned
with the neo-liberal restructuring of governance, the processes of capital
accumulation and the reinventing of cities and urban life. With few ex-
ceptions, such as the global cities literature, this scholarship does not
address migration. Nevertheless, the research and theorisation con-
tained in this literature can prove useful to the project of developing a
global power perspective on migration.
Neo-liberalism can be defined as a series of contemporary projects of
capital accumulation that, beginning in the 1970s, sought to reconsti-
tute social relations of production, including the organisation of labour,
space, state institutions, military power, governance, membership and
sovereignty (Harvey 2005, 2006; Jessop 2002). Neo-liberalism has al-
lowed for the creation of wealth by destroying and replacing previous
relations of production, consumption and distribution, thus generating
new forms of desire. The neo-liberal agenda reflected, therefore, more
general processes of capital accumulation characterised by Marx as
‘creative destruction’. There are always within capitalist economics con-
tradictions between the need first to construct, and then to replace, pre-
viously built social relations, ideas, values, political arrangements and
institutions that regulate, circulate and protect capital. The accumulated
impact of the transformations wrought by these projects and the poli-
cies and technologies that accompany them can be called neo-liberal re-
structuring, while the policies that institute the transformations can be
termed the neo-liberal agenda.
The term ‘agenda’ is useful because it reminds us of several aspects
that have structured the contemporary moment and produced the cur-
rent global crisis. Neo-liberal projects have taken the form of specific
sets of ideas and policies that may or may not be successfully imple-
mented. These ideas have been held, shaped, defended and contested
by a range of actors – including social scientists – whether or not they
are directly linked to policy. The broader projects involved not just the
domain of economics but also politics, cultural practices, ideas about
self and society and the production and dissemination of images and
narratives. In terms of specific social policies that affect the quality of
life for migrants and natives alike, neo-liberal restructuring has in-
cluded a reduction in state services and benefits and a diversion of pub-
lic monies and resources to develop private service-oriented industries
from health care to housing (sometimes in arrangements called ‘public-
private partnerships’). It has also constituted a relentless push towards
global production through the elimination of state intervention in a host
of economic issues – from tariffs to workers’ rights. Finally, the term
‘neo-liberal agenda’ and the work of geographers in exploring the
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implementation of these agendas is useful because neo-liberal projects
are implemented on the ground and differentially – depending not just
on different national policies, but on specific local histories including
that of migration.
By conceptualising the global restructuring of capital accumulation
and its relationship to urban and state restructuring processes, migra-
tion theorists can examine the ways in which the migration process is
shaped, in turn, shapes local space and is at the same time reflective of,
and contributes to, transnational processes. They can address Castles’
(2006: 1) call to analyse the way in which ‘migration plays a central role
in current global processes of social, economic and political change’, as
well as his observation that ‘migration is both moulded by and helps to
mould these global transformations’. At the same time, migration scho-
lars will have an analytic perspective that does not dichotomise macro-
level versus micro-level analysis, does not speak of levels of abstraction
and does not make the nation-state the exclusive unit of analysis. That
analytic perspective allows us to put migrants into the spaces where
they live and to which they are connected through various social
networks.
Of particular interest in this regard is a debate in geography about
the meaning and utility of the concept of geographic scale (Brenner
1999; Herod & Wright 2001; Marston, Hohn & Woodward 2005).
Previously, geographers worked with a concept of scale that portrayed
the local as being nested within larger encompassing units, which often
have political boundaries – municipalities, sub-state administrative
units, nation-states, geographic regions such as Europe and the globe.
Over the past few decades, geographers have had to confront a restruc-
tured world in which the implementation of neo-liberal agendas dis-
rupted fixed notions of nested and territorially bounded political units.
Cities became dynamic players within global fields of power and flows
of capital and labour, globally marketing their urban brand and, in some
ways, creating their own foreign policies and alliances (Brenner &
Theodore 2002; Jessop 2001; Peck 1998). They competed in an effort
to attract flows of capital and a mix of ‘new economy’ industries. New
economy industries are ones that produce services demanded within
the global economy, including the very consumption of locality in the
form of tourism. Central to this new economy are ‘knowledge’ indus-
tries, which produce the workers, skills, technologies and consumptive
patterns necessary to organise, aggregate and concentrate capital.
Geographers and scholars of the urban began to describe the neo-
liberal rearrangements of governance of territory as ‘rescaling pro-
cesses’ through which localities change the parameters of their global,
national and/or regional connectedness so that they ‘jump scale’
(Swyngedouw 1992). The term ‘rescaling’ emerged as a way to address
118 NINA GLICK SCHILLER
the repositioning of the status and significance of cities, both in rela-
tionship to states and within global hierarchies of urban-based institu-
tional power. Rather than understanding the local and global scale as
either discrete levels of social activities or hierarchical analytical abstrac-
tions, as in previous geographies of space, ‘the global and the local (as
well as the national) are [understood to be] mutually constitutive’
(Brenner 2001: 134-135).
The theorisation of rescaling provides a way to analyse questions of
governance that neither ignores nor privileges nation-states. It allows
for the acknowledgement that state sovereignty – never an accurate de-
scription of the differential powers of various states – is now more
mythical than ever. But states remained players within neo-liberal re-
structuring. States were rescaled to play new roles by channelling flows
of relatively unregulated capital and by participating in the constitution
of global regulatory regimes enforced by the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and international financial institutions. At the same time, speci-
fic states such as those of the US and Western Europe remained the
base for globe-spanning financial institutions such as the World Bank
and the WTO. Currencies based in these states remained necessary for
global transactions, albeit linked through the restructuring of finance
capital to investment strategies of China, Japan and Middle Eastern oil
states. A broader range of states including Russia and China, which
maintained their position as military powers, contribute to the global
dynamic through which capital accumulation is secured or protected.
As I have indicated, discussions of migration and migration policy
generally have not been part of the study of the neo-liberal restructuring
of governance and localities. While there are geographers, such as
Katharyne Mitchell (2003), who have approached studies of single cities
from this perspective, the full implications of this framework have not
been broadly applied to migration studies. The one significant exception
is the global cities literature (Friedmann 1986; King 1991; Sassen
1991). Looking at a small handful of cities, urban scholars have noted
that their prominence has been linked to their dependence on the mi-
gration of highly skilled professionals and on migrants who staff the re-
lated service sector of the new economy. Global cities, however, often
have been described as exceptions, as if all other cities and migration
flows reflect only the dynamics of national terrains and policies. Yet, the
scholarship on neo-liberal restructuring noted that all localities began to
compete globally.
Constantly drawn into discussions of national migration policies,
scholars of migration have not paid sufficient attention to the way in
which the neo-liberal restructuring of specific localities shapes the way
in which migrants live in a specific place. Neither urban geographers
nor migration scholars have examined how migrants become active
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agents of rescaling policies as they settle in specific places. Drawing
from the literature on urban restructuring and repositioning, Çağlar
and I (Glick Schiller & Çağlar 2009, forthcoming; Glick Schiller, Çağlar
& Gulbrandsen 2006; Çağlar 2006; Glick Schiller 2005) argue that to
differentiate and understand the dynamics of migrant incorporation
and transnational connection in different cities, it was necessary to situ-
ate migration within an analysis of the neo-liberal rescaling processes.
While combining the scholarship on the neo-liberal structuring of
space with migration studies in order to speak to the current apparently
contradictory migration policies and their accompanying discourses and
polemics, it is useful at the same time to draw on the emerging critique
of migration and development. An increasing number of scholars –
some in migration studies and others in development studies – have re-
sponded to current celebrations of migrant remittance economies by of-
fering a potent critique of the policies of co-development and migrants
as key agents of international development (Delgado Wise &
Covarrubias 2007; Faist 2009d; De Haas 2007). These scholars have ta-
ken to task ‘the global lending community’: the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Fund and other regional banking interests.
According to these major institutions, which structure the terms under
which two thirds of the world’s countries have been able to obtain fi-
nancing, migrant remittances can serve as a major source of capitalisa-
tion for growth in less developed states (Wimaladharma, Pearce &
Stanton 2004). Those critiquing this development strategy examine
how Europe and the US in previous eras of imperialism, as well as to-
day, have drained wealth from less powerful regions of the world (Glick
Schiller 2009). Transnational migration reflects this transfer of wealth.
It is a strategy through which families from exploited regions attempt
to meet their needs for housing, education, health care. Critics of mi-
gration and development policies look beyond methodological national-
ism to understand the context of international migration as a product of
uneven fields of power. However, these critics have not sufficiently ad-
dressed the specific and varying roles that migrants have been playing
in relationship to neo-liberal restructuring and rescaling in both local-
ities of departure and settlement or the forces that configure migrants’
agency. Nor have these scholars analysed the contradictions between
migration and development policies and the efforts of states throughout
the world to control migration and access to residency and citizenship
as well as subject migrants to neo-liberal labour policies.
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6.5 Explaining contemporary contradictory discourses
Migration scholars can begin to address the seeming contradictions I
outlined in the beginning of this chapter if they pay more attention to
the global role of power holders – including financial institutions, orga-
nisations and states that serve as base areas of capital. All of these cen-
tres of power play key roles in reconstructing and locally reconfiguring
various forms of capital and labour. Facing ongoing contestation, those
who hold power are intimately involved in the legitimation of their re-
gimes of truth through national anti-immigrant discourses, the celebra-
tion of migrant remittances by global financial institutions and the poli-
cies that divide global talent from the apparently unwashed and un-
wanted. We can add to this list a number of new issues, locating
tensions within, and resistances to, implementation of the restructuring
agendas in specific places, as these localities are affected by the intro-
duction of new migration regimes. Furthermore, new vistas for migra-
tion research open up to explorations of the multiple, significant roles
played by immigrants in the localities where they reside or to which
they are transnationally connected. First, in order to examine the under-
lying coherence of apparently contradictory aspects of migration dis-
course and policy, I review the relationship between neo-liberal restruc-
turing that was instituted globally and its intertwined migrant regula-
tory regime. I then speak briefly to some of the variability of locality,
migration and neo-liberal restructuring.
I will begin with neo-liberalism and the anti-immigrant rhetoric
adopted by so many countries. During the nineteenth and most of the
twentieth centuries, state-based institutions provided a common na-
tional infrastructure that materialised and legitimated the claims of the
state to constitute a single national community of shared norms and
practices. Beginning in the 1970s, these trends were reversed as a
worldwide, although variously implemented, neo-liberal agenda of pri-
vatisation. The diminution of public services, moreover, eroded the
quality of life and social cohesion of nation-states and public life. By the
beginning of the twenty-first century, as discrete realms of economic
production were ever more integrally linked to production and con-
sumption processes elsewhere, state narratives and citizenship regimes
were reinvigorated to stress once again the distinctness and exclusivity
of national identities based on cultural difference. In short, nation-states
have become identity containers that maintain and disseminate images
of the nation as a society. These national narratives bear little resem-
blance to the complex web of the contemporary transnational institu-
tional structures within which social life and relations of power are ac-
tually produced. The fewer services and rights states provide for their ci-
tizens, and the more they produce citizens educated to identify as
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customers enmeshed in cultures of consumption rather than within
forms of civic and social engagement, the more these states promote
discourses of social cohesion and national community. The inside of
that national identity container is increasingly constructed by framing
foreigners as the cause of disruption, the decline of social services and
the deterioration of community. The larger the number of citizens in
states around the world who find their futures circumscribed by poverty
or lack of social mobility, the more they are told by political leaders that
the problems are caused by persons from elsewhere.
None of this is new: nativism and anti-foreign sentiments have been
an aspect of successive stages of nation-state-building (Higham 2002).
Anti-immigrant discourse is a historic component of the nation-state-
building process. Through this ritual of renewal, citizens of states de-
fine their loyalty to a country by differentiating themselves from stigma-
tised racialised others. Movements of national renewal are currently tak-
ing place in the wake of the growing negative consequences of several
decades of neo-liberal restructuring. In this context, they have fuelled a
revitalised nationalism that has distracted public attention from the hol-
lowing out of the state and the growing disparities of wealth and power
facilitated by neo-liberal measures. By providing a foundation for new
migrant labour regimes, anti-immigrant discourses also have contribu-
ted to new sources of profitability for investors in a situation of falling
profits.
Worldwide competition in the last few decades of the twentieth cen-
tury led to the development of global assembly lines moving industrial
production away from North America and Europe into far-flung regions
where labour was cheap and unregulated. Tariff barriers were demol-
ished and untaxed export-processing zones were established throughout
the world. At the same time, first in the US and increasingly in Europe,
service jobs in restructured cities geared for consumer industries.
Meanwhile, tourism or agricultural jobs that could not be exported were
filled to some degree by undocumented migrants, who provided quies-
cent, hyper-exploited and flexible labour (Anderson 2007). In some
European countries, such as the UK, asylum seekers and refugees – leg-
ally or illegally – provided this form of labour. Undocumented migrants
working in non-union sweatshops kept industrial production closer to
US consumption centres (Kwong 1987).
Agricultural and industrial corporations based in Europe and North
America have increasingly faced a contradiction in their production pro-
cesses – the balance between near and far production. This contradic-
tion was intensified by the rise in oil prices and the prediction of future
oil scarcity, which means it will become more profitable to locate pro-
ductive processes closer to the areas of high consumer demand. As
many observers in Europe have pointed out, the low birth rate and
122 NINA GLICK SCHILLER
aging composition of European and North American populations will
heighten these contradictions by making labour scarce in these regions
(Castles 2006).
In response, labour regimes developed that were more suited to the
production needs of neo-liberal economies and their inabilities to rea-
lise sustained profitability. These provide workforces that are cheap,
controllable and relatively nearby. The crisis of profitability unleashed
by the 2008 downturn only increases the pressures to obtain such a
workforce, even in the face of dramatically rising unemployment in
Europe and the US. Integral to this transformation are the contempor-
ary denigration and criminalisation of asylum seekers and the undocu-
mented as well as the new enforcement regimes of bio-surveillance
measures that limit mobility. The new labour regimes once again offer
limited short-term ‘guestworker’ contracts to persons of various skill le-
vels who migrate from states that cannot sustain the workforce they
produce and educate. Part of this new configuration is an expansion of
the EU labour market, offering the most recent accession states policy
initiatives emphasising the merits of circulating labour. It seems likely
that we are witnessing a shift to a labour regime made up of circulating
labour from within the EU and new, very controlled forms of contract
labour from elsewhere. As Vertovec has pointed out: ‘circular migration
is … being advocated as a potential solution (at least in part) to a num-
ber of challenges surrounding contemporary migration’ (2007: 2).
Dehumanised through the rhetoric of national difference, policies of
short-term contractual migrant labour meet the needs of neo-liberal
agendas and their current profitability crisis more efficiently than the
previous use of family reunion, asylum and the undocumented to sup-
ply flexible and politically silenced labour. In many countries, new im-
migration regulations grant work visas, sometimes with time-limited
contracts, only to persons with technical and professional educations.
This regulatory labour regime complements, rather than contradicts,
the overall thrust of anti-immigrant narratives. The discourse highlight-
ing a ‘global war for talent’ commodifies skilled workers, denying their
rights to family life and full personhood.
If we examine the relationships among the neo-liberal restructuring
of capital, its profitability and legitimacy crisis and the emerging re-
gimes of controllable and flexible labour, then the underlying unity be-
tween the various seemingly disparate trends in migration policy and
discourse becomes clear. Nationalist rhetoric and exclusionary policies
pave the way for production regimes that rely on highly controllable la-
bour. Faceless migrating labour is portrayed as invading borders,
potentially lawless, and so requiring restriction, regulation and contrac-
tual constraints that limit the rights of workers to change employers or
challenge working conditions. The depersonalisation of labour as
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contractual services allows for labour policy statements in which the se-
paration of workers from home and family without rights of settlement
and family reunion become good economic policies. Depersonalisation
of the process highlights the category of the unskilled, despite the fact
that many such workers have relatively high levels of education. The
willingness of the university-educated, teachers, health professionals,
engineers and architects to migrate as ‘unskilled’ labour has everything
to do with the structural adjustment and privatisation policies in their
home localities that initially led to the depression of wages, to unem-
ployment of professionals and, increasingly, to worldwide crisis. Even
within the EU, the differential right to migrate for work granted by var-
ious Western European states to accession countries in the short term
has created a regime of controllable, exploitable labour (Andrijasevic
2009). Meanwhile, labour contracts offered to workers from states with
full membership, such as Italian construction workers in the UK, come
with restrictions and fee structures that, beneath a cover of legality,
make migrant workers more malleable – and exploitable.
Legitimating the migrant/native divide, scholars and policy analysts,
alike, justify legislation that excludes permanent settlement by migrant
workers and their families in the name of the importance of maintain-
ing family cohesion and community cohesion in the sending countries.
These migration experts report that circular migration increases the
likelihood that
both countries of origin and destination can make gains from
migration according to their respective preferences. Many mi-
grants and their descendants also prefer to move back and forth
between their ancestral and settlement countries. At their best,
circular migration policies align the objectives of origin coun-
tries, destination countries, and the migrants who comprise
these flows. (Newland, Agunias & Terrazas 2008: 2) Portes
(2006: 95) goes even further, emphasising how returnees are
much more likely to save and make productive investments at
home; they leave families behind to which sizable remittances
are sent. More importantly, temporary migrants do not compro-
mise the future of the next generation by placing their children
in danger of downward assimilation abroad. To the extent that
sending country governments provide the necessary educational
resources, these children can grow up healthy in their own coun-
tries, benefiting from the experiences and the investments of
their parents.
When migration scholars emphasise the benefits of transnational mi-
gration and remittance economy development to all concerned – without
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addressing the severe and permanent restriction of rights that increas-
ingly accompany this form of labour – they support a regime of hyper-
exploitation. Short-term labour contracts resurrect older forms of inden-
ture with limited rights and mobility. Condemning workers to a regime
of short-term contracts only means that they get caught within a system
of long-term family separation without rights, protections or benefits
from the states whose infrastructure they are building with their labour,
services and taxes. When families are separated by migration regula-
tions that allow no family reunion, they reproduce a social life at great
personal sacrifice: parents live separated from children, spouses are di-
vided from each other and elderly parents are left to survive without the
assistance of children (Constable 1997).
The global system of power in which this new arrangement of labour
takes place – and its human costs – are all too rarely addressed within
migration studies. While potent critiques have been made about each
strand of these contemporary, apparently contradictory, narratives, in-
cluding significant critiques of the migration and development para-
digm, they remain within separate migration literatures and thus have
little impact. It has been far too easy within the different streams of re-
search to take for granted neo-liberal restructuring, rather than ques-
tioning the underlying values it fosters and the human toll it exacts.
The seemingly disparate scholarships and narratives about migration re-
flect the implementation of neo-liberal restructuring in different cities
and states around the world. By globally examining the fields of power
constituted by transnational processes, migration scholars can develop a
research agenda that both calls attention to human costs of neo-liberal
restructuring and traces the various trajectories and resistances it
engenders.
In developing this perspective, it is also important to note that global
financial institutions have made migrant remittances a growing indus-
try just at the moment when many migrants may be less interested in
transnational strategies. To some degree, transnational migration has
reflected a ‘hedge your bets’ strategy on the part of migrants who were
unsure of the long-term welcome they might receive in the states where
they were settling, even if citizenship rights were available and utilised
(Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc 1994). Migrants sending remit-
tances to be invested in homes and businesses makes certain assump-
tions about the viability of local economies in sending states. They as-
sume that there will be sufficient security of persons and opportunity
structure for those with capital, such that investment is a viable strategy
to benefit them or their families. Increasingly, in many regions of the
world these assumptions no longer hold: regions of states or entire
states have become destabilised as a result of structural adjustment poli-
cies, the hollowing out of national economies through trade agreement
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provisions such as NAFTA and WTO restrictions, the growth of interna-
tional arms and drug trade and the fostering of proxy militias and war.
The result is that migrants from some regions in the world might pre-
fer settlement, family reunion and unilateral, rather than simultaneous,
incorporation, at the very time that this strategy is being foreclosed to
them. Transnational migration and connection are not inherent features
of migration but reflect conditions in localities in more than one state.
A global perspective on migration also highlights the varied roles that
transmigrants have been playing in relationship to the neo-liberal re-
structuring and rescaling of localities. Migrants can be ‘scale makers’
who reshape places as they integrate them within transnational social
fields of familial, commercial, religious, political and organisational re-
lationships (Glick Schiller & Çağlar 2009, forthcoming). Migrants’ mul-
tiple and contradictory transnational incorporations into localities in
more than one state cannot be analysed by reference to globalisation
from below – or transnational social spaces or communities – if these
terms direct us to separate the analysis of migrant agency from other
aspects of the structuration of a transnational social field: class position-
ing, localised economic and political opportunity structures, cultural
politics, racialisation and non-migrant actors. The multiple positional-
ities of migrants cannot be encompassed within analytical frameworks
that approach migrants solely within a context of resistance to uneven
globalisation, as ethnic communities or as labour, whether skilled or
unskilled.
Instead, building on the growing body of data on transnational migra-
tion, researchers can specify a series of differentiated roles that mi-
grants living within transnational fields have been playing within efforts
to implement neo-liberal agendas. These roles include, but are not lim-
ited to: 1) agents of neo-liberal neighbourhood gentrification; 2) exem-
plars of neo-liberal values; 3) significant actors in efforts to revitalise ur-
ban centres and deindustrialised cities; and 4) links to transnational
flows of capital (Glick Schiller & Çağlar forthcoming). These roles make
clear that migrants can be agents of differential development or resis-
tance to neo-liberal agendas in specific places and at specific points of
time. The roles migrants play in localities around the world have been
shaped in the past few decades by the interpenetration of the neo-liberal
agenda and local histories and structures. Hence, localities differentially
inserted in the global economy offer different opportunity structures,
pathways of transnational connection and barriers to incorporation.
In cities and towns that are not among the select handful of global ci-
ties but have been very much subject to, and active participants in
worldwide flows of capital, migrant activity is ever present: in labour
and property markets, in the establishment of small businesses, in
neighbourhood gentrification or in the attraction of international capital
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and infrastructure investment. Migrant input may prove vital to the ef-
forts of second-tier cities to restructure and reposition themselves re-
gionally, nationally and globally. This general statement applies to local-
ities around the world. On the one hand, the impact of migrant connec-
tions and the range of roles migrants have been able to assume within
these localities varies in relationship to the local ability to successfully
compete and rescale. On the other hand, migrants’ participation in, and
shaping of, transnational processes are integrally related to larger flows
and redistributions of capital – economic, political, social and cultural.
In some instances, corporations with a stake in maintaining their in-
vestments in a specific city have worked together with organisations of
transmigrants to recruit and retain highly skilled technicians (Brettell
forthcoming). In other cases, migrants and persons of migrant back-
ground may serve as crucial middlemen linking a deindustrialised
struggling city to foreign capital (Feldman-Bianco forthcoming). By con-
trast, in some localities, migrants contribute to restructuring and rescal-
ing by providing primarily low-wage factory and domestic labour (Salih
& Riccio forthcoming). In cities where work is scarce, migrant busi-
nesses may provide crucial economic activities as well as necessary pro-
ducts and services to natives and migrants alike, who are faced with
widespread unemployment and impoverishment as a result of the de-
struction of local industry. Drawing on transnational supply networks to
stock businesses and on transnational family networks to supply inex-
pensive labour, migrant businesses may fill up otherwise empty store-
fronts near the city centre, contributing to the vitality of a city (Glick
Schiller & Çağlar forthcoming).
By utilising a global power perspective, we can trace the transnational
social fields within which migrants appear not as foreigners to be differ-
entiated from natives, but as actors that connect local people to global
processes. An industry that has become as commonplace as that of ke-
bab shops, which provide inexpensive food for urban populations
throughout Europe and much of the US, is but one example of the uti-
lity of this perspective. It is possible to trace connections within the in-
dustry all over the world: websites in Spain offering kebab equipment;
German factories producing grills, knives and spits; meatpackers in var-
ious European cities serving the kebab industry; middlemen, shop own-
ers and clerks who have migrated from North Africa, South Asia and
Central Asia; and consumers of all backgrounds throughout Europe.
Some in the network reap sizeable profits, while others toil long hours
for low wages. The transnational networks of production, distribution
and consumption are simultaneously part of the restructuring of local-
ities, the re-imaging of local cultures and the reconstitution of the local,
national and global.
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION 127
Migrant-sending localities that provide the labour force of transna-
tional social fields have also experienced uneven development in rela-
tionship to the global economy and structural adjustment policies.
Because states have withdrawn public services during the structural ad-
justment process, those localities that have been able to receive remit-
tances have developed to the detriment of other municipalities and re-
gions. In some states, such as Mexico, government policies of matching
remittance-based electrification or other public-service improvements
with government funds have exacerbated differences between town and
regions. Remittances have not brought development, but rather, grow-
ing disparities within and across a national terrain (Çağlar 2006). The
differential success of those localities that do send sizeable numbers of
migrants also opens different possibilities for return, investment and
transnational connection. Significant investment or return depends on
local and regional security, itself an outcome of the balance of power be-
tween sending states and larger global institutions and powerful states
and their configurations of power including their drug and arms
industries.
6.6 Conclusions
Within these brief profiles of different trajectories of local restructuring,
it becomes obvious that migrants occupy a range of positions in the ci-
ties where they settle, including unskilled labour, cultural promoters,
city leaders, small business people, global talent and transnational capi-
talists. It is also clear that migrant transnational social fields contribute
to the varying positionality of migrants and to the restructuring and re-
scaling of cities. These transnational ties and the resultant local develop-
ments have been part of a global migration regime in which movement
and family reunification was possible, often legally and sometimes de-
spite barriers to movement. In general, most states where migrants live
have allowed some form of settlement with rights either at the time of
entry or as a long-term aspiration and realisable possibility. If migration
is restricted to those with short-term labour contracts or professional
skills, migrants will not be able to play the varied roles described in this
chapter. Their multiple positionings in relationship to the restructuring
of localities stems from their ability to travel, obtain rights in multiple
states and establish transnational social fields.
In short, a global power perspective on migration allows scholars to
speak to a series of integrally related processes that cannot be under-
stood separately. First, the projection of migrants as undesirable ‘others’
revitalises national identities and loyalties of citizens whose relationship
to the state as provider of services and social supports has been
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undermined by neo-liberal projects. At the same time, the dehumanisa-
tion of migrating bodies allows for their insertion and control as various
forms of unfree contracted labour. Meanwhile, migrant professionals
may be welcomed in specific places as contributors to the neo-liberal re-
structuring and rescaling of various cities. And migrant remittances can
be relied on to transmit foreign currency to families, localities and re-
gimes left behind, enabling their inclusion, however unequally, in glo-
bal patterns of consumption and desire. Migration scholars need to put
aside all forms of methodological nationalism so that their units of ana-
lysis do not obscure the localised processes through which capitalism is
continually restructured, reproduced, experienced and contested. To un-
derstand the dynamics that surround us, we need to examine simulta-
neously the cultural narratives of everyday forms of nation-state forma-
tion, the global efforts to reconstitute capital and facilitate its flexible ac-
cumulation and the struggles of people around the world to live their
lives with dignity and justice.
By developing such a framework, migration scholars will be able to
enter into the policy arena with perspectives that do more than follow
the well-worn path of sterile debates about the effects of immigration
on social cohesion. We can speak to factors that truly are eroding var-
ious human experiences of social solidarity as well as highlight the
everyday experiences of openness that bring people together in their
search for life with meaning, respect for all varieties of human differ-
ence and opportunities to explore their shared humanity.
Note
1 Goodhart, D. (2008), ‘The baby-boomers finally see sense on immigration’, The
Observer, Sunday, 24 February 2008. www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/
24/immigration.immigrationpolicy.
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Chapter 7
Bridging the divide: Towards a comparative
framework for understanding kin state and
migrant-sending state diaspora politics
Myra A. Waterbury
Whether by the coincidence or convergence of global events, the past
two decades have seen a significant increase in the number of states en-
gaging members of their national communities who reside outside the
state’s borders. As such, there has been a concomitant explosion of aca-
demic interest in those transnational and trans-state relationships. More
and more states are constructing ties to populations abroad, and those
populations are making more assertive claims for recognition of their
unique status as members of cultural and political communities brid-
ging more than one sovereign state. In the post-communist world, the
liberalisation of politics and the end of Soviet domination brought re-
newed attention to the relationship between potential kin states and the
trans-border ethnic groups created through the dissolution of multina-
tional states and empires. And in other areas of the world, political and
economic changes have encouraged states to rethink their previously in-
formal or even exclusionary stances towards migrant populations resid-
ing abroad.
Thanks to a flurry of fascinating case studies and theorising about
these phenomena, some progress has been made towards understand-
ing how, when and why states structure increasingly complex ties to po-
pulations abroad. Yet, as the debates in the literature over the meaning
of terms such as ‘diaspora’ and ‘transnationalism’ continue, we see that
important questions remain unanswered. How should we understand
the role of the state in shaping transnational practices? What causes
states to increase their engagement with populations abroad? What are
the risks and benefits of policies that seek to extend sovereignty and
control to those outside the state? A significant barrier to further pro-
gress towards a full understanding of these dynamics is the prevalent
analytical separation between studies of kin state and migrant-sending
state policies towards external national populations. By maintaining this
distinction – whether self-consciously or not – analysts of both sets of
cases are losing out on potentially fruitful insights that may be gained
from engaging across regions and historical specificities. This chapter
reconsiders the utility of this analytical separation and asks what may
be gained by constructing a broader comparative framework in which
to understand how and why states act on behalf of members of a na-
tional community residing outside the borders.
The chapter begins by comparing the analytical usage of diaspora ter-
minology in the migration literature with that in the literature on kin
states and cross-border minorities, then discussing how the two sets of
literature can learn from each other. The second section uses insights
and examples from both sets of literature to construct a comparative fra-
mework for understanding the relationship between states and popula-
tions abroad. This framework addresses four main questions: who the
state targets, why and when states increase their level of transnational
engagement, how states create and maintain ties with those abroad and
what barriers there are to integration of the diaspora into the homeland
state political community.
7.1 The definitional divide
In general, the literature on diaspora and transnationalism defines a
diaspora almost exclusively by its migrant origins or the far-reaching
dispersal of an ethnic community to multiple points, reflecting classic
cases of diaspora such as the Jewish and Armenian ones. This type of
definition tends to exclude cases of trans-border ethnic groups created
from the shifting of borders or the dissolution of states and empires,
such as ethnic Hungarians in East Central Europe or Russians in the
near abroad. For many authors, the diaspora phenomenon is unique to
the situation of people moving across borders. As Sheffer defines the
subject of his book on diaspora politics, ‘an ethno-national diaspora is a
social-political formation, created as a result of either voluntary or
forced migration’ (2003: 9).1
On the other side, those who study the relationships of kin states
with ‘stranded minorities’ across the border have not, for the most part,
adopted the diaspora terminology. They generally conceptualise their
universe of cases as a discrete set with unique conditions. Unlike mi-
grant diasporas, external kin are the product of borders moving across
populations. Migrant diasporas form gradually and voluntarily, are terri-
torially dispersed and members often maintain the citizenship of their
country of origin, at least through the first generation. ‘Accidental’ dia-
sporas, on the other hand, happen suddenly and largely against the will
of their members, tend to be more territorially concentrated and often
have the citizenship of only their new state of residence (Brubaker
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2000: 3). These populations may also be more bound to their host state
– and have less flexibility of membership and physical mobility – be-
cause the shifting of borders often coincides with the shifting of their
prospects for citizenship from the homeland to the host state.
The term ‘diaspora’ is often politically problematic as well. Diaspora
in Hungary, Poland and other kin states is most commonly invoked
when discussing political and economic migrants who settled outside of
the region – and historic territory – of the mother country (Tóth 2004:
375). When the term ‘diaspora’ is used to describe communities of eth-
nic kin in Eastern Europe, it is equated with weakened bonds of ethnic
and linguistic affinity and the triumph of assimilationist pressures on
the national community. For example, ethnic Hungarians described as
living in diaspora in neighbouring countries are those in a ‘state of
abandonment’: they did not migrate, but are living outside of ‘ethnic
blocs’ and therefore are in the process of losing their cultural and lin-
guistic ties to the Hungarian nation (Ilyés 2006: 46). In contrast, more
concentrated national communities ‘beyond the border’ are reachable
and critical components of the national project. Calling them ‘diaspora’
would indicate that they were ‘lost’ to those in the Hungarian state,
who would see them as a crucial source of cultural pride and influence.
By this logic, even those ethnic Hungarians who leave their ethnic kin
communities and emigrate to Hungary become part of the ‘intensifica-
tion of diasporisation due to assimilation and out-migration’ (Tóth
2006: 100).
The separation of migrant-sending and kin state cases based on these
assumptions of difference has led to distinct terminologies, theoretical
concerns and analytical debates. However, bringing the two sets of lit-
erature into dialogue with each other provides a much more complete
picture of the role of the homeland state in shaping transnational prac-
tices. For example, migration-centred analysts have begun to rethink
the conception of ‘transnationalism as subversive and transnationalists
as grassroots actors challenging the hegemony of states’ (Waldinger &
Fitzgerald 2004: 1186). More attention is now given to the homeland
state as an agent in constructing diasporas and shaping the member-
ship of those abroad in social, economic and political spheres between
homeland and host states (Fitzgerald 2005a; Itzigsohn 2000; Sherman
1999). Analyses of kin states and trans-border diasporas offer a wealth
of historical and contemporary examples of the state’s role in structur-
ing ties to those abroad, which can aid in creating useful models of
state-led transnationalism. The state of national origin is often a key
player in shaping trans-border ethnic ties, particularly in cases where
the homeland state is the politically and economically strongest actor in
the triadic relationship between host state, homeland and trans-border
minority (Brubaker 1996: 67-76). The actions of kin states, such as
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Hungary and Germany throughout the twentieth century, demonstrate
a range of engagement with ‘stranded minorities’, from diplomatic ef-
forts to guarantee their security and the creation of government minis-
tries for information gathering and cultural funding, to direct political
and economic support as well as ethnic repatriation and naturalisation
(Bárdi 2004; Wolff 2000).
Kin state cases also demonstrate the potential dangers of state-led
transnationalism: the instrumental use of cross-border ties to justify ir-
redentist ambitions and nationalist politics (e.g. Serbia in the wars of
Yugoslav succession); the security dilemma created when a homeland
state claims residents of neighbouring states as citizens (e.g. Russia’s
military intervention on behalf of its ‘compatriots’ in South Ossetia);
and the negative effects on inter-ethnic relations created by fears of
minority fifth-columnism or disloyalty to their state of residence (e.g.
ethnic Germans and Hungarians in Eastern Europe after World War
II). The dark side of transnationalism is an aspect that migration-fo-
cused analysts are beginning to grapple with as well. As Zolberg and
others have pointed out, states attempt to control both physical and
symbolic boundaries. Therefore, all efforts to construct states and na-
tions involve some kind of exclusion (Zolberg 1983; Fitzgerald 2005b).
The extension of the national community beyond the borders through
extraterritorial membership and other tools can be understood as a
form of ‘trans-border nationalism’, whereby the homeland government
promotes a specific definition of the national community for its own
purposes (Fitzgerald 2006a: 99).
Many of the cases in the migration-centred literature, on the other
hand, usefully demonstrate the contingent and instrumental nature of
state policymaking towards diaspora groups by tracing the processes
through which policymakers increase their level of engagement with
those abroad over time (Brand 2006; Smith 2003; Varadarajan 2005).
This perspective is a much-needed correction to the kin state literature,
which often sees ties of ethnic affiliation as enduring causal factors in
domestic politics and foreign policy decision-making. Analyses of irre-
dentism and trans-border ethnic conflict often assume that state actors
respond to the plight of co-ethnics and act accordingly in order to satis-
fy the demands of ethnic affiliation (Ambrosio 2001; Davis & Moore
1997). Yet, the numerous examples of fluctuating levels of engagement
with cross-border populations within and among potential kin states
have shown the need to look at domestic political interests to under-
stand the intensity of diaspora policymaking at different points in time
(King & Melvin 1999; Saideman & Ayres 2008; Waterbury 2006).
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7.2 A comparative framework
Bringing together these insights from kin state- and migration-centred
cases, the remainder of the chapter outlines a comparative framework
for understanding why and when states increase their engagement with
populations abroad and what factors affect the implementation of dia-
spora engagement policies. The framework focuses on the actions that
states take to engage populations abroad, rather than on the origin of
the population. It uses evidence from a wide range of cases to develop
four sets of arguments. First, while states often utilise a rhetoric of en-
gaging the ‘global nation’, their policies target specific populations
abroad, depending on what these populations can offer the homeland
state. Second, states increase their engagement with specific external
populations because it serves a specific political and strategic purpose.
Diasporas represent a set of unique cultural, material and political re-
sources, which homeland state elites come to recognise and seek to cap-
ture. Third, states expand the boundaries of citizenship and member-
ship in order to co-opt and control access to diaspora resources. Finally,
I argue that because this new engagement involves the expansion of the
political community, the development of diaspora policies is often a
contested process, which can lead to a backlash against diaspora en-
gagement and a disconnect between rhetoric and the substance of
policies.
7.2.1 Global discourse, targeted policies
In looking at the entire universe of potential diaspora members for any
given country, it becomes clear that many states cannot so easily be clas-
sified as either ‘ethnic kin state’ or ‘migrant-sending state’. Many states
have current or historical relationships with populations in other coun-
tries for various reasons, including the redrawing of international
boundaries, sporadic and voluntary dispersal and state-sponsored emi-
gration. Some states that are usually thought of primarily as emigration
states have had the potential to act as protectors of members of the na-
tional community who reside on territory that was once part of the na-
tional homeland (e.g. India, Haiti, Mexico). And many kin states also
have substantial economic and political migrant populations (e.g.
Hungary, Poland, Germany). Some states have policies that extend to
both cross-border minorities and migrant communities,2 but most have
chosen to target only one or the other for specific purposes. The target-
ing reflects what the homeland state wants from its engagement with
certain diaspora populations, as well as the feasibility of integrating ex-
ternal communities without risking tensions with other states.
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Haiti and India are two cases in which the state has expanded its en-
gagement with migrant diaspora populations, but has rejected a poten-
tial role as kin state to those across the border. In Haiti, the post-
Duvalier government of Aristide made diaspora relations a top priority,
even going so far as to call the diaspora the ‘Tenth Department’ of the
government. But because of historical tensions with the neighbouring
Dominican Republic over their respective boundaries on the shared is-
land territory and the need for help from economically prosperous and
politically connected diaspora members, the focus of Haiti’s policies
was Haitians in Canada and the United States, not those across the bor-
der in the Dominican Republic or throughout the Caribbean (Itzigsohn
2000; Howard 2003). Similarly, even though the Indian government
hailed the ‘global Indian family’ in the 1990s (Vardarajan 2005: 19), its
expanded policies to engage Indians abroad targeted primarily the privi-
leged professional-class diaspora working in high-tech jobs in the US
and Western Europe. India’s recent laws regarding ‘people of Indian
origin’ specifically excluded citizens of neighbouring Pakistan and
Bangladesh, reflecting fears of inflaming regional tensions (Lall 2003:
122).
Kazakhstan and Hungary, on the other hand, crafted policies focused
more on the integration of ethnic and linguistic kin than on engaging
with migrant populations. Kazakhstan’s decision in the years following
independence to offer ethnic repatriation to ethnic Kazakhs was tar-
geted not to those who had migrated to other former Soviet republics,
and would therefore likely speak only Russian, but to those outside the
Soviet sphere in smaller Kazakh-speaking communities who ‘would
most effectively contribute to the cultural rebirth of Kazakhstan’
(Diener 2005: 334). In Hungary, the country’s first post-communist lea-
der claimed to be the prime minister of fifteen million Hungarians, a
number that included those in the Western diaspora as well as those in
neighbouring Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and Serbia. Hungary’s law
granting special benefits and national identification cards to ethnic
Hungarians (the controversial ‘Status Law’) was valid, however, only for
those ethnic Hungarians in the neighbouring countries, not for those
assimilated Hungarians in the Western diaspora.3
7.2.2 Motives and triggers for diaspora engagement
The targeting described above suggests that the state crafts different re-
lationships to its various external populations, depending on what a dee-
per engagement with a potential diaspora group could offer. Clearly,
homeland state elites are not passive actors stirred only by feelings of
national affiliation or by demands made on them by those abroad.
Instead, shifts towards increased diaspora engagement are driven in
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large part by the interests and perceptions of homeland state political
elites. As I will discuss in more detail, these motives can be grouped
into three main sets of interests and ‘resources’ represented by dia-
sporas: the extraction of material resources for economic gain, the crea-
tion or maintenance of domestic and international political legitimacy
and the utilisation of those abroad as a culturo-linguistic resource to be
used in defining the boundaries of national identity.
Many states, however, initially resist opportunities to forge extensive
transnational ties, suggesting that diasporas represent a host of negative
aspects and potential dangers for homeland states as well. These nega-
tive connotations can manifest in representations of diaspora members
as ‘traitors’ who have abandoned the homeland, painful blights on the
national psyche or outsiders trying to take away jobs and resources.
Mass emigration can be a sign of state weakness and a threat to regime
legitimacy, causing resentment of those who left (Brand 2006: 33-34;
Fitzgerald 2005a: 7). When those abroad come home, they may be per-
ceived as being tainted by their unique experiences and therefore too
different to be reintegrated successfully into the homeland state. In ad-
dition, if formerly excluded diaspora members are given access to
homeland state resources and membership, they are often perceived by
permanent homeland state residents as unwelcome, resented competi-
tors for political influence, subsidies and even jobs. Finally, diaspora po-
pulations can embroil the homeland in tense relations with the states of
residence, thereby jeopardising the homeland’s security and other for-
eign policy goals. The dual nature of the diaspora issue permeates de-
bates over the state-diaspora relationship in kin states and migrant-
sending states, often leading to domestic opposition against increased
levels of political and economic integration between the homeland state
and those beyond the border.
Because populations abroad can be sources of risk and political un-
certainty, there are often barriers to elites perceiving certain diaspora
communities as positive resources. We must, therefore, also explain
what causes that perception to change: a moment in which the diaspora
goes from being seen as a liability or a population that can be ignored,
to an important resource that should be cultivated, and even exploited
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a: 219; Shain & Barth 2003: 450). Moments of
‘redefinition’ are often triggered by large structural changes, such as
dramatic shifts in the regime or political system, often occurring simul-
taneously with important changes in regional relations or economic re-
structuring. These changes allow space for a redefinition of the bound-
aries of the political community and a rethinking of the state’s relation-
ship to the diaspora. Such a redefinition could also result in a decision
to disengage from a previous policy commitment regarding a popula-
tion abroad, as occurred when the German government phased out
BRIDGING THE DIVIDE 137
many of its policies towards ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union in the decade following reunification, including
the promise of automatic German citizenship. The primary focus here,
however, is to provide a picture of the motives and processes compel-
ling a shift in perception that subsequently triggers increased engage-
ment with diaspora populations.
Diaspora communities are often sources of important material re-
sources through remittances they send back to the homeland state, in
the form of diaspora-led investment or by offering the homeland state
expanding markets for its exports, cultural output and even a temporary
labour pool (Barry 2006: 28; Itzigsohn 2000: 1143). Most migrant-send-
ing countries, like the Philippines, Turkey and many Latin American,
Middle Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, rely heavily on
the emigrant diaspora working in richer economies to contribute to the
country’s GDP (Newland & Patrick 2004). Economic interests play less
of a role in non-migrant diaspora situations, particularly when the
homeland state is more economically developed than the diaspora. Even
the promise of possible future economic gains, however, can be used as
a justification for activist diaspora policies in these states. For example,
in Hungary, the ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring states have been
described as a potential resource for businesses in need of labour as a
selling point for Hungarian policies towards co-ethnics (Melegh 2003:
120). Similar arguments have been used to justify repatriation pro-
grammes in Romania and Russia.
The state’s integration into economic and trade organisations is a
process that may compel or deepen neo-liberal restructuring of the
state’s economy, leading to a desire to stabilise and increase the flow of
diaspora remittances and investment (Varadarajan 2005: 6). Growing
economic opportunities as a result of regional integration and increased
foreign investment can also lead to a search for easily assimilated la-
bour migration, which may make the diaspora an attractive prospect. In
fact, it could be argued that Spain has invented such a diaspora for this
purpose by offering return opportunities to the descendants of Spanish
migrants in Latin America (Padilla 2007). Japan has also used second-
and third-generation Brazilians of Japanese descent to fill out its labour
needs without challenging its exclusive, ethnically based definitions of
citizenship (Fitzgerald 2006a: 102).
Diaspora engagement also plays an important role in political legiti-
mation, both domestically and geopolitically. Reaching out to those
abroad and establishing cross-border ties can be a way for governments
and political parties to redefine the bases of their legitimacy at times of
economic or political crisis, or when the sovereignty of the state is
being weakened by external forces. In describing the history of
Mexico’s changing policies, Sherman argues that the state extended its
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hand to those abroad during ‘moments in which political legitimacy
was being questioned, and the state was trying to consolidate a particu-
lar institutional order’ (1999: 847). Maintaining the loyalty of emigrants
to their home country, and thereby securing access to those commu-
nities and their resources, can be a vital ‘part of the process of nation-
building and maintaining elite dominance at home’.
Populations abroad are also strategically important because of their
culturo-linguistic function, particularly their role in state-building, na-
tional identity construction and cultural reproduction. The diaspora can
serve prominently in the construction of national myths, which are
used to legitimise nationalist political agendas and the modes of inclu-
sion and exclusion that designate who will have access to political power
and the resources of the state (King & Melvin 1999). External popula-
tions are often incorporated into narratives identifying forces that threa-
ten the survival of the cultural or linguistic nation, broadly defined as
extending beyond existing state borders. The continued existence of a
group beyond the border that maintains its cultural identity and connec-
tions to the homeland by resisting assimilationist pressures offers a de-
fence against fears of cultural dilution and a source of national pride.
For example, in the case of Mexico:
[t]he new Mexican ideology holds that by creating and maintain-
ing a distinct ethnic identity within the United States, albeit dif-
ferent from Mexico’s indigenous culture, Mexican Americans are
preserving their national heritage and proving that Latino roots
are much deeper than Anglo-American influences. (Shain 2000:
687)
In addition, such populations keep the influence of the homeland lan-
guage and culture alive in territories that were once part of the home-
land’s empire or colonial holdings, recalling the diaspora’s ties to his-
torically significant moments of past greatness and tragedy. Threats to
these groups, therefore, are framed as threats to the unity, status and
survival of the nation embodied by the homeland. This type of resource
has been particularly important for Hungary, a small, linguistically iso-
lated country with a history of empire (Kürti 2001).
One of the main triggers for utilising the diaspora to bolster state le-
gitimacy is political liberalisation through institutional or regime
change, which subjects control over the state-diaspora relationship to
more intense political contestation. The diaspora resources become
prizes to be captured within the context of domestic political competi-
tion. The opening up of political competition after decades of dictatorial
or authoritarian rule triggers the search for new sources of political sup-
port and legitimacy by new political actors on the scene. These actors
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have little governing experience, and may also have few organisational
resources or a track record of ideological positioning. Reframing a dis-
course of the nation and national identity that invokes those beyond the
border can provide a unique source of legitimacy for these new political
actors. They can position themselves as ‘nationalising elites’ or as sa-
viours of the nation who can now right the wrongs of the past.
Emerging elites can also utilise diaspora populations as potential consti-
tuents, who can affect domestic political outcomes through trans-border
media connections or eventually through gaining the right to vote or
have special representation within the government. At times of political
transformation, the diaspora ‘may come to be considered by a new re-
gime as the key population for domestic transformation’ (Shain 2000:
665).
For example, in post-communist Hungary, engagement with the eth-
nic Hungarians in neighbouring countries has been a crucial organisa-
tional and ideological resource for a party like the Alliance of Young
Democrats (Fidesz), a relatively new right-wing party that lacked a mo-
bilised base in the early 1990s (Waterbury 2006). The party cam-
paigned actively in the ethnic Hungarian communities in Slovakia and
Romania, not for votes, but to win the battle of public opinion there
that would be reflected in Hungarian state media. Domestic political
strategies involving the diaspora have also been seen in a number of
other cases, including Mexico, El Salvador, Haiti and the Dominican
Republic4 (Itzigsohn 2000). All these countries have seen electoral
campaigns spill over into diaspora communities, with party elites hop-
ing to capture the endorsement of diaspora leaders and their formal
and informal organisational networks, as well as to control the dis-
course of national interests and priorities by embracing the diaspora.
External actors and the actions of the state in which diasporas reside
can also cause shifts in the opportunity for elites to engage those
abroad. If the degree of access to, and availability of, diaspora resources
becomes constrained, then the homeland state is likely to increase its le-
vel of engagement. For example, if homeland state elites see that new
integrationist or assimilationist policies are being put into place by host
states, they may respond by trying to ‘pull’ the diaspora back to the
homeland through transnational connections and feelings of loyalty. As
Brand argues in regard to the Tunisian and Moroccan diasporas in
Western Europe:
as European states successively changed laws governing immi-
grant integration, the Maghrebi states faced the prospect of de-
clining loyalty among their nationals. In response, new institu-
tions and policies were put into place or existing ones were rede-
fined. (2006: 216-217)
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In another example, as its European Union accession became more cer-
tain, the realisation grew that Hungary would soon become the eastern
border of the Schengen visa regime. This meant that many ethnic
Hungarians would be left on the wrong side of a new Iron Curtain, for
the Schengen chapter of the accession treaty would have prevented
Romanian, Ukrainian and Serbian citizens from crossing the border
into Hungary without a visa. This prompted a search of new ways for
Hungary to maintain cross-border ties, culminating in the controversial
decision to give members of the regional diaspora ethnic identity cards
(Waterbury 2008). Poland and Romania also crafted legislation to deal
with the stranding of ethnic kin outside the Schengen borders.
7.2.3 The tools of engagement
We now turn to consider how the engaged homeland state creates, and
maintains access to, these diaspora resources. Taking examples from
both the kin and migrant-sending state cases, we see that homeland
states have better access to these resources when they are able to craft
and, to the extent possible, control ties with those abroad and their or-
ganisations. In order to shape these relations, states extend their sover-
eignty and redefine the boundaries of citizenship and membership to
include targeted members of populations abroad through institutiona-
lised packages of ‘engagement’ policies. In a tricky, often unsuccessful,
balancing act, state elites attempt to push these policies while keeping
in mind the demands of the diaspora communities, who may or may
not respond in kind to these overtures.
In both the kin state and sending state literature, institutionalised en-
gagement with populations abroad is recognised as a tool of co-optation
and a way of building clientelistic relationships that go beyond the bor-
ders of the state. In the case of Hungary, party elites have vied to co-opt
diaspora leaders and to create clientelistic relationships that extend
across the border. Fidesz, in particular, used the tools of patronage and
clientelism to develop its power base and establish its structure of alli-
ances and institutions (Waterbury 2006: 500-503). Similarly, in Mexico,
the Fox administration (and earlier governments as well) attempted to
shape the message and the loyalties of organised Mexican migrant com-
munities in the US (Martinez-Saldana 2003; García-Acevedo 2003).
According to Goldring, state-led programmes in the 1980s
signaled the state’s attempt to construct transmigrants and their
organisations as one more in a series of corporate groups that
the Mexican state could co-opt by engaging them in corporatist
and clientelist relations. (2002: 68)
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Middle Eastern states, such as Tunisia and Morocco, also utilised coun-
sels and expatriate affairs offices as instruments of coercion and control
in order to satisfy their own security objectives (Brand 2006).
Homeland states create systems of patronage and control by ‘reassert-
ing sovereignty’ over those beyond their territorial boundaries (Brand
2006: 26). They do so by crafting policies that ‘(re)produce citizen-so-
vereign relationships with expatriates, thus transnationalising govern-
mentality’ (Gamlen 2006: 4-5). All states have available a similar toolkit
of policies they can choose from in shaping relations with populations
abroad. Homeland states can: (1) seek to change host state policies
through diplomatic advocacy or treaty protections; (2) fund diaspora
community organisations and the creation of educational, cultural, poli-
tical and entrepreneurial institutions; (3) offer full or limited forms of
political citizenship, such as voting rights, special forms of representa-
tion, dual citizenship or dual nationality; (4) offer full or limited forms
of social citizenship through welfare state and labour market access and
direct subsidies to diaspora members; or (5) extend the benefits of cul-
tural and symbolic membership through rhetorical inclusion, ethnic
identity cards and trans-border cultural exchanges.
The most powerful – and controversial – of these policies is the ex-
pansion of citizenship through dual nationality legislation, giving those
abroad preferential access to entry and the state’s political community.
Both types of states utilise citizenship options, with some variation in
the purpose of the flexible membership. Kin states use ‘ethnizenship’,
which Bauböck defines as ‘external quasi-citizenship’ for those who do
not reside in the country granting the status (2007b: 2396), as a form
of symbolic membership and nation-building that may or may not
translate into real benefits and mobility. Or these states may allow for
multiple citizenship or preferential naturalisation for ethnic kin as a
form of minority protection, providing an ‘exit option’ for national
minorities facing discrimination and assimilation (Iordachi 2005: 241).
In Hungary, a failed attempt in 2004 to provide extraterritorial dual citi-
zenship reflected the ‘ethnizenship’ model, whereby ethnic Hungarians
in some neighbouring countries would have the option of ‘citizenship
without resettlement’. In 2005, the left-wing social democratic govern-
ment, which had rejected the ethnizenship model, simplified naturalisa-
tion requirements for ethnic Hungarians, creating a stronger frame-
work of preferential naturalisation based on individual application, not
a collective right to ethnic citizenship (Ministry 2005).
In migrant-sending states, external citizenship is meant to create a re-
lationship of rights and obligations with emigrant non-residents in or-
der to tie potentially reluctant or increasingly distant (in time and space)
populations abroad to the state or origin. Citizenship is thus ‘a substi-
tute for physical presence in the home state, and grounds emigrants’
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ability and even need to engage with it from afar’ (Barry 2006: 21).
Allowing for multiple nationality and even external voting rights is thus
a way for states to extend their sovereignty ‘in the absence of coercive
home-state power’ to ensure continued access to diaspora resources
(Gamlen 2006: 5).
The policymaking process for diaspora engagement, particularly
when it involves the expansion of citizenship, takes place in a context
fraught with contention and debate. The context of citizenship policies
certainly differs between kin and migrant states, but the policies trigger
similar levels of debate and contestation over changing the boundaries
of the political community. Policies must go far enough to provide po-
pulations abroad – both migrant and ethnic kin – with realistic incen-
tives for maintaining loyalties that correspond to what those populations
most likely seek from the homeland state: some combination of in-
creased economic opportunity (either investment, tax-free remittances,
property ownership or access to improved labour markets and subsi-
dies), symbolic and cultural membership (ethnic ID cards, support for
minority language education, cultural exchanges and events or rhetori-
cal inclusion as positive national members) and protection and advocacy
(consular and diplomatic services, pressure on host states regarding mi-
grant or minority rights). Yet, as I will demonstrate in the following
section, policymakers risk going too far, thereby provoking backlash
against the expansion of the political community.
7.2.4 Contested outcomes
When a state increases its engagement with the diaspora, this process
necessitates an expansion of the homeland state political community. At
a minimum, increased diaspora engagement involves the reordering of
foreign policy priorities, redistributing state funds and restructuring
government institutions to include agencies, commissions or ministries
to administer the new policies. Debates over diaspora policy increase in
intensity as those abroad are given access to membership in the politi-
cal community of the homeland state and new policies expand the
boundaries of political membership beyond the state borders, thereby
jeopardising the ‘coherence of the citizenry’ (Barry 2006: 24). As
Waldinger and Fitzgerald rightly argue: ‘The terms of national belong-
ing are almost always the subject of conflict’ (2004: 1179).
Elite rhetoric of ethnic kinship or national belonging, therefore, does
not always reflect the reality or acceptance of a particular national pro-
ject. Such projects are often contested, and there may be widespread re-
sistance to accepting members of the ethnic diaspora as ‘real’ members
of the civic community who deserve the full rights and benefits of citi-
zenship. Thus, even after diaspora resources have been identified and
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some policy changes are implemented to maintain ties with the dia-
spora, efforts to provide co-ethnics abroad with further access to politi-
cal membership are often met with resistance. Once discussion of dee-
per access to membership in the homeland political community is
opened, tensions are brought forward, stemming from the dual nature
of the state-diaspora relationship. Those legitimately opposed to expand-
ing the reach of the state may ask several questions. What is the cost to
the state if diaspora members acquire a unique legal status, giving them
increased political and even economic influence? What are the conse-
quences if they are allowed to choose among identities and loyalties as
they please? Are they – or are we – the authentic representatives of our
culture and our nation? What may be lost in terms of our economic
and political stability, even our foreign policy goals, by extending mem-
bership beyond our borders? Examples from the cases that follow help
illustrate the dynamics of this tension over the incorporation of dia-
spora members into the homeland political community.
Despite the popular rhetoric of historical responsibility and ethnic af-
filiation, the Hungarian public has consistently shown ambivalence
about the Hungarians across the border, particularly in relation to eth-
nic Hungarian labour migration and citizenship (Csepeli & Örkény
1996: 280). This ambiguity was reflected in the failed December 2004
referendum on whether Hungary should provide non-resident dual citi-
zenship for the ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries. Only 37
per cent of eligible voters turned out for the referendum and, of those,
support for the dual citizenship agenda was only slightly more than 51
per cent. The low turnout invalidated the results – by law, 25 per cent of
eligible voters must support or reject the initiative. Many expressed sur-
prise that so many Hungarians would vote against the measure (Kovács
2006: 62). Taken in the context of a broader comparative understand-
ing of state-diaspora relations, however, the outcome of the referendum
makes more sense. Fear of a ‘wave’ of ethnic Hungarian migration and
concerns about the political and economic consequences for Hungary
were the main arguments put forth by the centre-left governing coali-
tion against granting co-ethnics citizenship. Such arguments proved to
have traction amongst voters anxious about Hungary’s economic and
political stability. The willingness to vote against expanding citizenship
clearly showed the limits of cross-border ethnic attachments in
Hungary when they compete with other concerns of the citizenry and
opposing political elites. A similar debate went on for years in Poland
over the Charter of the Poles, which gives ethnic Poles in neighbouring
eastern states legal recognition of belonging to the Polish nation, in ad-
dition to a wide range of rights in Poland, such as less restrictive entry
requirements and access to some educational and social services. This
‘semi-citizenship’ included a Polish identity card to be issued by
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consulates, which would function as a lifetime nationality visa, but did
not allow for preferential naturalisation (Górny, Grzymała-Kazłowska,
Koryś & Weinar 2007: 158-163). After many years of debate and opposi-
tion, the Law on the Polish Charter was finally passed in September
2007 and came into effect in 2008.
In Mexico, the dual nationality issue spurred a public debate ‘about
what it means to be Mexican’ (Barry 2006: 48). As more integrative po-
licies were discussed, it became clear that there was ‘no consensus in
Mexico about the precise terms of the membership that should be of-
fered to the people of Mexican descent’ (Gutierrez 1999: 567). In 1997,
the Mexican government introduced a constitutional amendment to al-
low Mexicans abroad to take on a second citizenship without being
stripped of their Mexican one. This was seen as a crucial move to keep
the diaspora in the US from assimilating completely and losing their
ties with the mother country, and thereby to ensure a steady flow of re-
mittances and investment. Opposition to the new citizenship law, how-
ever, exposed concerns about the migrants’ political loyalties and the po-
tential for Mexico’s independence to come under attack. As one analyst
described this fear:
When migrants return home, they carry with them an assort-
ment of questionable beliefs, values and habits acquired in the
United States… Allowing them to participate in the national elec-
toral process paves the way to the degradation of Mexico and the
loss of independence. (Martinez-Saldana 2003: 46)
Reluctance about granting voting rights was also expressed by en-
trenched political interests, most notably the previously hegemonic
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which feared that diaspora vot-
ing would shift the political balance against them (García-Acevedo
2003: 543). However, once diaspora resources were rediscovered and
the perception had shifted, the political loyalty of Mexicans in the US
became a political prize to be won, reordering the interests of various
party elites. The PRI, once reluctant to incorporate the diaspora politi-
cally, shifted to using its version of revolutionary nationalism to criticise
the Fox government for not doing enough to help those beyond the bor-
der, and the dual citizenship legislation eventually went forward
(Martinez-Saldana 2003: 38).
In Kazakhstan, the government’s ethnic repatriation plan also trig-
gered backlash over the issue of national belonging. After Kazakhstan’s
independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, the government
actively sponsored the return and repatriation of ethnic Kazakhs in what
it called the ‘far abroad’, meaning primarily those in Mongolia, Turkey
and other parts of Asia. This policy was part of a nation-building
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process designed to balance out the demographic reality that Kazakhs
were an extremely tenuous ethnic majority in Kazakhstan: there were
large numbers of non-Kazakh Russian speakers as well as ethnic Poles,
Germans and other regional nationalities. At least 500,000 ethnic
Kazakhs came to Kazakhstan in the 1990s, induced by repatriation ben-
efits such as free air flights, expedited residency permits, language
courses (in Russian), job training, housing and potential economic op-
portunities. The process of incorporating the ethnic Kazakhs from
abroad proved to be difficult, however: cultural tensions between the
culturally ‘pure’ Kazakhs from the diaspora and the ‘Russified’ mother-
land resulted in distrust of those coming from outside (Cummings
1998: 141-145). Political tensions over the definition of the political com-
munity and to what degree it should be defined by ethnicity led to in-
complete policies that left many repatriating Kazakhs in a legal and eco-
nomic limbo. In 1995, dual citizenship – which previously had been al-
lowed only for ethnic Kazakhs – was abolished, forcing those from
abroad to give up their existing citizenship in order to apply for Kazakh
naturalisation. However, the paperwork necessary to formally renounce
one’s citizenship and gain another proved bureaucratically cumbersome
and costly. As a result, by 1999, almost 90 per cent of the repatriates
from the diaspora lacked Kazakhstani citizenship, and therefore could
not vote, own property or run for office (Diener 2005: 339). In addition,
many repatriates were not receiving their promised allowances or lost
their benefits because they neglected to register properly with local
authorities or failed to stay in the areas designated by government agen-
cies as suitable for resettlement (Cummings 1998: 144). As has been
the case in a number of states that have allowed ethnic repatriation of
specific diaspora populations, the state uses the influx of cultural sib-
lings for specific purposes, and shapes the terms of their incorporation
to benefit the perceived, often contested, needs of the state.5
7.3 Conclusion
Looking at the similarities in the structure and political dynamics of dia-
spora engagement by a variety of kin and migrant-sending states, this
chapter generated a broadly comparative model of how and why states
make policy towards their national populations abroad. In summarising
this model, we see first that populations abroad represent a set of un-
ique cultural, material and political resources for homeland state elites.
This model of ‘diaspora as resource’ offers a useful framework for ex-
plaining the motives for, and modes of engagement with, those outside
state borders. Within this framework, homeland state elites come to un-
derstand and promote the diaspora population as a source of strength,
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rather than a symbol of weakness for the homeland state and for their
own political agendas. Once the diaspora resources have been identified
and merged into political discourse and policy debates, potential threats
to their access are met by an increase in activism by the homeland
state. Changes in external conditions – such as realignments of power
in interstate relations and shifting economic and geopolitical alliances –
shape opportunities for states to establish and control their relationship
with external communities. In responding to these challenges, states ex-
tend their sovereignty and redefine the boundaries of state citizenship
and national membership in order to create, co-opt and maintain ties to
populations abroad. Policy consensus and implementation can, how-
ever, be challenged and disrupted – leading to incomplete and contested
engagement – by the overextension of sovereignty, domestic political
contestation and a backlash against the redefinition of the political com-
munity to include those outside the state borders.
There is still much work to be done towards a comparative frame-
work. One way to talk about both sets of cases without diminishing or
ignoring important differences would be to work towards a typology
based on targeting specific types of populations abroad (e.g. diasporic
economic migrants, diasporic exiles and political migrants, unorganised
expatriates, cross-border co-ethnics after independence) and the types of
policies the state uses to engage those populations. Such a typology
could help us see possible patterns to match motivation (what state
elites want from certain populations) with action. Some comparative
typologies have already been generated by those looking at one type of
action (e.g. external voting) or at one type of population (e.g. migrant
communities), but few attempt to incorporate both aspects (Gamlen
2006; Chander 2006). Work on the introduction of new types of citi-
zenship and membership options is a particularly promising model for
cross-regional and cross-type analysis (Bauböck 2007b; Faist 2001).
Future research towards a broader comparative framework would also
benefit from a deeper investigation of the role of host state policies. As
mentioned, a change in the diaspora’s political and economic incorpora-
tion in the host state can trigger a reaction by homeland state elites to-
wards more intense transnational engagement. Host state policies re-
garding kin minority or migrant populations also shape how and to
what extent diasporas will organise, and what kinds of connections they
will seek from the homeland state, thereby determining whether or not
a potential diaspora population is available to be mobilised as a re-
source. Furthermore, the amount of host state resistance to homeland
state activism can constrain or open opportunities for extraterritorial po-
licies to develop.
In terms of definitional distinctions, although using the term ‘dia-
spora’ to define a population beyond the border may be problematic,
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adopting the phrase ‘diaspora politics’ to describe state action and the
contention around those policies may be useful. Whether a migrant or
other external group can rightly be considered a diaspora bogs us down
in the rather fruitless search for an objective set of criteria. ‘Diaspora
politics’, however, may represent a stance taken by a potential homeland
or kin state that focuses on the intentionality of treating an external
group as if they were a bounded, distinct group with ties of loyalty and
affiliation to the motherland. In this way, I believe that diaspora politics
can be a useful catch-all to define a constructed relationship and inten-
tional set of policies employed to keep those abroad connected to the
homeland.
Clearly, there are important empirical and analytical nuances that are
lost in the attempt to create generalisations from such vast diversity.
Instructive differences between cases may include the ethnic make-up
of the homeland state (degree of homogeneity), whether a primarily
emigration state has kin state potential tied to a specific historical terri-
tory (e.g. India, Dominican Republic) and the relative economic and po-
litical strengths of the external population compared to the homeland
state. Yet, there is clearly analytical utility in looking beyond the preva-
lent type-specific distinction between kin states and migrant-sending
states. By engaging both sets of cases, we are forced to question case-
and region-specific assumptions, leading to a more nuanced under-
standing and broadly applicable theorisation.
Notes
1 Some authors have crafted broader definitions of diaspora that include trans-border
kin minorities (Shain & Barth 2003: 450; Brubaker 2005; Joppke 2005: 30; King &
Melvin 1999).
2 Italy, Turkey and Croatia are three examples of states that have developed policies to
engage both ethnic kin populations in neighbouring countries and migrant
diasporas.
3 Other countries with special legislation targeted only at kin minorities include
Germany, Poland and Russia.
4 Sheridan, M. B. ‘Salvadoran leader embraces diaspora’, The Washington Post B01 9
October 2004.
5 Other cases using targeted repatriation to move ethnic kin into specific, often eco-
nomically depressed regions of the country include Greece, Russia and Turkey.
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Chapter 8
Diasporas and international politics: Utilising the
universalistic creed of liberalism for particularistic
and nationalist purposes
Maria Koinova
8.1 Introduction
The growing pace of globalisation in the first decade of the twenty-first
century has prompted scholars to seek a better understanding of the
role of non-state actors in world politics. Transnational social move-
ments challenge states on international issues such as global warming
and global inequalities. International NGOs criticise states for disre-
specting human rights and lagging on democratisation and develop-
ment. Terrorist groups use violence to advance transnational ideological
and religious creeds that transcend the state. Diasporas use institutions
of their host state to advocate causes for their home states. All these
non-state actors are relatively autonomous from the state they live in
and its material resources; they are transnational or linked to more than
one state, and they seek to affect political change.
Analysing diasporas as non-state actors is a relatively new trend in
political science. While diaspora studies first emerged from cultural stu-
dies, anthropology and sociology, political science followed this trend
starting in the 1990s. (Sheffer 2003; Shain 1994-1995 2002, 2007;
King & Melvin 1999; Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau & Brannan
2001; Kaldor 2001; Wayland 2004; Adamson 2005a, 2006; Brinkerhoff
2006; Lyons 2006; Østergaard-Nielsen 2006; Smith & Stares 2007).
Interest in diasporas grew after 9/11 because foreign-born nationals liv-
ing in Western states were behind the terrorist attacks. There is a grow-
ing understanding that during this era of globalisation, diasporas are
not simply migrants in the eyes of host states; they are linked simulta-
neously to many political contexts through cheap communication and
transportation networks. Diasporas are becoming political actors with
local and transnational agendas.
To theorise about diasporas in political science means facing a num-
ber of challenges, including the conceptual ambiguities surrounding
the term ‘diaspora’. As highlighted in more detail elsewhere in this vo-
lume, positivist conceptualisations have so far dominated the field,
viewing diasporas as multigenerational groups of migrants who share a
similar identity and maintain recurrent contacts with their country of
origin (Esman 1986; Safran 1991; Cohen 1997; Sheffer 2003; Bruneau
this volume). Alternative constructivist accounts have recently become
more widespread. They treat diaspora as ‘a category of practice, project,
claim and stance, rather than as a bounded group’ (Brubaker 2005).
Nevertheless, conceptualising diasporas as a global political phenomen-
on requires more than mirroring classic disagreements in the literature
on how to define the ‘nation’ (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990;
Anderson 1991; Smith 2001). Diasporas in the global age differ from
nations of the modern age because they have multiple national identi-
ties and loyalties and are interlinked across the globe. The original na-
tion is no longer ‘homogeneous’. Dual citizenship and multiple loyalties
abound but are not yet conceptually integrated into the term ‘diaspora’.
These conceptual deficiencies obscure the unit of analysis in political
science. The questions asked, methodologies used and generalisations
reached are affected by whether a scholar considers a diaspora to be a
bounded group, a conglomerate of elites and individuals functioning
within that bounded group, networks or enduring discursive patterns.
Positivist views facilitate asking questions about the impact of diasporas
on the state and political processes within it, the use of comparative
and statistical methods and the conception of diasporas as unitary ac-
tors or elites with a shared identity. Such research designs simplify the
complexity of a diaspora by ignoring generational, gender and location-
based differences, but examine correlations and causality between de-
pendent and independent variables. In contrast, a constructivist view of
diaspora enables more complexity. It asks questions about how dia-
sporas emerge, who belongs to them from various generations and gen-
ders and how identities – in general (rather than a specific group or
elites) – affect the political world or are affected by it. This line of scho-
larship is closer to the humanities, where content and discourse ana-
lyses are often the methods preferred.
Without trying to resolve the conceptual debate about the term ‘dia-
spora’, I adopt in this chapter a definition used by Adamson and
Demetriou to address the contours of a ‘diaspora’ in the global space,
which contains both positivist and constructivist elements.
A diaspora can be identified as a social collectivity that exists
across state borders and that has succeeded over time to 1) sus-
tain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a
sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or ima-
gined homeland and 2) display an ability to address the collective
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interests of members of the social collectivity through a devel-
oped internal organizational framework and transnational links.
(2007: 497)
The second major problem with theorising diasporas in political science
stems from the non-consensual definition of the term ‘non-state actor’.
Although I have outlined three major traits of non-state actors – autono-
my from the state, transnationalism and aspirations for political change
– legitimate questions arise about all of them. How autonomous is a
non-state actor if state programmes are often the sponsors of NGOs, if
transnational social movements are penetrated by state officials and if
terrorist groups – such as Hezbollah and Hamas – and are embedded
within state institutions? How transnational are non-state actors? Are
they ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ (Tarrow 2005) embedded primarily in one
political context while maintaining links with others across the globe, or
are they embedded simultaneously in several social and political contexts
(Portes 1999)? Finally, some non-state actors, such as international
NGOs, may have a clearly defined agenda for political change. Diasporas
have no clearly unified agendas. Their institutions, powerful individuals
and transnational networks are capable of steering political change, but
often advance competing claims. Thus, political science scholarship on
diasporas has much conceptual and theoretical work ahead.
This chapter will focus on theorising the role of diasporas in world
politics, though will concentrate specifically on diasporas in liberal
democracies linked to homelands experiencing limited sovereignty.1
Since the end of the Cold War and the growing pace of globalisation,
territories of limited sovereignty have proliferated due to secessionist
and other intra-state conflicts. Their ambiguous international status
opens considerable political opportunity for international actors to inter-
vene in shaping domestic developments. Diasporas are among these ac-
tors because of their connection to kin in the homeland and the signifi-
cant resources that local elites are eager to capture. In this chapter, I ar-
gue that such diasporas utilise democratic discourses and procedures in
order to pursue nationalist projects related to their land of origin. The
mechanisms used relate to how diasporas filter global pressures for
democratisation.
8.2 Theoretical accounts of diasporas as radical and moderate
actors
Recent scholarship on diasporas and homeland politics has focused on
the role of diasporas in conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction in
their homelands. This interest has been prompted by two major
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findings. In 2000, a statistical large-N study on the economy of civil
war demonstrated that civil wars with strong diaspora involvement are
highly likely to continue to perpetuate, especially if the diaspora has
large concentrations in the United States (Collier & Hoeffler 2000).
Kaldor (2001) arrived at the same conclusion from a different theoreti-
cal perspective; juxtaposing ‘new’ (intra-state) vs. ‘old’ (interstate) wars,
she found that diasporas were crucial in sustaining the intra-state wars
of disintegration of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. In the early
2000s, other studies made similar generalisations, mostly deriving in-
ternal validity from case studies rather than external validity across
many cases. Occupying scholarly attention have been the Tamil Tigers
and the conflicts in Sri Lanka, the Albanians and the conflict in Kosovo
in the 1990s, the Kurds and the conflicts in southern Turkey and Iraq,
among others. As a result, diasporas have largely been considered
‘long-distance nationalists’ (Anderson 1998) that participate in a wide
range of nationalist and conflict-perpetuating activities because they
lead comfortable lives in the industrialised world and do not face the
consequences of their actions. Diasporas that emerged as a result of po-
litical conflicts, rather than from economic or other types of voluntary
migration, maintain traumatic identities attached to homeland territory
and the myth of return, barring them from seeing potential avenues for
conflict resolution (Faist 2000a; Shain 2002; Sheffer 2003; Lyons
2006; Smith & Stares 2007; Baser & Swain 2008). While they lobby
their homeland governments, organise peaceful demonstrations and
provide humanitarian aid, they also often mobilise for radical causes in
the transnational space. They broadcast hate speech and nationally intol-
erant messages, engage in fundraising and sponsorship for radical
groups and often take up arms to go fight in the homeland (Byman et
al. 2001; Hockenos 2003; Biswas 2004; Wayland 2004; Adamson
2005a; Fair 2005; Lyons 2006; Orjuela 2008).
More recently, other scholars have noted that such accounts are one-
sided, not capturing the peaceful practices in which a number of con-
flict-generated diasporas have been engaged. While the Boston-based
Irish diaspora for years helped perpetuate the conflict in Northern
Ireland by supporting the Irish Republican Army through fundraising
activities, it was able to moderate its stances after intervention from the
Clinton Administration in the peace process that led to the 1998 Good
Friday Agreement (Cohrane 2007; Anonymous 1 2008). More recently,
the Ethiopian and Kurdish diasporas have been promoting moderate
politics in their homelands ravaged by internal wars (Lyons 2006;
Koser 2007; Natali 2007; Zunzer 2008). Diasporas have been able to
promote liberal ideals and participate in the democratisation of their
home countries before the end of communism and thereafter (Shain
1999; Biswas 2007; Koinova 2009).
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Nevertheless, scholarship is still in the preliminary stages of under-
standing the conditions and mechanisms that make diasporas agents of
either the radicalisation or the moderation of politics in their home-
lands. Little comparative work exists, and much scholarship describes
diaspora practices in different cases instead of building theory. This
chapter goes beyond taking sides in a cluster of arguments maintaining
that diasporas are either ‘nationalists who perpetuate conflicts’ or ‘could
be moderate actors’. I argue that diasporas in liberal societies linked to
homelands experiencing challenges to their external or internal sover-
eignty react not simply by endorsing nationalist rhetoric and activities.
Rather, they act in a more sophisticated way: they filter international
pressures for democratisation in a world where the liberal creed has no
significant ideological opponent after the end of the Cold War apart
from radical Islam (which nevertheless has incoherent ideological mes-
sages across a variety of internally divided communities and organisa-
tions). Hence, diasporas use the universalist creed of liberalism instru-
mentally in order to increase their political clout with Western govern-
ments while simultaneously pursuing nationalist projects related to
their country of origin. They do so by: 1) using discourses about democra-
tisation, peace and reconciliation and 2) occasionally endorsing minimal
democratic procedures. They do not, however, promote a full-fledged ver-
sion of liberalism and they fall short of supporting liberal democratic
values.
I build this argument on the basis of numerous interviews that I con-
ducted between 1999 and 2008 with representatives of Albanian,
Armenian, Ukrainian, Serbian and Lebanese diasporas in Washington,
D.C., and other locations along the East Coast of the US, Kosovo and
Lebanon.2 In this chapter, I expand my argument based on literature
and interviews conducted among diaspora returnees in Macedonia in
the summer of 2008. While I am aware that these diasporas do not re-
present the entire universe of cases, they are nevertheless representative
of diasporas generated by conflicts and severe tensions in deeply di-
vided societies.
I limit the scope of this chapter to diaspora linkages with homelands
that do not experience acute violence. Non-violent periods allow domes-
tic and external actors – including diasporas – to make choices ranging
from moderate to radical in order to affect domestic change. The gamut
of choices is foreclosed during periods of violent warfare in the home-
land when diasporas almost unconditionally support the local actors
who best advance nationalist goals (Shain 2002). Under violent condi-
tions, radicals usually hold more political clout.
In order to avoid simplifications when generalising diaspora beha-
viour, scholars should examine diaspora mobilisation and attitudes dur-
ing different stages of the political processes in the homeland. On the
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most basic level, a diaspora might become belligerent when violence af-
fects its ethnic brethren, but become much more constructive when the
violence stops. Bercovitch rightly argued that a diaspora’s involvement
may vary depending on the conflict-cycle in the homeland (2007: 27).
However, his account considers cycles of violence from a beginning to
an end, ignoring the fact that in states where sovereignty is deeply con-
tested – e.g. Lebanon, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh – conflicts may last
for decades in some parts of the country while non-violent relationships
predominate in others. Thus, a diaspora connection to the homeland
may not be related to a conflict cycle, per se, but to the violence and
non-violence ensuing during larger processes of secessionism, state col-
lapse and contested sovereignty. The Albanian diaspora provides a good
example. It supported the radical Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during
the most violent years of Kosovo’s secessionist struggle, 1998-1999.
The Albanian diaspora acted more moderately, however, prior to the
conflict and following NATO’s 1999 military intervention in Serbia.
This moderation occurred despite the fact that Kosovo did not enjoy in-
ternational state sovereignty throughout that time and gained indepen-
dence only in February 2008.
8.3 Diasporas and the liberal creed
Socialised with liberal values in Western societies, diasporas might be
expected to be interested in promoting such values in their homelands.
Indeed, this often occurs in the transnational space. Diasporas teach
their extended families and friends about democratic practices, such as
how to vote for local government and to develop gender equality norms
– a process termed a transfer of ‘social remittances’ (Levitt 2001).
Moreover, there are deep-seated reasons motivating this transfer.
Voluntary migrants chose a democratic political system over living in
their original societies, whether autocratic, semi-autocratic or demo-
cratic. At first glance, conflict-generated diasporas may look different
from voluntary migrations because they were dispersed by violence and
could not proactively make political choices. However, this perception is
not entirely accurate. Political exiles – such as many among the
Lebanese and Albanians from this pool of cases – were given asylum
because of their pro-democracy inclinations. Even refugees dispersed by
violent conflicts and settled in Western states – such as refugees from
the wars of disintegration of former Yugoslavia – have interacted with
the political culture of their host country for extended periods of time
and internalised some of the liberal political values. Moreover, political
pluralism allowed many migrants who did not have a political voice in
their homeland to form political groups and societies in their host lands
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(Adamson 2002). These formations socialised migrants with the demo-
cratic values of freedom of speech and association.
Empirically, however, we can still observe a wide range of diasporic
practices: radical activities, aggressive and passive nationalism as well
as interest in promoting democratisation. The Polish diaspora, for ex-
ample, was consistently anti-communist and pro-democratic long before
the end of communism. Thus, it would not be an analytically crucial
case for elucidating reasons why – and ways in which – diasporas might
relate to democratisation during the age of globalisation. Diasporas
linked to homelands experiencing internal or external challenges to
their sovereignty would be more analytically significant because these
challenges make them more prone to act on the nationalist and radical
side of the spectrum. If they were to act with moderation, however,
there should be clear-cut reasons explaining this behaviour. Challenges
to the homeland’s sovereignty subject diasporas’ engagement with the
liberal creed to what social sciences call ‘strong tests’.3
I argue that diasporas of this kind utilise the universal creed of liber-
alism for particularistic purposes. They are neither simply nationalists
nor simply democracy promoters. They claim a middle ground by
adopting democratic discourses and using democratic procedures to ad-
vance nationalist goals. Situating their claims in this central space, they
use the existing global opportunity structure of liberalism to advance
goals related to their country of origin. Teleological statements that de-
mocracy signals ‘the end of history’ and an end-point of man’s ideologi-
cal evolution after the end of communism (Fukujama 1992) would be
misplaced in this discussion. Nevertheless, acknowledging that liberal
democracy has been the most powerful ideological creed for the past
two decades would be an accurate description of its place in the global
normative space. Adamson even argued that liberalism has become a
global opportunity structure in the international system (2005b: 547-
569). However discredited by the US-led pre-emptive wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq during the early 2000s that were justified in the
name of ‘democracy’, democracy promotion has nevertheless long been
embedded in the foreign policies of major powers such as the US and
the European Union, as well as global institutions linking democracy
promotion with development aid, such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. Thus, almost every country in the world
– even if not sincerely interested in promoting democratisation within
its borders – has been exposed directly or indirectly to elements of the
liberal creed.
One could rightly argue that Marxism lost its currency as an ideology
with the demise of communism, but economic inequalities within so-
cieties and across the North-South divide are growing and creating
space for new ideological creeds to emerge and channel such
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grievances. The anti-globalisation social movements that grew in ascen-
dance in the 1990s have been one venue to address them, but they
lacked a clear ideology and have lost some significance (Tarrow &
Hadden 2007). Thus, the majority of grievances have been channelled
through religious-based movements making claims on behalf of popula-
tions of various nationalities living in multiple states. Islam, in particu-
lar, has aspired to such a global ideological reach (Adamson 2005b).
While ambitions for a global Islam certainly exist, the actual reach of
Islamic organisations has been confined to certain world regions such
as the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central and South-East Asia.
Islamic groups are stronger in Europe than in the US and Australia,
with no real footing in Latin America.
8.4 Democratic discourses for particularistic purposes
One way in which diasporas linked to homelands experiencing chal-
lenges to their sovereignty engage with the political projects in their
country of origin is to frame sovereignty within discourses on democra-
tisation. In order to demonstrate how they do so, I use theoretical in-
sights from the literature on framing, an integral part of scholarship on
social movements. Works on transnational social movements – addres-
sing anti-globalisation, environmental, feminist and other movements –
originally engaged with theorising on principled action based on uni-
versalist claims rather than on particularistic projects of identity-based
actors such as diasporas (Keck & Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink
1999; Della Porta & Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005). However, a number of
scholars have incorporated ideas from this scholarship into their works,
seeking to capture dynamics in diaspora politics. Most notably, the
opening of political opportunity structures – such as the onset of wars,
withdrawal of foreign troops and the political opportunities available in
the host country and the international environment – have been
deemed important for the political mobilisation of diasporas (Wayland
2004; Adamson 2005a; Brinkerhoff 2006; Smith & Stares 2007; Natali
2007; Skrbic 2007; Koinova 2009). Political opportunities both con-
strain and enable diasporas, determining to a certain extent their ideolo-
gical and strategic choices (Biswas 2004). The choice to frame pro-
sovereignty claims in democratisation terms deserves attention as an
important characteristic of diaspora mobilisation.
A frame is an ‘interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses
the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding objects,
situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s
present or past environment’ (Snow & Benford 1992). Effective frames
demonstrate that the existing status quo is not natural, identify a
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responsible party or parties and propose credible solutions (Keck &
Sikkink 1998). Framing takes place alongside strategic ‘alignment pro-
cesses’, among which ‘frame bridging’ is the most common (Benford &
Snow 2000). Frames do not operate in a vacuum but are dynamically
related to political and cultural opportunities and constraints. In the
transnational realm, local insurgents capture distant imaginations and
the support of international actors by successfully matching five shared
elements with their international counterparts: substantive goals, cus-
tomary tactics, ethical precepts, cultural attitudes and organisational
needs (Bob 2005).
I will illustrate how framing of sovereignty is linked to democratisa-
tion by comparing the cases of the Lebanese diaspora linked to the
2000-2005 movement in Lebanon and the Albanian diaspora linked to
the 1999-2008 pro-sovereignty movement in Kosovo.4 The largely non-
violent episode of contested sovereignty in Lebanon began in 2000
when Israel withdrew its military forces from the country’s south and
finished with Syrian troops’ withdrawal in 2005. The Lebanese diaspora
linked to Lebanon mobilised to restore the country’s internal sover-
eignty and the ability of domestic institutions to function without perpe-
tual interference from Syria. In Kosovo, the period started with the end
of NATO’s military intervention in 1999 and the arrival of the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on
Kosovo’s territory, and, to a certain degree, ended with the proclamation
of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008.5 The Albanian diaspora
was strongly connected to the pro-sovereignty efforts of local elites and
institutions that chose an ‘institutional path to independence’ over pre-
vious strategies of non-violence and guerrilla warfare.
The Lebanese and Albanian diasporas used the process of frame brid-
ging to connect sovereignty with democratisation claims. The process
refers to the ‘linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structu-
rally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem’
(Benford & Snow 2000). Sovereignty and democracy are ideologically
congruent because national self-determination has been a major part of
the democratic creed since US President Woodrow Wilson formulated
his fourteen points at the end of World War I. In both cases, diasporas
linked sovereignty and democracy, aspiring to resonate with US policy’s
global promotion of democracy. While often contesting each other and
acting without sustained coordination, Lebanese diaspora organisations
nevertheless adopted a similar pro-democracy stance: ‘Help Lebanon to
regain its place among democracies of the world…’ appealed Hassan El-
Najjar, a prominent diaspora individual, to US President George
W. Bush (Najjar 2001). Delegates of the World Maronite Congress, a
pro-opposition and anti-Syrian gathering of journalists, exiles and
Lebanese diaspora members in 2002 in Los Angeles, joined forces to
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‘speak with a common voice and to advocate a Free and Sovereign
Lebanon…free to elect a democratic government where all are equal…’
(LFP 2002). Supporters of one of the most active diaspora factions, the
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun, exiled in France, used
its political influence in the US to emphasise Lebanon’s partnership
with the US in building democracy in the Middle East (Anonymous 2
2007). Individuals linked to the Lebanese Forces, another political
group with strong diaspora presence, linked sovereignty and democracy
claims by emphasising how human rights abuses should not be toler-
ated in Lebanon. They argued that abuses occur because Syria sup-
presses domestic opposition (Anonymous 3 2007). These claims were
made keeping in mind that their leader Samir Geagea was imprisoned
in Lebanon.
Like their Lebanese counterparts, Albanian diaspora organisations in
the US held personal and institutional rivalries, but they also adopted a
clear stance linking Kosovo’s international sovereignty to a democratic
discourse. The president of one of the most influential diaspora institu-
tions, the Albanian American Civic League (AACL), Joe DioGuardi, con-
gratulated Kosovo-Albanians for their ‘disciplined behavior’ in the 2000
municipal elections and claimed that it established that ‘Kosova is ready
for a democratic society and self-governance.’ Although DioGuardi
maintained ties with less moderate parties in Kosovo that emerged from
the former KLA, including war veterans, he nevertheless claimed that
he wanted to ‘see leaders who are ready to demonstrate that Albanians
are ready to solve problems…’, thus ‘speeding Kosovo’s democratization
and solidifying international support for its independence.’6 The
National Albanian American Council, a Washington, D.C.-based organi-
sation more closely related to parties in Kosovo that had emerged from
the non-violent Democratic League of Kosovo during the 1990s, empha-
sised the need to develop the rule of law, thus launching programmes
for the democratic education of Kosovars to pave the way to indepen-
dence (Anonymous 4 2006). Although diaspora groups shared a rejec-
tion of the United Nations policy of ‘standards before status’ – devel-
oped in 2002 to give leverage to the international community in speed-
ing the democratisation process and including respect for minority
rights – they used the democratic creed to justify their own logic against
this policy. They argued that, regardless of intentions, ‘standards before
status’ de facto prevented Kosovo from becoming more democratic.
Self-government without membership in international institutions that
open opportunities for economic development is difficult to sustain.
One could argue that democratic discourses can be adopted easily be-
cause there is no cost to advancing them and commitments are not
‘sticky’. While such observations sound almost commonsensical, the lit-
erature on democratising an Eastern Europe of the 1990s has shown
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that rhetorical entrapment might be a mechanism for further demo-
cratic change (Schimmelfenning 2001). Reputational, rather than mate-
rial, costs are paid if one deviates greatly from rhetorical commitments.
Especially in Western societies, reputational costs matter. Diasporas that
often want to be viewed as ‘good citizens’ (Biswas 2007) also want to
avoid increased securitisation measures after the terrorist attacks of 9/
11 (Rudolph 2003) and various stigmas related to their connection to a
conflict-ridden homeland. They could face reputational costs if they do
not adhere to their discursive arguments.
8.5 Democratic procedures and unresolved nationalist goals
Diasporas do not only use democratisation discourses, they also pro-
mote minimal democratic procedures in their homeland. These prac-
tices are mostly related to electoral pluralism and rotation of power of
local elites rather than to liberal aspects of democratisation associated
with human, minority or gender rights. Diasporas advocate these demo-
cratic procedures for nationalist and other particularistic purposes.
Evidence from diasporas linked to the democratising region of Eastern
Europe during the past two decades could well elucidate this point.
Serbia was a chronically disintegrating state from 1991 and did not
enjoy full internal sovereignty over Kosovo during the 1990s. Local poli-
tical institutions, economic life, educational and medical facilities were
mirrored by the parallel structures of the secessionist Kosovo shadow
state. In this time period, Serbian diaspora groups in the US focused
their efforts – however sporadic and uncoordinated – primarily on sup-
porting Milosevic and some parties of his opposition. Interestingly, the
diaspora promoted groups that were often no less nationalist than
Milosevic. For example, Chicago-based groups stemming from old
Chetnik organisations rendered limited support to both opposition lea-
der Vuk Draskovic and his ultra-nationalist rival, Vojislav Seselj
(Hockenos 2003: 127). The influential Serbian Unity Congress (SUC)
initially backed Milosevic during the war effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but changed its attitude after the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.
Thereafter, Milosevic was briefly considered the ‘peacemaker’ of the
Balkans’ in US circles, but the diaspora considered him an opportunist
who had jeopardised Serbian interests in ‘Greater Serbia’ (Hockenos
2003: 109; Anonymous 5 2007). The Serbian Unity Congress (SUC)
supported opposition groups that could oust him from power and spon-
sored some of their leaders to travel to the US to testify before US
Congress. SUC president Michael Djiordjevic often acted as the official
representative in the US for Serbian politicians Vuk Draskovic, Zoran
Djindjic and Vesna Pesic (Hockenos 2003: 171-172).
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As mentioned, in the case of Kosovo it was not internal, but interna-
tional, legal sovereignty that was missing. The diaspora’s engagement
with the homeland’s unresolved nationalist goal was not simply to link
claims between sovereignty and democratisation, but to engage in pro-
moting certain procedural aspects of democratisation. Keeping their
eyes on Kosovo’s future independence, the Albanian diaspora adopted a
pragmatic attitude with the understanding that if democracy is the ‘only
game in town’ for achieving independence, then it will play it
(Anonymous 6 2006). Diaspora organisations regularly provided moni-
tors for elections in Kosovo. They officially disapproved of mob violence
in 2004 when Kosovo-Albanians injured and killed a number of Serbs
and destroyed Serbian cultural monuments. They also did not actively
stand in the way of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) when it indicted for war crimes Ramush Haradinaj,
once a KLA commander and then Prime Minister of post-war Kosovo.7
Challenges to the international legal sovereignty of Nagorno-
Karabakh have been responsible for the Armenian diaspora’s limited in-
volvement with democratisation. Unlike Kosovo, for which indepen-
dence is de facto a reality, the conflict over the Armenian enclave of
Karabakh on Azerbaijan’s territory is considered ‘frozen’ after a cease-
fire that ended the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1994. The
Armenian diaspora has had few real incentives to promote democratic
behaviour, knowing that a resolution of the Karabakh problem is not on
the international community’s current agenda. It nevertheless engaged
with promotion of democratic procedures in the most minimalist ways
in order to meet general international pressures for democratisation,
for example, by providing monitors for elections (Chouldjian 2007).
After the violent electoral outcome during Armenia’s 2008 presidential
elections, a few diaspora individuals became proactive in supporting the
opposition represented by former President Levon Ter-Petrossian.
Finally, the Macedonian diaspora based primarily in Australia used
the democratic procedure of the referendum to challenge the adoption
of a package of laws aimed at allowing Albanians living in Western
Macedonia and other territorially concentrated minorities to enjoy larger
self-government rights. This package emerged from the provisions of
the Ohrid Framework Agreement that ended the brief internal armed
conflict in Macedonia in 2001. During the conflict, the guerrilla
Albanian National Liberation Army challenged the internal sovereignty
of the state. At that time, the territorial division of Macedonia into areas
populated primarily by Albanians and Macedonians was strongly con-
templated among both Albanian and Macedonian elites. Thus, the post-
war decentralisation package became highly politically charged. The
November 2004 referendum was organised by the nationalist
Macedonian opposition and sponsored by diaspora contributions
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channelled through the World Macedonian Congress based in
Macedonia. Many Macedonians with close connections to the diaspora
became engaged in widespread grassroots activities to advocate partici-
pation in that referendum. They attacked the upcoming redistricting of
municipalities, which they considered as favouring the Albanians. Both
the EU and the US made extraordinary efforts to campaign against this
referendum, regarding it as a tool to promote Macedonian nationalism
rather than liberal democratisation. It is common knowledge among
scholars and activists in the region that the referendum would have had
high chances of succeeding, and therefore preventing Albanians of
Macedonia from benefiting from the Ohrid Peace Accords and its envi-
saged devolution of power, had the US not committed themselves to re-
cognising Macedonia by its constitutionally defined name, Republic of
Macedonia. With this move on the eve of the referendum, the US
boosted the established Macedonian government’s position and the le-
gal framework envisaging under the Ohrid Accords. This example illus-
trates how a diaspora can be instrumental in boosting nationalism by
using a common democratic procedure, the referendum.8
8.6 Why not promote liberal democratisation?
The discussion thus far demonstrates that diasporas linked to homelands
experiencing challenges to their sovereignty use democratic discourses
and can promote procedures for the democratisation of their homelands
(political pluralism, electoral change, referendum) in order to advance
unresolved nationalist goals in the homeland. Unlike violence or clandes-
tine activities, these discourses and methods allow them to promote the
homeland’s political goal through democratic practices acceptable to the
international community. Why, finally, do I then argue that diasporas
cease their pro-democratic support when a promotion of liberal values of
democratisation enters the picture? I will validate this argument after
putting the diasporas’ behaviour to test on one issue of great importance
for the liberal values paradigm: the tolerance of ethno-national diversity.
Among the cases I have researched, only the Ukrainian diaspora sup-
ported some aspects of liberalism in their homeland, including inter-
ethnic cooperation throughout the 1990s. I have argued elsewhere that
this difference owes to the fact that the Ukrainian diaspora was linked
to the newly independent state of Ukraine since 1991 (Koinova 2009).
Unlike Poland, which alongside Japan is one of the most internally
homogeneous states in the world, Ukrainian society is deeply divided
between Ukrainians and speakers of Russian in Ukraine. Thus, the
Ukrainian diaspora provides an appropriate shadow case to demonstrate
that challenges to the sovereignty of the homeland are what predicts
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whether a diaspora will engage in full-fledged promotion of the liberal
creed or will stop short of promoting democratic values. Without deeper
research one could expect that the ethno-linguistic divisions in Ukraine
would give the Ukrainian diaspora an incentive to support primarily
Western Ukraine, the territory from which its ancestors originated.
Unlike in Macedonia, however, these divisions had not become internal
challenges to the sovereignty of the state. For the Ukrainian diaspora,
which had supported state independence since World War I, it became
of utmost importance to preserve the integrity of independent Ukraine.
This meant that, in a political neighbourhood dominated by Russia and
prone to conflict, the diaspora was interested in keeping the loyalty
among Russian speakers towards Ukraine intact. Thus, diaspora groups
provided occasional support for dialogue among parliamentarians and
mayors of Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking regions and supported
other initiatives that cut across the Ukrainian-Russian internal divide
(Andrushkiw 2007).
None of the other diasporas linked to homelands experiencing chal-
lenges to their sovereignty was inclined to consider support for minority
rights and ethno-national diversity. Lebanese in the diaspora have tradi-
tionally engaged in Arab-American causes and often joined demonstra-
tions advancing the Palestinian cause in the Arab-Israeli conflict. But
challenging the Lebanese system to allow more rights for the displaced
Palestinians in Lebanon would have been considered highly inappropri-
ate. For example, the 2002 World Maronite Congress rejected – by over-
whelming majority – a proposition to discuss the state of Palestinians
in Lebanon on the grounds that many Christian Lebanese hold them re-
sponsible for ‘the destruction of Lebanon’ (Najjar 2002).
Similarly, Albanians in the US have adopted a zero-sum game atti-
tude towards the national question. The AACL was opposed to the inter-
national community’s vision that post-war Kosovo should become a
‘multi-ethnic society’ through the return of large numbers of Serbian
refugees (DioGuardi 2003). Most of the politically active diaspora
groups either remained silent or made pro forma statements against
the sporadic violence in March 2004 that inflicted serious harm on the
Serbian minority in Kosovo. As he most influential Serbian diaspora or-
ganisation, the SUC has been openly anti-Kosovar. From a total of 29 is-
sues of the Bulletin of the Serbian Unity Congress, 23 issues (sixteen from
1998-1999 and thirteen from 2000-2007) contained at least one article
dedicated to Kosovar ‘terrorists’ and ‘war-mongers’ or to keeping
Kosovo as an integral part of Serbian territory.
The Armenian diaspora has remained hostile to any reconciliation
with, or moderation towards, Azerbaijan and Turkey. Moreover, the dia-
sporic trauma of the Armenian genocide has perpetuated continued
hate speech against Turkey and increased lobbying to prevent Turkey
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from entering the EU or from entering into more amicable relations
with Armenia proper. Becoming a textbook example of how a diaspora
can harm conflict resolution in the homeland (Libaridian 1999;
Tölölyan 2000; Papazian 2001; Shain 2002) is the case of former
President Ter-Petrossian, who was ousted from power in 1998 after
strong intervention from the Armenian diaspora because of his inclina-
tions to improve Armenia’s relations with Turkey. Ten years after this
event the Armenian diaspora has not changed its attitude.
8.7 Conclusions
This chapter has sought to demonstrate major modes of thought about
diasporas in political science and the challenges this scholarship en-
counters. Political science inquiry currently focuses on considering dia-
sporas as non-state actors similar to anti-globalisation, feminist, envir-
onmental, terrorist and other movements. Major challenges arise from
the lack of a clear conceptual understanding of how to treat diasporas.
It is also unclear to what extent diasporas are indeed autonomous from
the state as non-state actors, if various diaspora groups have competing
claims driven by both diaspora and home-state circles. Theorising about
diasporas as identity-based actors requires critical scrutiny of existing
theoretical approaches on transnational social movements that have
dominated this new scholarly field. This scholarship has built its in-
sights mostly from principled, rather than identity-based, transnational
action. It could thus make claims about universalist, rather than about
particularistic, ideological projects.
Another goal of this chapter was to review major theoretical accounts
with respect to the question of whether diaporas are actors of radicalisa-
tion or moderation of homeland politics. It identified two major clusters
of arguments. One argued that diasporas often perpetuate conflicts by
way of their traumatic identities, myth of return, attachment to territory
and various practices such as fundraising for radical causes and taking
up arms to fight for the homeland. Another line of thought found these
statements biased towards certain diasporas (Tamil, Sikh, Albanian) on
which scholarly attention has been focused. Some scholars deemed
these cases not be representative of all diasporas, even those generated
by conflicts. They argued that diasporas could also be engaged with
moderate politics and with peace-building and democratisation activ-
ities. A few recent accounts have shown how to go beyond this dichoto-
my, demonstrating that diasporas may relate differently with respect to
different phases of a conflict cycle in the homeland. These works do
not take into account that homeland conflicts often are ‘frozen’
(Nagorno-Karabakh), have multiple spirals (Lebanon) and are related to
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larger underlying processes such as secessionism (Kosovo, Nagorno-
Karabakh), state collapse (Serbia) or transition during democratisation. I
have offered theoretical insights that illuminate the fact that diasporas
are not simply moderate or radical actors, but actors that engage strate-
gically in homeland projects. I have limited my theory-building to a uni-
verse of cases of diasporas linked to homelands experiencing limited so-
vereignty. I have argued that they use democratic discourses and proce-
dures to pursue unresolved particularistic nationalist goals related to
their homeland, but do not fully endorse democratic values. I derived
this argument on the basis of multiple interviews with representatives
of the Albanian, Armenian, Lebanese, Macedonian, Serbian and
Ukrainian diasporas.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature on diasporas and
homeland politics in several ways. First, it focuses scholarly attention
on the need to discuss diasporas not in general, but how they relate to
particular political contexts in their homelands. Second, my account de-
monstrates that diasporas are not simply identity-based actors driven by
nationalist or ideological claims. They can act instrumentally when ap-
proaching political issues in their homeland that need support from
their host land or the larger international community. The need for the
international recognition of the emerging Kosovo state is a good exam-
ple of a major incentive for the Albanian diaspora to formulate demo-
cratisation discourses on its own, and to promote democratisation pro-
cedures and transform its own radical behaviour from 1998-1999 into
one that makes moderate claims. Third, this chapter offers a wide com-
parative approach to the study of diasporas against the backdrop of the
single-case approaches that still dominate the field. This chapter thereby
contributes to meso-level theorising on diasporas and world politics.
My theoretical account faces some limitations due to the selection of
cases of diasporas in liberal states linked to homelands experiencing
limited sovereignty. It remains to be tested whether my theoretically in-
formed findings could be generalised into a broader theory of diasporic
support for democracy by extending the analysis to three other contex-
tualised comparisons. These are: 1) diasporas linked to homelands ex-
periencing challenges to their sovereignty but residing in non-liberal
states (Lebanese in Africa, Armenians in Syria and Iran and
Palestinians in the Middle East would be good examples); 2) diasporas
living in liberal states that are engaged with homelands that do not ex-
perience any challenges to their internal or external sovereignty (the
Ukrainian and Polish cases discussed above are good examples and the
pool of cases could be potentially expanded to diasporas linked to the
democratising political environments of Eastern Europe and Latin
America); 3) transnational political participation of migrants casting ab-
sentee ballots in a democratic election. This phenomenon could be
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studied across an even wider array of cases including citizens of transi-
tion countries or competitive authoritarian regimes, but also expatriates
of liberal democracies residing throughout the globe, including increas-
ing numbers of individuals enjoying double citizenship.
Notes
1 International legal sovereignty designates the judicial recognition of an international
legal entity. Domestic sovereignty denotes the ability of domestic authority structures
to control activities within their territorial borders (Krasner 2001).
2 In-depth comparative studies on concrete conflicts can be found in Koinova (2009,
forthcoming).
3 A ‘strong test’ is one whose outcome is unlikely to result from any other factor except
the operation or failure of the proposed theory (Van Evera 1997).
4 For further in-depth discussion about framing, access and shifts of foreign policy
with regard to these cases, see Koinova (forthcoming).
5 One can rightly argue that challenges to Kosovo’s sovereignty have not been comple-
tely resolved with the February 2008 declaration of independence since, as of July
2009, Kosovo had been recognised by only 62 of the 192 UN member states.
Nevertheless, this major event paved the way for UN rule in Kosovo to be signifi-
cantly downsized, as well as for further development of statehood structures, includ-
ing diplomatic missions in major countries that have recognised Kosovo. Most nota-
bly, it created widespread sentiment among Kosovars that their sovereignty goal has
been finally achieved.
6 Zeri, ‘A Strong Man on the Side of Kosova: Interview with Former Congressman Joe
DioGuardi,’, October 2000, www.aacl.com/Diaspora.html, accessed November 2009.
7 Haradinaj was acquitted by the ICTY in 2008.
8 While the referendum is a democratic procedure, it has been widely used to enhance
the legitimacy of non-democratic regimes, and democratic regimes have used it to
support non-democratic policies. This discussion demonstrates that diasporas could
potentially be part of a pool of actors who utilise the referendum for non-democratic
(here specifically, for majoritarian) purposes.
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Chapter 9
Diaspora, migration and transnationalism:
Insights from the study of second-generation
‘returnees’
Russell King and Anastasia Christou
9.1 Introduction
In an era of globalisation and accelerating and diversifying mobility, cer-
tain ‘new’ types of migration escape the attention of statisticians and de-
mographers. They become ‘known’ through anecdotal evidence, qualita-
tive research, even newspaper reports. Such is the case with the particu-
lar migratory form that we discuss in this chapter: the ‘return’ of the
second generation to their parental ‘homeland’, often independent of
their parents who remain in the ‘hostland’. In the United Kingdom,
newspaper articles have recently picked up on this phenomenon, de-
scribing it as ‘going back to my roots’1 or ‘home from home’.2 Wajid
(2006) describes the growing number of British-born Pakistanis, espe-
cially women, who are settling in the parents’ country of origin. She
identifies two different types. One concerns young women taken back,
sometimes against their will, to arranged marriages in villages in
Mirpur, the main area of origin of Britain’s Pakistani community. The
other features university-educated career women who migrate to
Pakistan’s cities to pursue professional careers. In Karachi or Lahore,
they enjoy a greater measure of freedom than they would have been al-
lowed by their family and community in Britain, as well as being free
of the racial discrimination still characteristic of British society.
Our aims in this chapter are, first, to bring this phenomenon of sec-
ond-generation return into focus and, second, to explore its theoretical
and conceptual implications. The chapter comprises three parts. The
first deals with conceptualisation and definition: of the narrow phenom-
enon of second-generation return and its constituent elements (second
generation, return); and of the broader theoretical frameworks that are
central to this book, namely transnationalism and diaspora. In the sec-
ond section, we demonstrate the significance of second-generation re-
turn as an empirical phenomenon by pinpointing three geographical
settings where the phenomenon has been researched: Japanese
Brazilians or Nikkeijin, British-born ‘returnees’ to the Caribbean and
Greek-Americans relocating to Greece. The last of these three case stu-
dies draws on our own research.3 In the third and concluding part of
the chapter, we use the second-generation return optic to reflect briefly
on the broader theoretical approaches of diaspora and transnationalism.
9.2 Second-generation return: A new migration chronotope
The stripped-down definition of second-generation return is unambigu-
ous: it is the ‘return’ of the second-generation children of first-genera-
tion immigrants to their parents’ country of origin. It is a time-space
phenomenon, or chronotope, defined by genealogical time and by two
places – origin and destination – which are the reverse of those framing
the parental migration. Complications arise when we adopt the emic
gaze of the second-generationers themselves, for whom the ‘destina-
tion’ is also the ‘origin’ – ‘going back to their roots’ (Wessendorf 2007).
A similar reflective ambiguity surrounds the notion of home: they are
relocating from one home to another, except that the return to the par-
ental home place has a different cadence – the home is the homeland.
The same holds true for return: strictly speaking, if the migrants were
‘true’ second generationers, i.e. born and brought up abroad, this is not
the return migration of migration statistics. Yet, for the protagonists
themselves, it is very much a real, ontological return to the land of their
ancestors.
These, then, are some of the nuances that emerge when we excavate
the apparently straightforward term ‘second-generation return’. Other
difficulties arise when we break the term down into its constituent
parts. We quickly appreciate the rigidity of definitions in the face of the
messy evidence of reality.
The term ‘second generation’ is a hostage to fortune. Its pure form is
clear enough, but all sorts of complications arise when we scrutinise
the concept more closely. Ego may be foreign-born to immigrant par-
ents, but if the parents were married before emigrating, there may be
other siblings in the same family who are not, in the pure sense, sec-
ond generation, i.e. born in the host country. Some definitions of sec-
ond generation include children born in the home country and brought
to the host country at an early age, for instance, before the age of six
years in many European studies, though later in American research
(Thomson & Crul 2007). The well-known studies by Portes and
Rumbaut take the threshold at twelve and relax the definition of second
generation even further by allowing one of the parents to be native-born
(Portes & Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut & Portes 2001). Home-country-
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born children brought by their migrating parents are also known as the
1.5 generation, although this definition too can be very loose, ranging
from very young babies to teenagers, with consequent differences re-
garding educational experience, acculturation, linguistic competences,
etc.4
Three further refinements of second generation phenomenology can
be noted. First, interesting questions arise when the second generation
is the offspring of parents of two different immigrant national origins.
The transnational allegiances and diasporic identities of such indivi-
duals have yet to be studied. We signal this as a major gap in the litera-
ture on the second generation.
Second, how does one define host-country-born individuals when one
parent is first generation and the other second? Given the practice
among many ethnic communities of seeking spouses for the second
generation in the home country and then ‘importing’ them through
‘marriage migration’, this category of offspring is becoming increas-
ingly common and is sometimes labelled the 2.5 generation.
Third, how do we describe individuals who are born in the host coun-
try but are then sent back to their ‘home’ countries for part of their
schooling? Many reasons may lie behind such a course of action: the
need for both parents to work full time and to be relieved of childcare
duties, taken on by grandparents or other relatives; the desire of the par-
ents for the child to absorb the home-country language and culture; the
wish to have their children educated in a safer and more supportive en-
vironment. Each individual case will vary and depend on the ages at
which the child is sent ‘home’ and brought back, as well as the fre-
quency and quality of parental contact during the separation.
Ultimately, these ‘transnational children’ (if that is an appropriate term
to describe them – we are not sure) are difficult to regard as ‘pure’ sec-
ond generation. Their evolving identities, career options and subse-
quent migratory paths are unlikely to be unaffected by a period of
schooling in the home country.
Moving now to ‘return’, the meaning of this term is clearly stretched
when we consider individuals who are relocating to a place they have
never lived in – although they may have visited it frequently. The point
has already been made, however, that there is an ontological sense of re-
turn to a point of origin, a homeland. The literature on return migra-
tion, which is now quite substantial5 but under-theorised (Cassarino
2004), says very little about second-generation return, although it does
acknowledge a subspecies of return, ‘ancestral return’, noting studies
on such groups as Jews ‘returning’ to Israel; Aussiedler, ethnic Germans
resettling in Germany from Eastern Europe; and the Pontic Greeks, si-
milarly relocating to their ethnic homeland after generations of exile in
places such as Georgia and Kazakhstan (King 2000: 10).
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What does this mean for the broader conceptual fields of transnation-
alism and diaspora? Some answers will be given in the final part of this
chapter. For now, we signal relevant perspectives to be kept in mind
during the intervening empirical section of our account.
The first general point to make is that none of the four main litera-
tures that are constitutive of the themes of this chapter – those on the
second generation, return migration, transnationalism and diaspora –
has much to say about second-generation return migration, which
seems to slip into the interstices between these literatures. The litera-
ture on the second generation – dominated by US scholarship – is beset
by the assimilation paradigm that derives from the historical self-
narrative of the United States as a large, welcoming country ‘made’ by
immigrants who become, eventually, ‘Americans’; ‘return’ is thus coun-
ter-intuitive (King 2000: 29). Meanwhile, recent comparative survey re-
search on the integration of the European second generation focuses
largely on their educational and employment trajectories within host so-
cieties, not on links to the parental home country (Crul & Vermeulen
2003). Likewise, in the now-extensive literatures on transnationalism
and return migration, scant attention is paid to the second generation:
the returnees, on the one hand, and the transnationally active, on the
other, are overwhelmingly portrayed as the first-generation migrants.
There are some exceptions to this last generalisation, but only few.
Leichtman (2005) has documented the second- and subsequent-
generation transnational links of the Lebanese community in Senegal.
On a broader front, Levitt and Waters (2002) have edited an important
volume on the transnational lives of the second generation in the US;
many of these contributions reveal that strong tendencies towards as-
similation can coexist with significant participation in transnational so-
cial fields. The kinds of second-generation transnational activity most
commonly depicted are return or homecoming visits that are designed
to link up with family roots and to expose the foreign-born to the ‘eth-
nic culture’ of their parents’ country of origin. Such visits usually do re-
inforce the emotional link to the parental homeland, but they can also
make the visitors realise that they can never relocate or feel at home
there. In Kibria’s contribution we hear of Jeff, a Korean-American who
went to Korea on a study-visit after finishing high school (Kibria 2002:
304-305). Flying into Seoul, he felt a deep connection to his ‘homeland’:
I remember flying into Seoul… I could see these little houses,
farms in the country… Something about it felt good. I remember
thinking… ‘this is an important part of me.’
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Then, disappointment set in:
The natives looked down on us because a lot of us couldn’t speak
Korean… they were basically saying, ‘You’re so stupid. You’re
Korean, but you can’t speak Korean.’ There were some isolated
incidents where we were… yelled at, harassed.
For Jeff and others like him, the homeland visit serves only to accentu-
ate differences of culture and nationality, and to reinforce a heightened
sense of their American identity (Kibria 2002: 307). A definitive return
seems out of the question.
Diaspora theory, on the other hand, posits a somewhat different rela-
tionship to second-generation return since, according to most defini-
tions of diaspora, return is part and parcel of the aetiology of the con-
cept. If we subscribe to Safran’s often-quoted criteria for diasporas, we
find strong relationships to the homeland and the aspiration for return
prominently featured. To paraphrase, diasporas maintain a collective
memory (which, however, may be mythical) about their homeland; their
consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by their ongoing
relationship with their territories of origin; and they see their ancestral
home as their ‘pure, authentic’ home and as a place of eventual return
(Safran 1991: 83-84). In this sense, ‘ancestral return’ or ‘counter-
diasporic migration’ (King & Christou 2008) represent the logical clos-
ing of the diasporic cycle: the final, longed-for return ‘home’. This is
consistent with Van Hear’s observation (1998: 6) that, if diasporas have
become more widespread in recent decades, for instance, through on-
ward or secondary migration, so too has the ‘unmaking’ of diasporas,
through ‘in-gathering’ or ‘re-grouping’.
But return is perhaps questionable as a defining criterion of diaspora.
Some diasporas do not desire to return. The Parsees, mainly resident in
Western India but also scattered in many other locations, have no ideol-
ogy of return to their original homeland, Iran, which they left in the
eighth century. Gypsies or Roma are a different case (Safran (1991: 87)
calls them a ‘metadiaspora’) because their nomadic diasporisation is an
expression or idealisation of their existential condition. African
Americans, products of the slave diaspora, do have a ‘homeland myth’,
but it can no longer be precisely located and only a tiny minority have
‘returned’ to Africa.
A complicating factor with any attempt to frame second-generation
return within diaspora studies is that the definition of what, exactly,
constitutes a diaspora has inexorably widened (Brubaker 2005). On the
whole, we endorse Cohen’s (1997) typology of diasporas into those
formed as a result of persecution, labour migration, colonial settlement
and trade, not least because this makes us realise that counter-diasporic
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flows, including second-generation return, originate from different dia-
sporic formations. However, the danger with this elasticated meaning
of diaspora is that it becomes confused with other notions such as mi-
gration, ethnic communities and transnational social fields. What dis-
tinguishes the diasporic condition from contemporary international mi-
gration and transnational communities, we suggest, is historical conti-
nuity across at least two generations, a sense of the possible
permanence of exile, and the broad spread and stability of the distribu-
tion of populations within the diaspora. In other words, ‘time has to
pass’ before a migration becomes a diaspora (Cohen 1997: 185).
We recognise the problems inherent in this broadening of the mani-
fold historical processes and myriad individual journeys and narratives
that lead to diasporas being formed; yet we also appreciate that Cohen’s
diversification of diasporic types is helpful in explaining the spread of
diasporic consciousness among so many exiled peoples in the world, be
they the result of ancient population displacements or of contemporary
economic and political processes such as labour migration or refugee
expulsion.
9.3 Studies of second-generation return
Second-generation return is a rather specific migration chronotope
within the wider movement known as ancestral or counter-diasporic re-
turn (King & Christou 2008, 2009). Studies of ancestral return are
quite numerous, if scattered, and include a variety of cases from differ-
ent time periods and different parts of the world. Earlier we noted Jews
going to Israel, the German Aussiedler and the Pontic Greeks. We can
also point to various ‘return’ migrations of colonial peoples, such as the
‘Dutch Indonesians’ who repatriated from the Dutch East Indies after
the independence of Indonesia in 1949, the pieds noirs who settled in
France from Algeria in the early 1960s, the Portuguese retornados who
‘came back’ from Portugal’s African colonies in the mid-1970s and
British colonial settlers who came to the UK after independence was
achieved in India and East Africa. Andrea Smith calls these post-colo-
nial returnees ‘Europe’s invisible migrants’ and estimates their num-
bers to be between five and seven million (2003: 11). In terms of
European demography, this migration, concentrated in the three dec-
ades after World War II, contributed to the continent’s shift from a site
of population export to one of mass immigration – an immigration
which is more commonly studied by a focus on ‘foreign’ immigrants,
some of whom came from the same ex-colonies whence came the colo-
nial repatriates. Their return was relatively invisible because it was an
ambiguous and problematic relocation: they were
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a population that arrived in a decolonizing metropole during an
era of shifting understandings of their nation’s relationships to
Europe [when]…the colonial era [was] quickly fading in signifi-
cance. (Smith 2003: 31)
Although Smith’s book is careful to avoid homogenising the colonial re-
turnees, there is almost no attention paid to their generational specifi-
city. In the rest of this empirical review section we examine three case
studies where the particular issues surrounding ‘second generationness’
are more prominently foregrounded: Japanese Brazilians, British-born
in the Caribbean and Greek-Americans.
9.3.1 Japanese Brazilians
Compared to other highly developed countries, Japan was a ‘late-starter’
as a country of emigration and as one of immigration. During the first
two thirds of the twentieth century, around 350,000 Japanese emigrated
to Latin America, mainly to Brazil but also to Peru, Mexico, Argentina
and Paraguay. By 1998, according to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, there were 1.5 million Nikkeijin (people of Japanese descent) liv-
ing in Latin America, 1.3 million in Brazil and 100,000 in Peru (White
2003: 314).
When Japan’s industrial economy started to run short of labour in
the 1980s, Nikkeijin were prioritised as immigrants to Japan, filling
‘bottom-wage’ jobs in factories (Sellek 1997: 182-183). A new immigra-
tion law implemented in 1990 allowed Nikkeijin up to the third genera-
tion and their spouses to legally enter, reside and work in Japan, initi-
ally for three years. Employers were keen to hire them, partly because
they were ethnically Japanese, but also because of fear of prosecution
for employing illegal migrant workers from within the Asian region
(the Philippines, Thailand, Bangladesh, etc.). By 2000, there were
around 250,000 Brazilian Nikkeijin in Japan, 47 per cent of them nisei
(second generation) and 37 per cent sansei (third generation); their age
range – more than half between 25 and 44 years old – reflected their
primary function as labour migrants (Tsuda 2003: 98-101).
How has the encounter between the Brazilian Nikkeijin and Japanese
society worked out? The comprehensive ethnography by Tsuda (2003)
provides detailed and nuanced answers to this question.6 Tsuda ex-
plores how the migrants constitute their identities in ways that ‘fit’
neither the country of origin nor that of destination. This is partly be-
cause the specification of origin and destination is ambiguous for the
Japan-bound second (and third) generation, and partly because of the
way Japanese cultural nationalism devalues those who are not fully
Japanese by virtue of their significant time spent abroad. Multiple status
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and identity shifts are involved, some of them contradictory. From the
Japanese perspective, Nikkeijin are regarded as ‘inferior’ for a variety of
reasons: their historical origins as lower-class Japanese who emigrated
to Latin America out of poverty; their present employment in working-
class jobs; and their ‘non-Japaneseness’ including poor Japanese lan-
guage skills and ‘Brazilian’ cultural traits. From the Nikkeijin perspec-
tive, moving to Japan, initially on a temporary basis but increasingly
long-term through family migration, involved both a return to the ‘eth-
nic homeland’ where income prospects were much better than in
Brazil, but also a loss of social status since most nisei and sansei had
achieved middle-class status in their birth country. In fact, in response
to their socio-economic marginalisation in Japan, many Japanese
Brazilians have strengthened their Brazilian cultural and nationalist
sentiments.
These ‘Brazilian counter-identities’ are deployed as a reaction to the
ironic situation in which, from the point of view of an expected confor-
mity to rigorous Japanese cultural standards (which demand total as-
similation for those of Japanese descent), it is easier for the Japanese
Brazilians to pursue a strategy of marginalisation rather than attempted
ethnic adjustment (Tsuda 2003: 274-275). ‘Acting Brazilian’ involves
displaying a more assertive, convivial and outgoing lifestyle, including
public displays of embracing and kissing, wearing tight jeans and T-
shirts with the Brazilian flag or slogans, affirming Brazilian first names
and organising samba festivals. However, it is evident that many of
these ‘Brazilian’ lifestyle components are either exaggerated or merely
symbolic constructions of Brazilianness: they are ‘culturally decontex-
tualised and reconstructed’ so that they have ethno-national meaning
only in Japan. Thus the samba is a ‘performance’ that is actually rather
a pale imitation of the ‘real thing’ – the costumes are amateurishly
home-made and ‘unauthentic’ and few returned Nikkeijin know the
dance movements (Tsuda 2001: 67-70, 2003: 283-289).
On the other hand, there are strategic advantages to such ‘Brazilian’
comportment, since it is a way of pre-empting negative judgements
based on failure to conform to expected Japanese cultural standards. In
the words of two of Tsuda’s interviewees (2003: 280, 282-283):
It is easier to live in Japan if you… reveal your Brazilian identity…
and give up trying to be Japanese because, this way, you can es-
cape the pressure to act Japanese… If I try to be Japanese, they
will judge me by their own standards and this will lead to discri-
mination… Instead I can say: ‘I’m sorry, I’m Brazilian so I come
late to appointments…’
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Or, put more crudely:
Hey, I’m Brazilian and I’m going to act Brazilian in Japan. And
if you don’t like it, screw you.
It needs to be emphasised that the situation of Nikkeijin in Japan is
structurally different from the two cases which follow. British-born
Caribbeans and Greek-Americans are, by and large, migrating to their
ethnic homelands out of sentimental and lifestyle choices rather than
purely economic considerations; they are moving from highly developed
economies to ones that are somewhat less advanced; and they generally
attain middle-class socio-occupational positions in the homeland.
Japanese Brazilians were recruited to Japan as guest workers and re-
main socially positioned as such; their Japanese origins gave them pre-
ferential treatment in terms of their immigration rights, but their
Brazilian birth and culture disadvantage them within the Japanese hege-
monic ethno-nationalism. Although at arrival only 2-3 per cent of
Brazilian Nikkeijin intended to make Japan their permanent home,
nowadays more than half are committed to staying long-term and 60
per cent are with their families, including children (Tsuda 2003: 377-
378). These children give an interesting, final twist to the story; they
are, in a sense, ‘the second generation of the second generation’, and
their own assimilation into Japanese schools (where the educational cur-
riculum and their socialisation process blot out their Brazilian heritage)
leads them to deny their Brazilian roots. This sets up a generational ten-
sion between parents and children: both are second-generation retur-
nees, but the parents are also, in a way, first-generation immigrants to
Japan holding on to their Brazilianness in the face of the impossibility
of fully becoming Japanese, while their children are pressed to assimi-
late and have the capability to achieve this, but can only do so by shed-
ding their Brazilian parental culture.
9.3.2 British-born ‘returnees’ to the Caribbean
The Caribbean has been a classic locus for migration research, includ-
ing studies of return. Until recently, however, most of the published
work on return migration focused on the first generation (see, among
others, Byron 1994; Chamberlain 1997; Gmelch 1992; Pessar 1997;
Thomas-Hope 1999). From this literature it is apparent that return as a
‘homecoming’ project is not a unified social process but a versatile cul-
tural experience characterised by diversity, complexity and ambivalence.
The return can be a source of creativeness and ingenuity that expresses
strong agency and ambition, but it can also be a socially conservative
act linked to later-life return and retirement. For both first- and second-
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generation returnees in the Caribbean homeland, the experience of mi-
gration does not necessarily end with return: transnational links gener-
ally continue. Unlike the Brazilian Japanese, returning Caribbeans gen-
erally enjoy enhanced social status in the homeland. This is partly
through the various kinds of capital (financial, social, cultural, etc.) they
have acquired through migration, and also through time spent in the
colonial ‘mother country’. As Chamberlain (1997: 70-72) points out, the
‘sacred geography’ of empire remained intact in the Caribbean, such
that emigrants leaving for Britain in the post-war decades felt, in a
sense, that they were heading for a kind of ‘home’: an imagined space,
‘remembered’ through school and colonial propaganda, which was the
heartland of their imperial world. For many, the reality of emigration
brought disillusionment, above all through the racism that they were
subjected to, but also the difficult conditions of work, housing, food
and climate. Some of these negative outcomes have been inherited by
the second generation and form part of the nexus of push factors that
have stimulated a substantial return of British-born in recent years.
According to the pioneering research of Potter and his associates in
Barbados,7 it seems that second-generation returnees are a positively se-
lected group in terms of education and ambition; hence, these indivi-
duals are seen, and see themselves, as agents of social change and eco-
nomic development. Plenty of work and business opportunities exist for
qualified returnees, reflecting a strong economic performance driven by
tourism, light industries and offshore finance. Typical second-
generation returnee jobs in Barbados, according to Potter (2005: 220-
221) and Potter and Phillips (2006a: 905-909), are found (for males) in
mechanical trades, catering, computing, sales and management, and
(for females) in administration, accountancy, personnel, clerical work,
health services and retailing.8
Potter and Phillips (2006a) see second-generation return as a mainly
middle-class phenomenon: nearly all their interviewees had been to col-
lege and more than a third were university graduates. There was a ten-
dency among those returnees without qualifications to ‘re-return’ to
Britain (Potter 2005). However, returnees’ class position in Barbadian
society (and presumably this holds true for other Caribbean countries
involved in migration to Britain) is only partly determined by their edu-
cational qualifications. The returned second generation occupy a struc-
turally intermediate position as post-colonial hybrids: they are both
black and – because of their British birth, upbringing and accents
– symbolically white (Potter & Phillips 2006a). In Fanonian terms, they
reflect a black skin/white mask identity. Interviewees articulated the
contrast they felt between how they were treated in Britain (racialised
because of their Afro-Caribbean ethnicity, stereotyped as low-achievers
and potential trouble-makers) and how they were perceived, and were
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able to position themselves, in Barbados – as smartly dressed go-getters
who traded on their English accents (Potter & Phillips 2006a).
More contradictory and nuanced views, however, were also uncovered
in the encounter between returned ‘Bajan-Brits’ (Potter & Phillips’
term) and the island’s still racially stratified society. Returnees were sur-
prised that, in contrast to ‘cosmopolitan’ London, Barbadian society still
embodied the acceptance of ‘white hegemony’, segregated in a form of
quasi-apartheid where, effectively, whites and blacks rarely mixed so-
cially (Potter & Phillips 2008). The returned (black) second genera-
tioners were put – and saw themselves – in an intermediate and ambig-
uous position in regard to this colour-coding, as noted above. But they
also expressed other negative feelings towards the way local society
functioned. They complained about the slow pace of life, lack of profes-
sionalism in business and poor public services. Barbadians, for their
part, fashioned a trope of ‘madness’ as a means of ‘othering’ the Bajan-
Brit returnees, thereby positioning them outside mainstream island so-
ciety. The ‘mad’ label derives from two origins: first, the Bajan-Brits’ ob-
served behaviour (rushing around in the heat, talking quickly, obsession
with punctuality, etc.); and second, stories of high rates of mental ill-
ness among Caribbean migrants in Britain (Potter & Phillips 2006b).
Although Barbados dominates the existing research on second-
generation return to the Caribbean, other islands are not totally over-
looked. Reynolds’ (2008) research in Jamaica and Guyana provides a
somewhat different slant. She focuses on the role of social capital and
family narratives in sustaining an ideology of return that, when not ac-
tualised by the first generation, is transmitted to the second as a kind of
inherited duty. In her words:
So central to the family narrative was this dream to return to the
country of origin that their parents’ narrations of home and return
became part of the second generation’s own narratives in terms of
understanding their personal identity and sense of self. (2008: 10)
Key to Reynolds’ analysis is also the social disadvantage and poor eco-
nomic conditions encountered by many British-born Caribbean youth.
Roystone, interviewed in Jamaica, put it like this:
I was born in England but I always felt unwelcomed in my own
country, so I can’t call England home, if you mean home as a
place of warmth and comfort… prejudice and discrimination was
always there… in London you grow up constantly looking over
your shoulder… I was always getting stopped by the police… now
here [in Jamaica] I’m comfortable in my own skin. I’m a very
hard worker… and if you come to Jamaica with that attitude…
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there’s more options to build up your own business. I’m in a bet-
ter position now to invest in a future for my family.
In his last remark, Roystone hints at another factor favouring return –
looking to the subsequent generation and the judgement that the
Caribbean ‘homeland’ is a more ‘secure’ place to raise children. In the
words of Monica, interviewed in Guyana:
You make your life for your kids… I can see how much the move
has been good for the kids. They love it here and have settled
really well… they walk to school on their own, they’re always out
playing on the lane – I would never allow them to do that in
London… I have peace of mind because I’m not constantly worry-
ing about their safety.
With these interview quotes Reynolds (2008: 12, 15-16) highlights the
emotional and psychological satisfactions of returning to the parental
homeland – something that also looms large in the Greek-American
case.
9.3.3 Greek-Americans
Although the colonial aspect is absent in the Greek-American context,
this example of second-generation return has several things in common
with the Caribbean case, though rather less with the Japanese-Brazilian
one. In all three cases, the first generation’s memories and stories of
the diasporic home were passed on to the second generation, often rein-
forced by periodic visits that were a prelude to the ‘final’ return. In the
Caribbean and Greek cases, we observe a post-war mass emigration of
poor, mostly uneducated labour migrants, followed by a selective sec-
ond-generation return made up of young men and women who, for the
most part, were much better educated than their parents and aspired to
middle-class or professional status upon their homeland relocation.
The 40 oral and written narratives collected by Christou (2006) and
the further accounts obtained in a subsequent phase of research by
King and Christou (2010) confirm the highly educated profile of the
second-generation returnees. Unlike their parents, whose emigration in
the 1950s and 1960s was economically driven, the returnees migrate to
the ethnic homeland primarily for emotional, life-stage and lifestyle rea-
sons. Of course, economic considerations do play a role, but they are
not the prime pull factor for return; rather, the situation is generally
one of subsequent difficulty in finding sufficiently remunerative, stable
and intellectually rewarding employment for those (the majority) who
are seeking work. Good, well-paid jobs are hard to attain in Greece, and
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all too often returnees find access to such posts cloaked in corruption
and nepotism. In the words of Christou’s (2006: 128, 131) two male
interviewees:
I sent my résumé to a few companies that I would see advertise-
ments that would fit my qualifications, and got really discour-
aged when I didn’t even get a response back…They put an ad in
the paper and even before it’s been published the job has been
filled by somebody’s nephew or cousin.
Working here is hard… To start a business you have to bribe half
the population… you have to ‘pay for air’, as they say… I want to
live here, I love this country but it’s difficult to start from scratch.
You either have to have connections or you got to have money.
This is not the only disappointment faced in the homeland. Two other
themes repeated themselves in interviews: the lack of care for the envir-
onment, and the changes brought in Greek society through globalisa-
tion and immigration. On the environment, Lucy said:
We still get frustrated about the things we never noticed before
[when we came to Greece on vacations]. We didn’t notice the
graffiti, or the garbage on the beach, and we can’t understand
why they just can’t keep their environment clean, you know, it
really bothers us…
The issue of immigration into Greece is more complex in terms of re-
turnees’ reactions. Some returnees are surprised, even shocked at the
scale of immigration into Greece in recent years, particularly the influx
of half a million Albanians; this has compromised the pure, ethnically
homogenous Greek homeland that they had held as an ideal in their re-
turn project. Christou and King (2006: 826-827) have documented
openly racist reactions to this change in the composition of the popula-
tion. For instance:
When I was in America I felt Greek and was Greek.
Unfortunately… at this moment, this specific time period in
Greece, I don’t feel Greek. I feel like a stranger, like a foreigner
in my own country… A lot of foreign immigrants have come to
Greece, especially illegal migrants… It has made a big impres-
sion on me…I don’t like it, I haven’t accepted it… It has upset
me… and… yes, it has made me angry.
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Other returnees are highly critical of Greek racist attitudes towards im-
migrants, especially the way the Greek media frame them so negatively.
According to another interviewee:
Sometimes the media spend too much time [on immigrants]…
This morning… on TV… they were talking about a Polish man
who was on a bus and he was drunk and being aggressive and
threatening… And the news presenter was going on and on… I
mean, hey, what kind of news is this? Big deal! I mean… if he were
a Greek, would they spend so much time discussing it? No. There
is a phobia, it’s obvious, a phobia in Greece [about immigrants].
Yet another dimension of the migration story is the way that the retur-
nees themselves are treated as partial outsiders by Greek society – a re-
action also noted for returning Japanese Brazilians and foreign-born
Caribbean resettlers. The fact that the diasporic hearth does not offer
the anticipated welcoming embrace is a major disappointment to
Greek-Americans who have bought into the ideal of the Greek home-
land as the ‘place to be’. We have treated this particular diaspora dy-
namic in a separate paper, from which we take the following two
quotes: the first from an older long-term resident of Athens, the second
from a younger, more recent arrival (Christou & King 2006: 829).
Being a Greek-American in Greece has a lot of drawbacks. The
Greek people are not that ready to accept someone who is not
really Greek. Even though I speak Greek, my dad was born in
Greece, I am married to a Greek, I’ve been here 35 years, they
have not accepted me…
I feel that being American or half-American or raised in the
States is not accepted at all… I still find it kind of hard. I feel that
I stand out even though I love Greece... and I speak the language
much better than when I first got here… It’s not like I walk
around with the American flag draped round me… But yes, I still
feel like… I don’t fit in.
And yet the strength of attachment to Greece, and of the motivation to
‘return’ and resettle, seems almost overpowering in the Greek-
American case – at least among those who have returned. Time and
again, our participants stressed the importance of relocating to the patri-
da, the fatherland, and how this final, mythical return ‘closed the circle’,
not only of their own lives but also the migration cycle started by their
parents half a century or so ago.
180 RUSSELL KING AND ANASTASIA CHRISTOU
9.4 Concluding discussion
What light does the second-generation-return chronotope shed on the
broader theorisation of diaspora and transnationalism and on the dis-
tinction between these two overlapping concepts? As a particular form
of counter-diasporic migration, second-generation return should be con-
ceptualised first within the study of diasporas and, as such, here we
pick up some of the issues raised earlier.
Classic definitions of diaspora (e.g. Clifford 1994b; Safran 1991) and
also their subsequent refinement and deconstruction (e.g. Anthias
1998; Brah 1996; Brubaker 2005) tend to portray a rather static entity:
a historical process of spreading and scattering to produce a particular
‘ethnic’ population distribution and a ‘state of being’ or ‘diasporic con-
sciousness’ that likewise does not stress further movement, except per-
haps in terms of a ‘floating’ liminality and hybridity (Mitchell 1997).
Even if the (often mythical) return to the diasporic hearth is written into
the aetiology of diaspora à la Safran, few scholars have paid much atten-
tion to this final phase, in which the diaspora is ‘unmade’. It is almost
as though the very definition of diaspora assumes that diasporic popula-
tions aspire to but cannot return. This may indeed have been the case
in the past, and may still be so in some diasporas for whom the point
of origin no longer exists or cannot be identified. Increasingly, however,
a combination of the maintenance of the diaspora’s ethnic (or other)
identity and improved means of long-distance travel enables a return to
the land of parents and ancestors to become a reality.
According to Fortier (2000: 160), the association between diaspora
and dispersal produces three dualities that lie at the heart of the inher-
ent betweenness of diaspora: here and there, homeland and hostland
and indigenousness and foreignness. These binaries emerge from con-
ceptualisations of culture and ethnicity that are deeply connected to his-
tory, territory and language, but which also produce mixings and cross-
ings of the dualities, such as the notion of being ‘at home abroad’ or
the condition of the second-generation ‘immigrant’ or ‘returnee’ who
no longer speaks the language of the ethnic group. Second-generation
return demonstrates the blurring that exists over these dualities and
even challenges how they should be framed.
Our three case studies of second-generation return reveal both the
common features of the chronotope, but also some key differences in
how this movement is conceived and motivated in different historical and
geographical contexts. One of the strongest similarities is the reflective
symmetry of ‘strangerhood’ when ‘here’ and ‘there’: in other words, the
return turns the feeling of being Japanese in Brazil into one of feeling
Brazilian in Japan. As Lucy, one of our Greek-American interviewees said:
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Let me put it this way…When we were in the United States we
were Greeks, and now that we’ve come to Greece we are
Americans, and that’s what we’ve realised – we’re neither good
here nor there!
Also common is the strength of memories from homecoming visits that
makes the ‘homing’ vivid and a step towards a more definitive ‘return’.
Of course, the return, whether short- or long-term, is very much a nego-
tiated and constructed experience filtered through cultural markers,
images and events.
As for the differences, the following can be highlighted. The return
of the Japanese Brazilians to Japan was orchestrated as a labour recruit-
ment within clear hierarchies of socio-occupational class, global eco-
nomic power and hegemonic Japanese culture: the result was a kind of
‘reactive ethnicity’ whereby the Nikkeijin reasserted their Brazilianness
in the face of the Japanese marginalisation of them as ‘impure’
Japanese. In the Caribbean, there seems to be a ‘culture of migration’
through which most families have implemented a migratory model
based on economic necessity and flexible mobility for various family
members: a combination of individual autonomy of movement with fa-
mily loyalty and sharing of responsibilities (such as child rearing) that
enables frequent journeying home, including second- and 1.5-genera-
tion return. The selectivity of this return (mainly available to the better
educated) combined with lifestyle choices and a developmental focus
tend to make this case a broadly positive experience, albeit framed with-
in post-colonial hierarchies of race and ‘Britishness’. The Greek-
American case, like the Caribbean, arises from a history of poverty and
mass emigration in the post-war years. This is set not within a colonial
context, but involves historical and ideological links between national-
ism and the cultivation of a strong ethno-national identity as part of the
modern Greek state’s irredentist policy that supports claims for co-eth-
nics’ repatriation to the Greek homeland.
Transnationalism fits into our analysis in three ways – first, in the
maintenance of meaningful links to the homeland during the pre-re-
turn phase, especially return visits; second, in the maintenance of those
links in the other direction in the post-return phase; and third, in the
way that second-generation host-country entrepreneurs invest in the
‘homeland’ without resettling there. Second-generation return is a re-
flection of the strength of transnational social spaces (see Faist 2000b),
and can also act to strengthen them, although this does not always oc-
cur, particularly if the return involves a rejective detachment from the
place of birth and upbringing.
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Notes
1 Wajid, S. (2006), ‘Going back to my roots’, The Guardian G2 23 October 2006: 18-19.
2 This is the headline of an article detailing five case studies of ‘second-generation re-
turn’ featured in The Guardian 22 May 2008.
3 See Christou (2006), Christou and King (2006), King and Christou (2008, 2009).
Our current research into what we call ‘counter-diasporic migration’ is funded by the
UK Arts and Humanities Research Council under their ‘Diasporas, Migration and
Identities’ programme (grant no. AH/E508601/XI), 2007-2009.
4 Rumbaut (1997) has proposed a graduated system of 1.75, 1.5 and 1.25, respectively
referring to children arriving: before age six; between six and twelve; and between
twelve and seventeen.
5 For key studies see Bovenkerk (1974), Ghosh (2000), Harper (2005), King (1986)
and Markowitz and Stefansson (2004).
6 For other worthwhile studies see Lesser (2003), Linger (2001), Roth (2002) and
Yamanaka (2000); on returning Japanese Peruvians see Takenaka (1999).
7 See especially Potter (2005), Potter and Phillips (2006a, 2006b, 2008), as well as
the selection of studies in Potter, Conway and Phillips (2005).
8 These findings come from two surveys totalling 91 interviewees of whom, however,
74 were females and only seventeen males; it is not clear to what extent this predo-
minance of females reflects the real gender distribution of second-generation return,
since there are no official data for comparison.
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Chapter 10
Private, public or both?
On the scope and impact of transnationalism
in immigrants’ everyday lives
Paolo Boccagni
10.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, research on immigrant transnationalism has
shifted. It has gone from being primarily concerned with ‘transnational
migrants’ – aiming to identify specific groups of people (or even com-
munities) that somewhat qualify as transnational (e.g. Portes, Guarnizo
& Landolt 1999) – to a wider focus on the transnational features in im-
migrants’ everyday lives. This new emphasis may shed more light on
their opportunity structures and subjective experiences, as well as on
any ongoing interdependence with countries of origin (Levitt &
Jaworsky 2007).
Nevertheless, the use of the term ‘transnational’ as a general theoreti-
cal category, in sociology at least, still shows relevant ambiguities
(Bauböck 2003; Faist 2004; Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). One lies at
the core of this chapter: an implicit conflation of quite different objects
of immigrants’ involvement at distance, namely, their mother country
(or local community), their family and their earlier life.
From a bottom-up, actor-centred perspective (e.g. Levitt 2001; Smith
2006), I have developed upon certain implications arising from my
own doctoral fieldwork for the theoretical consistency of the transna-
tional approach (Boccagni 2009). This fieldwork has involved a two-
sited, ethnographic and biographic study of a relatively recent and un-
structured migration flow from Latin America (Ecuador) to Northern
Italy. It allowed for an in-depth analysis mediated by my systematic rela-
tionships with Ecuadorian immigrants and with their family members
at home. Within a limited translocal case, I have generally found little
evidence of transnational social ties. These mostly apply to the practices
of transnational care giving in families set apart by migration.
Transnational ties are quite sporadic and less effective, however, in the
public sphere with respect to social relationships linking immigrants or
their groups to social institutions back home – i.e. the political system,
market and civil society in the country of origin. From this viewpoint,
immigrants’ homesickness and persistent belonging by far exceed the
scope and the relevance of their actions at distance.
In this chapter I first focus on the meaning of transnationalism. I
will then interpret findings in my ethnography, highlighting the vari-
able relevance of transnational ties in the everyday lives of the immi-
grants (and their significant others) whom I personally met, from three
complementary vantage points: an individual level, a family level and a
wider social group level. In the conclusion, I will raise two key critiques
against the dominant theoretical framework of transnational migration:
1) the poor fungibility between social action at distance and in proximity
(especially in the affective realm) and 2) the need to distinguish be-
tween private and public features of immigrants’ transnational action.
10.2 ‘Transnational ties’: A window on immigrants’ everyday
lives?
Given the risk of using (or abusing) ‘transnationalism’ as a catch-all,1 I
have developed a working definition of the term that aims to be more
accurate. It is better applicable to empirical research than the earlier
standard notion introduced by Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc
(1994: 6): ‘the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-
stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and
of settlement’. At the same time, my proposed definition is wider than
the well-known definition by Portes and colleagues (1999: 219): ‘occu-
pations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts
over time across national borders for their implementation’.
The latter definition, though valuable for its greater empirical rigour,
may be broadened to include immigrants’ attachments at distance in
the affective and the emotional realms, insofar as they fuel systematic
relationships of mutual communication and support not grounded in
physical proximity.2
I will approach Ecuadorian immigrants’ daily lives, therefore, through
the notion of transnational social ties. Such ties imply any social relation-
ship and practice ‘at distance’ (along with the identity orientations they
build on) that allows immigrants to exert relevant influence on the so-
cial lives of those left behind and, vice versa, that allows the latter to im-
pact the life course of the former in significant ways. Building on such
an ‘agential’ approach to immigrant transnationalism (Kivisto 2001;
Morawska 2003a; Faist 2004) – and centred on the differential involve-
ment-at-distance of ordinary social actors – I will explore immigrants’
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social, affective and emotional ties, in their everyday lives away from
home.
This does not necessarily amount to assessing whether their orienta-
tions, relationships and practices are more or less transnational or in-
creasingly localised in the receiving countries, whatever their wishes
and expectations. The real point is a deeper and more significant one:
whether and, if so, to what extent social relationships at distance – be-
tween migrants and their significant others left behind – may offset the
lack of physical proximity, or even substitute (or replicate) co-present re-
lationships, in the life courses of those affected by physical distantiation
as the result of migration. This also involves examining in which life
domains such replication takes place, and for how long. I will therefore
explore, through multi-sited ethnography within a long-distance migra-
tion flow (Marcus 1995; Fitzgerald 2006b), the perceptions, utilisation
and maintenance of transnational ties in immigrants’ daily lives.
10.3 On weight and usability of transnational ties in immigrants’
everyday lives: From self to family and to one’s wider
community
My research is built on participant observation of the daily social lives
of a few hundred Ecuadorian immigrants in a local immigration context
in Northern Italy and of their manifold exchanges with those left be-
hind in Pasaje, Ecuador (Boccagni 2009). For one and a half years, I
carried out ethnographic research both ‘here’ (Italy) and ‘there’
(Ecuador).3 After a critical period in which I negotiated access to the
field, I became familiar with the immigrants’ informal social events
and after-work activities – associational meetings, parties, religious ser-
vices, sport and cultural events, or simply going out together. I inter-
viewed some 35 of them in depth. I was also hosted, while in Ecuador,
by a few of their family members left behind in Pasaje.
By meeting these immigrants and gradually entering into their
informal places of sociability, networks and public events, I explored the
connections between the ‘transnational’ – as a theoretical construct –
and their daily behaviours and experiences – as reflected in their self-
perceptions insofar as they refer to a persistent tie with their
motherland.
In what follows, I explore the immigrants’ own ‘transnational social
field’ (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004) from three vantage points: at an in-
dividual level, in the realm of family relationships and in a wider public
sphere. Each is explored in terms of accessibility, relevance and impact
of transnational ties, assuming that such ties do exist and endure,
which, as I will show, is far from obvious. While these three viewpoints
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crisscross in many ways in immigrants’ ordinary lives, it is still worth
distinguishing between them on analytic grounds.
10.3.1 The individual level: Belongings, cognition and communication from
a transnational vantage point
A first terrain of analysis concerns the actual relevance of transnational
ties and the potential to keep them alive by examining immigrants’ per-
sonal attitudes. From this perspective I will look at their identities and
belonging, as well as the actual scope and depth of their communica-
tion with the motherland, or in any case at their ongoing interest – if
any – for the social life and current events there.
Most Ecuadorian immigrants I met, whatever their ‘integration’ in
Italy, still feel overtly and proudly bound up with their mother country.
Many would regard Italy, or their local receiving context, as little more
than ‘the place where I work hard’ to save money to send back and to
lay the foundations for a future better life at home. Though arguably re-
lated to a time factor – most Ecuadorian emigration to Europe having
occurred only within the last decade (Jokisch & Pribilsky 2002) – this
finding is not without practical import.
‘Italy’, in the immigrants’ own accounts, is basically a resource that
one (and one’s family) has invested in for the sake of attaining some ur-
gent or non-deferrable key objectives. In everyday life, ‘Italy’ is the place
where one might feel either exploited and misunderstood, to varying de-
grees, or helped and supported, though in any case unable (indeed, not
allowed) to lead a normal life with regard to carrying on with one’s ear-
lier habits and lifestyle. Almost no one among the first-generation im-
migrants I stayed with would ever claim to belong ‘here’ rather than to
their home country (or village).
Apart from self-identification, the unbroken relevance of the mother-
land often emerges in their accounts. Whether family members have
been left behind or not, it emerges both as a source for nostalgia and as
an implicit standard according to which one makes sense of values, ha-
bits and life experiences in the context of immigration.
Homesickness for Ecuador concerns, first of all, immigrants’ emo-
tions, perceptions and feelings related to their former everyday milieu.
While their self-identification, on an abstract level (or in patriotic
terms), may remain intact, reminiscence of the sensory features of their
daily lives at home – colours, tastes and smells – may easily fade away.
To the (limited) extent that they may be reproduced by immigrants, this
is a result of repeated social events with fellow countrymen here, rather
than of the continuous relationships with co-nationals there. As S, an
immigrant reunited with his wife and children (and thus showing an
apparently good ‘functional adaptation’ to life here), puts it:
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The longer I stay here, the more I lose my identity – not really
‘my identity’, I know what I am – I am Ecuadorian; I lose... the
pleasure of staying in my own land. [...] I lose this taste, I mean
when you feel right there, don’t you? Yeah, it’s like when you get
up in the morning [here], you get up and breathe... you can smell
it when it’s spring, when it’s autumn, the smell of the leaves...
for me it was different, I used to wake up and there were banana
plantations everywhere... and it smelt of wet land, of guavas, of
coffee... (S, 36, in Italy for six years)
A special reference to one’s earlier life – irreducible to a vague feeling
of patriotism – can be found in most immigrants’ accounts, including
among those who have actually built or rebuilt a regular family life
here. The relevance of one’s continuously Ecuadorian identity, should
not, however, be reduced to only a matter of reminiscences.
In immigrants’ self-awareness, still feeling Ecuadorian results in an
‘identity reservoir’ one cannot be stripped of, whatever the difficulty
one may face in the country of settlement. Hence the unwritten convic-
tion that one’s own values, habits and lifestyle can still make a relevant
contribution for oneself and, even more so, for one’s children.
Moreover, there is a sense of moral duty – going well beyond a merely
passive habit – not to lose them. Reaffirming one’s national identity,
whether as an obvious fact or as a source of pride, is a means of self-
distinction from the all-embracing identity of ‘immigrants’ – or, in its
stigmatising Italian version, extracomunitari – that one feels being im-
posed by the receiving society. Whatever regret or disenchantment re-
garding the ‘ever worsening’ situation in Ecuador, one’s persistent na-
tional identity is the basis for personal consistency, in the face of the
drastic changes that result from migration.
The central position of ‘home’ in immigrants’ mindsets manifests it-
self in their future life projects as well. These reportedly remain, with a
few exceptions (basically relating to mixed marriages), strictly linked to
the motherland. Nearly everybody among the inhabitants of Pasaje
whom I met in Italy would like to build a new house at home, is build-
ing it now, or – in the more successful cases – has already done so.
Building one’s own house in Ecuador is a clear marker of the expecta-
tion to return there ‘soon’. It is also a matter of maintaining social sta-
tus and a simple investment strategy for the money saved here – that
is, a complementary form of remittance, which gains increasing sal-
ience once non-migrants’ daily needs are satisfied.
Nobody would really deny the intention to return home, albeit post-
poned to a ‘future’ they are unable to determine. Indeed, a covert but
pervasive ‘myth of return’ (Anwar 1979) is manifest here. A good illus-
tration is found in the account of H, a woman in Italy for almost a
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decade who is the first link of a chain including a dozen family mem-
bers. Though aware of the ambivalent gazes and opportunistic re-
sponses a migrant encounters when back home, H sounds just as deter-
mined as most of her country fellows to return sooner or later in order
to enjoy the fruits of her labour and sacrifices abroad.
[When you return home], it’s different, it’s no more the same,
’coz they think we’ve come here and made big money, which is
not – and they look at you, they ask you for money: ‘You who
come from there, lend me some money! 100, lend me 200,
300,’ and as this is not so, one tells them ‘no’, and they get
steamed up, they don’t look at you anymore, one is nearly upset,
’coz it’s your own people... it’s no more the same. [...] We want
to return, as we say, our life is there, we’ve come here to work,
we make sacrifices while we are young, and then we’ll go there.
We don’t know how life will treat us, but we want to go back. (H,
38, in Italy for nine years)
One may wonder, however, what the primary object of the immigrants’
persistent self-projection towards the home country is. As these quotes
suggest, it has much more to do with the past of one’s country, or actu-
ally with a few selected good memories related to it, than with the pre-
sent state of its affairs. Apart from special emergencies (e.g. political up-
heavals, natural disasters), immigrants’ interest is generally weak.
Scepticism and mistrust – especially as far as politics is concerned
(Boccagni 2007) – are quite widespread.
Ecuadorian immigrants can and often do communicate at distance in
a relatively easy way. Cheap phone calls, ‘the social glue’ of immigrant
transnationalism (Vertovec 2004b), are a pertinent current social prac-
tice, especially within the family realm. Still, as a wider survey on
Ecuadorian immigrants in Italy suggests (Boccagni 2007), relevant in-
formation on the motherland involves one’s private sphere (i.e. family
members left there) much more than the public one. Accounts by non-
migrant kin play a far more significant role than immigrants’ access to
the internet – or to any other channels of information available in the
immigration context.
It is an open question whether this selective gathering of informa-
tion results more from lack of interest and disenchantment regarding
public life at home or from poor access to information and commu-
nication technologies and ‘ethnic media’ in the country of immigra-
tion. The fact remains that the apparent real time accessibility to in-
formation on public life at home certainly does not amount to an ac-
tual ‘information involvement’ of most immigrants, nor to a real
interest in it.
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Moreover, if an attitude is considered transnational only if it involves
‘feeling equally at home in both countries’, according to the rather de-
manding criterion of Haller and Landolt (2005), one must object that
such a condition is hardly filled by the people I have met. Their attach-
ment to the country of origin by far exceeds that to the settlement one.
The above definition, which suitably applies only to a restricted and
self-selective minority of ‘cosmopolitans’, underestimates the relevance
of the persistent (though vague) orientations to the motherland emer-
ging in my case study. The transnational projection of Ecuadorian im-
migrants, as far as their identities and life projects are concerned, can
hardly be regarded as a merely symbolic (Gans 1979) or abstractly pa-
triotic one. Quite the contrary: their homeland orientation may exert a
relevant impact on their patterns of consumption, their ways of sociabil-
ity, their values and narratives underlying children’s upbringing and
their future life expectations.
The fact remains that, in terms of ‘actually existing’ transnational rela-
tionships and practices, the family domain is the only one where – for
some time, at least – systematic interactions between migrants and the
motherland could be empirically detected in my case study. The realm of
family life, therefore, warrants a deeper investigation in its own right.
10.3.2 The family level: ‘Your body is here, your heart is there’4 – a real case
for transnationalism (and its shortcomings)
If any widespread social practice within the migration flow I have stu-
died may qualify properly as ‘transnational’, it is that which is related to
the social life at distance of family members pushed apart by emigra-
tion. Building on the framework of transnational families (e.g. Bryceson
& Vuorela 2002; Landolt & Wei Da 2005), I will focus on the interac-
tions between migrant parents and the children who are left behind.5
This set of phenomena includes their personal expectations, the prac-
tices of ‘filling the distance’ (both in emotional and material terms) and
the dilemmas parents and children are bound to face. I will shed light
on the everyday practices of here and there that fuel and reflect recipro-
cal commitment and obligations, rather than emphasise the structural
features of the families involved. The notion of a ‘transnational family
life’ (Sørensen 2005; Smith 2006; Banfi & Boccagni 2010) may be
especially helpful here.
In transnational mothers’ accounts, providing for the livelihood of
their children stands out as the only explicitly stated, self-conscious mis-
sion of the new life that begins after leaving their children behind
– supposedly for a short period. The emphasis on the significant ex-
pected material gains from emigration may lessen the relevance,
though not the suffering, of their actual affective loss:
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You feel stronger as you say: ‘Well, I’m working for them [one’s
children left behind]... that’s all!’ ‘Stronger’, I mean that... you
think: ‘Who am I here for? I think: if I was alone, what’s the
point of staying here? Why do I stay here, making sacrifices,
staying alone… why? It wouldn’t make sense. [...] I – I love my
child, but I’m compelled to stay here. Coz you need money, to
help him. But if you are alone... who are you fighting for? (N, 25,
in Italy for five years)
Unless the hope of an approaching reunion can be sustained, women
struggle, according to their own accounts, to find meaning and justifica-
tion in the practice of mothering-at-distance. Whatever the reasons in-
ducing or compelling them to leave, whatever their efforts to keep in
touch and the self-sacrifices they make, transnational mothers hardly
deny that they are missing something important in the realm of affec-
tion, in their capability to raise their children, in their very role as
mothers. This role may shift towards being that of a female breadwin-
ner, while those who care for the children left behind take centre-stage
in the children’s affections. A few interview quotes may be helpful in il-
lustrating each of these issues.
I’ve lost so many major things of my life... for instance, my fa-
mily, which now... exists no more. My husband, for instance. My
children, who are growing up without me, which is still worse...
I’m even losing my hope to see them growing up...[...] The only
thing I will really complain about, till my – my last days, is... my
children. Not being with them, right now. (I, 45, in Italy for five
years)
Most of them [immigrant mothers] – well, they don’t really ‘for-
get’: they trust those who stay here with their children... I know
only this, they get used to staying without them. They forget that
they are the mothers... [...] They think all is settled with the
money they send back. And it is not... (D, 41, former immigrant,
interviewed in Machala, Ecuador)
Maybe you can reproach yourself... I mean: I went away, I didn’t
see my children growing up... I’ve completely lost their child-
hood years. But at the same time you’re satisfied, as your chil-
dren... never behave badly... I tell them: ‘If you behave well, if
you keep on studying, if you don’t give it up – I will be always
proud of you.’ And I think they, while studying, have a good ex-
ample of a mother who, from afar, can give them what – what
maybe she couldn’t have given them at close range. [...] My
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children have been growing up in the country, with my parents –
for them, my parents are their own parents... (M, 27, in Italy for
four years)
Despite these inherent limitations, nearly all mothers-at-distance whom
I met make systematic attempts to retain close ties with the children
they left behind by sending remittances, communicating at distance
and – to a lesser extent, given the costs involved – visiting home. The
role of remittances, as well as their impact, would deserve a deeper ana-
lysis in its own right (Boccagni 2009, 2010). I will here make only a
few remarks about communication at distance.
While calling home once a week or so is a common habit for most of
the Ecuadorian immigrants I have talked with, for transnational
mothers the frequency is usually higher and the communication is
charged – or maybe overburdened – with greater meaning and expecta-
tion. For parents communicating with children at distance, telephoning
can be a unique opportunity to recover a sense of real proximity
through voice contact. Hence a peculiar personal space emerges,
though it is ephemeral and filled with painful experiences, through
which those who left may dive into the everyday and emotional lives of
those who stayed.
At the same time, while communicating at distance, a transnational
parent – and indeed, any migrant – may realise that he or she can
hardly exert any real control over the children (or anybody else) left be-
hind. This is manifest, for instance, in the use of remittances.
Whatever the parents’ endeavours, it is only those taking care of their
children in situ who may have a chance to really impose their will on
them. Once again, it seems hard to find a substitute for actual physical
proximity.
If we look closer, even frequent phone communication has its short-
comings. The loss – or the indefinite postponement – of physical proxi-
mity, much more so in the delicate realm of primary care relationships,
is hard to heal. ‘Always communicating by phone’, as M remarks pon-
dering her own experience, may recreate some feeling of proximity for
adults, but is unlikely to do the same when one’s children are involved.
No. They don’t accept you. They want you to be there. Phoning
is not enough for them. My elder [daughter] can already under-
stand you a bit, she knows why one stays here... the younger
[son] instead, no – he wants to share all with you, the simple
things of every day... no way. (N, 25, in Italy for five years)
Most mothers, when communicating with their children and families,
seem intentionally to leave out – or even disguise – actual references to
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their own life conditions, including the manifold difficulties and trou-
bles they may be facing.
Whenever I call them up, they tell me what happens there, what
they’re doing, or how my child’s doing – what about school, what
he did, what he didn’t… and anything more about him. All about
my family: what’s happening, what will happen…all about them.
If they ask me how do I do here, fine?, and I – even when I feel
bad – I always tell them I feel well. ’Coz I – I don’t want them to
suffer. So, I’d never… tell them how I do really feel. (Y, 27, in
Italy for four years)
At stake here is an attempt to prevent suffering that may hardly be
managed at distance, rather than simply the transmitting of an idealised
picture of one’s conditions overseas. Whatever the motives, communi-
cation across distance between migrants and non-migrants – though in-
stantaneous and easily accessible – results in a highly fragmented and
selective flow of information. The same applies to the incessant flow of
gossip and rumours, which dominates the relationships between com-
patriots in the immigration setting.
Ironically, the family members left behind in Ecuador seem quite
aware of the ‘emotional filters’ developed by their relatives abroad, and
tend to do the same.6 Only visits back home, ultimately, may really al-
low for eased communication between one another, without the ambiva-
lent mediation of physical distance.
In the accounts of migrant women who leave infant children behind,
the most painful aspects of transnational motherhood result from the
loss of topical moments such as birthdays, First Communions and reli-
gious feasts.
However ‘close’ one may feel and in spite of any remittances, physi-
cal distance seems here to remain an objective constraint – much more
so when it cannot be bridged by frequent, circular migration. The very
inability to overcome distance applies most obviously to critical events
such as a serious disease, or even the death, of a family member at
home. This is, for instance, how I told me about her mother’s death, ex-
perienced from afar.
[You can participate] only with your own thoughts... as I know
from the experience of my mother’s death. (...) We are accus-
tomed, there [in Ecuador], to hold a wake at the dead person’s
home (...). That day they did so, then they carried her to the cem-
etery... [here in Italy] we had a mass, the priest prayed for my
mother’s soul too. (...) But at the time of the funeral [night time,
in Italy] I was alone. I was calling up my daughter all the time,
194 PAOLO BOCCAGNI
and she was telling me: ‘We are almost at the cemetery now’;
‘We are praying’... it was awful. (I, 45, in Italy for five years)
On the whole, relationships at distance between migrants and their
loved ones – whether children or not – are permanently exposed to a
sort of unspoken uncertainty. This is due to the chance that some
negative event takes place – here or there – without the ‘others’
being able to participate directly, that is, without their physical pre-
sence. It is right here that a transnational social relationship unfolds
both its utmost import, in affective terms, and its utmost inadequacy,
or even its impotence, in comparison with an ordinary co-presence
relationship.
‘We always sleep with the mobile on’, N abruptly tells me. You
can never tell: ‘If they call us from there, all of a sudden, when
something happens...’. (Field notes, Trent, 26.10.06)
Whatever may happen there, we do suffer here... we feel power-
less, as we can’t help... my son, for instance, when he was there
[as an irregular migrant, before being repatriated], he once had a
bike accident, and I was in despair here, I didn’t know what I
could do... you feel impotent ’coz you can’t stay there with your
family, with your child... no way. You suffer, that’s all. All of us
with some relatives there, we suffer the same. (H, 44, mother of
a former immigrant, interviewed in Pasaje)
To sum up, for most Ecuadorian families divided by emigration, trans-
national ties are basically a tool for coping with the negative effects of
an extended separation, in terms of both time and space. Such a condi-
tion impinges both on their private relationships and, broadly speaking,
on the trust and scope for reciprocal control inherent in any proximity
relationship. Family life at distance is a matter of endurance, or of resi-
lient affections, along with the social practices emanating from them (e.
g. remittances, gifts, ongoing communication). The more these prac-
tices make sense and the more effective they are for those involved, the
quicker they disappear as a result of a family reunion. Hardly ever is fa-
mily life at distance perceived as a value or resource in its own right. It
is experienced rather as a natural, albeit difficult, way to counter the in-
jurious impact of migration in the affective realm.
Family life at distance is expected to be a transient condition, fore-
shadowing a return to life together, whether ‘here’ or ‘there’. It is sim-
ply a constraint one has to live with, attempting to fill the distance gap
with frequent communication, remittances and a constant emotional in-
volvement, which in the medium term may prove – especially in the
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realm of relationships between spouses or partners – difficult to
sustain.
Despite referring to a similar set of relationships at distance, transna-
tional family life has indeed little in common with the so-called transna-
tional social practices, in the public sphere of immigrants’ ‘dual-
focused’ lives. I now turn my attention to these social practices, which,
in my case study at least, are far less widespread or socially relevant
than the former.
10.3.3 The public sphere level: The motherland as a catalyst for
transnational symbols
Another key area in studying transnational ties in the field concerns im-
migrants’ attitudes and behaviours in the public sphere, beyond their
personal orientations or their family belongings. At issue here is
whether their sociability patterns in the receiving context, as they mani-
fest themselves specifically in co-ethnic ‘community’ events, have some
impact on their ties with the motherland. Is there, in other words, a
link between immigrants’ social life here and their ongoing involve-
ment (if there is any) with social life in their home country? A good
starting point here is the so-called ‘socio-cultural’ facet of transnational-
ism. According to a well-known definition, this refers to:
transnational practices that recreate a sense of community based
on cultural understandings of belonging and mutual obligation.
We examine the scope and determinants of participation in insti-
tutionalized sociocultural transnational activities, that is, the for-
mation of a community public space that spans national borders.
(Itzigsohn & Saucedo 2002: 767)
In empirical terms, the authors draw attention – in the wider frame-
work of a US survey on the transnational practices of three Latino
groups (Portes 2003) – to certain key indicators: participation in home-
town associations, monetary support for projects in one’s hometown,
travels back home for public festivities and involvement in any club or
charity linked to one’s country of origin. As I will show, the structure of
the migration flow I have considered (and indeed of most immigration
to Italy) is not ripe enough for such transnational practices to have rele-
vant impact with respect to all these indicators. To put it differently, the
approach, though possibly pertinent in the US context (at least for se-
lected minorities of immigrants), far overestimates the potentials for a
real public transnationalism in a recent and poorly structured migration
flow, such as the one studied here.
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In the context of this migration flow, informal sociability relation-
ships with co-nationals, which are not necessarily coextensive with soli-
darity relationships, play a significant role in many respects. First, co-
nationals are generally a reference point for job and accommodation
searches, as well as for leisure activities and friendship networks.
Second, they are a potential resource for organising informal sociability
initiatives – in, for instance, entertainment or ethnic consumptions –
that reinforce common feelings of belonging and homesickness. Third,
in the context of immigration, co-nationals are an essential touchstone
for one’s reputation, which may give everybody the incentive to preserve
some trust – or at least respect – from the others. For most of the peo-
ple I met, informal gatherings with co-nationals are a natural habit,
somewhat recalling their earlier life at home, that needs no justification.
Hence, they have frequent involvement, within the boundaries of frag-
mented subgroups, in common social events such as parties, dinners,
football matches and so on.
In the context I have studied, which is quite isolated from the major
Ecuadorian ‘colonies’ in Italy, the scope of informal sociability is, how-
ever, essentially a local one. This is because it cannot rely on the infra-
structure of an ethnic economy – that is, on products or services dedi-
cated to their own consumption and mostly imported from the mother-
land. The small size of the Ecuadorian collectivity studied (some 400
individuals overall) does not permit a relevant circular flow of goods
and resources from the motherland. Even apart from the impact of their
number, one cannot help but conclude that distance, once again, (still)
matters.
To the extent that some transnational circulation of resources does
take place between the host country and the motherland, it is mediated
by networks of co-nationals going to Pasaje (for holidays only) and then
returning back here. This consists of no more than a few informal and
emotionally charged exchanges of photographs, letters, clothes or small
presents. A short fieldwork account may be helpful here.
I am at an organisational meeting of the first local Ecuadorian as-
sociation. Curiously, it has been summoned right on Easter Day.
A public feast, which will take place a few weeks later, should be
prepared; few are, as usual, volunteering for this. Once again, I
feel astonished by their emphasis on small details which an out-
sider would find quite irrelevant: the rules for electing the reyna,
the girl who will be patroness to the event; [...] the three-colour
band she will have to wear, which should be in velvet, with a
number of ornamental frills I can’t even remember.
As petty as they may be, these details (as well as their emphasis
on the national flag) may suggest their unspoken but resilient
PRIVATE, PUBLIC OR BOTH? 197
identification with earlier habits and rituals. Both for the velvet
band and the association banner, they would like them to be
brought right now from Ecuador – their hope being that some
pasajeño, being on holiday just now, may return in the mean-
time. The only Italian guy there (apart from me), the husband of
one of the leaders, makes an objection: well, they could just buy
all that stuff right here, it would be cheaper... nobody seems to
agree. It is as if there were always, in their own background, a
blurred (but potentially rich) intermediate social space – that is,
the circulation of information and objects between here and
there, along with the circulation (an almost uninterrupted one)
of immigrants on holiday there, and soon back here – which they
would like to build on, in order to put together the few symbols
they will proudly exhibit on the feast day. It’s a pity that, for now,
this ‘social space’ is so discontinuous and not much trodden.
(Field notes, Trent, 08.04.06)
From a transnational viewpoint, immigrants’ informal sociability looks
ambivalent. Conspicuous references to the motherland (exhibiting the
national flag, wearing the national football team T-shirt, reproducing
the flag’s colours in one’s clothes) coexist with little interest in current
news from the motherland, and with even fewer contacts – outside of
the family domain – with any social, political or economic institution at
home. Hence, there is a common vision of the motherland as an object
of cultural consumption, rather than a significant point of reference in
immigrants’ everyday life (Boccagni 2007, 2008).
Even immigrants’ own associations, spontaneously emerging (and
vanishing) quite frequently, build on the same pervasive feelings and
symbols of patriotic affiliation, though are quite localistic in their scope
and orientation. Whether concerned with leisure and sport activities or
occasionally with advocacy and solidarity, they basically aim to satisfy
common demands or needs inherent in immigrants’ everyday life. The
motherland remains an evocative background symbol; the dimension of
mutuality by far prevails over the transnational one in the interests and
practices of those involved. A few field notes illustrate how, once again,
a common identification with the motherland, even when paving the
way for a shared collective action, is hardly a channel for contacts or ex-
changes with the country of origin itself.
In a year, or so, this is at least the third attempt to found an ‘associa-
tion’ involving the Ecuadorians in Trent. The initiative, this time, has
been from I, in Italy for decades and married to an Italian. At the first
meeting, while she talks of ‘representing Ecuador’ or of ‘making soli-
darity’ with their country, the others stay silent. They don’t look very
persuaded. Apparently, they would rather expect to be able to claim
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more rights or opportunities here; for instance, an easier access to
home loans, or to banking operations, as S puts it. ‘Solidarity’ is not an
issue at stake here. Nor, indeed, is Ecuador. At most, the new associa-
tion should be concerned with some Christmas initiative, involving en-
tertainment and presents for their children, here. (Field notes, Trent,
27.04.06)
The ‘start up’ of the new association has been made, the second meet-
ing of the ‘board’ has begun. As frank as usual, K summons up what
most of them apparently think: ‘We’d better help first those of us who
are here! And then, the rest...’ (Field notes, Trent, 02.06.06)
Much caution is needed, therefore, with respect to Itzigsohn and
Saucedo’s (2002) claim of a growing ‘participation in immigrant orga-
nizations that promote cultural or social ties with the country of origin’.
This may apply (in a few cases at least) to relatively structured migration
systems, apart from being related to significant integration in receiving
societies (Portes 2003). In my case study, this conjecture is not sup-
ported by the empirical evidence. In the context of a recent, first-genera-
tion migration flow, immigrants’ sociability in the public sphere acts as
a channel for mutual support and recognition, or for a revival of the
past, but definitely not for ‘the creation of an institutionalized transna-
tional public space, not dependent on local propinquity’ (Itzigsohn &
Saucedo 2002: 779).
10.4 From fieldwork back to theory: Emerging issues and
relevant implications
The more days go by, the more it seems to me that, here and now at
least, so-called ‘transnational social fields’ are nothing but little paths,
not always laid out well (nor much trodden). Seldom have they greater
scope than family relationships, or contents other than exchanges of af-
fections at distance... homesickness... and sometimes, whether to com-
plement them or to substitute for them, of remittances. (Field notes,
Pasaje, November 2006)
Altogether, the Ecuadorian pasajeños immigrants I stayed with qualify,
at least in the public realm of their everyday lives, as only ‘potentially
transnational’. Most of them feel emotionally bound up with their coun-
try of origin, or possibly with their earlier ways of living. Yet, given the
large distances and high costs separating them from the motherland (in
travelling and even in communicating), they prove unable to really keep
in touch with it. Many of them would probably like to do so. This is
suggested by their patterns of sociability in the public sphere, which at-
tempt to reproduce their earlier ‘social worlds’, i.e. their own habits,
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values and lifestyles (Guarnizo 2003). Given the structural conditions of
immigrant life, however, the actual transnational interactions of mi-
grants are rare and inconsistent, and their knowledge of current events
in the motherland is just anecdotal and superficial, being shaded by
their prevailing disregard and disenchantment with political life there.
A somewhat different picture emerges for their family lives. For at
least as long as family members live apart – which applies especially to
migrant mothers and children left behind – a constant flow of informa-
tion, affections and even material resources links immigrant workers to
their significant others at home. Though widespread, these affection-
based relationships at distance are a reaction to an unwelcome separa-
tion – hoped to be a short-term one, though not necessarily so – rather
than a deliberate attempt to keep ‘living in two places’, building on the
potential opportunities inherent in one’s double embeddedness within
separate social systems.
Having said this, affective relationships of proximity at distance may
be successful in the short term and from an ‘instrumental’ point of
view (i.e. in earning a livelihood). They can, however, hardly endow mi-
grants and non-migrants with the depth of communication or the op-
portunity to negotiate and control each other’s behaviours inherent in
any co-proximity relationship (Urry 2006). Unless such a relationship
is restored in the medium term, or at least replaced by frequent jour-
neys back home, proximity at distance seems bound to be an extremely
vulnerable and weak condition. This holds not only for mothering-at-
distance, but also for elective relationships between spouses and
partners.
Overall, my ethnographic evidence questions the validity of a fashion-
able notion such as ‘transnational social field’. While some authors
would have it as no less than an empirical research tool, my study sug-
gests it is far too vague for fieldwork use and contentious not only as a
theoretical tool, but even as a simple metaphor.
Rather than transnational, most social ties maintained at distance by
the people I stayed with are actually translocal, as they involve only a
specific local community of origin (Waldinger & Fitzgerald 2004). The
label ‘transnational’ may instead apply, to some extent, to their wider
patriotic or nostalgic orientations, in basically symbolic terms. Rather
than ‘long-range fields’, Ecuadorian immigrants’ accounts reflect a set
of fragmented and highly particularistic relationships, hardly ever
stretching beyond the familial domain and not always predictable –
even within that domain – in their actual solidity and persistence. As
significant as ‘cross-border contacts’ may turn out to be – especially in
the affective realm – they generally act, and are perceived as, a poor sur-
rogate for physical proximity.
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Given this small scope of transnationalism, terms such as ‘transna-
tional social paths’ – describing immigrants’ privatised ties at distance
in the realm of affective relations – or ‘transnational social tracks’ – that
is, their even weaker transnational connections in the public sphere –
may be more appropriate metaphors than ‘transnational social fields’.
10.5 Conclusions
Applying a transnational perspective to a recent migration flow originat-
ing from a distant country highlights both frequent relationships and
exchanges at distance in the realm of family life and a growing embedd-
edness in the local immigration context. Proper ‘transnational practices’
– involving entrepreneurship, political activism, socio-cultural initia-
tives, philanthropy or whatever else – are instead marginal, apart from
remittances. In contrast with transnational family relations, transnation-
alism in the public sphere is much more self-selective, contingent and
even elitist. It is only within the scope of kin ties – or, moreover, pri-
mary care relationships – that transnational hypotheses are substan-
tiated, at least for as long as family members live far apart. In any other
respect, the motherland is still a source of identity and belonging, but
much less a source of opportunities in ordinary immigrant lives.
No wonder Waldinger (2008) argues that a relevant transnational en-
gagement in one’s private sphere may coexist with a substantive em-
beddedness in the receiving country (whatever one’s persisting national
self-identification may be). Still, if the diagnosis of an ambiguous coex-
istence of private transnationalism and public localism (not necessarily
amounting to straight ‘assimilation’) is correct, one may wonder if it
still makes sense – from a sociological viewpoint – to frame the twofold
phenomenon under a common analytical rubric. The persistence of sig-
nificant social relationships at distance may, in itself, be a poor reason
for maintaining a common ‘theoretical qualifier’. The two forms of
transnational social ties are in fact quite different in their extent, sus-
tainability and impact.
On the one hand, private transnationalism is relatively widespread,
but – from an individual viewpoint at least – likely to decline in the
medium term, together with remittances, insofar as families come to-
gether again (or if, instead, they split up forever). On the other hand,
public transnationalism – in terms of distinctive social practices inter-
acting with the homeland, apart from common symbols or belonging –
is much less frequent and more selective; in my own case study, it is al-
most non-existent. Whether it gains relevance, even in the medium
term for first generations only, depends more on key structural factors
than on immigrants’ will. These factors include the potentialities for
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the development of an ‘ethnic economy’, facilitating both ethnic con-
sumption and transnational businesses oriented towards the mother-
land; the political orientations prevailing in countries of origin – e.g.
whether voting at distance is bound to remain a merely symbolic act or
a potential channel for emigrants’ greater influence on the political life
back home, which reinforces their huge economic weight through re-
mittances; the accessibility and costs of communication at distance,
both in terms of information and communication technologies and phy-
sical transportation to the motherland.
From all these viewpoints, the translocal case I have studied, which is
likely to apply to the overall migration flow between Ecuador and Italy –
or Europe overall – suggests scepticism about over-generalised uses of
the term ‘transnationalism’. Apart from all other factors, geographical
distance makes it relatively hard to keep up transnational practices,
while creating lesser obstacles for interpersonal ties and attachments.
The very notion of transnationalism, ultimately, conflates three quite
distinct ‘motherland references’, which may be more or less relevant in
immigrant life experience:
1) social ties at distance with one’s motherland structured by its
political, economic or other institutions through which this
country of origin remains for the migrants a source of rights,
opportunities, identities or belonging;
2) social ties at distance with one’s family, or with a limited
group of ‘significant others’, embedded in a regime of mutual
affections and obligations;
3) emotional and affective ties with immigrants’ earlier lives,
whose often idealised nostalgic memory contrasts with the ex-
igencies of the immigrants’ hard present life; this orientation
towards the past may pave the way for ongoing contacts with
home but will rarely support a viable future ‘dual’ life project.
In my case study at least, I found a continuum of increasing empirical
salience when moving from public ties at distance to private ones and
to ties based on mere reminiscence. Whether the term ‘transnational’
should be applied to all three manifestations of ties across borders and
which one should be the focus of analysis is an issue that warrants far
more attention in future transnational migration studies.
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Notes
1 The following key literature reviews helpfully discuss both the proper and the not-so-
proper uses of transnationalism in migration research: Kivisto (2001), Levitt and
Glick Schiller (2004), Vertovec (2004a) and Levitt and Jaworsky (2007).
2 One further aspect of transnationalism missing in Portes’ definition concerns trans-
national institutional structures and policies of sending and receiving states
(Baubo¨ck 2003).
3 The research process also resulted in a significant investment of writing down – and
then analysing – my own field notes (see Emerson, Fretz & Shaw 2001), along with
migrants’ narratives (see Bertaux 2003). As I aimed to understand migrants’ repre-
sentations and use of their transnational social ties, these methodological options
were more promising than an impersonal survey or even a set of formal interviews
(unless they were situated in a specific ethnographic setting). As such, this chapter
contains frequent recourse to my field notes as a reflexive and self-critical research
tool.
4 From the interview with I (44, in Italy for four years), a mother with two children left
behind in Ecuador.
5 No less significant and even more troublesome is the realm of interactions at dis-
tance between partners separated by the emigration of either: for the Ecuadorian case
see Pribilsky (2004), Banfi and Boccagni (2010), Boccagni (2009).
6 While in Pasaje, I found systematic evidence of a greater awareness regarding the ac-
tual life conditions of immigrants in Italy than I expected. A fieldwork passage may
be helpful here. It is drawn from my visit with D, a former immigrant, whose chil-
dren are still in Italy and with whom I have often talked.
Here we are at Mrs. D’s. [...] In the dining room, along with the usual paintings
of their ancestors hanging on the walls, I cast an eye on a small photo – right
above the TV set. It shows a girl, in Italy, outside a Despar supermarket. Mrs D
has been to Italy, as an irregular migrant, and has come back. In her wake, an
indefinite number of children, brothers and nephews has left too. She says she
would return now, but ‘only together with all my children.’ Only at last, while
asking her for some more photos, do I realise that one of her children still in
Italy, in their twenties, is S (still undocumented): one of those guys who seem
to drink, play football and listen to (loud) music all the time. He has not called
up home ‘for five months’, but she looks resigned, rather than worried. ‘He al-
ways drinks a lot, doesn’t he?’ I try to come up with a vague answer, but I feel
really impressed by her lucid account of S’s situation – despite living far from
him for years, and despite – I guess – their poor communication. No room for
migration myths, here. ‘They’re messing around, that’s all,’ she sighs at last.
(Field notes, Pasaje, 22.11.06)
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Chapter 11
Operationalising transnational migrant networks
through a simultaneous matched
sample methodology
Valentina Mazzucato1
11.1 Introduction
Migration is a topic of great interest in both research and policy circles.
On the one hand, the increasing numbers of migrants to developed
countries and the xenophobic reactions in many of these countries have
led to a slew of studies focusing on migrant integration in receiving-
country societies. On the other hand, governments of developing coun-
tries and development organisations have become increasingly con-
scious of the great contribution that migrant remittances make to home
country economies. This awareness has led the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and other international institutions to
commission studies of the effects of remittances for the development of
migrant home countries.
These studies split migrants’ lives in two: they focus on either what
migrants do in the receiving country or the effects that migrants have
on the people back home. Reality, however, is more variegated, with mi-
grants often maintaining linkages with the country of origin and creat-
ing new social ties, adapting ideas and values and redefining a sense of
belonging in the new country of residence. ‘Transnationalism’ was
coined as a concept in the early 1990s to bring these two research are-
nas to bear on one another. It was noted that migrant realities could be
understood only by taking into consideration the linkages between home
and host countries and the simultaneity of flows with which these lin-
kages are created and maintained.
Since the 1990s there has been a burgeoning of transnational stu-
dies. Many theoretical works have been written, identifying transnation-
alism as a new and unique area of study. Empirical studies have ad-
dressed the theoretical concepts to differing degrees and are still devel-
oping methodologies through which to operationalise these concepts.
This chapter offers a review of the important theoretical concepts
making transnationalism a unique area of study and identifies a re-
maining methodological gap. It explores the contributions of a simulta-
neous matched sample (SMS) methodology by way of a case – the
Ghana TransNet research programme – with reflections on the kinds of
additional knowledge an SMS methodology can contribute to current
understandings of migration.
In the second section of the chapter I briefly review transnationalism
as a concept, categorise empirical studies according to the methodolo-
gies used and identify a methodological gap. Section three describes in
detail the SMS methodology used by the Ghana TransNet research pro-
gramme. Section four reviews some findings emerging from the SMS
methodology that can supplement knowledge about migration. Section
five concludes with some recommendations for research and develop-
ment policy.
11.2 Transnationalism
Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc (1992) were among the first to
theorise about the concept of transnationalism. What sets their analysis
apart from previous approaches to the study of migration is that they fo-
cus on migration within a globalising economy and draw into question
the role of the nation-state in regulating the activities that migrants en-
gage in and the identities that they create. Transnationalism problema-
tises notions of space that assume that physical, social and political
spaces overlap perfectly onto one geographical area. The nation-state af-
fects the way migrants move and organise themselves by creating bar-
riers for them (via restrictive visa policies) or providing opportunities
(e.g. employment within developed country economies). At the same
time, there are also flows that transcend the nation-state such as cultur-
al images (Appadurai’s (1996) ethno-space, media-space, etc.), people
and goods that contribute to the constitution of new kinds of spaces.
Various definitions of transnationalism have been set forth, reflecting
the different disciplinary backgrounds of scholars it has attracted.
Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc define transnationalism as ‘the
processes2 by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social
relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement’
(1994: 7). Vertovec emphasises the importance of people within net-
works by focusing on the ‘multiple ties and interactions linking people
or institutions across the borders of nation-states’ (1999: 447). Portes,
Guarnizo and Landolt delimit the concept of transnationalism to occupa-
tions and activities that require sustained contacts over time across na-
tional borders (1999: 218). Other authors emphasise the flow of
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immaterial things such as ideas and feelings of solidarity across bound-
aries (Clifford 1994b) that serve to form transnational identities.
What these definitions have in common is their emphasis on the lin-
kages that bind people living in different countries. A major contribu-
tion of the literature on transnationalism has been to recognise the indi-
vidual migrant as a member of a larger whole that extends beyond geo-
graphical boundaries. This conceptualisation of transnationalism has
methodological consequences. Hannerz (1998) explains that in most
transnational cases, the most relevant unit of analysis is the network, or
what others have called transnational communities, villages (Levitt
2001) or circuits (Rouse 1992).
Simultaneity is considered to be a second distinguishing feature of
transnational linkages (Levitt & Glick Schiller 2004). New technologies
(airplanes, telephones, satellite technology, faxes and computers) make
movement and communication between large distances possible with
much greater frequency, speed and regularity and in greater numbers
than even just 50 years ago (for overview articles see Ethnic and Racial
Studies 22(2); Vertovec 2001; Mazzucato, Van Dijk, Horst & De Vries
2004). This makes it possible for people to be simultaneously engaged
in both their home country as well as in other countries where they
have lived or are living. Simultaneous engagement enables linkages to
tighten between dispersed people, new livelihood opportunities to
emerge, social institutions to change and hybrid identities to develop.
These changes have led to qualitative differences in how migrants, the
cities in which they live and their home communities are impacted by
migration (Foner 1997).
Thus, simultaneity and networks are two important aspects that
emerge from the theoretical transnational literature. In what follows I
investigate how these aspects have been operationalised in methodolo-
gies used by transnational studies.
The simultaneity of flows means that at least two locations must be
incorporated into one research field. This has been operationalised in
two ways. One is by situating research in one geographical location,
usually migrant-receiving areas,3 but focusing on people’s discourses
about home and their feelings of belonging. Many transnational studies
follow this line of questioning (Charles 1992; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001;
Poros 2001; Salih 2002; Smith 1998). They are fundamental to the
point that in order to understand migrant realities, it is not sufficient to
study how migrants take on cultural forms of the countries in which
they reside, or whether they participate in local labour markets. It is
also necessary to understand how migrants relate to their countries of
origin in their imaginaries, in the cultural forms they practice, the poli-
tical identities they associate themselves with and the discourses they
engage in. These studies have, however, largely neglected the more
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material social and economic flows in which transnational identities re-
sult,4 and they do not include any empirical research in the other loca-
tion: a migrant’s home community that is conceptualised as being im-
portant by the theoretical transnational literature. Furthermore, these
studies cannot be distinguished from any others on identity and ethni-
city that were undertaken before the coining of the concept of
transnationalism.
A second type of transnationalism study that became more prevalent
in the late 1990s and early 2000s operationalised simultaneity by study-
ing both home communities and migrants’ country of residence jointly,
giving rise to theoretical reflections on the need for multi-sited research
(Hannerz 1998; Stoller 1997; Marcus 1995). These two-country empiri-
cal studies offer something apart from previous methods and their ap-
proach will thus be the focus for the rest of this chapter.
Two categories of two-country studies can be distinguished: those
with matched samples and those without. A matched sample focuses on
networks of people linked to one another across national boundaries as
the unit of analysis. Unmatched sample studies select people who are
on both sides of the migration process but may not be directly linked to
one another. The individual is thus the unit of analysis in unmatched
sample studies, while the network is the unit of analysis in matched
sample studies. Unmatched sample studies are more numerous.
Since the 1990s, two-country, unmatched sample transnational stu-
dies have burgeoned. They have taken research on the linkages between
countries further by conceptualising home and host country as a single
arena for migrants’ social, economic and political action (Basch et al.
1994; Feldman-Bianco 1992; Gardner 1999; Glick Schiller & Fouron
1998; Guarnizo, Portes & Haller 2003; Hinojosa Ojeda 2003; Matthei
& Smith 1998; Marques, Santos & Araujo 2001; Portes & Guarnizo
1991; Riccio 2002; Rouse 1992).
Matched sample studies are fewer (Osili 1998; Saifullah Khan 1977;
De la Cruz 1995; Massey 1987). Because such studies collect informa-
tion from both sides, they best investigate questions about the inner
workings of transnational flows and link migrants’ actions with those of
people back home. These questions include: how do migrants decide to
whom they send remittances? What kinds of reciprocal relations exist
between people living in different countries, and how do they work?
What mechanisms do migrants use to ensure that remittances get used
as they intend, and, at the same time, are migrants’ remittances being
used in the way migrants intended?
A review of two-country, transnational studies (see Table 11A.1) shows
that few studies work with matched samples and no study to date has
involved collecting information from both ends of the migration pro-
cess simultaneously.
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Among two-country transnational studies, two further methodological
distinctions can be made: their scope, relating to the number of people
they study, and the type of contact with the research population, be it in-
tensive or one-off (this categorisation is presented in Table 11A.2). The
majority of studies is large in scope (more than twenty respondents)
and uses methods in which respondents are interviewed only a few
times (such as surveys or one or two in-depth interviews per respon-
dent). Such one-off methods can be used to learn the extent of certain
phenomena and can produce reliable data only if the population in-
volved is not vulnerable (e.g. migrants with working permits). In cases
of a vulnerable population, a relationship of trust between researcher
and respondent is necessary and an intensive research methodology is
needed. Intensive methods involve repeated contacts with the same peo-
ple. Table 11A.2 shows how the studies that use intensive methods are
for the most part ethnographies. They do not collect quantitative data
and cannot assess the extent of the transnational phenomena they study
(Portes 2001).
This chapter explores a simultaneous matched sample (SMS) metho-
dology in which a relatively large matched sample of respondents is stu-
died simultaneously and intensively (repeated visits over a long period
of time). It is similar to an ethnosurvey, as described by Massey (1987),
in that it uses multi-method data collection and a matched sample of re-
spondents, yet it gives equal attention to, and collects data simulta-
neously from, both sides of the matched sample. The chapter reflects
on the experiences of using such a methodology from the Ghana
TransNet research programme by investigating what it can add to our
knowledge of transnational migration and by discussing some consid-
erations one needs to make before employing such a methodology.
11.3 A simultaneous matched sample methodology
The Ghana TransNet research programme5 examines how migrants’
transnational networks affect the principles and institutions6 on which
local economies are based. Through the flows of goods, money, services
and ideas between migrants and the people they know in their home
country, values, knowledge, economic opportunities and means of social
assistance change, adapt and transform. This ultimately impacts the in-
stitutions that shape local economies both at home and abroad. The
Ghana TransNet research programme aims to understand how local
economies are being changed by focusing on institutions that are im-
pacted by migrants’ transnational lives.
The methodology thus takes migrants’ simultaneous engagement in
two or more countries directly into account (Mazzucato 2000). The
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programme is composed of three projects based in three important
nodes of Ghanaian migrants’ transnational networks: Amsterdam,
where most Ghanaians in the Netherlands reside; Accra, the capital city
of Ghana, where most migrants have lived or passed through; and rural
to semi-urban villages in the Ashanti Region of Ghana, to which many
migrants trace their roots. The projects have been conducted simulta-
neously so that transactions between people could be studied on both
sides and in real time.
Migrants’ social networks are taken as the unit of analysis. Migrants
have a multiplicity of contacts with people in their home country, ran-
ging from friends and family members to business partners and church
members. We were interested in investigating the different roles of kin
and non-kin relationships in migrants’ networks, rather than to assume
that it is only kin relationships that are relevant, as is done in studies
that take the household as the unit of analysis.
Both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies were ap-
plied over a two-year period (2003-2004) with 115 respondents who
were followed intensively over the three research locations.7 In a first
phase, 29 Ghanaian migrants in Amsterdam were selected based on a
network survey conducted among 106 migrants. There exists no base-
line survey of Ghanaians in the Netherlands, and a large number of mi-
grants are undocumented. The 106 Ghanaians were therefore selected
through a variety of gateways (churches, community leaders, hometown
associations, cultural projects and randomly encountered migrants in
markets or at the workplace). The diversity of gateways helped ensure
our coming into contact with a wide variety of migrants with different
individual and network characteristics.
Once the selection of respondents was made, the second phase of the
programme could begin. The research team jointly developed question-
naires and question lists so that the same information would be asked
for in the three research locations. First, a transaction study was devel-
oped to record on a monthly basis all transactions conducted in eight
domains of daily life, which were identified from literature and preli-
minary fieldwork as being important in the economic lives of migrants
and people back home. These domains are housing, business (includ-
ing farming), funerals, church, health care, education, communications
and community development projects. Transactions were recorded on a
monthly basis during the period of July 2003 to June 2004. Second, in-
depth interviews were carried out on the eight domains. Third, life his-
tories were collected, focusing on the changes in people’s social net-
works throughout their lifetime. Fourth, observation of, and participa-
tion in, social events were employed in Amsterdam from June 2002 to
February 2005 and in locations in Ghana from May 2003 to August
2004.
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11.4 Results from a simultaneous matched sample
This section reviews findings from the Ghana TransNet research pro-
gramme that are particular to the SMS methodology. Reflections are
made on how the findings supplement current knowledge coming from
transnational, migration and migration and development studies.
11.4.1 Linking policy consequences across countries
Expenditure patterns reflect migrant objectives as well as policies that
may create or facilitate certain expenditure categories. An SMS metho-
dology allows migrants’ expenditure patterns to be studied simulta-
neously in the country of origin, in the country of residence and across
national borders. At the same time, it allows the effects of migrants’ ex-
penditures on network members to be observed directly. As such, an
SMS methodology can show the direct effects that policies in one coun-
try have on livelihoods in another. The example of Amsterdam-based
Ghanaian migrants’ expenditures illustrates such effects.
Ghanaian migrants’ in the Netherlands from our sample spent over
35 per cent of their total non-consumption expenditures8 on remittances
in the period of July 2003 to June 2004. Remittances consist of money
and goods sent or carried to Ghana by migrants. Forty per cent of these
remittances was spent on help for network members or organisations
in Ghana (including funerals, church donations, education, health,
community development projects and general subsistence), and 50 per
cent was spent on investments (on housing or business pertaining to
the migrant himself or herself) (Mazzucato et al. 2006). Almost 5 per
cent was spent on identity documents for travel to, and stay in, the
Netherlands, and the remaining 5 per cent on miscellaneous expendi-
tures (Mazzucato 2005).
At the same time, almost 60 per cent of non-consumption expendi-
tures was spent in the Netherlands. Non-remittance expenditure pat-
terns show in what ways migrants participate in the Dutch economy as
well as the consequences Dutch migration policy has on migrants’ abil-
ity to send money back home and contribute to development.
Discussions of whether migrants support the neighbourhoods and ci-
ties in which they live focus on whether migrants start their own busi-
nesses or buy their own homes. Like any inhabitants, however, mi-
grants can support the neighbourhood, city or country where they live
in many different ways. Table 11.1 presents the major non-remittance
expenditure items and their geographic destination based on the trans-
action study conducted with 30 Ghanaian migrants over a one-year
period.
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Non-remittance spending shows that Ghanaian migrants contribute to
businesses and services that are offered at the neighbourhood, city, na-
tional and international levels. Not all spending, however, leads to
growth in the formal economy. Much money gets absorbed into the for-
mal and informal economies of identity papers (see italicised items in
Table 11.1). As mentioned, identity papers absorbed 5 per cent of total
remittances sent, but they also take up financial resources in the
Netherlands. Substantial amounts of money are spent on lawyers’ fees.
Some lawyers are of very low quality, not having specialised in migra-
tion law, and can cause delays and, ultimately, the denial of a visa re-
quest due to improper handling of the application procedure (personal
communication, head of visa office, Dutch consulate, Accra, 26 March
2004). Fees charged by the Dutch embassy for legalisation of docu-
ments and for visas can also lead to substantial spending. Legalisation
alone cost E 122 in 2002 and, due to highly stringent procedures, a per-
son may have had to pay the fee several times before succeeding. The
fact that the embassy verifies the detailed information it requires of mi-
grants leads the migrants to hire people to oversee the verification
Table 11.1 Geographic destination of largest non-remittance expenditure items of
Amsterdam-based Ghanaian migrants
The Netherlands International
Neighbourhood Amsterdam Other
· School party
· Church/association
donations
· Food shopping
· Liquor (for
celebrations of rites
of passage)
· Services (child-care,
telephone call
centres, money
transfers, travel
agencies)
· House purchase
(real estate
agencies)
· Rent (housing
corporations)
· Car purchase
(second-hand
stores)
· Housing and
household refuse
taxes
· Personnel for own
business
· Dutch wax cloth
(Vlisco)a
· Business and
income taxes
· Health care taxes
· Lawyers
· Foreign police
· ‘Connection men’b
· Dutch embassy in
Ghana
· International phone
calls
· Electronic
appliances
· Airline tickets
· Shipments via sea
freight
· ‘Connection men’b
Source: Transaction study 2003-2004; table from Mazzucato (2008)
Note: Entries in italics indicate non-productive investments.
a This is a type of high-quality cloth used to make clothing, produced by a Dutch company
and much valued in many African countries.
b Refers to persons who facilitate obtaining travel or residency papers in exchange for
payment.
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procedure. In 2003 and 2004, such people charged around E 2,000.
Over two years, the immigration police raised the fees for staying and
permanent residency permits eightfold and fourfold, respectively (Table
11.2). For some migrants, this cost is equivalent to their monthly in-
comes. One of the most substantial costs for undocumented migrants
is obtaining papers in the informal economy. In 2003 and 2004, the
going rate for such transactions was between E 10,000 and E 15,000.
The other significant cost incurred is for using other people’s papers in
order to work. The unwritten rule is that the papers’ owner keeps 30
per cent of the net salary earned by the undocumented migrant. This
can amount to almost E 4,500 per year for the blue-collar jobs typically
held by undocumented migrants. Another cost is the forgone income of
better-paying jobs that are inaccessible to those without a working per-
mit. Finally, there is the cost of the ill health likely to result from work-
ing in informal economy jobs. These jobs are usually physically stress-
ful – for example, cleaning jobs, in which people inhale strong cleaning
solvents all day or repeat the same movement for large parts of the
day – and lead to ailments.
These expenditure patterns on both sides of the migration process
– remittances to Ghana and investments and spending in the
Netherlands – reflect the double engagement of migrants in their home
country and in the country where they reside. At the same time, some
expenditures reflect the hardening of Dutch migration policies that cre-
ate both a formal economy (lawyers, embassies, immigration police)
and an informal economy (‘connection men’,9 marriage partners, use
of others’ documents) of identity papers. Were these resources not ta-
ken up by obtaining identity documents (visas, passports, work per-
mits), we deduce from migrants’ current spending patters that these re-
sources would be spent in ways that contribute to the Dutch economy
Table 11.2 Cost (in E) of formal and informal economy of identity papers, the
Netherlands 2001, 2003
2001 2003
Residence permit 56 430
Renewal of residence permit 0 285
Residence permit for unlimited time 227 890
Legalisation of birth certificate 122
‘Help’ with legalisation procedure 2,000
Marriage partner 10,000 – 15,000
Use of other person’s work permit 30% of salary earned
‘Typical’ immigration lawyer fee 1,000
Prison stay for two months 4,000
Source: Table from Mazzucato (2005)
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at the neighbourhood, city or national levels, to multinational corpora-
tions and to the local economies of cities and villages in Ghana.
Our analysis links migrant spending in the receiving country with
spending in the home country and highlights how migration policies in
a receiving country can have development consequences for sending
countries. An SMS methodology also brings these effects to light on the
individual level. Joy, a Ghanaian nurse living in the Netherlands, was
never able to have her nursing diploma validated in the Netherlands
and worked in the lowest ranks of elderly care for nine years. Joy had
grown increasingly dissatisfied with the repercussions for her self-
esteem and, during our fieldwork, her patience reached a limit. She
decided to move to the United Kingdom, where she had a better chance
of getting her diploma recognised. This move had financial conse-
quences, as she needed to pay for her trip and housing in the UK, and
would not have income for the time it would take her to obtain a nur-
sing job. Her husband in the Netherlands had to use all his savings to
support her and took on an additional night job. The consequences of
this additional spending for Joy’s immediate household and her net-
work in Ghana were documented in the transaction study. Joy and her
husband were supporting a nephew through school in Ghana and, as a
consequence of Joy’s move, were unable to pay the school fees for the
remainder of the academic year. By the end of our fieldwork, no one in
Ghana had been able to compensate the lost money and the child was
taken out of the school.
Observing this effect was made possible by collecting transaction data
simultaneously in different locations. Joy and her husband had not
mentioned their inability to pay school fees for the nephew, perhaps be-
cause they had not thought to do so, or because they were ashamed.
Questioning respondents in Ghana long after the boy had been taken
out of school may not have turned up this information as the link be-
tween the remittances and the boy’s schooling may have been forgotten
or was not clear in people’s minds. This effect might not have emerged
had the research relied solely on informants on one side – instead of
both sides – of the migration process simultaneously.
Having transnational lives means that factors affecting migrants’ re-
sources will have repercussions in more than just one country.
Economic studies of the benefits and costs of migration for receiving
countries typically focus on migrants’ participation in the labour market
and their use of social services such as education, health and pensions
(Roodenburg 2003). The analyses presented here show that a more ac-
curate estimation of the costs and benefits of migration involves widen-
ing the scope of these studies. A broader view as such would include es-
timated costs of excluding migrants from participating in an economy
to the state of the receiving country (the budget of the Dutch migration
214 VALENTINA MAZZUCATO
police is greater than that of the whole of the UNHCR (Veenkamp,
Bentley & Buonfino 2003)), to the migrant (i.e. reduced resources, ill
health and an unsatisfactory life) and to the migrant’s home country
economy (i.e. forgone remittances).
11.4.2 Two-way flows
Studies on migration and development often focus on one-way flows
and what migrants do for the home country. There are also flows that
go in the other direction, from home country to receiving country, but
these flows have usually been ignored. A recent overview of interna-
tional migration and economic development shows one exception
(Lucas 2005): studies of brain drain analysing flows from developing
countries to migrant-receiving countries (Mensah, Mackintosh & Henry
2005). Transnational studies also tend to focus on what migrants do for
their home countries, for example, through hometown associations and
festivals in which contributions are collected for community develop-
ment projects or through entrepreneurial activities (Guarnizo et al.
2003; Levitt 2001). Some transnational studies mention services that
people at home provide to migrants abroad, such as caring for children,
managing housing construction (Levitt 2001) or sending local goods
(Wiltshire 1992), but no detailed analysis of these flows has been
conducted.
In what follows, I present a study of how insurance agreements be-
tween migrants and their network members back home bind the coun-
try of residence with the home country. One of the possible uses of re-
mittances is for insurance. The new economics of migration (NEM) the-
ory argues that migration is a household-level strategy for dealing with
risk (Stark & Levhari 1982; Lucas & Stark 1985; Stark & Bloom 1985;
Taylor 1999). Remittances are explained as the outcome of self-enfor-
cing contractual arrangements between migrants and their families in
which both parties expect to be better off. The family helps the migrant
to move to where he or she expects to have better income opportunities.
The migrant then sends remittances either as delayed payment for the
initial investment the family made in the migration or as insurance to
the family in times of need (Stark & Lucas 1988). What make the mi-
grant abide with the contract are altruistic feelings towards his or her
family and/or the desire to be eligible for the family inheritance, usually
land or cattle (De la Brière 2002).
No study to date has explored the possibility that migrants and home
country dwellers may be involved in a mutual insurance contract in
which a migrant may provide for the family because she is in need of
their help. Using SMS methodology, we investigated this possibility.
Migration histories of our respondents revealed that migration
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trajectories of Ghanaian migrants in the Netherlands have three phases:
first, the preparation phase in Ghana during which the money and
documents necessary for the trip are obtained; second, the installation
phase in the Netherlands during which migrants regularise their stay
by obtaining the necessary documents; and third, the settled phase after
they succeeded in obtaining their documents and are able to travel ex-
tensively back and forth to Ghana. During the 1980s and first half of
the 1990s, the second phase of undocumented stay in the Netherlands
typically lasted from two to five years. Subsequently, with increasingly
stringent visa policies in the Netherlands and the rest of Europe, this
phase has become longer. Some respondents in our sample had been
waiting ten years.
While a migrant is in the process of obtaining needed documents,
the probability of unforeseen events having a large income shock is
high. An insurance event must involve a degree of unpredictability; if
one could know exactly if and when the event were to occur, one could
plan ahead and not rely on mutual insurance. An insurance event must
also involve costs that migrants are unable to pay on their own. Table
11.3 shows the kinds of shocks that migrants experience during the sec-
ond stage of the migration process.
Different aspects of the unpredictability of the events outlined in
Table 11.3 create a need for insurance. First, one does not have the cer-
tainty that the events will occur. For example, some people without stay-
ing permits are lucky to never be caught by police. Second, migration
policy in the Netherlands and Europe has changed quite dramatically
and frequently over the past fifteen years, becoming increasingly
Table 11.3 Insurance events for migrants in the Netherlands during Phase II
Insurance event Service Unpredictability Urgency* From whom
Getting a residence
permit legally
Paperwork in Ghana + + Family and friends
in Ghana
Getting a residence
permit in the black
market
Finding a candidate
Candidate
paperwork
++ ++ Family and friends
in Ghana and The
Netherlands
Marriage deal gone
wrong
Arbitration ++ +++ Family and friends
in Ghana and the
Netherlands
Getting put in
prison
Getting out of
prison
+++ +++ Family and friends
in Ghana and the
Netherlands
Source: Adapted from Mazzucato (2009)
*Urgency is used as a proxy for financial cost as the help that is needed from the migrant is
usually a service, such as obtaining correct documentation, arbitration or obtaining accurate
information. These services are not always quantifiable in terms of financial costs.
216 VALENTINA MAZZUCATO
stringent towards migrants. Potential migrants may have acquired infor-
mation about the ease of obtaining documents in the Netherlands that
was no longer valid after their arrival in the Netherlands.
Insurance events can impose a large financial cost on migrants. Our
data show that although migrants use their own financial resources or
borrow from their migrant networks in the country of residence, they
also need the services of family and friends in Ghana. In what follows I
describe the nature of these services for each kind of insurance event.
Respondents without papers first try the cheapest route of obtaining
papers via official channels. This entails a lot of work in Ghana, collect-
ing the necessary documentation and informing all those who might be
interviewed by the embassy controllers what answers to give. This sys-
tem is necessary as the Dutch embassy employs strict documentation
verification that is virtually impossible for Ghanaians older than 25 to
satisfy because the consistent documentation needed to satisfy embassy
requirements did not exist 25 years ago. This means migrants need to
have documents made, school records changed, hospital birth records
forged and extended family members informed about the ‘official’ an-
swers to controllers who come to villages to verify all information given
on the application form. One friend or trusted family member in
Ghana will be charged with collecting forms at the embassy, which en-
tails many hours of waiting in lines at the different agencies, travelling
and coordinating efforts to ensure information will be consistent on all
records. These services require a substantial input from family or
friends in Ghana, which can be documented with the SMS
methodology.
To obtain documents on the black market, in most cases migrants
need to find a ‘marriage partner’ with legal documents. Here again, mi-
grants make use of friends or family in the Netherlands or in Ghana to
put them in contact with a trustworthy candidate. Migrants are in extre-
mely vulnerable positions vis-à-vis their prospective partners because
costs must be made up front. Many are the occasions in which a mi-
grant loses his or her money on a deal gone wrong. Thus, finding a
trustworthy candidate is essential.
In the case of a marriage deal gone wrong, a migrant must try to ob-
tain reimbursement by asking his or her own network members in
Ghana to pressure the candidate – in turn, through his or her own so-
cial network – to repay the costs. In one case in our study, the marriage
candidate of a migrant who had paid E 2,000 for the arrangement dis-
appeared. The migrant was able to recuperate the money after his par-
ents in Ghana went to speak with the parents of the partner.
In the event of having been caught and put in prison, again the mi-
grant may rely on friends and family in Ghana. One respondent who
was imprisoned in the Netherlands asked his family in Ghana to help
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by going to a prayer camp with pastors who were believed to have
powers to resolve document problems. Other respondents who were ex-
periencing problems in obtaining their residence permits also asked fa-
mily in Ghana to attend prayer camps (see Van Dijk 1997). This in-
volves costs for the family back home, such as funds for travel and mak-
ing donations at the prayer camp, as well as time, since a prayer camp
usually involves an extended stay of one or two weeks for prayer and
fasting.
These insurance services are difficult for a researcher based in a mi-
grant’s home country to notice as they blend in with everyday tasks.
Furthermore, some difficulties migrants experience, such as imprison-
ment, are shameful, and the family back home may not want to tell
people about them. An SMS methodology can help make such services
more visible. When an unexpected insurance event occurs to the mi-
grant, the researcher in the migrant-receiving country can alert the re-
searchers in the home country to observe attentively and ask how net-
work members deal with the crisis.
There are many additional services that migrants receive from people
at home, such as help with housing construction, business investments
and child-care in their home country. These services have been de-
scribed by transnational studies (De la Cruz 1995; Matthei & Smith
1998; Marques, Santos & Araujo 2001). An SMS methodology can help
researchers go beyond the description of reciprocal relations and to ex-
plain how these relations work by observing both sides of the reciprocal
relation simultaneously. Moreover, by following people over an extended
period of time, it is possible to quantify these services, for example,
through a time-budgeting study that collects data on how much time is
spent on these services.
11.4.3 Triangulation, tracking change and getting beyond migration
discourses and false dichotomies
So far, this chapter has focused on what type of information can be
found by using an SMS methodology. This section focuses on the qual-
ity of data obtained, centring on three characteristics: triangulation,
tracking change and getting beyond migration discourses in both prac-
tice and academia. Collecting similar data in different localities contem-
poraneously can enhance the quality of data because researchers can tri-
angulate information with each other about their research locations.
This enables researchers to complete and correct information by asking
for more relevant or detailed responses and topics that they would
otherwise not consider. For example, a respondent in Accra had not
mentioned owning a business, but the fact came to light in Amsterdam
when a migrant mentioned helping her to start one. This alerted the
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researcher in Accra to ask more detailed questions and obtain more
complete information about business activities. Another relevant exam-
ple resulted from an interview with a migrant who had a tense relation-
ship with one of her network members in Ghana. By asking both her
and the network member in Ghana about this relationship, it was possi-
ble to obtain both versions of the story, add detail and gain insight into
the relationship and how it became strained over time.
Interviewing people repeatedly on a monthly basis over a one-year
period made it possible to observe changing attitudes or social relation-
ships. In the course of our study, a mother in Ghana and a daughter in
Amsterdam became closer after a period of estrangement. We were able
to ask about the reasons for the estrangement and also to observe how
the relationship evolved. Quantitative data showed how the closeness
between mother and daughter resulted in a series of two-way flows be-
tween Ghana and the Netherlands that had not existed previously.
In another case we witnessed a respondent’s growing religiosity.
While at the beginning of the research the respondent was quite critical
of Ghanaian pastors operating in Amsterdam, she later began to fre-
quent one of the Pentecostal churches in her neighbourhood. We were
able to trace the events leading to her increasing religiosity and the ef-
fects on her exchanges with people in Ghana. We were able to docu-
ment factors that lead to strong membership in Ghanaian Pentecostal
churches in the Netherlands and the flows they generate. Although not
unique to the SMS methodology, another benefit is that it is possible to
track changes by following those respondents who move from one re-
search location to another (Smith 1998; Sorensen 1998).
One year of data collection cannot capture all changes, but it does en-
able researchers to observe the evolution of some attitudes and social re-
lationships, rather than rely only on interviews. The latter are subject to
the pitfalls of human recollection and reflect discourses about the way
people want to remember the past rather than the actual events
themselves.
Collecting information from more than one site and following what
people do over an extended period of time also facilitates getting beyond
dominant discourses. Various discourses exist around migration among
both migrants and academics. An example is migrants’ complaining of
their family’s constant requests for help. Often, researchers who base
their findings on one-off interviews with migrants report this discourse
as a finding, and thus propagate the image of the migrant as a helpless
victim of extended family systems prevalent in developing countries.
Observing what migrants do – i.e. their practices – revealed in our
study the various strategies migrants employ in order to continue sup-
porting people back home while, at the same time, giving space to their
own personal objectives (Mazzucato, Kabki & Smith 2006). In reality,
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migrants have more room for manoeuvring, we concluded, than they
portray. Furthermore, we observed how some migrants do not receive
so many requests, and others that do sometimes explicitly deny these
requests. Finally, as stressed in section 4.2, migrants also depend on
their relations in the home country, particularly in certain phases of
their migration trajectory. This can partially explain why they continue
to send remittances despite the fact that they say they feel oppressed by
requests. This conclusion could be reached only by observing and col-
lecting quantitative data from the different sides of the migration pro-
cess. Migrants’ reliance on home did not emerge in interviews with mi-
grants themselves because migrants often view this reliance with shame
as it is associated with a ‘failed’ migration story.
Another dominant discourse is that migrants show off their hard-
earned income in their country of origin, leading to the misconception
that ‘money grows on trees’ overseas. This misconception encourages
in youth a desire to migrate and compels extended family members to
make constant requests for money and goods. Having researchers in
different locations allowed us to observe migrants’ behaviour during
their home visits and ask migrants what they tell their network mem-
bers in Ghana about life overseas. We could cross-check this informa-
tion by asking the network members in Ghana what they knew of life
overseas. This inquiry led to the finding that people in Ghana, espe-
cially in cities, had a very realistic picture of life in developed countries
and were aware that their compatriots were often working and living in
difficult conditions. We found that migrants usually did not make expli-
cit to their network members their own personal circumstances, but
they explained how living conditions were difficult, in general, and
sometimes gave details about people they knew. That some of our
young respondents who were able to secure a decent job in urban
Ghana did not express any desire to migrate showed that, while the
‘money growing on trees’ discourse may have reflected reality at the be-
ginning of Ghanaian emigration overseas in the 1980s, it is now out-
dated. Many migrants have since returned temporarily or permanently
with realistic stories about their experiences or, worse, with little to
show from their stay abroad. The exaggerated discourse may, however,
still be relevant in rural or other areas (Kabki, Mazzucato & Appiah
2004) where there is little overseas emigration (De Lange 2003).
Finally, an SMS methodology is useful for researching migration
across the academic divide between international and internal migra-
tion. As Skeldon (1997) argues, often the two are related – migrants
first migrating internally and then overseas – and involve similar dy-
namics and ties with the home area. An SMS methodology does not de-
part from national boundaries as defining the relevant research field
but, rather, works from the network and where the nodes of the
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network are located. These nodes may be located both within the same
country and/or beyond country borders. The Ghana TransNet research
programme studies, for example, not only the linkages Amsterdam-
based migrants have with people in their hometowns or in Accra, but
also the linkages internal migrants have within Ghana between the
hometowns and Accra. In the latter case, we were able to document the
intermediary function of Accra-based network members who disbursed
remittances to members located in hometowns and to show that Accra-
based network members were often used to check on how recipients
were using remittances. These dynamics demonstrate that internal mi-
gration and international migration are parts of one process, fulfilling
different functions in a transnational network.
11.5 Conclusions
Two general implications result from this review of SMS methodology
and its contributions to our knowledge about the migration and devel-
opment nexus. First, more studies using SMS methodology are needed.
SMS methodology allows the operationalisation of two concepts that
make transnationalism a unique area of study: the embeddedness of
migrants in networks that span sending and receiving areas, both within
and across national boundaries, and the simultaneity of flows between
these areas. Two-country transnational studies are multi-sited and focus
on both migrants’ communities at home as well as their place of resi-
dence. To our knowledge, however, data have never been collected si-
multaneously, and rarely across a matched sample of network mem-
bers. One way to do this is through an SMS methodology. This chapter
has reviewed the main added advantages of using such an SMS metho-
dology. First, such a methodology allows migration policies in a receiv-
ing country to be directly linked to effects at the local level in develop-
ing countries. Second, it highlights the principle that flows engendered
by migration are two-way: they involve not only remittances from mi-
grant recipient countries to their home countries, but also flows, espe-
cially of services, from developing to developed countries. Both flows
should be taken into account when studying the benefits and costs of
migration for developing countries. Third, an SMS methodology allows
the triangulation of results, provides supplemental information with
which to improve the reliability of data and allows researchers to go be-
yond dominant migration discourses. Finally, an SMS methodology
transcends the dichotomy of internal versus international migration
and demonstrates how the two forms of migration are linked through
transnational networks. Our findings regarding the simultaneity of mi-
grant networks have implications for the conceptualisation of migrants
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in both academic and policy circles. Migration is usually seen either as
an issue of development studied by developing-area specialists (e.g. de-
velopment economics, development studies), or as an issue of integra-
tion and social exclusion studied by scholars of different disciplines fo-
cusing on the developed world where migrants usually live (for a review
see Portes & DeWind 2004). Policies follow a similar separation. While
development often falls under the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, integration is an issue dealt with by ministries concerned with
the national territory such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry
of Education and the Ministry of Justice. This dichotomy obfuscates the
relationship between migration policies in developed countries where
migrants live and development processes in migrants’ countries of ori-
gin. The bifocal lens used in transnational studies – and specifically, an
SMS methodology – is useful for highlighting the linkages that exist be-
tween migration policies in developed countries and the lives of people
in the developing world. Migration researchers should be familiar with
the economy and society of the countries from which migrants emi-
grate as well as with the policy and economic circumstances migrants
face in receiving countries. Working in interdisciplinary teams, re-
searchers can combine the knowledge of developing-area specialists
with that of urban anthropologists, sociologists, legal experts and econo-
mists specialising in developed countries (Stoller 1997; Hannerz 1998).
For policymakers, the transnational lives of migrants linking developed
and developing countries mean that receiving-country governments af-
fect development in migrants’ home countries through their migration
as well as their development policies. Migration policies should focus
on reducing – if not eliminating – the unintended consequences they
have produced, such as the formal and informal economies of identity
papers. Our SMS methodology has shown that migration is related to
development, not only through flows (i.e. remittances) from the receiv-
ing country to the home country, but also through reverse flows of ser-
vices that home country residents must conduct for migrants in order
to bring security to migrants’ vulnerable lives in the receiving country.
This has the consequence of absorbing productive resources of network
members back home, which, in the absence of migration, could have
been employed elsewhere. Designing policies that recognise migrants’
double engagement in their home country and in the receiving-country
economies can help avoid the unintended negative consequences of mi-
gration policies. Such policies should aim at creating space for migrants
to invest in their home country while facilitating their more active parti-
cipation and offering them secure living in the receiving-country
economy.
At the same time, development policies should aim at making mi-
grant remittances as productive as possible. This means investing in
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basic infrastructure and human capital to attract migrant investments
or fostering the creation of credit unions in migrant-sending areas to
provide multiple services for migrants such as money transfer services,
as well as arranging health and funeral insurance for migrants’ family
members, similar to what has been done in some rural communities in
Central America (Orozco 2003b). Credit unions have mandates in
which they must reinvest their profits in the community, thus leading
to greater multiplier effects from migrant remittances than are cur-
rently being realised in countries such as Ghana, where most profits
from remittances accumulate with large multinationals such as Western
Union with no obligation to reinvest in migrant-sending areas.
This mixture of migration and development policies needs to be coor-
dinated and implemented simultaneously in order to avoid possibly
counterproductive effects of one policy on another. This can only be
achieved through closer collaboration – than is currently the case in
most developed countries – between ministries that deal with migrant
integration and the ministry that deals with development cooperation.
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Appendix
Table 11A.1 Two-country transnational studies by simultaneity and matched sample
Sample Simultaneous Step-wise
Matched De la Cruz (1995)
Osili (1998)
Massey (1987)
Saifullah Khan (1977)
Partly matched Basch et al. (1994)
Constantinides (1977)
Goldring (1998)
Klaver (1997)
Landolt (2001)
Levitt (2001)
Sorensen (1998)
Wiltshire (1992)
Unmatched Feldman-Bianco (1992)
Gardner (1999)
Glick Schiller & Fouron (1998)
Guarnizo et al. (2003)
Hinojosa Ojeda (2003)
Matthei & Smith (1998)
Marques et al. (2001)
Portes & Guarnizo (1991)
Riccio (2002)
Rouse (1992)
Watson (1977)
Source: Author’s literature review
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Notes
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the conference Migration and
Development Within and Across Borders organised by the Social Science Research
Council of the United States and the International Organization for Migration in
New York, 17-19 November 2005. This chapter was originally published in DeWind
and Holdaway (2008). It reports on results of a collaborative research programme en-
titled ‘Transnational networks and the creation of local economies: Economic princi-
ples and institutions of Ghanaian migrants at home and abroad’ (Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) grant number 410-13-010P). Programme
partners were the University of Amsterdam (AGIDS), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
(AOE), Amsterdam Institute for International Development (AIID) and African
Studies Centre Leiden – all of which are in the Netherlands – and the Institute of
Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER) in Ghana. I would like to thank
Luca Bertolini and the members of the ‘Transnational links and livelihoods’ group
for insightful comments and Magali Chelpi for excellent research assistance.
2 All italics in this paragraph indicate the author’s own emphasis.
3 Based on a literature search of 33 articles, book sections and books, only one study
(Georges 1992) situated research in one geographical location and in a migrant-send-
ing area.
4 Portes, Guarnizo and Haller (2002) is the exception.
5 See www2.fmg.uva.nl/ghanatransnet.
Table 11A.2 Two-country transnational studies by scope and type of respondent
contact
Respondents N  20
per country
Respondents N > 20
per country
Intensive contact with
respondents
Levitt (2001)1
Matthei & Smith (1998)2
Saifullah Khan (1977)
Sorensen (1998)2
Costantinides (1977)2
Rouse (1992)2
Watson (1977)2
Massey (1987)
One-off contact with
respondents
De la Cruz (1995)
Klaver (1997)1
Basch et al. (1994)
Feldman-Bianco (1992)2
Gardner (1999)
Glick Schiller & Fouron (1998)2
Goldring (1998)2
Guarnizo et al. (2003)
Landolt (2001)
Marques et al. (2001)
Osili (1998)
Portes & Guarnizo (1991)
Riccio (2002)2
Wiltshire (1992)1
Hinojosa Ojeda (2003)
Source: Author’s literature review
1 These sources include surveys by way of background information but the material on
migrants’ lives comes from a partly matched sample of respondents. These studies are
categorised according to their methods with the partly matched sample.
2 These sources are ethnographies in which it is not clear how many people are studied.
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6 Institutions are the commonly held rules and norms that guide social behaviour by
‘defining the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies’ (North 1994:
360).
7 An additional sixteen respondents were followed in a fourth location (Kumasi) over a
six-month period.
8 Consumption expenditures refer to all expenditures used for obtaining food for daily
consumption. All else is considered a non-consumption expenditure.
9 ‘Connection men’ are persons who facilitate obtaining travel or residency papers in
exchange for payment.
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Chapter 12
Transnational research collaboration:
An approach to the study of co-publications
between overseas Chinese scientists and their
mainland colleagues
Koen Jonkers1
12.1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, the mobility of students and scientists has
dramatically increased worldwide. Initially a trickle, the outbound flow
of Chinese students increased during the 1980s and, after a dip follow-
ing restrictive measures in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, the
outbound flow continued its exponential rise during the 1990s. The re-
turn rate of students and scientists to China in the 1980s and 1990s
was low (Zhang & Li 2002). Many students decided to remain and work
in their host system – or to move on to another. In many cases, this re-
sulted in permanent migration and the adoption of a foreign nationality.
This happened especially in North America, for a long time the most
popular destination region, and to a lesser extent in Western Europe.
As a result, the number and visibility of overseas Chinese scientists has
grown considerably over the years, as will be shown in this chapter’s
section on findings and results.
Some of these overseas scientists return to their home country on a
temporary or a permanent basis. But even when they remain abroad,
overseas scientists can be important sources of new knowledge, technol-
ogy, business links, policy advice and collaborative ties. The Chinese
government has therefore not only set up programmes to promote the
return of overseas Chinese scientists, but also engaged in a range of ac-
tivities to strengthen its ties with growing communities of overseas
scientists. Networks of Chinese scientists had begun to emerge organi-
cally in the United States, and the formation of similar networks has
been actively supported in various other host countries. Examples of
such networks include the Society of Chinese Bioscientists in America,
the Chinese Life Scientists Society in the UK and the Chinese Network
of Life-sciences in the Netherlands (Jonkers 2010). Through the support
of such networks, governments in the home country can attempt to re-
main in contact with their expatriate communities. Ways to do so in-
clude the organisation of conferences aimed at this group and the facili-
tation of networking and information-sharing between expatriate scien-
tists. Internet portals provide another way to actively engage overseas
communities of scientists and students by providing access to informa-
tion on opportunities and events in home and host countries. Yet an-
other type of measure encouraging contact with expatriate scientists in-
cludes programmes to promote temporary and permanent return as
well as cooperation between overseas Chinese scientists and their coun-
terparts in mainland China. Chinese intermediary organisations offer
some designated research funding for overseas Chinese scientists.2
The last decade has seen a rapidly emerging presence of China in the
global science system. This development has made China an increas-
ingly important collaborative partner for science systems in North
America, Western Europe and Asia-Pacific. The growing number of
China’s international co-publications has almost kept pace with its en-
hanced share of publications in international journals (Jonkers 2009).
One would expect overseas Chinese scientists to be involved in a rela-
tively large share of international co-publications with China. This ex-
pectation is based in part on an assumption that the scientists would
have a relatively strong interest in cooperating with their peers in main-
land China. A second possible reason is that they are actively encour-
aged to do so by governmental and intermediary organisations in their
home country. Yet another reason to expect a major role for overseas
Chinese scientists is that these actors are assumed to possess cultural
capital – including language skills – as well as existing contacts with re-
searchers in mainland China. These factors are thought to give them an
advantage over their non-Chinese peers in forging ties with researchers
in mainland China.
This chapter contributes to the study of migrant transnationalism by
examining the specific field of scientific collaboration across interna-
tional borders that uses ethnic origin and migration experience as a re-
source. There are several possible reasons to treat this type of interac-
tion as a specific subset of international collaboration. The motivations
for the formation of such ties, the barriers and stimuli affecting their
formation and intensity – as well as the distribution of the potential
cognitive, material and reputational investments, outcomes and spill-
overs at the individual and systemic levels – may differ from other
forms of international scientific cooperation. The study of such ties can
also shed light on the positive effects of migrant communities on devel-
opment of the home system. This chapter will focus on discussing a
methodological approach that can be used to study transnational re-
search collaboration.
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12.2 Definition of concepts
‘Scientific cooperation’ refers to the conscious (and voluntary) exchange
of private valued resources between scientists. The resources can in-
clude research materials, unpublished information, cognitive resources
in the form of advice, criticism and other inputs, the provision of train-
ing both to each other and each other’s staff and students, etc. The
strongest form of scientific cooperation is defined as ‘research colla-
boration’, in which researchers work together on a specific joint project
with the aim of a joint publication (Jonkers 2010). It is this phenomen-
on that is of interest in this chapter. When considering collaboration be-
tween researchers working in different countries, it is common usage
to speak of international research collaboration.
The term ‘international research collaboration’ is problematic from
both a semantic and a conceptual viewpoint. To start with the semantic
issue: ‘international collaboration’ means collaboration between nations
rather than between individual actors in different nations. The terms
‘cross-border’ or ‘transnational collaboration’ used by Crawford, Shinn
and Sörlin (1993) may be more appropriate for this latter type of inter-
action, but they have not come into common use. As will be discussed
later in this section, the concept of ‘transnational research collaboration’
will be defined as having a different meaning, following theoretical
work outside the realm of the social studies of science. The term ‘inter-
national collaboration’ may also be conceptually problematic. It could be
understood to refer to interactions between actors at all four levels that
Van der Meulen and Rip (1998) identify in the research system – in-
cluding the governmental level of policymakers, the intermediary level
of funding agencies and the organisational level of research institutes
and universities. Finally, international research collaboration can be –
and generally is understood to refer to – the interaction between scien-
tists at the operational level of the research system supported, or not, by
agreements made at higher levels of the research system. It is the inter-
action at this operational level of the research system to which interna-
tional research collaboration refers in this chapter.
As indicated in the introduction, the focus of this paper is on a speci-
fic subset of cross-border or international collaboration, namely the in-
teraction between expatriate scientists and researchers in their home
country. The concept of transnational research collaboration will be
used to refer to this specific phenomenon. Transnationalism is a con-
cept that originated in the international relations literature (Keohane &
Nye 1972), before it was taken up in the early 1990s by anthropologists
and sociologists studying international migration. It refers to ties be-
tween actors, at sub-political levels other than the governmental, which
are important in shaping relations between nations. Crane (1971) was
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the first to apply this concept to a study of the science system. She uses
it to refer to the cross-border ties of non-governmental organisations
such as scientific associations and international organisations in which
individual scientists from different countries are members, as well as
the cross-border interactions of individual scientists engaging in scienti-
fic cooperation. All three types of actors may influence national science
policies, which could lead to truly international science policies at the
level of national governments and intermediary agencies, or to the set-
up of joint research programmes and joint laboratories. With some ex-
ceptions, the concept of transnationalism has not been used frequently
in studies of scientific collaboration.
The concept has been more popular in other areas of social science,
such as migration studies. In this literature, authors began using the
concept to refer to cross-border linkages beyond the political realm in-
cluding, for example, the role of migrants in the formation of commer-
cial, cultural and religious ties (Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc
1994; Portes 1999). Compared to international relations literature, mi-
gration studies literature has put greater stress on the shared ethnic or
cultural background of the individual actors or members of organisa-
tions who engage in these cross-border interactions. In recent years,
several authors have begun to explore the formation of ‘transnational in-
novation networks’ in which expatriate, returning and circulating entre-
preneurs play an important role in connecting innovative regions in dif-
ferent national innovation systems (Saxenian 2002, 2005; Coe 2003).
This chapter discusses a simple extension of such literature by consider-
ing the emergence of cross-border scientific networks in which overseas
Chinese researchers engage with researchers in their former home sys-
tem or, in the case of second-, third- or nth-generation migrants, their
ancestral home system. The definition of a transnational scientific coop-
eration in this chapter is thus narrower than that adopted by Crane
(1971) and is restricted to the interaction between individuals with the
same ethnic or cultural background living in different countries. A clas-
sification of transnational activities according to degree of institutionali-
sation in the manner introduced by Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt
(1999) is difficult to make using the methodology introduced in the
next section. In general, international research collaboration – of which
transnational research collaboration is a subset – is thought to be char-
acterised mainly by bottom-up investigator-driven interactions. Some
degree of institutionalisation, however, such as framework agreements,
which allow researchers to engage in cross-border collaboration, is al-
ways required. The importance of intermediary agencies in promoting
and potentially funding these interactions will differ from one instance
of transnational research collaboration to another. How large this influ-
ence is on average is an empirical question, which will not be addressed
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in this chapter. By focusing on transnational research collaboration this
chapter does not refer in detail to other forms of scientific migrant
transnationalism, such as the influence exerted by prominent overseas
and circulating Chinese scientists on Chinese science and technology
policy in the past three decades, the active involvement of overseas
Chinese scientists in peer-review structures and advisory functions in
mainland China or the role of circulating migrants in directing interna-
tional joint labs or entire research institutes (see, among others,
Jonkers 2010).
This chapter refers to Chinese scientists who reside and work abroad
– whether as first- or nth-generation migrants – as overseas Chinese re-
searchers. The expectation that overseas Chinese scientists engage to a
relatively high extent with their former or ancestral homeland is shared
with the diaspora literature. However, a choice was made not to make
explicit use of the concept of ‘scientific diasporas’ (Meyer & Brown
1999; Meyer 2001). Unlike the members of many other so-called dia-
sporas, most, though not all, overseas scientists are expected to be first-
generation migrants. Compared to other types of migrants, scientists
and highly skilled expatriates, in general, continue to display a relatively
high level of international mobility after arrival in their first home coun-
try (e.g. Koser & Salt 1997). Scientists and other highly skilled profes-
sionals tend to include migrants as well as non-migrants in their profes-
sional networks (Meyer 2001). In comparison to other types of mi-
grants, they are therefore expected to have a relatively low positive bias
for professional interaction with members of their ethnic/cultural com-
munity in the host country.
Because of the highly specialised nature of scientific research, actors
engaged in transnational research collaboration are assumed to do so in
relative isolation from other expatriate scientists working outside their
own relatively narrow subfield of research. The formation of institutio-
nalised student and scientific migrant networks or associations, which
were briefly mentioned in the introduction, appears to be an argument
against the latter expectation, but it is unclear what role these associa-
tions play in facilitating transnational research collaboration. The choice
not to refer to ‘scientific diasporas’ in this chapter, but to use the con-
cept ‘overseas Chinese scientists’ instead, is thus mainly motivated by
an attempt to make clear that the level of analysis consists of individual
overseas Chinese scientists and their interactions with mainland
Chinese scientists, rather than associations of Chinese scientists that
have formed in various countries.
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12.3 Methodology and data sources
As discussed in the previous section, scientific cooperation is a broad
concept, which refers to a wide range of activities. This makes develop-
ment of a proxy/indicator that could be used for its measurement diffi-
cult. Gaining detailed insight into the intensity of the various forms of
interactions between scientists would require data gathered through
surveys or in-depth qualitative interviews. As such, co-publications will
be used as an imperfect proxy for research collaboration, which is an in-
tense form of scientific cooperation. The databases most commonly
used for bibliometric studies contain information on the authors of
publications and their addresses, which allows for co-publication studies
at the individual, organisational, national and international levels. For a
review of the literature on the use of this proxy, see Glänzel and
Schubert (2004). Exclusive use (in absolute counts) of co-publications
as a proxy for research collaboration has received considerable criticism
over the years, but it goes beyond the purpose of this chapter to discuss
these limitations in detail. For a more extensive discussion, see the
aforementioned review as well as Katz and Martin (1997).
Reliable large-scale data about the nationality and/or ethnic/cultural
background of scientists in North American and Western European re-
search systems are not publicly available. It is believed that some orga-
nisations, most notably the US National Science Foundation (NSF), col-
lect these data in their surveys and it may prove valuable in future stu-
dies to gain access to these records. Other potential sources, such as
national census data gathered by governmental organisations and col-
lected in comparative databases by international organisations like the
OECD and UNESCO, lack the level of detail required to conduct studies
of the activities of overseas scientists, let alone their role in specific sub-
fields of science. Studying specific scientific subfields is considered im-
portant because the dynamics of various types of interaction between
scientists, including the levels of international research collaboration,
varies across scientific fields (see e.g. Wagner 2005). For this reason, a
proxy was developed to measure the visibility or the contribution of
overseas Chinese scientists in different host countries. It makes use of
an approach that was initially developed for human population biology
(for a review see Colantonio, Lasker, Kaplan & Fuster 2003). In recent
years, bibliometricians have started to adopt a similar approach
(Webster 2004; Basu & Lewison 2006; Jin, Rousseau, Suttmeier & Cao
2007; Lewison & Kundra 2008). In short, it involves the collection of a
country’s scientific publications co-authored by researchers with sur-
names that are geographically, ethnically and culturally distinct. Lists ex-
ist of typical Chinese (as well as Indian, Korean, Iranian, etc.) sur-
names, and a surname search can yield a collection of articles co-
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authored by scientists of Chinese descent. In China, fewer than 5 per
cent of surnames are held by over 85 per cent of the population (Yuan,
Zhang & Yang 2000). Because there is so little variation in Chinese sur-
names, this approach is particularly suitable for assessing the visibility
of overseas Chinese scientists. Similar approaches, however, have been
applied to measure the contribution and visibility of other ethnic/cultur-
al groups in the output of Western research systems as well (e.g.
Webster 2004; Basu & Lewison 2006). A recent report used a similar
approach to study the contribution of migrants and their descendants
in filing World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) patents in
the US (Wadhwa, Jasso, Rissing, Gereffi & Freeman 2007). For this
study, a list of 270 surnames was used, consisting of variations of those
most frequently occurring in the Chinese population. What motivated
taking these common spelling variations into account was an attempt to
capture the descendants of previous generations of migrants as well as
recent migrants. To control whether the surnames yield a sufficient pro-
portion of Chinese-born scientists, a search was performed applying the
list to publications produced by authors based in mainland China. The
search yielded over 95 per cent of the total number of Chinese publica-
tions. After inventorising the articles in which these surnames did not
occur, fifteen other surnames were included in the list. Several addi-
tional surnames will be considered in future studies. Some surnames
that were also common in other countries were deleted from the list.
To assess the relative contribution of overseas Chinese scientists in a
nation’s publication output using this simple approach, it is necessary
to exclude international co-publications with the home country. In the
case of overseas Chinese scientists, this involves excluding co-publica-
tions with researchers based in China, Chinese Taipei (Republic of
China, Taiwan) and Singapore, since their inclusion would lead to a
substantial overestimation of the contribution of scientists with a
Chinese surname. Their exclusion potentially leads to slight underesti-
mation of the contribution of researchers with a Chinese surname in
each country’s output. At least this would be true if there is indeed a
significant influence of Chinese ethnic/cultural background on the like-
lihood of co-publishing with scientists in mainland China. For the spe-
cific aim of the analyses discussed in this chapter, inclusion of these in-
ternational co-publications would also have led to a methodological pro-
blem of endogeneity because the number of international co-
publications with China is used as a dependent variable. For, apart from
using these data to show the contribution of overseas Chinese scientists
in the research output of the Western research system, they can also be
used to explore whether the size of the community of overseas Chinese
scientists in various host countries is related to the number of interna-
tional co-publications between China and these countries. The data on
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which these proxies are based were collected for each year between
1990 and 2007 for twenty countries.
On the basis of available statistical data, neither transracial adoption
(Stolley 1993) nor transracial marriage (US Census Bureau 2006) were
considered to have a large influence (less than 0.5 per cent) on the
number of articles published by researchers with a Chinese surname.
The unavailability of sufficiently detailed data, however, makes it im-
possible to give an exact assessment of the error introduced by these
factors. Another issue open to question is whether second- or third-
generation migrants do indeed retain sufficient cultural capital to justi-
fy a distinction from other individuals in the host/partner system. To
address this and similar concerns, a small-scale survey was carried out
among researchers with a Chinese surname. This survey limits one of
the benefits of this methodological approach, namely its non-
intrusiveness. Fortunately, it only has to be carried out once in order
to test whether the assumptions hold for the specific group under
study.
The sample for this survey was collected from among the correspond-
ing authors of scientific publications in the international scientific press
in the year 2007. To identify these corresponding authors, an approach
similar to that described in the previous sections was followed. That is,
the corresponding authors had to have ‘Chinese surnames’ and be
based outside China, Chinese Taipei (Republic of China, Taiwan) or
Singapore. Respondents were asked only a few questions relating to
their place of birth, their nationality, the country in which they started
their university training, the country in which they did their PhD and
language skills. Answers to the first and the last questions were espe-
cially of interest. Answers to the first question were expected to provide
insight into the relative distribution of first- and second-generation (or
nth-generation) migrants. Responses to the last question were expected
to provide us with insight into the extent to which surnames can be
used as a proxy for cultural capital or the cultural background of scien-
tists. Email surveys tend to have a low response rate, especially – as was
the case for this survey – when they are sent out in summer. In deter-
mining sample size, a response rate of 32 per cent was expected.
Setting the confidence interval at 10 and the confidence level at 95 per
cent, the estimated required sample size was therefore 300. The confi-
dence interval was set relatively high in order to limit the number of re-
spondents involved. As the response rate was initially lower than ex-
pected, a second round of email messages was sent out after two
months. A response rate low as the one expected for this email survey
indicates that a response bias could influence the findings. The distri-
bution of responses to the follow-up part of the survey, which were si-
milar to the first round, does not add to this doubt. Still, the low
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response rate does require caution in placing too high a level of trust in
the extent to which the outcome of the survey can be generalised.
12.4 Findings
The final response rate of the survey was 33 per cent. Around 8 per cent
of non-response was due to faulty or expired email addresses. The sur-
vey yielded the following results. First, 7 per cent of the respondents in-
dicated that their surname was not exclusively ‘Chinese’, but Korean,
Vietnamese or Indian as well. These responses could be used further to
refine the query in future studies. Of all survey respondents, 75 per cent
were born in China and 46 per cent still had Chinese nationality. A to-
tal of 74 per cent started university education in China, but only 12 per
cent did their PhD there. Of the latter, 2 per cent of respondents had
completed a second PhD degree in the US. Of the group as a whole, 93
per cent of respondents reported being able to speak and/or read and
write Chinese. If the newly identified names in which the surname was
also a popular Korean or Indian surname are excluded, the respective
percentages are 80, 50, 79, 13 and 100. While all these respondents in-
dicated having Chinese-language abilities, 2 per cent stated that the
skills were limited.
Based on responses to the last question, this approach appears suita-
ble for identifying researchers with a Chinese cultural background ac-
cording to their surnames. Other interesting findings are the high
number of first-generation migrants in the sample, being 75-80 per
cent. This share would have been slightly higher had ‘China’ been de-
fined in this survey as including Hong Kong and Chinese Taipei
(Republic of China, Taiwan). As one respondent indicated, respondents
who originate in either of the two places likely consider themselves as
not having been born in China. Since this chapter discusses a transna-
tional phenomenon in a migration-study context, it is also interesting
that almost half the respondents still had Chinese nationality at the
time of the survey. Finally, the relatively high share of Chinese-born re-
spondents who started university training in China (99 per cent) com-
bined with the relatively low share of respondents who did their PhD in
China (16 per cent) provides us with some additional insight into the
mobility dynamic of overseas Chinese scientists. Most of the respon-
dents were likely to have left China for postgraduate/PhD studies, and
only a relatively small share of overseas Chinese scientists left China at
a later stage of their scientific career.
Over the past decade and a half, the output of the Chinese research
system in terms of publishing in international journals listed in the
Science Citation Index (SCI) has increased rapidly. The relative impact
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and visibility – both in terms of publications and of the citations these
publications receive – show strong variations across fields. In the plant
molecular life sciences, for example, one in ten SCI journals is cur-
rently published by mainland Chinese authors, and these publications
receive a similar number of citations as the average article published
worldwide (Jonkers & Tijssen 2008). Other molecular life science sub-
fields score far lower on these indicators. For all subfields, the number
of international co-publications increased rapidly over time as well. In
relative terms, the importance of North American research systems as
collaborative partners (measured in terms of the share of China’s co-
publications) has increased at the expense of Western European sys-
tems. This trend is expected to be related in part to the increasing im-
portance of transnational research collaboration (Jonkers 2009).
The data presented in Figure 12.1 give an indication of the size of the
number of highly skilled individuals born in China in various countries
in North America and Northern Europe based on 2000-2001 national
census data collected by the OECD (2004). ‘Highly skilled’ refers to
anyone with a tertiary education and is thus not restricted to active
scientists. What is more, it is not possible to make a distinction be-
tween researchers working in different scientific fields on the basis of
this type of general data. For this reason, a proxy was developed to
gauge the contribution of scientists with a Chinese background in var-
ious research systems in specific fields of science. Figure 12.2 shows
how the share of US and EU-17 SCI publications published by research-
ers with a Chinese surname has evolved over time in the field of the
plant molecular life sciences.3 Worldwide, the share of the total number
of publications in the plant molecular life science subfield co-authored
Figure 12.1 Chinese-born with tertiary education in the US, EU and Japan1
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by a researcher with a Chinese surname has increased from less than
10 per cent in 1990 to more than 25 per cent in 2006.
If one excludes articles of which one author is based in China, Hong
Kong, Chinese Taipei (Republic of China, Taiwan) or Singapore, the
share increased from around 8 per cent to a little below 15 per cent. As
Figure 12.2 shows, more than 30 per cent of American SCI publications
in this subfield are currently co-authored by a researcher with a
Chinese surname, while this share was around 15 per cent in 1990
(Jonkers 2009). This relative measure provides a strong indication that
the contribution of overseas Chinese scientists in the US research out-
put has increased considerably. To a far lesser extent, this increasing
contribution holds for the EU-17 region as well. Within the EU-17, the
share of publications co-authored by researchers with a Chinese sur-
name is higher in some countries, such as the United Kingdom, than
in others, such as France. The share is even lower in the case of coun-
tries like Italy, Spain, Portugal or Greece. It thus appears justified to de-
duce, on the basis of this figure, that in this subfield the relative size –
or at least the contribution of the overseas Chinese community – in the
EU-17 is much lower than in the US.
Figure 12.3 presents a similar figure, albeit for all scientific fields ta-
ken together. These data on English-language articles, letters, notes and
reviews was sourced from the online version of Elsevier’s Scopus.4 As
the figure shows, the trend towards increasing contribution by research-
ers with a Chinese surname is visible for all scientific fields collectively
Figure 12.2 Share of plant molecular life science publications co-authored by
researchers with a Chinese surname (in %)2
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as well. The observed shares are lower than was the case for the plant
molecular life sciences.
Table 12.1 presents the results of a series of simple partial correlation
analyses that aim to show the correlation between the annual number
of international co-publications between China and twenty countries in
Europe, North America and Asia-Pacific and three factors that were ex-
pected to be potential explanatory factors for observed geographical var-
iations. The data underpinning the proxies for these potential explana-
tory factors were all collected on an annual basis for each year between
1990 and 2006. That the size of the research system – for which the
Table 12.1 Partial correlation coefficients for annual indicators of scientific output,
population of overseas Chinese and international co-publications with
China
Plant molecular
life science
All fields
X1. National share of international publications 0.535** 0.492**
X2. Share of a nation’s publications by authors
with Chinese surnames
0.362** 0.246**
T. Year 0.309** 0.412**
**Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).
Source: Adapted from Jonkers (2010)
Figure 12.3 Share of English-language publications co-authored by researchers with
a Chinese surname (in %)
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proxy X1 denoting a country’s share of the global number of interna-
tional scientific publications was used – would be correlated to the
number of co-publications with China is far from surprising: a highly
visible research system contains a large number of potential collabora-
tive partners for researchers in China. All other things being equal, it is
thus likely that there be more co-publications with this potential partner
country than with smaller and less visible research systems. Over time,
the number of international co-publications increases, so the signifi-
cantly positive correlation between the year variable T and the depen-
dent variable was also expected. Of greater interest to the discussion in
this chapter is the significantly positive independent correlation be-
tween the proxy used to gauge visibility of the overseas Chinese scienti-
fic community in respective partner countries (X2) and the number of
international co-publications (Jonkers 2010).
The relationships between these indicators are explored in more
depth in a recent paper using cross-panel time series analyses (Jonkers
2009). These analyses provide an indication of the relative increase in
importance of transnational research collaboration between the Chinese
research system and its main partner systems. The outcomes of these
analyses reveal, among other things, that the explanatory power of the
independent variables increases over time. Simple regression analyses
of annual data indicate that the relative contribution of variable X2 be-
comes consistently significant only in the years after the turn of the
century. A different paper by Jin, Rousseau, Suttmeier and Cao (2007)
uses a similar methodology to explore in detail the role researchers with
Chinese surnames in various partner countries play in co-authoring in-
ternational co-publications with China. With the aid of a large team of
students, this research actually studied the authors of each individual
paper, showing that 72 per cent of the international co-publications be-
tween the US and China in the period 2001-2005 had at least one US-
based author with a Chinese surname. For Europe, this percentage
proves considerably lower albeit still quite high (40 per cent for
Germany, 48 per cent for England and 30 per cent for France). Another
highly relevant finding of this study is that an increasing share of inter-
national co-publications between the US and China is made exclusively
by researchers with a Chinese surname based in the two countries. In
2001, co-publications of this sort were 30 per cent US-China, 12 per
cent Sino-English, 14.6 per cent Sino-German and 12 per cent Sino-
French. In 2005, the respective shares were 35 per cent, 18 per cent, 14
per cent and 10 per cent. This growth in the number of international
co-publications written exclusively by researchers with a Chinese sur-
name provides an especially strong indication that transnational re-
search collaboration is becoming an increasingly important characteris-
tic of scientific interaction with China (Jin et al. 2007).
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12.5 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter discussed a methodological approach for quantitative stu-
dies of the visibility of ethnic groups of scientists in Europe and North
America and of transnational research collaboration, which is under-
stood as research collaboration between overseas (expatriate or migrant)
scientists and their counterparts in their home country5. The validity of
the approach has been provisionally tested by means of a small-scale
survey providing a first indication that Chinese surnames can indeed
be used to identify this particular group of scientists and make state-
ments about publications co-authored by them. This approach thus per-
mits quantitative studies of specific groups of scientists, something that
is not possible with available survey and statistical data.
This chapter provides a quantitative example to show that highly
skilled expatriates interact to a relatively high degree with their former
home system. It offers a further indication that transnational interac-
tions can involve the transfer of cognitive as well as material resources.
Scientists are expected to be distinct from other migrants because they
are thought: 1) to be very mobile internationally, 2) to engage in a rela-
tively high degree of professional interaction with non-migrant indivi-
duals and 3) to be of potentially high importance for the development
of their home country. Furthermore, 4) in the case of China, transna-
tional interaction is actively promoted by the government of the home
country.
This and related studies show an absolute and relative increase of
transnational research collaboration between overseas Chinese scientists
and researchers in mainland China. This finding compels a qualifica-
tion of the notion of ‘brain drain’, insofar as sending countries can ben-
efit from their expatriate scientists. This effect is likely to occur only or
mainly for those countries that have succeeded in building up a re-
search system with the absorptive capacity to gain from international re-
search collaboration. Overseas scientists may form a bridge between
scientists in their home country and their colleagues in their host coun-
tries. In addition, provided they have attained independent positions
and a critical mass in their host country, they may engage in exclusive
transnational collaboration with researchers in their home country.
The observed increase in, and dimensions of, transnational collabora-
tion could be specific to the Chinese case. There are at least three rea-
sons why this may be. First, the number of overseas Chinese scientists
is high in absolute and relative terms. Second, the Chinese research
system has experienced a rapid improvement in terms of infrastructure,
manpower and visibility in the last decade, whereby it has outpaced
other major sending countries. Third, the Chinese government has im-
plemented a broader and more intense range of programmes to engage
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its overseas scientists than other major sending countries. While the
methodology described in this paper is particularly suited to the case of
China, it may also be used for several other sending countries, such as
Korea, India, Iran and Turkey. Whether scientists from these countries
or, for example, Eastern European countries and Russia can be identi-
fied through this approach depends on whether most of the surnames
used in these countries are unique to them. For this reason, the ap-
proach is less suited for studies of expatriate scientists from classic im-
migration countries in Latin America and South Africa, as the sur-
names of the inhabitants and migrants from these countries are ex-
pected to be less easily distinguishable. The same is true for studies of
European expatriates in the US. It may be possible to apply a similar
methodological approach to fields outside the social studies of science.
It is clear that it can be used for patent studies for which similar data-
bases are available. Whether transnational collaboration also occurs fre-
quently in this field remains an open empirical question. Other fields
in which data on contributions or companies is linked to the names of
authors, owners or directors could potentially be amenable to a similar
approach.
An interesting question asks to what extent the increase in transna-
tional scientific collaboration leads to a change in the distribution of
both costs and potential gains of research collaboration between the par-
ticipating research systems. Scientific cooperation is not a zero-sum
game – all partners may gain but, then again, some may gain more
than others. The Chinese government’s active promotion of transna-
tional collaboration and other forms of interaction with overseas scien-
tists suggests that the government believes there are benefits of interac-
tion with its expatriates that extend beyond the benefits associated with
international research collaboration in general. The first of these poten-
tial benefits is that the promotion of research collaboration, like the pro-
motion of short-term return and other forms of interaction, may lead to
an increase in permanent return migration of its overseas scientists.
Second, but only hypothetically, transnational collaboration may yield
higher benefits to the Chinese research system than other forms of in-
ternational collaboration in terms of the transfer of knowledge, informa-
tion and other resources. This expectation could be based on suppo-
sedly better understanding by overseas Chinese scientists of the poten-
tial, problems and needs of researchers in mainland China. Their
cultural and linguistic skills may also lead to higher-quality collabora-
tion. Finally, compared to non-Chinese scientists, overseas Chinese
scientists may have a relatively strong desire to contribute to the devel-
opment of the Chinese research system. They may also be more willing
to do research on subjects that are of strategic importance to China’s
development. Whether such qualitative differences between
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transnational and international collaboration exist on average or not re-
mains an empirical question.
The potential rise of transnational scientific collaboration may war-
rant some attention from a European and North American policy per-
spective as well. First of all, one may wonder whether partner countries
that lack a large Chinese scientific community have fewer opportunities
in developing ties with the emerging Chinese science system. Will the
potential emergence of a transnational scientific community between
mainland China and North America put the EU at a relative disadvan-
tage in the development of strong scientific ties with China? By exten-
sion, similar dynamics could play a role in the formation of other ties,
including commercial ones. If so, should this have implications for im-
migration policies with respect to the highly skilled? Or are other ap-
proaches to investing in the establishment of cross-border ties less
costly, more effective and/or sustainable?
As prior discussed in this chapter, transnational scientific collabora-
tion may differ from other forms of international scientific collaboration
in terms of the motivations that drive this type of interaction. It can also
differ in the distribution of the potential gains from this interaction
with respect to intellectual property rights or non-protected spill-overs
that could include human capital development, technological develop-
ment or policy insights. The increasing economic, political and scienti-
fic prowess of major sending countries such as China may or may not
lead to greater sensitivity concerning the desirability of knowledge flows
and the role that scientific mobility and transnational cooperation play
in these processes. A risk of the emergence of scientific nationalism ap-
pears low; over time, the resistance to cross-border scientific contacts
has been overcome by considerations of their benefits. Overall, the large
contribution of foreign-born scientists in the research efforts of some
countries and the positive light in which international collaboration gen-
erally tends to be seen are likely to off set these potential concerns.
Pondering these potential, possibly far-fetched policy concerns trig-
gered by an increase in transnational research collaboration does bring
to the fore some ethical considerations regarding the use of this metho-
dology. The classification of researchers or their contributions on the
basis of ethnicity or cultural background is a potentially sensitive issue.
Individuals may object to being classified as members of a group on
the basis of a simple linguistic signifier – a surname – alone. The sur-
vey results suggest that, in this case, surnames do constitute a relatively
reliable indicator of cultural background (i.e. linguistic skills). The pub-
lished material, on which such assessments are based, is furthermore
in the public domain. Using the methodology to assess group size or
group visibility, as demonstrated in this chapter, is therefore not consid-
ered very problematic. Care should be taken, however, to use
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sufficiently large samples and to stress that, while the number of scien-
tific publications seems an accurate measure for estimating group visi-
bility, it is not justified to make statements about the ethnicity or cultur-
al background of specific individuals on the basis of their surnames
alone.
Notes
1 This chapter is based on part of the author’s PhD thesis entitled ‘Scientific mobility
and the internationalisation of the Chinese research system’, defended at the
European University Institute and funded through a PhD grant provided by the
Dutch Ministry of Education (Jonkers 2008b). A book on the basis of this thesis is
currently in press (Jonkers 2010). The chapter has benefited from comments pro-
vided by reviewers and participants of the IMISCOE conference on which this book
is based. Parts of this chapter have been published in a different form (Jonkers
2009).
2 See, among others, Jonkers (2008a) for examples of return migration programmes
and network activities set up by the Chinese government.
3 Data sourced from the online version of Thomson Scientific ® ISI Science Citation
Index expanded 2007. For a discussion of the journal-based demarcation of this scien-
tific subfield see Jonkers and Tijssen (2008).
4 The EU-14 figure for the Chinese-born population with secondary education consists
of the EU-15 member states, Norway and Switzerland. Specific statistics on Chinese-
born residents in Germany, Italy and Switzerland are unavailable, hence the abbrevia-
tion EU-14 rather than EU-17. More than half of Chinese-born with tertiary education
in the US, Canada and Australia have been naturalised. To a lesser extent, the same
is true for France (38 per cent). The figure is adapted from Jonkers (2010).
5 The EU-17 includes the EU-15 member states, Switzerland and Norway. The figure is
adapted from Jonkers (2009).
6 Thomson Scientific ® ISI recently changed the interface of the SCI in such a way that
complex searches, such as those described in this chapter, are, at least for the mo-
ment, no longer possible. This change hindered further elaboration of this chapter
and may hinder future studies using this methodological approach. Fortunately, alter-
natives to this database do exist and it is possible to do a similar study in Elsevier’s ®
Scopus database. The data for ‘all science fields’ in Figure 12.3 and Table 12.1 were
based on a collection of all English-language articles, notes, letters and reviews in
Scopus. This search may include publications in journals not included in the SCI.
The sudden decrease observed in the share of Canada and the US around 1995-1996
is thought to be related to the structure of the database.
7 Home country is used in this text to refer to the country (China) in which the indivi-
dual researchers have been born themselves or in which their ancestors were born.
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Chapter 13
The internet as a means of studying
transnationalism and diaspora
Kathrin Kissau and Uwe Hunger
13.1 Introduction
Present-day challenges in conceptualising diaspora and transnational
migrant activities have proliferated different ways for defining the theo-
retical characteristics of a prototype group. These definitions, however,
have come without means for analysing differences and commonalities
in detail. The various typologies created (e.g. by Cohen 1997) have been
such that most groups can be assigned to more than one type or that
one group can develop from one type to another over time (e.g. the
Greek diaspora in the United States transforming from one of trade
into one of labour) (see Kokot 2002: 35).
The diaspora concept itself has evolved over the years, from the origi-
nal ‘old diaspora’ conception (Jewish, Armenian) defined by groups’
concentration on return to the (imagined) homeland (Safran 2004), to
encompassing characteristics such as a transnational relationship with
both country of origin and host country, now conceptualised broadly as
‘new diaspora’ (Grassmuck 2000). Such a flexible, open definition
stresses the particularity of each migrant group and its widely varying
characteristics. In this case, almost all migrant groups could be defined
as a transnational or new diaspora, thus making the concept itself quite
meaningless. A narrower definition, however, highlights structures and
patterns of migrant contacts and networks more accurately. In this re-
spect, disassociating ideas of diaspora from ideas of transnationalism
could yield more lucid results (see Cohen 1997; Faist 1999).
Another challenge to date is the classic triadic model (Sheffer 1986)
that portrays the relationship between host and home country and the
migrant community. The model is criticised for its simplicity, as it im-
plies a migrant community homogenous in its activities and interests.
This theoretical approach is central to most analyses, as internal differ-
entiations of migrants’ contacts and goals are a methodological problem
(Adamson 2001: 158). Østergaard-Nielsen concludes that migrant activ-
ities in relation to host and home country ‘must be measured with a
more finely meshed tool than is usually the case in the analysis of poli-
tical change at domestic and international levels’ (2002: 200).
In our chapter, we suggest that the internet could be just such a finely
meshed tool, constituting an appropriate research site for advancing the
study and comprehension of migrant networks and influence abroad,
and adding to more fertile conceptions of diaspora and transnationalism.
Discussion of these concepts began (anew) simultaneously with the glo-
balisation debate, which suggests the ideas are closely intertwined. The
globalisation process is driven by, among other things, new information
and communication technologies (ICT), which indicates that ongoing de-
velopments of ICT, globalisation and migrant activities are intertwined.
Additionally, a new rise in diaspora activities and changing dynamics
in the role in politics played by migrant groups abroad since the devel-
opment of the internet show that processes and contacts between dis-
persed groups (in different countries) are now enabled to a degree not
previously possible. In fact, as Scherer and Behmer assume, commu-
nity structures destroyed by migration are often rebuilt only with the
help of the internet, thereby also engendering new forms of community
abroad (Adamson 2002: 297).
When studying diasporas or migrants’ transnational activities, factors
such as social networks, identity construction, the local dimension of
day-to-day life, migrants’ role in bridging national and cultural boarders,
their position in the public sphere and their migration history are often
the focus of research (Kokot 2002: 34). The internet can be an asset in
exploring many of these aspects. Note how it has become central to the
following life dimensions:
1) ‘Diasporic communities have always relied on networks, which ex-
panded from the immediate local to the transnational and global’
(Georgiou 2002: 3). The internet is now the central framework for
such networks, so that observing online structures can provide in-
sights into diasporic community characteristics. When the influence
of migrant groups is investigated, it becomes obvious that main ave-
nues are found in their cooperation with NGOs and third political
parties, the construction of new (alternative) political identities, dis-
course within transnational space and fundraising and campaigning
for action (Adamson 2001: 160). For all these influential activities,
the internet is a significant instrument – if not the central instru-
ment – used by diaspora groups.
2) The construction of a shared imagination is also crucial to sustain-
ing migrant communities. Central herein is inter-group communica-
tion behaviour, which promotes identification and goal attainment.
Today, internet platforms play a key role in this process as they
further the retention or reawakening of identities and imagined home-
lands. As Georgiou put it:
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The Internet has allowed most of these communities to discover
and rediscover this shared imagination and commonality; it has ta-
ken even further the potentials for developing diasporic cultures of
mediated, transnational and partly free from state control communi-
cation. (2002: 3)
3) Though ICTs alone do not create a community, they enable the com-
munication that is essential between its members.
4) Meanwhile, the internet has also taken up a central function in
many migrants’ day-to-day lives (forums, email, online chat, weblogs,
private homepages, ethno-portals, etc.). The implicitness of ICT in
migrants’ lives is equivalent to the use of the technology by non-mi-
grant citizens. It can be stated that, in general, most migrants use
the internet as often as everyone else does and for the same reasons
(information, communication and recreation). Newer studies show
that the percentage of internet use by migrants is increasing steadily,
as is their competence of the internet itself (see (N)Onliner Atlas
2008).
5) Diaspora and transnational communities form bridges between host
and home countries. In analysing these bridges, the internet can be
used as a device, as these connections mainly consist of communica-
tive relationships sustained, to a large degree, with the help of ICT.
The internet’s significance for this purpose can be understood when
we keep in mind that the situation of exile and dispersal is consti-
tuted by a specific communication problem (Scherer & Behmer
2000: 283). This issue has, to a large degree, been resolved with the
rise of ICTs (the internet, mobile phones, etc.). Therefore, analysis
of internet sites, their uses and thus emerging communication paths
can add to the understanding of migrants’ bridging behaviour, as
well as the differences and similarities within and between transna-
tional communities and diaspora.
6) Apart from this, the internet as a meeting point – for private and
public as well as personal and communal – reflects different levels
of migrant interaction. Online platforms are used for personal dis-
cussions between friends, the organisation of community activities
or the publication of alternative information about the home coun-
try’s or diaspora’s situation. Through this information about the
general public as well as about other migrant community members,
‘dispersed Diasporas gain political and community visibility’
(Georgiou 2002: 2). By obtaining access to the public sphere as it ex-
ists online, topics can be kept on the public agenda in the host coun-
try or beyond. This might well be the most relevant possible influ-
ence of diaspora groups. Again, this aspect can be analysed by moni-
toring the internet, as it is increasingly becoming central for the
public sphere. While the offline public sphere is dominated by mass
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media, the internet highlights private, non-governmental actors,
such as migrant groups and organisations.
7) Last but not least, a vast number of resources are available on the in-
ternet about the history of individual migrant movements as they
themselves, their host country and country of origin see it. The
study of these resources is basic and central to understanding mi-
grant groups’ behaviour and their orientation towards both
countries.
All in all, using the internet as a research site to decipher the character-
istics of different migrant orientations and relationships seems to yield
insights into institutions, behaviours and novel developments online as
well as offline (Wellman & Gulia 1999). One should not make the mis-
take, however, of studying all these activities solely by analysing the in-
ternet. Though online spheres are the extension of offline worlds, they
alone do not suffice for a thorough analysis. Field studies of offline
realms cannot be replaced, but the internet can add to an overview of
different migrant communities’ characteristics. Online and offline
worlds interact and are not independent of one another, so that analys-
ing online behaviour allows us to draw conclusions about overall, gener-
al interests (also offline) (see Matei & Ball-Rokeach 2002: 409).
At the same time, the analysis of internet phenomena aids in over-
coming problems of ‘methodological nationalism’ and ‘groupism’, as
internet sites and their users do not respect national or group bound-
aries. Online networks are instead grouped around topics and interests,
rather than geographic background or neighbourhood proximity.
13.2 Method
This section will illustrate methodological possibilities associated with
the internet for exploring diaspora and transnational communities with
the help of empirical data and experiences collected as part of the
authors’ research project at the University of Münster in Germany. As
the political interest and involvement of migrants in their host country
and/or home country are significant aspects of diaspora and transna-
tional communities and experience (Morawska 2003), we focus on poli-
tical activities carried out on the internet by migrants from the former
Soviet Union, Turkey and Kurdish areas in the Middle East. Combined,
the three groups represent roughly 25 per cent of all migrants in
Germany (Destatis 2008).
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13.2.1 Empirical analysis of the internet
The internet opens up new options for assessing social activities. Until
now, however, there have only been a few studies using socio-scientific
methods in conjunction with analysing the internet (Luzar 2003), and
there are many challenges to face. One of the biggest obstacles for em-
pirical research on the internet is that it is up to now impossible to
identify enough websites to – in no uncertain terms – define the uni-
verse of cases, which would be necessary to satisfy one of the criteria of
scientific research (Janetzko 1999: 145). This means that it is proble-
matic to make general statements about the characteristics of the inter-
net (Theobald 2000: 182). The use of particular search engines, such as
Google and AltaVista, gives only partial insight into the total universe of
websites. For lack of alternatives, however, these search engines are of-
ten used in internet research (Welker, Werner & Scholz 2005: 52) on
the grounds that internet users themselves make use of these same
search engines to access the World Wide Web.
A further challenge for website analysis is the fact that the internet
is a dynamic construct. The content of websites, user profiles and ac-
cess to the content of websites can change daily (Meier & Pentzold
2009). Moreover, websites often contain audio and video content, in-
creasing the scope of data that need to be taken into account (Van
Leeuwen 2005). Websites with multilingual options as well as links to
other similar websites augment the research object further (Welker et
al. 2005: 133). Finally, anonymity is another element that makes it dif-
ficult to link web phenomena to social groups or individuals: it is com-
mon for website users and providers to withhold their names or use
fake identities.
On the basis of these limitations, scientific research on internet phe-
nomena must draw on a variety of different research methods in order
to get the most differentiated picture of online reality possible. The
methods of our study consist of a content analysis of websites created
and used by migrants for political activities (focusing on their thematic
orientation, self-description and group boundaries), an analysis of the
link structures of these websites (using a hyperlink analysis program to
uncover virtual networks) as well as a survey of the sites’ users and ad-
ministrators (detecting individual interests beyond groupism).
Using a structured website search with the help of search engines
and the snowball sampling method (Hawe, Webster & Shiell 2004), we
studied websites created and used by migrants from the former Soviet
Union, Turkey and Kurdish areas in the Middle East who are now living
in Germany, Switzerland and Austria. In this analysis, we viewed over
800 sites. Of them, 99 German-post-Soviet, 108 German-Turkish and
102 German-Kurdish websites1 turned out to be relevant for our
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research question about political content. These sites were explored
with respect to their year of establishment, the degree to which they
could be considered up to date, their political information, communica-
tion and participation features, as well as existing references to home
and/or host country politics. In addition, 30 websites were chosen for a
more intensive content analysis and a survey of the sites’ operators and
users.
Since our interest lay in uncovering organisational structures and or-
ientations of migrants’ political online activities, we made use of a net-
work visualisation tool (called “Issue Crawler”). This server-side internet
network location software performed a co-link analysis of the 99, 108
and 102 relevant URLs entered from the three groups (see Rogers
2006: 2). The results of the inquiries are geographical visualisations of
the networks (see Figures 13A.1, 13A.2 and 13A.3). This method enabled
us to reveal relationships, displayed online through hyperlinks, between
different political websites, thus enhancing our understanding of mi-
grants’ political spheres that were the focus of this research.
We also conducted an online user survey, which was posted on the
30 most relevant German-post-Soviet, German-Turkish and German-
Kurdish websites,2 and explored the political online and offline activities
of the three migrant groups. In all cases, the questionnaire was avail-
able in two languages (German or Russian/German and Turkish). The
form was completed by 136 migrants from the former Soviet Union
(Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, etc.), 177 Turkish migrants and 136
Kurdish migrants. Of the first group, 37.6 per cent identified their eth-
nic background as Russian-Jewish, 21.8 per cent as German (Aussiedler)
and 20.3 per cent as Russian, which shows how heterogeneous the mi-
grant groups are. The sample is not representative due to the self- selec-
tion of the participants (Dillman 2000: 209). Nevertheless, since draw-
ing a representative sample of internet users is, to date, impossible, this
procedure allows us to generate preliminary explorative conclusions
about the political use of the internet by migrants in Germany.
By analysing the political activities of migrants in this way, we sought
to view the following dimensions of migrants’ orientations:
1) internal interaction of migrants within one online community and
within one country (information and data exchange, discussion and
political mobilisation);
2) interaction with the residents and organisations in the country of
origin (input of alternative information, articulation of opposition,
mobilising resistance);
3) interaction with the residents and organisations in the host country
(information about the situation in the country of origin, lobbying
for support);
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4) interaction within a possibly international public (diaspora) sphere
(worldwide visibility and influence).
In compliance with Kokot (2002), we argue that rather than developing
different concepts and then finding migrant groups to fit the definitions,
the reverse approach is much more sensible. Analysing migrant activ-
ities online, we collect data to reveal the characteristics of each group in
order to compare them and ultimately conceptualise our findings.
13.3 Results
13.3.1 Website analysis
The website analysis was conducted mainly in order to address the fol-
lowing questions: which target groups are associated with the sites?
Which political topics are treated with what kind of priority? What lan-
guage is used? And how are the websites linked to each other?
Target groups
For eight out of the ten most relevant political internet sites evaluated,
migrants from the former Soviet Union are not the primary target
group. The administrators of these sites more often stated that their
websites were designed for Russian-speaking users in host and home
countries as well as people interested in Russian culture and politics
(for details see Seveker 2007). By contrast, nine out of ten surveyed
Turkish administrators indicated that their primary target group com-
prises persons of Turkish origin who now live in Germany. Five admin-
istrators stated that they also address web users of German origin. One
administrator explained that his site was intended to serve as ‘a forum
for exchange of experiences and opinions of all German-speaking
Turks, all their friends and those who are interested in them.’ Analysis
of the Kurdish websites showed that the sites were not designed primar-
ily for Kurds in Germany, but for Kurds everywhere in the world or peo-
ple interested in Kurdish issues. Since many of the websites are blocked
by the government in Iran, Syria or Turkey, it can be assumed that
Kurdish websites are not commonly used for communication between
migrants and inhabitants in the country of origin.
Topics
The majority of websites deals with political issues concerning the
country of origin as well as the country of residence, but clear discre-
pancies become evident as each migrant group is considered separately
(for details see Table 13.1). More than 50 per cent of the evaluated post-
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Soviet websites concentrate on international topics. In contrast, political
topics with reference to Germany count for 19 per cent, and 9 per cent
of the websites concentrate solely on post-Soviet topics. The emphasis
of the Turkish websites is on German politics: 50 per cent have a domi-
nant political reference to the migrants’ host country, while roughly 17
per cent of the websites refer to political developments in Turkey.
Political information from both countries is offered by 32 per cent of
the webpages. Kurdish sites show a strong focus on the Kurdish ‘cause’:
28 per cent focus exclusively on this topic, highlighting a strong
‘Kurdish nationalism’. They also deal with political events in their host
country (70 per cent of the websites), but only when linked to Kurdish
interests or incidents in Kurdish areas in the Middle East.
Language
German is most often used on the analysed websites, although there
are differences between the three migrant groups (see Table 13. 2). The
Russian language serves more often than German as the communica-
tion basis of post-Soviet migrants on the web: 70 per cent of the post-
Soviet websites use Russian, while on more than 30 per cent of the
sites it is the only language. About 22 per cent of the sites are exclu-
sively in German, while 23 per cent are multilingual. In contrast,
Turkish websites are mostly maintained in German, while more than
47 per cent are in the language of only the host country. Of the Turkish
sites, 26 per cent are offered in both German and Turkish, whereas 12
per cent use Turkish as the only language. Again, Kurdish sites differ,
Table 13.1 Geographical references to political topics on the analysed websites
(in %)
Total
(N=309)
Post-Soviet
case study
(N=99)
Turkish
case study
(N=108)
Kurdish
case study
(N=102)
Both country of origin and
country of residence
41.7 21.1 32.4 70.6
Solely Germany/Switzerland/
Austria
24.9 19.0 50.9 1.0
Different countries (international,
beyond countries of origin and
residence)
17.2 50.5 4.6 1.0
Solely the country of origin
(former Soviet Union, Turkey,
Kurdish areas)
16.2 9.4 12.0 27.5
Source: PPI data
Notes: Chi-square test significant (x2=175.661; p < 0.001)
Cramer’s V=0.533
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as they are predominantly multilingual. This means the user can
choose between at least two languages such as German, Turkish,
English, French or Arabic; 20 per cent of the sites are in German and
Kurdish, while 23 per cent use solely German.
Links
Links to other websites are the foundation and central idea of the inter-
net. However, post-Soviet as well as Turkish migrant websites are rarely
linked to each other (possibly due to competition). The sites of post-
Soviet migrants basically refer to Russian websites, particularly weblogs
(for details see Figures 13A.1, 13A.2 and 13A.3). Only rarely do they show a
connection to Germany by linking to German websites. A major contrast,
Turkish sites are linked primarily with host country websites, particularly
with German media sites and national institutions such as Germany’s
parliament, the federal government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the Goethe Institute. Another group of links refer to Turkish self-help or-
ganisations in Germany, such as the Federation of Turkish Entrepreneurs
(Bteu.de), the Turkish Student Federation (BTSonline.de) and the Turkish
Community in Germany (TGD.de). Links to Turkish websites without re-
ference to Germany are very rare. Websites of Kurdish migrants, how-
ever, are strongly interlinked: many sites have a list of links to a number
of other Kurdish websites maintained from Germany or other European
countries. There are also generally more websites in the Kurdish network
than in the post-Soviet and Turkish ones.
13.3.2 User surveys
The user survey addressed the following questions: what are the inter-
viewees’ political interests? Which form of political activity (informa-
tion, discussion, participation) do they prefer online and offline? And
who are their preferred communication partners online and offline?
Table 13.2 Language use on the analysed websites (in %)
Total
(N=309)
Post-Soviet
case study
(N=99)
Turkish
case study
(N=108)
Kurdish
case study
(N=102)
Solely German 31.4 22.2 47.2 23.5
Multilingual (e.g. Kurdish, Turkish, German,
English, Swedish)
24.9 23.2 13.9 38.2
Turkish/Russian/Kurdish and German 23.9 24.2 26.9 20.6
Solely Russian, Turkish, Kurdish 19.7 30.3 12.0 17.6
Source: PPI data
Notes: Chi-square test significant (x2=35.859; p < 0.001)
Cramer’s V=0.485
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Political interests
For the majority of the interviewed migrants, international affairs as
well as political developments in their country of origin were of fore-
most interest. Of the post-Soviet interviewees, 46 per cent stated that
their main political concerns lie with ‘international relations’ followed
by the topics ‘education’ and ‘labour and social affairs’. The topic ‘mi-
gration and integration’ was less important for this group of users (see
Table 13.3). In general, 56 per cent of the post-Soviet users were inter-
ested more in the politics of their country of origin than in German pol-
itics (see Table 13.4; for details see Kissau 2007). The main topic of poli-
tical interest to Turkish interviewees, by contrast, was ‘migration and in-
tegration’ (29 per cent). International politics rank in second place,
ahead of themes such as elections and democracy. Kurdish migrants
show a dominant concern for ‘international relations’ (55 per cent), de-
velopments in Kurdish areas in the Middle East (91 per cent) and the
topic of migration.
Table 13.3 Interest in political topics on the internet (in %)
Total
(N=133)
Post-Soviet
case study
(N=133)
Turkish
case study
(N=174)
Kurdish
case study
(N=129)
International relations 39.2 46.6 21.3 55.8
Migration and integration 18.3 9.8 29.3 12.4
Elections, democracy, participation 11.7 9.0 13.8 11.6
Education 10.8 12.5 11.5 7.8
Labour and social affairs 8.9 11.3 11.5 3.1
Economy and finance 6.7 6.8 8.6 3.9
Religion 4.4 3.8 4.0 5.4
Source: PPI data
Notes: Chi-square test significant (x2=57.258; p < 0.001)
Cramer’s V=0.257
Table 13. 4 Main political interest/orientation (in %)
Total
(N=441)
Post-Soviet
case study
(N=134)
Turkish
case study
(N=172)
Kurdish
case study
(N=135)
Country of origin (former Soviet Union,
Turkey, Kurdish areas)
65.3 56.7 51.7 91.1
Country of residence (Germany,
Switzerland, Austria)
34.7 43.3 48.3 8.9
Source: PPI data
Notes: Chi-square test significant (x2=58.003; p < 0.001)
Cramer’s V=0.363
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Political activity
In general, the survey shows that Turkish and Kurdish users are more
politically engaged online than post-Soviet users. Turkish and Kurdish
users more often search for information on websites of parties or public
authorities, online newspapers as well as associations than do post-
Soviet users. Forums and weblogs, however, are used more frequently
by post-Soviet users. These findings correspond to the political offline
activities of the three groups: Turkish and Kurdish migrants are more
frequently members of political parties, trade unions or migrant self-
help groups than post-Soviet migrants. They also discuss politics offline
more often. Turkish and Kurdish users also indicated that their political
activities (information retrieval, political discussions and participation)
have increased considerably since they began using the internet, while
post-Soviet users’ political activity has increased only slightly.
Communication partners
Using the internet to enable – and simplify – contact with their country
of origin is a central motive for many of the questioned users, suggest-
ing that their individual online sphere and online activities are influ-
enced by their migratory experience. Their primary communication
partners online are migrants from the same country of origin who also
live in their country of residence (see Table 13.5).
Table 13.5 Communication partners on the internet (in %)
Total
(N=433)
Post-Soviet
case study
(N=135)
Turkish
case study
(N=165)
Kurdish
case study
(N=133)
x2
p
Migrants from the former
Soviet Union, Turkey and
Kurdish areas now living in
Germany, Switzerland, Austria
61.3 57.0 59.1 67.9 Not
significant
Germans, Swiss, Austrians
without a migratory
background
44.2 33.4 55.1 44.2 16.908
0.031
Residents of states of the
former Soviet Union, Turkey,
Kurdish areas
44.1 55.6 40.6 36.0 16.736
0.001
Migrants from the country of
origin now living in countries
apart from Germany,
Switzerland, Austria
12.9 19.5 5.7 12.9 -
Source: PPI data
Notes: sum of response categories ‘very often’ and ‘often’
Germans: Cramer’s V=0.140
Residents: Cramer’s V=0.139
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More specifically, post-Soviet users communicate more often with in-
habitants of the former Soviet Union than with Germans lacking a mi-
gration background. Turkish and Kurdish users tend to have this con-
tact with German users more frequently. The majority of Turkish and
post-Soviet migrants also belonged to a permanent group of communi-
cation partners on the internet, with whom they discuss politics (52.6
and 53.8 per cent, respectively). Kurdish users were less often integrated
in such an online community (46.6 per cent).
13.4 Discussion
The political online activities that we identified throughout our research
can be used to characterise differences and similarities in the orienta-
tions and organisational structures of migrant groups. Our study found
variations between migrant groups in terms of their online linkage
structures, predominant online language use, purpose for using inter-
net sites, integration status offline as reflected online, as well as the
central function of the internet. All in all, we think that our sample of
migrant internet users represents three different online spheres of mi-
grants (see Kissau & Hunger 2009). These can be categorised as trans-
national (online) communities, (virtual) diasporas and ethnic (online)
public spheres, all of which have become evident through analysis of in-
ternet usage characteristics (for an overview of the distinguishing crite-
ria, see Table 13A.1).
13.4.1 Transnational online communities
We consider migrants from the former Soviet Union an example of a
transnational (online) community that is politically involved, albeit not
very actively, both in the home country and the host country through the
internet. This group communicates predominantly with other post-Soviet
migrants and inhabitants of their country of origin online, thereby prefer-
ring to use the Russian language and frequently reverting to their com-
mon Russian culture. With respect to the general communication struc-
ture of post-Soviet migrants on the internet, the network of their political
sites is stable. In contrast to the Kurdish group, for example, the aim is
not to facilitate return to their home country, but to sustain interest
among users in political topics relevant to host and home countries. They
exchange political views and information about their political activities in
both countries, such as online petitions or fundraising campaigns, which
are supported by many of the post-Soviet migrant internet users.
The political internet sites used by post-Soviet migrants in Germany
are part of a larger Russia-based internet network. Most hyperlinks of
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the analysed sites refer to Russian-language sites and only a few to
German ones (see Figure 13A.1). Through hyperlinks, website adminis-
trators and users express their orientations and interests by referring
other users to these pages. In this respect, links to webpages have been
compared to references in academic documents (Thelwall 2001). The
number and quality of links on one page also add to the relevance and
visibility of an internet site. Hyperlink structures of websites, therefore,
reveal power structures, communication paths and relationships and in-
terests between different sites within the network (see Kim 2000). In
our example, relevant political sites of migrants in Germany thus show
the groups’ central thematic focus on their Russian heritage.
The social spaces inhabited by transnational communities are not
uniform, but should rather be viewed as constituting what Appadurai
refers to as a ‘diasporic public sphere’ (1996: 147). This is in fact visible
when studying the online interests and interactions of post-Soviet mi-
grants. Within their online public sphere, which is dominated by the
use of Russian, inner differentiations can be detected between indivi-
dual and sub-sphere orientations – some are more host country-or-
iented, while others are more home country-oriented. Many of the mi-
grants also explicitly stated that they prefer not to choose between home
and host country but, rather, to sustain a parallel interest in the politics
of both countries. As to the relationship between offline and online ac-
tivities, it became evident that users are politically active in German or-
ganisations offline while, online, their orientation is focused more on
their home country.
Transnational communities maintain lasting relationships across bor-
ders, through the agency not of states or nations, but individual actors
or associations (see Kokot, Tölöyan & Alfonso 2004: 4). This individua-
listic character is also noticeable online. The majority of post-Soviet mi-
grants interviewed keep themselves informed about political topics
through online journals, forums or weblogs, while the sites of political
parties or governmental organisations are seldom visited. While most
of the questioned migrants had posted in a forum or blog, only 13.5 per
cent used emails to contact politicians in home or host country.
13.4.2 Virtual/online diasporas
A contrast to this transnational focus, our analysis of Kurdish migrants’
uses of the internet reveals that online activities serve to enhance their
diaspora identity. This migrant group is centrally focused on the Kurdish
‘cause’. While they communicate with other Kurdish migrants dispersed
worldwide, the entire structure of their online interaction and their resi-
dence abroad appears unstable, as their return to ‘Kurdistan’ is a predo-
minant goal. At the same time, the network of these diaspora websites
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has something of a campaign character, whereas only a few of the other
Turkish or post-Soviet sites have such a quality. Many of these sites are
even blocked by the governments in Iran, Syria or Turkey, which again
underscores their central focus on political change and influence.
Their political involvement in the host country, as it becomes visible
online, is, in contrast, only peripheral, though not altogether absent.
Often, the host country’s government is lobbied into taking action.
Schwalgin points out that:
a positive redefinition of diaspora offers the possibility of a posi-
tive identification with locality because a diaspora can only serve
as a mediator if it is successfully integrated in its country of resi-
dence. (2004: 88)
Kurdish websites reflect – much more than post-Soviet and Turkish
websites – an ethnic group consciousness (common homeland, myth,
origin, tradition, history), which is used to distinguish Kurds from other
groups in the host society (see Wonneberger 2004: 118). In contrast to
post-Soviet and Turkish sites, topics such as life in Germany, integration
or political developments in Germany are almost never discussed. On
Kurdish sites, Kurdish nationalism is evident in many cases, and is at
least subliminal to the political online discussions of Kurdish migrants.
Another difference between Kurdish sites and their post-Soviet and
Turkish counterparts is the network factor. Among the Kurdish sites, in-
terlinkage is strong and reciprocal. While it seems that competition be-
tween sites is no obstacle, this is not the case for many of the post-
Soviet and Turkish sites. Kurdish internet sites have an international fo-
cus group of Kurds worldwide, since quite often the sites are multilin-
gual (French, German, Kurdish, Turkish, English), thus showing how
analysis of the internet goes beyond national frameworks.
Other research data suggest that Alevis in Germany have a similar
diasporic online orientation. They have also established a close network
of action in order to improve the living conditions and rights of Alevis
in Turkey. However, they are much more rooted in German life and so-
ciety than Kurdish migrants in general (see Sökefeld 2002). This again
shows the value of assessing differences between diasporas through in-
ternet analysis.
13.4.3 Ethnic online public spheres
Evaluating political information, communication and participation of
migrants online has disclosed that additional forms of political migrant
institutions and structures beyond diaspora and transnationalism have
developed. We have come to conceptualise them as ‘ethnic (online)
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public spheres’ (Hunger 2004). Migrants from Turkey in Germany pro-
vide an example. While contact with their country of origin is essentially
passive, their political interest and actions are focused on their host
country, Germany. These migrants prefer, however, to discuss political
topics within their differentiated ‘ethnic’ sphere.
Contact with German citizens does take place frequently (in contrast
to post-Soviet migrants), but Turkish migrants’ chosen political commu-
nication space is one of Turkish heritage. Online and offline worlds are,
in this case, very close and interwoven because the local dimension of
users within one country makes it theoretically and practically possible
for users to meet offline (whereas online and offline contact is much
more unrealistic in diaspora and transnational contexts). Such internet
use as shown by the Turkish group indicates the creation of a public
sphere in a twofold sense. The contents are, on the one hand, publicly
accessible, often even in German (this is much more often the case
than on post-Soviet or Kurdish websites), and topics are tailored for an
‘ethnic’ user group of Turkish migrants. On the other hand, the internet
as a platform enables the creation of an ethnic public, independent
from the general German public and journalistic selection mechanisms.
This concept of an ethnic online public sphere describes a public
sphere that is predominantly open to a subgroup within society – in our
case, Turkish migrants. This sphere enables its members to develop dis-
cursive abilities under conditions shielded from the pressures of the
dominant group’s public sphere and simultaneously allows members to
maintain or develop their cultural identity apart from the dominant cul-
ture (see also Fraser 1992: 126). Such a sphere is not to be mistaken
with an ethnic enclave that severs all connections with the general pub-
lic sphere (Fraser 1992: 124). In contrast, our survey of the websites’
link structure (see Figure 13A.2) uncovered a tight network and inter-
linkage of Turkish migrant and German websites. The study also re-
vealed that web users of Turkish origin communicate more frequently
with German web users than do users of post-Soviet or Kurdish origin.
This example illustrates how globalisation has not influenced all mi-
grant groups to act as a diaspora or transnational community. Other re-
search has also shown that Indian migrants in Germany, for example,
may well also be understood as maintaining such an ethnic public
sphere (see Goel 2007). Characteristics of sites such as theinder.net
seem to indicate that differentiations viewed in our analysis may also
apply to other migrant groups.
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13.5 Outlook
These three communication structures discussed above – transnational
(online) communities, (virtual) diasporas and ethnic (online) public
spheres – are probably not implicitly stable. Rather, their modification
is dependent on the political, social, economic or even religious devel-
opments of home, host and third countries, the status of migrants
themselves and the duration of their presence abroad. In this context, it
seems possible to imagine a phase model based on time, in which the
first generation of migrants could be called a diaspora and the second,
a transnational community (see also Faist 1999: 44; Emanuelsson
2005: 52). The results of our research also suggest that a third stage is
possible in the form of an established ethnic public sphere that is pre-
dominantly nationally oriented and displays only a secondary transna-
tional dimension. For this reason, we rather could call it a ‘national
public sphere with an ethnic imprint’. Given this typology, one could
speculate whether the transnational post-Soviet online community
might develop in this direction over time.
This question of course cannot be resolved at this stage, but must be
observed closely in the years to come. It is to be expected that the young
generation accustomed to internet use in day-to-day life will especially
determine migrants’ networks and orientations in the future. Second-
and third-generation migrants in host countries will have to decide for
themselves how to use the internet to fit their political interests and activ-
ities. By evaluating ongoing changes in communication practices and
characteristics of internet sites, however, the fluidity and malleability of
these structures and relations can be taken into account. Using network
analysis of linkage structures within and between different communities
on the internet, we can trace contact with other actors and monitor shifts
in activism and orientation. Stable linkages between websites and user
groups provide evidence of the existence of durable transnational com-
munities in contrast to mere transnational practices of individuals.
In this context, it appears necessary to point out that though national
borders are not visible online, they are often artificially drawn through
the behaviour of users – in our case of migrants. Where no such bor-
ders exist, language and ethnic belonging enable the creation of new in-
group-outgroup structures. It therefore becomes evident nonetheless
that the nation-state is dominant for online interaction. Especially with
respect to political topics, the migrants in our research acted in relation
to such national patterns despite the internet enabling activities beyond
the nation-state.
Furthermore, the internet is of growing importance for numerous as-
pects of society (e.g. the internet and development), and it will have an
enormous impact on the structural change of migrants’ situations
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abroad. But this does not mean that migrants’ interests or organisa-
tional structures did not exist prior to these technological possibilities.
Rather, the dominant features of different migrant settlements abroad
were reinforced and strengthened by new media developments. In
some cases (e.g. the Crimean Tatars), moreover, the internet has helped
diaspora communities to survive when contact was lost, membership
numbers were too low or individuals too dispersed. In such cases, the
internet has not only intensified diasporic communication and activ-
ities, but has been essential for survival as a group.
In another respect, the internet allows for diversification and demo-
cratisation of migrant opportunities. Now it is not only opposition lea-
ders deciding what the diaspora should do, but also other, even margina-
lised, individuals can gain a voice within these communities. An exam-
ple here is the Kurdish diaspora, which was originally a tightly linked
and politicised community. Now the open and more democratic design
of online interaction enables alternative actions, beyond established
power structures. The minority within the minority is no longer voice-
less or invisible, as Georgiou summarises (2002: 10). Since communica-
tion online is non-hierarchical, or almost nearly so, it lets diaspora cen-
tres become more grounded, strengthening pluralism beyond the focus
on a homeland, imagined or not. Empowerment of the periphery can
thus add to the advancement of diaspora groups towards transnational,
ethnic public spheres and/or other forms of migrant orientations.
Nonetheless, all migrants are not online. There is a digital divide
within migrant communities abroad, and social boundaries are repro-
duced online, which hinders an all-embracing internet-aided evaluation
of migrant actions. Further problems with, and restrictions on, the ana-
lysis of migrant networks include the deficits of technological infra-
structure in home countries, control or censorship by governments, in-
adequate knowledge of internet use and the necessity of English-lan-
guage skills for computer and internet activities. Normally, the internet
cannot reach a large or even world public by itself without classic mass
media coverage, which also constricts the role of the internet for mi-
grant activities and empowerment.
The internet constitutes a new realm and new possibilities for com-
munication, representation and imagination, as migrants are often
otherwise excluded from the public sphere or mainstream media (see
Georgiou 2002: 5). This alternative space online is only a solution to
some extent, however, as the central problem of exclusive public
spheres in the host countries still exists.
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Appendix
Figure 13A.1 Network analysis of post-Soviet websites
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Figure 13A.2 Network analysis of Turkish websites
THE INTERNET AS A MEANS OF STUDYING TRANSNATIONALISM AND DIASPORA 263
Figure 13A.3 Network analysis of Kurdish websites
264 KATHRIN KISSAU AND UWE HUNGER
Notes
1 In this section, when speaking of the migrants’ host country, only Germany is re-
ferred to for the sake of simplified legibility, even though our study also included
websites and migrants in Austria and Switzerland.
2 In this section, websites are often referred to as ‘Turkish websites’ or ‘Kurdish sites’
for the sake of simplifying legibility. However, as explained above, they also comprise
websites used or created by migrants from Turkey, the former Soviet Union or
Kurdish areas in the Middle East now living in Germany, Austria and Switzerland.
Table 13A.1 Migrant political orientations
Transnational
(online) community
(Virtual) diaspora Ethnic (online)
public sphere
Political involvement
in home country
Partly involved in
home country
Centrally focused on
home country
Observant, not
directly involved
Political involvement
in host country
Partly involved in host
country
Low, only with respect
to home country
Centrally focused on
host country
Stability of
communication
structure
High Medium Medium
Central orientation Transnational National (home
country)
National (host
country)
Anchorage Migrants worldwide
from one home
country and
inhabitants of that
home country
Migrants worldwide
from one home
country (dispersal)
Migrants within one
host country
Integration level in
host/home country
High – medium Medium High
Political objectives/
goals
Improve relations
between both
countries
Have political
influence
Keep informed,
participation not
central
Reason for/emotion
behind development
Emotional Emotional Rational
Examples of migrant
groups
Migrants from Russia,
Jewish migrants from
Russia, migrants from
Mexico
Kurdish migrants,
Ukrainian migrants,
Kazakh migrants
Turkish migrants in
Germany, Indian
migrants in Germany
Sample websites www.eursa.org
www.sem40.ru
www.palpalo.de
www.atameken.de
www.turkcom.org
www.theinder.net
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Chapter 14
Transnational links and practices of migrants’
organisations in Spain
Laura Morales and Laia Jorba
14.1 Introduction
Recent scholarship on transnationalism has focused primarily on prac-
tices of individuals, to the extent that some argue that the individual is
– or should be – the proper unit of analysis (see Portes, Guarnizo &
Landolt 1999). Yet, the literature is vastly populated with research on
whole communities and migrant groups. In particular, a number of
scholars place migrants’ organisations and organisational networks at
the core of their definitions of transnationalism. For example, Faist
(2000a: 189) broadly defines transnationalism as the ‘sustained ties of
persons, networks and organizations across the borders across multiple
nation-states, ranging from little to highly institutionalized forms’;
meanwhile Portes (2001: 186) emphasises how the notion of transna-
tional activities should be restricted to initiatives by members of civil so-
ciety, be they ‘organized groups or networks of individuals’.
From these perspectives, migrants’ organisations and their networks
are not just privileged actors in the web of transnational practices and
fields, but they also crucially shape access to social capital and patterns
of network embeddedness that allow us to understand individuals’
transnational practices more clearly (Vertovec 2003; Portes 2003). Most
notably, migrants’ organisations are afforded a special role in the pro-
cesses that structure transnational political practices; to the extent that
their transnational activities are often equated with political transnation-
alism per se (Portes et al. 1999; Itzigsohn 2000; Østergaard-Nielsen
2003c).
In contrast to this core placement of migrants’ associations in the
study of transnationalism, there are still only a limited number of em-
pirical studies that systematically address the transnational engagement
of a wide range of organisations in several contexts.1 This chapter is a
modest attempt to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. Our
study aims to provide a systematic analysis of the transnational prac-
tices of migrants’ organisations in three Spanish cities, with
information on more than 200 associations of migrants of multiple na-
tional and regional origins. In doing so, we favour a methodological ap-
proach that combines the advantages of studying ‘several groups’ in the
same context and ‘one group in several’ contexts (Østergaard-Nielsen
2003b: 772), while also avoiding the severe limitation of sampling on
the dependent variable – in this case, transnational engagement (Portes
2001).
In this regard, we have chosen to study multiple locations within the
same country because we share with other scholars an intuition that the
place of settlement is of primary importance (see e.g. Bloemraad 2005;
Martiniello & Lafleur 2008). And, though the primary focus in the past
has been on national contexts, research in this field is pointing increas-
ingly to the critical role of subnational politics in moulding socioeco-
nomic and political opportunities for transnational practices to emerge
and be shaped (Bauböck 2003).
Our research focuses on migrant associations in three Spanish cities:
Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia. This study2 is part of a larger European
project called LOCALMULTIDEM. It has been designed in such a way
that all active associations of migrant groups are listed (and included as
the target population) and later contacted for interviewing.3
Furthermore, because our information was gathered through structured
interviews with the leaders of these organisations, we can address the
issue of how widespread transnational practices are within the migrant
associational field and what factors are associated with transnational-
ism. Hence, our chapter addresses some of the main questions that re-
main unanswered when studying the transnational practices of mi-
grants’ associations: how many organisations actually engage in trans-
national fields? What kinds of practices prevail? Which organisations
are more likely to become ‘transnational’? How does the settlement
context impinge on migrants’ transnationalism?
14.2 Transnational practices of migrants’ organisations:
Conceptual and methodological considerations
Studying transnational activities of migrants has served to emphasise
the multiplicity of identities and roles that shape the daily experiences
of immigrants and their descendants. Transnationalism – in some of its
early definitions – encompasses a wide range of activities, and has been
defined broadly as ‘the processes by which immigrants forge and sus-
tain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of
origin and settlement’ (Basch, Glick-Schiller & Szanton Blanc 1994: 7).
Even beyond the debate on the overall scope and extension of trans-
national activities (for a summary see Portes 2001), this initial notion of
268 LAURA MORALES AND LAIA JORBA
transnational practices has been contested frequently, as it prevents re-
searchers from focusing on clearly defined boundaries of the phenom-
enon under scrutiny. In this sense, Portes and his colleagues (Portes et
al. 1999; Portes 2001; Guarnizo, Portes & Haller 2003) have proposed
to limit the notion of transnationalism and transnational practices to
those organised by non-institutional actors and across national borders,
which take place outside the realms of state regulation and control.
Thus, more recent conceptualisations of transnationalism have focused
on civil society actors and individual migrants as the main units of ana-
lysis, and some scholars are strongly advocating a focus on transna-
tional ‘practices’ as a more restricted and useful notion for empirical re-
search (Martiniello & Lafleur 2008: 651).
Civil society actors – and, in particular, migrants’ organisations –
should thus be privileged agents in transnational practices because they
provide the networks and the infrastructure to facilitate and sustain var-
ious forms of transnational engagement by individuals and commu-
nities (Faist 1998: 214), most notably civic and political transnational-
ism. Thus far, however, the systematic and quantified analysis of organi-
sational transnational practices has been limited to very few studies
(Orozco 2003a; Portes et al. 2007), which is not to say that scholars
have in the past ignored the organisational dimension of transnational
practices altogether (see Rex, Joly & Wilpert 1987; Soysal 1994;
Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c; Cano 2004; Bloemraad 2005, 2006;
Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005; Dumont 2008; Itzigsohn &
Villacrés 2008).
Still, in most cases, organisational studies present a number of short-
comings that limit their usefulness in producing generalisations to go
beyond the case studies analysed. Frequently, these studies are based on
ethnographic methods that – while extremely useful for generating hy-
potheses and providing ‘thick descriptions’ – are ill-equipped to evaluate
the scope and extension of transnational practices. In other cases, stu-
dies suffer from a serious selection bias, as they ‘sample on the depen-
dent variable’ if the selection of the organisations has been made on the
basis of their actual involvement in transnational practices. The latter
problem is very common, for example, in studies that restrict attention
to hometown or international cooperation and development associa-
tions. Hence, the results of these works can hardly provide insights
about the extent and nature of organisational transnational activities.
Overall, there are extremely few studies that attempt to overcome these
limitations by casting the net wider through including all reachable or-
ganisations of a number of ethnic or migrant communities (a notable
exception is Cordero-Guzmán 2005).
Similarly, past studies have tended to study only specific ethnic
groups or communities (e.g. Turks, Italians or Dominicans), thus
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placing a special stress on ethnicity as the main category for the social
organisation of migrant communities. We are unconvinced that this is
an adequate methodological approach. While acknowledging that a vast
proportion of transnational practices is structured along ethnic lines,
transnational alliances and practices that transcend the most immediate
and restricted ethnic identities should be afforded due consideration. In
particular, we are interested as well in exploring the transnational prac-
tices that revolve around broader identities: regional, religious or ‘posi-
tional’. Hence, when studying migrants’ organisations we should not
restrict our attention to those of co-ethnics, but broaden the scope to all
associations formed primarily by migrants and their immediate descen-
dants, regardless of whether they identify themselves around a specific
ethnic identity or choose to rally around religious, regional or profes-
sional identities.
These methodological considerations are relevant because, even if en-
gaging in transnational practices is often regarded as a ‘natural’ inclina-
tion of migrants and their communities (Sayad 1975), a number of stu-
dies have shown that transnationalism is far from generalised and sub-
stantially decreases with second generations (see e.g. Portes 2003).4
Hence, when studying the transnational practices of migrants’ organisa-
tions, one of our first goals should also be to determine the scope and
extension of these practices as well as their correlates. Indeed, Portes et
al. (2007) suggest that a number of factors are relevant to understand-
ing the different types of transnational practices by organisations: in
particular, national origin and type of membership.
A final conceptual consideration before proceeding to describe in
greater detail the methodological aspects of our own research is the
connection between our study and the analysis of political transnational-
ism. Some scholars would regard all or most transnational practices by
migrants’ organisations as expressions of political transnationalism
even when these associations are not prima facie ‘political’ in their aims
– as with hometown associations and committees (see e.g. Portes et al.
1999; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). Though migrants’ organisational ac-
tivities almost by definition belong to the public realm, not all of their
activities either at the receiving or sending country are politically or-
iented, nor should they be considered expressions of political transna-
tionalism per se. Otherwise, we risk stretching unnecessarily and exces-
sively the notion of ‘political’ transnationalism. Equally, and unlike
Martiniello and Lafleur (2008), we favour a notion of political transna-
tionalism that does not automatically include every form of political ac-
tivity in the country of residence but, rather, one that only considers
those truly linking migrants with the political realm of their countries
of origin. This conceptual clarity is important if we want eventually to
assess the analytical and empirical connection between transnational
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practices and activism and migrants’ capacity and inclination to become
actively engaged in political mobilisation in the receiving country.
14.2.1 The context
Spain has experienced a sudden immigration flow that has resulted in a
rapid change in the social outlook and composition of its major urban
centres. The strong and sustained growth of the Spanish economy dur-
ing the first half of the 2000s, together with its ageing population struc-
ture, has favoured the inflow of migrant workers mostly from Eastern
Europe, Latin America and the Maghreb. This has resulted in a steep
surge, from little more than 2 per cent of a foreign population in 2000
to more than 10 per cent in 2007.5 The longitudinal trends and the mi-
gration structures in the cities of Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia resem-
ble, for the most part, those of the whole country. The crucial difference
is that the proportion of migrants in these three cities is somewhat
higher than the national average – a pattern common to the major ur-
ban areas in Spain.6 Some differences exist, though, between the three
cities in terms of the national composition of their migrant populations.
First, Romanian and Bulgarian citizens are settling down in Madrid
much more than in Barcelona and Murcia; Argentineans are more nu-
merous in Barcelona than in Madrid or Murcia; the proportion of
Ecuadorians living in Madrid and Murcia is double the size of that
same group in Barcelona; and, while the most numerous national com-
munity in Barcelona and Madrid is the Ecuadorian, Moroccan citizens
outnumber them in Murcia; finally, non-Chinese Asians – primarily
Pakistani – are a much more sizeable community in Barcelona. Second,
the cultural – and in particular, religious – diversity of the migrant po-
pulation is higher in Murcia than in the other two cities, as the propor-
tion of migrants from countries where the majority of the population is
of Islamic religion is higher in the former (30 per cent) than in both
Barcelona (14 per cent) and Madrid (9 per cent).7
Similarities in the overall structure and trends of immigration should
not lead us to conclude that the local context for migrants is the same
or very similar in the three cities. First, the patterns of urban segrega-
tion differ in important ways. Migrants are much more spatially con-
centrated in Barcelona than in Madrid and Murcia. A second important
difference in the local context that migrants encounter in the three ci-
ties is related to the policies towards immigration and immigrants de-
signed by the respective municipal and regional governments. Even if
the major elements of immigration policy – entry, permits, nationality,
voting rights8, conditions for family reunification and socioeconomic
rights – are defined by the national government, regional and local gov-
ernments can have a substantial impact on migrants’ daily lives through
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their policymaking. Spain is a quasi-federal state, and most of the
powers related to the implementation of welfare-related policies –
health care, education, housing, social services, etc. – are assigned to re-
gional governments. Frequently, moreover, local governments comple-
ment this policymaking with their own budgetary and regulatory
authority. This means that local governments can leave an important
imprint on the nature and direction of the welfare policies that affect
migrants’ integration into the host society. In Barcelona, left-wing par-
ties and coalitions have been governing the city since the first demo-
cratic local elections of 1979 whereas, in Madrid and Murcia, the
centre-right Partido Popular (PP) has been in control of the local gov-
ernment since the early 1990s. And, as we shall see, this has resulted
in very different approaches to migrants’ integration and migrants’ par-
ticipation. Specifically, Barcelona has a much more developed and struc-
tured policy of citizen participation and consultation than Madrid or
Murcia, as well as a more open and transparent practice of selecting as-
sociational representatives to the participation bodies.
If we turn our attention to the specific policies towards migrants’ in-
tegration and participation, important differences emerge between the
three cities. A first crucial difference relates to the overall approach to
migrants’ integration. The policy orientation in Barcelona starts from
the assumption that migrants’ integration should be approached from a
general perspective of combating social exclusion and promoting equal-
ity of treatment, just as it is for the mainstream population. Other than
specific actions that must be undertaken for assuring the adequate initi-
al settlement of newcomers to the city, migrants’ integration is viewed
as a ‘natural’ process that will emerge from migrants’ equal access to
all social welfare and services provided by the city, which are based on
the same principles and requirements than for pre-existing residents.
In sharp contrast, the local and regional policies in Madrid have, in a
very short period of time, been explicitly designed to address migrants’
integration through services specifically catering to migrants at the dis-
trict and neighbourhood levels. And an important feature of the ap-
proach to integration policies, especially by the regional government, is
the emphasis on national origin as one of the main axes around which
some integration services are organised. This is evident in the creation
of ‘national centres’ or ‘houses’ on the basis of national origins –
Bolivian, Ecuadorian, Colombian, Dominican, African, Moroccan, etc. –
that are conceived as spaces where migrants of specific national origins
can gather for social activities as well as to obtain vocational training
and general counselling and orientation. Finally, in the city of Murcia,
the municipality embraces openly the concept of social integration for
immigrants, but rather than setting up parallel networks of assistance
and support for migrants, the city has incorporated all information and
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support initiatives within the general structure of the local social ser-
vices. Nevertheless, the local government of Murcia has been much less
active than that of Madrid in accommodating any special needs of the
immigrant population.
This differential approach to migrants’ integration is also clearly re-
flected in local governments’ approach to calls. The local government of
Madrid has set up separate calls for granting subsidies to migrants’ or-
ganisations, and has created spaces for participation exclusively con-
cerned with representing migrants – the Madrid Forum (Foro Madrid
de Diálogo y Convivencia) and the district boards for dialogue and coex-
istence (Mesas de Diálogo y Convivencia Distritales). Meanwhile, the lo-
cal government of Barcelona intentionally funds migrants’ organisa-
tions within the general call for subsidies to all local associations, and
has avoided setting up participation mechanisms that are specifically
addressed to migrants.9 The local government of Murcia does not have
any separate funding for migrants’ associations either, but this is quite
consistent with its lack of well-developed policies towards migrants and
towards participation more generally.
In summary, the context of settlement in Madrid is much more wel-
coming for migrants to organise around ethnic and national identities
than in Barcelona and Murcia, if only because there is explicit policy by
the regional government to promote the self-organisation of immigrants
along those lines. Furthermore, the accommodation and promotion of
migrants’ separate organisations through specific calls for funding in
Madrid should result in more economic resources being available for
engaging in sustained transnational practices.
14.2.2 The study and the data
The data employed in this chapter were collected by a joint team of re-
searchers at the University of Murcia and the Autonomous University
of Barcelona following the same methodology between 2003 and 2008.
The final dataset combines information gathered through a pilot study
done in Madrid and Murcia in 2003-2004 – which was updated during
2007-2008 in both cities10 – and a full new study in the city of
Barcelona also done in 2007-2008.
In every city, the data collection was organised in two different stages.
First, we elaborated a census or list of all existing migrant organisations
– as no reliable single list was available. At a second stage, we organised
interviews with organisational leaders and administered a face-to-face
structured questionnaire of approximately one hour and fifteen minutes
in duration. For the pilot studies in Madrid and Murcia, interviews took
place between October 2003 and September 2004,11 while the updates
and the new study in Barcelona were conducted between May 2007 and
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July 2008. All stages of the process and the three cities combined, we
interviewed 218 distinct associations.
14.2.3 The definition, location and selection of migrants’ associations
As Moya (2005), Vermeulen (2005, 2006) and Recchi (2006) have cor-
rectly pointed out, there are a number of significant difficulties that we
are confronted with when studying migrants’ organisations. Among
them, those of definition, location and selection of the organisations
stand out as being most critical for the research process.
Two definitions were thus crucial in our selection of organisations.
First, we consider an association to be ‘a formally organized named
group most of whose members – whether persons or organizations –
are not financially recompensed for their participation’ (Knoke 1986: 2).
This definition allows us to distinguish associations from other social
and political institutions such as the family, groups of friends and other
organisations frequently encompassed in notions of the ‘third sector’ or
‘civil society’. In this regard, associations are considered to be distinct
from other organisations, such as foundations or government agencies,
in that very few individuals receive payment for their activities in the
former (Knoke & Prensky 1984). Additionally, associations are different
from economic organisations such as companies in that they are insti-
tutions seeking solutions for individual or collective problems distinct
from those of the market (Knoke 1990: 5). And Knoke’s definition also
excludes kinship groups that are not open to outsiders, while including
groups or clubs of migrants that are not fully institutionalised, as long
as they have a name and some minimal visibility to outgroup
individuals.
Second, we defined an association as a migrants’ organisation when
at least nearly half of its members or half of its board members (i.e. its
leadership) were of migrant origin (either foreign-born themselves or
having at least one foreign-born parent), thus including first and second
generations. We thus used a relatively wide definition of the term ‘mi-
grant’ – in order to include other EU citizens12 – though we did not in-
clude associations mainly devoted to work with or for migrants but,
rather, those mostly composed of Spanish natives. However, we did in-
clude associations – whether founded by natives or by migrants – of
mixed memberships as long as approximately half of the members or
the leadership were of migrant origin.
Other important aspects of our case’s definition of ‘migrant associa-
tion’ contrast with that of Vermeulen (2005, 2006). We included only
those organisations that are, directly or indirectly, membership-based,
though we did not require the organisations to signal in any specific
way that they were ‘ethnic-based’.
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Turning to the crucial issue of ‘detectability’, our mapping census of
migrants’ associations of all origins was created by combining the avail-
able information from various official registers, embassies, privileged
informants (NGOs, trade unions, etc.) and systematic searches on the
internet.13 We then sifted these initial lists by considering ineligible
those organisations not formed by migrants themselves – e.g. pro-mi-
grant organisations – as well as by excluding those that had disappeared
in previous years. Table 14.1 summarises this multi-stage field process.
An important point to make is related to mortality and response
rates. Unfortunately, official registers and directories in Spain are not
regularly updated; that is, associations must register in order to gain le-
gal status, but they are not obligated to update their information regu-
larly, nor do public administrations set any registration ‘expiry’ date so
as to keep information up to date. This means that initial lists are al-
ways problematic, as they include many associations that no longer ex-
ist, but also fail to capture a substantial portion of the real associational
Table 14.1 Summary of the fieldwork process
Barcelona
(2007-2008)
Madrid
(pilot study
2003-2004)
Madrid
(2007-2008
update)
Murcia
(pilot,
2004)
Murcia
(2007-2008
update)
Associations in the initial list 707 215 540 33 114
Sifted list without known
ineligibles (i.e. native and/or not
membership-based)
465 172 417 31 74
Sifted list with only confirmed
active associations
223 147 199 16 17
Confirmed not active 34 24 13
Mortality rate* 13.2% 14.5% 10.8% 48% 43.3%
Interviewed associations 100 67 96
20+43(+33)
12 18
3+8(+7)
Response rates 44.8% 45.6% 40.7% 75% 76.5%
Registered eligible associations 388 312 47
Sifted list only with confirmed
active associations
186 139 13
Confirmed not active 26 15 3
Mortality rate 12.3% 9.7% 18.8%
Source: Survey of Immigrants’ Associations in Madrid and Murcia (2003-2004); Survey of
Immigrants’ Associations in Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia (2007-2008)
* Mortality rate is computed to include only those fully confirmed as inactive. For Madrid
and Murcia, the first figure of the interviewed associations indicates the re-interviewing of
those that responded in 2004; the second figure is for organisations interviewed for the first
time in 2008; the last figure is that of associations interviewed only in 2003-2004. For the
Madrid and Murcia update figures, response rates are computed by including in the calcu-
lation only those associations interviewed in 2003-2004 that are still active: eighteen for
Madrid and two for Murcia.
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field that is not recorded in official registers because it is less institutio-
nalised (see lower section of Table 14.1). We could, however, estimate
how many associations were no longer active when attempting to locate
them for an interview: between 10 and 15 per cent of migrants’ associa-
tions have disappeared in Barcelona and Madrid, while the mortality
rate is much higher for Murcia. Nevertheless, we should note that this
mortality rate includes only organisations for which we have clear con-
firmation of being no longer active. For a large number, we could get
no confirmation though we suspected inactivity. In fact, out of the 67
associations interviewed in Madrid in 2003-2004, ten (15 per cent) were
no longer active in 2007. For an additional six we could get no final
confirmation, though they were also suspected of being inactive. When
these aspects are taken into account, our response rates thus result in
much wider coverage of truly active associations in the three cities.14
14.2.4 Overall description of the associations targeted and interviewed
The organisations targeted vary substantially in terms of their self-defi-
nition and country or area of origin. Some of them will primarily identi-
fy as associations that defend immigrants –or a specific subset of immi-
grants, e.g. Latin Americans – while others gather around their specific
national origins or some functional status (e.g. professionals, artists,
doctors). Our data collection process allows us to record at least the
country and regional origin even for those organisations not inter-
viewed and to draw a comparison with the results. The subset of organi-
sations we were able to interview indicates that there is no substantial
bias by origin in our dataset.
The distributions very much reflect the stocks of migrant groups in
each city. Latin American organisations are more abundant due to the
relative size of the groups of migrants from this region. Across national
origins, however, associational formation is not necessarily strictly pro-
portional to the relative size:15 there is a clear over-representation of
Peruvian associations as compared to their population sizes both in
Barcelona and in Madrid. This is probably due to their longer period of
settlement in Spain (since the 1980s), as compared to Ecuadorean mi-
grants (who mostly arrived in the 2000s). Similarly, non-Moroccan
African organisations are also much more numerous than would be ex-
pected from the size of the populations in all three cities. Thus, there
seem to be relevant differences in organisational capacity depending on
the regional and national origin of migrants.
In the remaining part of this chapter we will focus on the transna-
tional activities and engagement of the organisations we interviewed.
Our study of immigrants’ organisations in three Spanish cities –
Barcelona, Madrid, and Murcia – is ideally suited to address the
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research questions around the extension, nature and covariates of orga-
nisational transnationalism, as well as to address some important meth-
odological shortcomings in past research on transnational practices.
14.3 The scope and nature of transactional practices among
migrants’ associations
To what extent are migrants’ associations in these Spanish cities en-
gaged in transnational activities? What is the nature and variety of
transnational practices? What factors account for the fact that some or-
ganisations do engage in such practices and others do not? In this sec-
tion we approach these questions in a fundamentally descriptive fashion
and leave the more systematic account of correlates for the following
section.
Most theoretical accounts of migrants’ transnationalism reflect on the
multidimensionality of transnational practices and fields (e.g. Portes et
al. 1999; Faist 2000a). While this multidimensionality is usually re-
ferred to as different arenas of the public space –economic, socio-cultur-
al and political – it is undoubtedly also related to the multiple forms
transnational exchanges can take. We focus our analysis first on the sev-
eral ways in which migrants’ associations can engage in transnational
practices, paying special attention to ‘how’ they act transnationally, with
‘whom’ and for ‘what’. Consequently, we differentiate between: 1) differ-
ent forms of ordinary transnational activity – the ‘how’; 2) the various
other organisations with which they establish transnational alliances –
the ‘with whom’; and 3) a specific area to which transnational engage-
ment by migrants’ associations is commonly oriented, the political are-
na – the ‘what for’.
In all these instances, we are looking for sustained and recurrent pat-
terns of transnational exchange and linkage, rather than sporadic or cir-
cumstantial activities across national borders. For this purpose, most of
our questionnaire items are phrased to uncover regular, as opposed to
sporadic, exchanges and links. We are thus tapping both information
exchanges and reciprocity patterns. Overall, these items will allow us to
provide a more or less complete picture of the nature of the transna-
tional practices of migrants’ organisations in these three Spanish cities.
Table 14.2 presents the general outlook of the extension and nature
of the transnational practices of migrants’ associations. The results of
our survey in Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia indicate that – although
transnational activities are quite common – a substantial number of mi-
grant organisations (between 20 and 40 per cent, depending on the
city) do not engage in transnational practices at all. By a wide margin,
political transnationalism is the least common of cross-border
TRANSNATIONAL LINKS AND PRACTICES OF MIGRANTS’ ORGANISATIONS IN SPAIN 277
exchanges that migrants’ associations engage in, thus contradicting the
common view that most transnationalism of migrants’ organisations is
political in nature.16
In general terms, migrants’ associations do not commonly engage in
transnational practices that require their continued attention. For
Table 14.2 Transnational engagement by migrants’ associations, in % of all associa-
tions in each city
Type of transnational activity Barcelona
(2007-2008)
Madrid
(2004 & 2008)
Murcia
(2004 & 2008)1
Ordinary transnational activity
Undertakes activities in other countries
(other than Spain)
15 25 11
of which are…
in homeland country 13 20 6
elsewhere overseas 5 9 0
both homeland and elsewhere 3 4 0
Regular contact with any public
administration of the country of origin,
past two years
24 35 12
Gets any funding from country of origin,
last year
2 6 6
Have arranged meetings with homeland
TV journalist, past two years
23 30 11
Have arranged meetings with homeland
newspaper journalist, past two years
35 38 22
Organisational transnational alliances
Association is a member of an
international organisation, federation/
confederation
16 12 28
Regular contact with any organisation in
homeland country, past two years
42 38 33
Regular contact with any organisation in
any other overseas country, past two years
22 32 17
Political transnationalism
Regular contact with politicians or political
parties of the country of origin, past two
years
15 19 6
Any member has been a candidate in
homeland country elections
0 13 0
Summary indicators
Any transnational activity (any of the
above)
71 82 61
Ordinary transnational activity 56 59 39
Organisational transnational alliances 55 56 56
Political transnationalism 15 27 6
Number of cases 100 96 18
Source: Survey of Immigrants’ Associations in Barcelona, Madrid and Murcia (2007-2008)
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example, the proportion of organisations undertaking activities in other
countries is relatively reduced, between 10 and 25 per cent, and this is
largely limited to activities in the home country. Similarly, fewer than
one third have frequent contact with public administrations in their
countries of origin, and only a tiny minority gets any funding from the
sending-country authorities. More common, though, is the less de-
manding exchange of information with homeland TV and press journal-
ists. In most of these cases, we notice a substantial gap in levels of
transnational engagement among the three cities, especially between
Madrid and Murcia.
These gaps are much smaller when we focus on organisational trans-
national alliances. Around half of all migrant organisations in the three
cities are connected to organisations overseas, and around one fifth
have stabilised these links by joining international federations or con-
federations. Yet, in sharp contrast, explicitly political transnational prac-
tices are much less frequent. Typically, fewer than 20 per cent of the or-
ganisations have regular contacts with politicians or political parties in
the countries of origin, and only in Madrid can we find any organisa-
tion whose members have recently run as candidates in homeland
elections.17
A more detailed analysis of the patterns of transnational organisa-
tional alliance of migrants’ associations in our three cities reveals very
interesting findings (Figure 14.1).18 The use of formal social network
analysis (SNA) is useful because it preserves the original information
on interactions and exchanges, and is a methodological approach mostly
absent from analyses of transnationalism (see Vertovec 2003). Because
of how the information is retrieved, these are, by necessity, ego net-
works with asymmetrical connections, thus reducing the overall connec-
tivity. Yet, SNA depictions allow us to analyse several factors that condi-
tion transnational practices in a single snapshot. On the one hand, our
results indicate that Latin American associations accumulate a larger
number of transnational links with organisations in their homelands
and elsewhere overseas. On the other hand, the results in Figure 14.1
show that – even if usually more associations have contact with at least
one homeland organisation than with at least one such organisation
elsewhere overseas – the extension of non-homeland-based transna-
tional links is quite wide. Indeed, many Latin American associations
have contacts only with transnational organisations that are not based
in their homelands, especially in Madrid. In this sense, there is an in-
teresting contrast between the configuration of transnational networks
of Latin American associations in Barcelona and Madrid, as the former
are much more likely to restrict transnational contacts to homeland or-
ganisations. And it is interesting to see that even Latin American asso-
ciations in Murcia are very poor in transnational contacts as compared
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Figure 14.1 Structure of the organisational transnational alliances of migrants’
organisations
Barcelona
Madrid
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to their counterparts in Barcelona and Madrid. Finally, although ego
networks are not particularly suited for the study of overlapping links
within networks, we do find that some homeland organisations sponta-
neously ‘connect’ several local associations through common transna-
tional alliances. For example, Argentinean Workers Central (Central de
los Trabajadores Argentinos, CTA) is a common transnational contact
for three different local associations in Barcelona, two of which com-
prise Argentineans, but a third is composed of people of mixed Latin
American origins. Equally, in Madrid, four organisations – two sub-
Saharan African and two Latin American – are linked in their transna-
tional alliances through the European Network Against Racism (ENAR).
Hence, the SNA of the transnational alliances of migrants’ organisa-
tions provides us with valuable additional information on the patterns
of transnational interaction of migrants’ associations in our three
Spanish cities. The contribution that formal SNA can make to the study
of transnationalism should thus not be underestimated, and it is a
methodological innovation in this field that we feel should be
embraced.
Figure 14.1 Continued
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One final aspect worth exploring relates to the distinction between
‘comprehensive’ and ‘selective’ transnational practices (Levitt, DeWind
& Vertovec 2003). Comprehensive transnational practices cut across dif-
ferent arenas or domains, while selective practices are restricted to one
or only a few. Figure 14.2 shows the distribution for each of our three
cities of the number of types of transnational activity – as classified in
Table 14.2 – in which migrants’ associations become engaged. When an
association engages in ordinary transnational activity, in organisational
transnational alliances and in political transnationalism, it gets a score
of 3. Clearly, the majority of migrants’ associations are ‘selective’ in
their transnational practices, but a substantial proportion is engaged in
two or three domains simultaneously, especially in Madrid and
Barcelona. If we apply an even more stringent notion of ‘comprehen-
sive’ transnationalism – and require that an association undertake activ-
ities abroad, have regular contact with a public administration and have
regular contact with any organisation in their homeland or overseas –
then only a tiny proportion of migrants’ associations can be regarded as
practicing comprehensive transnationalism: 9 per cent in Madrid, 6 per
cent in Murcia and 2 per cent in Barcelona.
Two illustrative examples can provide further insight on this. One of
the associations in Barcelona that qualifies as comprehensively transna-
tional is a large Moroccan association created more than ten years ago.
Figure 14.2 Comprehensive vs. selective transnationalism: Number of types of
transnational activities of migrants’ associations
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It is well connected with platforms and networks of autochthonous or-
ganisations, describes itself as an immigrants’ association (rather than a
Moroccan association), is primarily active in issues related to Moroccan
migrants in Catalonia, but does not often engage in protests related to
international or homeland politics. It is also one of the largest
Moroccan associations in Barcelona, with a significant number of staff
and volunteers and a large budget. Another of the comprehensive trans-
national organisations – this time based in Madrid – is an Ecuadorian
association that is also more than ten years old, has multiple connec-
tions with Latin American and autochthonous organisations, is active in
all of Spain in addition to Ecuador, also defines itself as mainly an im-
migrants’ organisation (rather than solely an Ecuadorian association), is
primarily active in issues related to politics, but also does not often en-
gage in protests related to homeland politics and is, again, one of the
largest Latin American associations in Madrid, though its budget is
much more modest. These are only two examples, but they are illustra-
tive of the resources required to be ‘comprehensively’ transnational, in
a context where migrants’ associations have fairly limited technical, eco-
nomic and human resources.
In summary, systematic differences in the transnational inclinations
of migrants’ associations are apparent between organisations based in
Barcelona and Murcia and organisations based in Madrid. Almost every
indicator points in the direction of the organisations in Madrid as being
much more transnationally focused than those in either of the two
other cities. Furthermore, ordinary transnational activities and organisa-
tional transnational alliances are much more common than political
transnationalism regardless of the context. And Latin American associa-
tions are particularly inclined to accumulate many transnational organi-
sational contacts and, for the case of Madrid, quite often with organisa-
tions that are not based in their homelands. In the next section, we ana-
lyse in greater detail what causes might be driving transnational
practices as well as the cross-city variations.
14.3.1 What drives transnational practices? The organisational correlates of
transnationalism among migrants’ associations
Some scholars have past reflected on factors that drive migrants’ trans-
national practices, both at the individual level and the systemic or
macro level. For example, Faist (2000a) discusses the systemic or con-
textual elements that are linked to transnationalism and mentions the
saliency of ethnicity as a factor that could contribute to the development
and extension of transnational practices. He also discusses how obsta-
cles to migrants’ integration or the denial of acculturation can foster
transnationalism. Portes (2003) agrees that hostile contexts of reception
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also foster transnational practices, but he also mentions other relevant
properties of the sending and reception contexts: for example, highly
concentrated communities are likely to show more intense patterns of
transnationalism.
At the individual level, Portes et al. (1999) point to additional factors
related to transnational practices: access to technology, the economic
and human capital stocks as well as the distance to the homeland.
Hence, more resources and longer times of settlement are more condu-
cive to engaging in transnationalism (Portes 1999; Guarnizo et al.
2003; Portes & Rumbaut 2006).
There is, however, much less scholarship on what factors we should
expect to be related to transnationalism when we focus on migrants’ as-
sociations. Nevertheless, in one of the few systematic studies of organi-
sational transnationalism, Portes et al. (2007) show that transnational
engagement is determined by the country of origin and related to the
degree of formalisation and form of creation. Furthermore, if we extend
the hypotheses put forward at the macro and individual levels, we
should also expect the following types of organisations to be more likely
to engage in transnational practices: 1) those formed by migrant groups
that face greater hostility in Spain – e.g. Maghrebis and Africans, gener-
ally; 2) those that define themselves along more restrictive ethnic cate-
gories – thus making ethnicity more salient; 3) those with greater access
to technological, economic and human capital; and 4) those based in ci-
ties with greater spatial concentration of the migrant population, i.e.
Barcelona.
In Table 14.3, we explore the relationship between transnational activ-
ity and the origin and identity of the organisations, while in Table 14.4,
we analyse the covariation between certain organisational attributes and
transnationalism.19
Although estimates are unstable, and statistical significance is rare
due to the number of cases, some patterns emerge, especially with re-
gard to self-identity of the organisations. There is mixed evidence with
regard to the impact of ‘hostility’ towards the group in the settlement
country: African and Muslim organisations are somewhat more likely to
engage in transnational activity, but more so in Madrid than in
Barcelona, and the difference is not statistically significant.
Furthermore, associations that define their primary identity along terri-
torial lines and a single country of origin are more likely to maintain
transnational activities or links, but associations whose primary identity
revolves around functional or ascriptive social categories (e.g. women,
immigrants’ or professional groups) are equally oriented towards trans-
national contacts. These results contrast with Koopmans et al.’s (2005:
129-135) finding that groups that organise around status-related identi-
ties (such as ‘immigrants’ and ‘foreigners’) are less likely to make
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Table 14.3 Transnational engagement by origin and identity of organisations,
Madrid and Barcelona (% with any transnational activity)
Barcelona Madrid
Total 71 81
Region of origin
Latin American 71 81
African 70 100
Eastern Europe (100) (100)
Other regions (63) (67)
Mixed regional origins (71) 60
Muslim (100) (100)
Type of primary self-identity of the organisation
None 54* 84
Functional and/or ascriptive 87 83
Territorial – regional 40* (86)
Territorial – single country 84* 80
Religious (67) (100)
Ethnic – non-territorial (100) –
Total number of cases (100) (96)
Notes: Values are row percentages for each column. The asterisk * signals a percentage that
is statistically different from the total value for all organisations for p 0.05, as indicated by
adjusted residuals. Chi-square tests confirm the existence of a statistical association be-
tween primary self-identity and transnational engagement only for Barcelona. In brackets
we signal those percentages that are computed from a row category with fewer than ten
cases. The – sign indicates that there are no cases in this category.
Table 14.4 Transnational engagement by organisational characteristics
Barcelona Madrid
Any
transnational
activity
Value for all
organisations
(number of
cases)
Any
transnational
activity
Value for all
organisations
(number of
cases)
% of female members 51 50 (81) 49 49 (81)
% of income derived from
public subsidies from
Spanish institutions
15.9* 11.8 (86) 20.9* 18.8 (93)
Total annual budget (in E ) 28,838* 22,254 (90) 54,657* 48,853 (87)
Total number of members 957 * 709 (87) 1,401* 1,227 (88)
Degree of organisational
formalisation (0-1 scale)
0.55* 0.51 (100) 0.58 0.58 (96)
Number of years since its
creation
7.5 7.3 (100) 9.4 9.2 (99)
Notes: Values are average figures for each row attribute for each column. The asterisk *
signals a value that is statistically different from the value for organisations with no transna-
tional activity/links for p 0.10.
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transnational claims than groups that organise around ethnic and na-
tional identities.20 We have found, however, that the former groups are
as likely to become engaged in transnational practices as those that
identify along more restrictive (national) ethnic categories. The findings
are not necessarily contradictory, but they indicate that transnationally
oriented ‘claims-making’ is just a particular form of transnational en-
gagement, possibly with dynamics different from other transnational ac-
tivities. Hence, different types of transnational practices are likely to be
differently related to identity construction processes, and we should not
conclude that only ethno-national identities are conducive to heightened
transnationalism.
In general, differences in the inclination to act transnationally across
identity-based categories are more pronounced in Barcelona than in
Madrid. This is probably related to the fact that the context in Barcelona
is generally more hostile than in Madrid towards the acceptance of eth-
nicity as a valid category for public engagement. Thus, migrants’ asso-
ciations that avoid any clear identity as ‘immigrants’ or that embrace
wider regional identities – e.g. Latin American – refrain more from en-
gaging in practices that link them to narrow ethnic identities.
The findings that economic and human resources contribute to trans-
nationalism are valid not only for individual transnational practices but
also for organisational ones. Again, in spite of the limited number of
cases, we can safely say that larger organisations (in terms of the num-
ber of members) with more formalised structures, larger budgets and
larger proportions of public funding are invariably more likely to en-
gage in transnational activities. In contrast with other hypotheses devel-
oped with individual-level data, feminisation and the time passed since
settlement, which is of course highly correlated with the ‘age’ of the or-
ganisation, are not related to transnational practices.
In recent times, increasing attention is being paid to the link between
transnational practices and development promotion in the sending
countries. Hence, we should expect that migrants’ associations that de-
scribe themselves as organisations primarily devoted to humanitarian
aid, human rights or cooperation, or that are active in these areas – re-
gardless of whether they prefer to describe themselves as a more gener-
ally oriented association – will be more inclined to engage in transna-
tionalism. Tables 14.5 and 14.6 explore this connection.
Our evidence generally supports these expectations. Migrants’ asso-
ciations that define themselves as humanitarian aid or human rights or-
ganisations or that are active in these areas, in community development
or in international cooperation are indeed more likely to be engaged in
transnational activities. This is more the case in Barcelona than in
Madrid, however, where generally higher levels of transnationalism
make these distinctions less relevant.
286 LAURA MORALES AND LAIA JORBA
To conclude the analysis of the correlates of transnationalism among
migrants’ organisations, we assess the concurrent impact of the various
factors explored in previous tables. Table 14.7 shows the results of three
binary logistic regressions on the separate indicators of transnational
practices: ordinary activity, organisational alliances and political transna-
tionalism. Our goal is to examine whether different factors are relevant
for the different forms of transnational activity that we have identified
in the initial sections of this chapter.
Indeed, our results are noteworthy to the extent that they point to the
existence of commonalities and differences in the correlates of transna-
tionalism. Latino organisations are only more likely to engage in
Table 14.5 Transnational engagement by primary self-description of association
(% with any transnational activity)
Barcelona Madrid
Immigrants’ organisation 80 78
Cultural, musical, dancing, etc., society 65 82
Humanitarian aid or human rights organisation 90 88
Ethnic organisation 57 91
Charity or social welfare organisation 86 100
All organisations 71 82
Number of cases 92 93
Notes: Values are average figures for each row attribute for each column. No difference with
the average for all organisations is statistically significant for p 0.10.
Table 14.6 Transnational engagement by sectors/areas of activity (% with any
transnational activity)
Barcelona Madrid
Active in…? Yes No Yes No
Charity 82 $ 58 83 81
Ethnic group concerns 83 $ 47 88 77
Sports 71 71 89 78
Culture 72 68 86 $ 70
Humanitarian aid 80 $ 59 89 78
Human rights 78 $ 57 83 81
Community development 83 $ 62 94 $ 76
Issues related to immigration 80 $ 48 83 81
International cooperation 83 57 90 $ 75
All organisations 71 82
Number of cases 100 96
Notes: Values are average figures for each row attribute for each column. The left right
arrow$ signals a difference in the percentage of transnational activity between
organisations active and inactive in a give sector/area that is statistically significant for
p 0.10. When no arrow is present, the difference is not statistically significant.
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transnational practices when these refer to the political domain. In con-
trast, African organisations – which represent the migrant groups fa-
cing greater hostility and discrimination in Spain – are not more trans-
nationally oriented than the other organisations, irrespective of the form
of transnationalism we scrutinise. Narrowly defined ethnic identities do
promote greater engagement in ordinary transnational activities, but are
not crucial for the establishment of transnational links with organisa-
tions abroad or for political transnationalism. Associations that are ac-
tive in community development or in international cooperation are
more inclined, by the nature of their own activities, to establish organi-
sational alliances that are transnational but, interestingly enough, they
Table 14.7 The correlates of transnational practices among migrants’ organisations,
logistic binary regressions
Ordinary
transnational
activity
Organisational
transnational
alliances
Political
transnationalism
Intercept -0.58 (0.24) -0.49 (0.47) -2.91 (0.53)
Latino organisation n.s. n.s. 0.76 (0.46)
African organisation n.s. n.s. n.s.
Self-identity = territorial-single
country
0.9 (0.32) n.s. n.s.
Self-description = Humanitarian
aid or human rights organisation
1.6 (0.6) n.s. n.s.
Active in community development n.s. 0.57 (0.33) n.s.
Active in international
cooperation
n.s. 0.75 (0.33) 0.81 (0.41)
Derives any income from Spanish
public subsidies
n.s. n.s. n.s.
Annual budget (in 100s E ) 0.001 (0.000) n.s. 0.001 (0.000)
Number of members n.s. n.s. n.s.
Degree of formalisation (0-1) n.s. n.s. n.s.
City (ref = Barcelona)
Madrid n.s. n.s. 0.63 (0.38)
Murcia n.s. n.s. n.s.
Number of cases 193 193 193
Chi-square of model (degrees of
freedom)
29.158 (3) 16.173 (7) 19.487 (4)
Nagelkerke R-square 0.19 0.11 0.15
Cox & Snell R-square 0.14 0.08 0.10
Hosmer & Lemeshow test Chi-
square (degrees of freedom)
4.38 (8) 8.63 (8) 9.62 (8)
Notes: Beta coefficients with standard errors are in brackets. All coefficients are statistically
significant for p 0.10, and n.s. marks those that were initially estimated but removed from
the model because they were not statistically significant and the number of cases calls for
parsimonious models. All Hosmer and Lemeshow tests show a good fit of the models to
the data.
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are also more likely to be active in political transnationalism. When as-
sessing the role of resource mobilisation, only economic capital seems
to have any significant impact: the number of members or the degree
of formalisation is not decisive, surely due to its important correlation
with budgetary capacity.
Finally, once we control for all these organisational attributes, the lo-
cal context in itself seems to have a very limited additional impact.
Migrants’ organisations in Madrid are more likely to engage in political
transnationalism. This is probably due to the fact that Madrid is the ca-
pital of the country, and thus is more often the focus of political mobili-
sation from homeland institutions and actors – such as the embassies
and the political parties – but it could also reflect an endogenous pro-
cess: migrants who were politically active in their countries of origin
might be more likely to choose the capital city due to migration chains
among political refugees. In any case, this should not lead us to con-
clude that the local context of settlement has little or no impact; rather,
its impact is indirect: migrants’ organisations in Madrid more fre-
quently define themselves along narrow (national or local) ethnic lines,
receive substantially more public subsidies, have an average budget that
is roughly double that of associations in Barcelona and Murcia and have
larger memberships. In sharp contrast, migrants’ associations in
Barcelona are more likely to be active in the areas of humanitarian aid,
community development, human rights and international cooperation,
hence partially offsetting their resource disadvantage. In other words,
local policies and local contexts are relevant not so much because they
directly promote (or fail to do so) transnational practices – which they
do sometimes through subsidising policies – but primarily because they
have a substantial impact on the type of migrants’ organisations that
consolidate and on the resources they accumulate.
14.4 Discussion
Transnational engagement is by no means universal among migrant or-
ganisations in Spanish cities, but it is very common that a large major-
ity of them will at least practice some form of transnationalism. Our
chapter makes the point that the type and nature of transnational prac-
tices migrants’ associations engage in is quite varied, and thus we
should analyse different forms of organisational transnationalism sepa-
rately. Migrants’ associations in Spain are more often involved in ordin-
ary transnational activity and frequently they establish alliances with or-
ganisations abroad, yet they more rarely engage in political transnation-
alism. Consequently, we reject the common view that migrants’
organisational transnational practices are primarily expressions of
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political transnationalism. We would encourage a less all-encompassing
view of political transnational practices, or else we risk emptying it of
real meaning.
On the other hand, transnational practices are certainly not restricted
to links with homeland actors and social fields. We have found a con-
siderable number of exchanges with overseas countries other than the
countries of origin of the migrant groups. In particular, there is a signif-
icant connection with the United States for the Latino groups, and with
European countries and organisations for migrants’ associations of all
regional origins.
Yet, the picture that emerges from our study is one of ‘selective’
rather than ‘comprehensive’ transnationalism. Comprehensive transna-
tional practices are rather limited to a few organisations and are more
frequent in Madrid than in the other cities. In general terms, while we
also find smaller and more informal associations that are comprehen-
sively transnational, when it comes to engaging in transnational prac-
tices in multiple domains and forms simultaneously another profile
dominates. That is, the profile of large, resourceful and well-connected
associations, which often also identify with the broader identity of ‘im-
migrants’ and are not necessarily explicitly concerned with homeland
politics, but more with improving the situation of their co-ethnics in
Spain.
In this sense, transnationalism is often driven by the identity of the
organisation – when narrowly defined along ethnic lines – the area of
activity – especially if it is active in community development and inter-
national cooperation – and the economic resources at its disposal. In
this regard, the local context of settlement and the policies implemented
by local and regional governments are especially relevant to the extent
that they fundamentally shape the migrants’ associational ecology. The
impact of the local context and of local policies is thus both direct and
indirect. Directly, they can incentivise transnational practices through
their promotion of international cooperation and development activities
of migrants’ associations. Indirectly they can do so through their effect
on the resources associations they accumulate and the collective identi-
ties they generate. Yet, local policies do not always operate in consistent
directions to promote or hinder transnationalism, and our three cases
illustrate the variety of effects we can find in real-life situations. On the
one hand, the local policies and approach in Madrid foster the emer-
gence and consolidation of associations that coalesce along narrow eth-
nic identities, whereas policies in Barcelona discourage the emphasis
on ethnicity. Furthermore, in Madrid, migrants’ associations can access
a larger net amount of economic resources from different funding insti-
tutions, while in Barcelona and Murcia they grow cash-poor. Yet, local
and regional policies in Barcelona are very active in promoting
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international cooperation and development, and hence we find that mi-
grants’ organisations privilege these areas of activities in this city; and
this offsets the limitations that smaller budgets impose on the transna-
tionalisation of migrants’ organisations. A lack of both cash and active
international development policies in Murcia largely results in a much
more limited engagement in transnational activity.
In conclusion, the local context powerfully shapes through direct and
indirect paths the opportunities that migrants’ associations face in tak-
ing on transnational practices. Further comparative studies of multiple
ethnic groups across multiple cities should shed more light on the ex-
tent to which our findings may be more generally applicable.
Notes
1 Some exceptions are Bloemraad (2005) and Portes, Escobar and Walton Radford
(2007).
2 The Spanish project was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Education
(grant SEJ2005-07733/CPOL) and by the Se´neca Foundation of the Region of Murcia
(grant 03007/PHCS/05). More information can be found at www.um.es/
capsocinmig.
3 Multicultural Democracy and Immigrants Social Capital in Europe: Participation,
Organisational Networks, and Public Policies at the Local Level, also known as the
LOCALMULTIDEM project, was funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of the
European Commission (contract CIT5-CT-2005-028802). Comprising a team of se-
ven European universities and research institutes, it studied the cases of Budapest,
London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan and Zurich. For more information see www.um.es/
localmultidem.
4 Portes also argues that the concept is only of some use if this is not an omnipresent
phenomenon, i.e. if there is variation across individuals and organisations.
5 Nevertheless, there are sizeable migrant populations from sub-Saharan Africa and,
most recently, from China. ‘Retirement’ migration from Western Europe is also
substantial.
6 Some rural municipalities, however, have even higher proportions of migrants than
the larger cities, especially in the Mediterranean regions and in Andalusia.
7 The size of the Muslim population is roughly estimated by adding all individuals
born in countries that the CIA World Factbook lists as having populations that are 50
per cent or more Muslim in 2005.
8 Non-EU nationals cannot vote in any elections in Spain. Voting rights, even at the lo-
cal level, can only be granted by the national level and, in most cases, they require
modifying the Constitution. Although the issue of allowing all residents to vote in lo-
cal elections has been raised on various occasions, the necessary political agreements
between the two major parties (PSOE and PP) have never materialised into legal
amendments in this direction.
9 This does not mean that in Barcelona there are no consultation bodies dealing with
migration issues. Though there is a municipal sectorial council for immigration, it is
not specifically designed to address migrant or immigration issues in particular but,
rather, as an additional sectorial policy alongside many other issues – youth, gender,
sports, homosexuals and transsexuals, housing, etc.
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10 The update entails partially re-interviewing organisations included in the pilot study
to analyse changes in their organisational activities and composition and interviewing
organisations we were unable to interview in 2004 as well as organisations formed
after the pilot was completed.
11 A more detailed description of the questionnaire and of the pilot studies can be
found in Ortega and Morales (2006).
12 EU-15 citizens’ associations (e.g. French, Italian, British), as well as those from richer
OECD countries (e.g. US, Canada, Australia), have been excluded from the analyses
and tables in this chapter to restrict our focus to the national origins that produce
the bulk of ‘economic’ migrants in our three cities. The needs and activities of these
two subpopulations differ too much to make their joint analysis meaningful for the
purposes of this chapter.
13 Our searching methods in official registers and on the internet were systematic and
thorough, and included a long list of word strings with various variants of the words
‘immigrant’ and ‘foreigner’ and the multiple countries and national qualifiers.
14 One might wonder whether, given this relative fluidity of associations, our results on
transnational practices are likely to be stable over time. Of course, this can only be
fully assessed by a proper longitudinal study, but if the over-time evolution of the few
associations (22) that we were able to interview both in 2003-2004 and 2007-2008
in Madrid is of any indication, the inclination to engage in transnational practices
seems quite stable. For example, only five associations that mentioned transnational
links with associations overseas in 2003-2004 did not mention any in 2007-2008,
and only two associations that mentioned any links in 2007-2008 had not mentioned
any in the previous round of interviews.
15 See Schrover and Vermeulen (2005) for a discussion of this frequent mismatch.
16 In the 2007-2008 questionnaires, we included an item that enquired into the main
specific protest or demonstration events associations had participated in over the pre-
vious two years. However, because this item was not posed to the associations inter-
viewed only in 2003-2004, we decided not to include it in these analyses.
Nevertheless, a close inspection of them leads us to conclude that ‘transnational’ pro-
test is the exception rather than the norm, as barely fifteen associations out of over
100 that had participated in protests mentioned a ‘transnational’ cause being at stake.
In fact, ‘international’ issues, such as the Iraq War, were much more common; and,
by far, exclusively national or local issues dominate the scene. Among the few trans-
national protests, the most abundant were those related to violence in Colombia, poli-
tical turmoil in Pakistan and support for victims of national disasters in the
homeland.
17 Unfortunately, given the difficulty in tracking such a detail, our ability to establish
whether these members ran for office once already in Spain is limited. However, hav-
ing included an item that enquired into the date when these members ran as candi-
dates, we found that all were in the 2000s, thus strongly suggesting that respondents
report on only recent electoral contests and that this is indeed a valid indicator of po-
litical transnationalism.
18 Although the total number of cases interviewed in Murcia is too small for frequency
statistical analyses to be meaningful, we have preferred to report them as an addi-
tional piece of information. Parallel to the study in the city of Murcia, we undertook
an identical study in the whole region/province of Murcia, which resulted in 25 addi-
tional interviews (a total of 43). In terms of the transnational practices, the results are
very similar for the whole region and, if anything, would indicate that the organisa-
tions in the city of Murcia are more transnationally oriented than those of the rest of
the region.
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19 These are all ego networks. The relative size of the interviewed organisations (in
white shapes) indicates the number of transnational organisations they named, i.e.
their outdegree.
20 In subsequent tables we do not include the case of Murcia because the limited num-
ber of cases renders it unsuitable for bivariate analyses.
21 These are self-defined identities that need not overlap fully with the ‘legal’ status of
members of these groups. Koopmans et al. (2005: 126-127) identify three types of
transnational claims-making: transplanted homeland politics (e.g. claims against the
homeland regime), homeland-directed transnational claims (e.g. claims requesting
the settlement country government to intervene in homeland politics) and country of
residence-directed transnationalism (e.g. homeland resources mobilised to intervene
in host country arenas).
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Chapter 15
Cold constellations and hot identities:
Political theory questions about
transnationalism and diaspora
Rainer Bauböck
The initial question from which we started when inviting the contribu-
tions assembled in this book was whether the concepts of transnational-
ism and diaspora can still be analytically distinguished, or if they have
become so overstretched and blurred that they no longer refer to dis-
tinct phenomena. If we find that the two concepts are still useful, then
a second question follows: how do they relate to each other in different
academic disciplines and theoretical perspectives, and can they be inte-
grated into broader theories of boundary-crossing and boundary
change? Finally, does the study of empirical phenomena that are called
‘transnational’ or ‘diasporic’ also require replenishing the methodologi-
cal toolboxes used in social research with new instruments?
Predictably, our authors have not agreed on answers to these three
questions. Some have responded indirectly by demonstrating the heur-
istic validity of a certain approach to transnationalism and diaspora;
others have done so by highlighting in a critical vein what has been
missing or overlooked in their respective disciplines. The appropriate
conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is that this is neither the time
to jettison the two concepts nor the moment to integrate them into a
grand theoretical synthesis. Instead, this is a time for ‘talking across
disciplines’ (Bretell & Hollifield 2006) in order to explore how different
perspectives may cross-fertilise each other and move the debates for-
ward. We may even hope, rather optimistically, that such transdisciplin-
ary encounters have a transformative effect on academic boundaries si-
milar to the effect of transnational migration on the boundaries of
nation-states.
This concluding chapter will not repeat the task of the introduction
in summarising the debate or drawing conclusions from the contribu-
tions assembled in this book. Instead, I want to consider what my own
discipline of political theory could learn from engaging with the find-
ings of other disciplines and what it could contribute in return. For this
purpose, I will refer selectively to other chapters in this volume. The
weakness of political theory is that it takes a long time to digest insights
of other disciplines about changing structures of modern societies, in-
cluding those changes that we associate with transnationalism. Its
strength lies in the striving for analytical consistency in conceptual ana-
lysis and normative judgements. I will therefore want to explore
whether political theory can help clarify the relation between the two
concepts and to address the normative challenges for democracy that
arise from a transnational blurring of political boundaries and the mo-
bilisation of diasporic identities.
15.1 Transnational citizenship from above and below
As discussed in Faist’s introduction to this volume, transnationalism
has had a strong career as a concept in quite disparate fields of aca-
demic study. Probably the three most important ones are the following:
first, international relations, where the concept began to be used as
early as the 1970s to refer to the growing importance of non-state ac-
tors, such as multinational corporations and international NGOs, in the
international arena (e.g. Keohane & Nye 1972); second, social move-
ment studies, which were interested in political mobilisation across bor-
ders (e.g. Smith, Chatfield & Pagnucco 1997); and third, migration stu-
dies (e.g. Basch, Glick Schiller & Szanton Blanc 1994). Although these
are quite different fields, there was a common underlying perception
that transnationalism was about ‘globalisation from below’ (Guarnizo &
Smith 1998; Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & Reiter 2006).
Transnational relations were accordingly distinguished from interna-
tional ones by insisting that at least one of the actors involved in the for-
mer be a non-state entity (Risse-Kappen 1995; Portes, Guarniz &
Landolt 1999). Much of the empirical research on transnationalism has
accordingly focused on individual and group agency across international
borders.
From a political theory perspective, there is something missing here:
a focus on political institutions and how they not only provide ‘opportu-
nity structures’ for individual or collective transnational practices, but
are themselves transformed through transnational relations. Political
philosophy has for some time been divided between approaches that fo-
cus on the ethics of individual action or on justice as the first virtue of
political institutions (Rawls 1971: 1). The latter approach has been domi-
nant since the 1970s, and has led to a stronger engagement between
normative political theory and empirical research on democratic institu-
tions (Bauböck 2008a). The notion of transnational citizenship reflects
such an institutionalist perspective (Bauböck 1994).
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While the international relations and social movements literatures
have focused on boundary-crossing political issues, such as environmen-
tal risks or economic globalisation, and responses by institutionalised
or informal political actors, migration raises more complex questions
about political membership. The underlying problem is how to resolve
the mismatch between states as territorially bounded jurisdictions and
citizenship as an intergenerational status of membership in a political
community. Democratic citizenship has a sticky quality: it clings to indi-
viduals, and they cling to it as well when moving across international
borders. But democratic states are organised as non-overlapping territor-
ial jurisdictions. Migration between states therefore produces citizens
abroad and foreign citizens in the territory. The term ‘transnational citi-
zenship’ was coined to refer to a pluralisation of citizenship statuses
and the differentiation of rights in response to this problem. This re-
sponse can be partially derived from the evolution of democratic state
practices, but the term also contains a normative surplus in the sense
of providing guidelines as to how liberal democracies ought to trans-
form their conceptions of membership when faced with transnational
migration.
In the post-World War II era, democratic immigration countries had
gradually and unevenly liberalised their conceptions of citizenship by
granting quasi-citizenship status to long-term resident foreign na-
tionals. They did this by turning naturalisation from a discretionary de-
cision of authorities into an individual entitlement and by tolerating
dual citizenship acquired at birth or through naturalisation. Some
authors explained this move towards greater inclusion as the impact of
global human rights discourses (Soysal 1994) and international legal
constraints on state sovereignty (Jacobson 1996), while others empha-
sised domestic sources of liberalisation (Joppke 1999; Hansen & Weil
2001). Only a few scholars noted that towards the end of the twentieth
century, analogous changes occurred among an increasing number of
sending countries. These started to consider external citizenship as a
persistent link with their expatriates abroad that could be activated for
economic, political and cultural policy goals. The move towards tolera-
tion of dual citizenship has been even more dramatic in sending than
in receiving countries (Faist & Kivisto 2007; Blatter, Erdmann &
Schwanke 2009). Since nearly all receiving countries also have substan-
tial numbers of expatriates, mixed motives of both kinds have driven
policy change in most Western democracies.
The core citizenship rights of democratic participation and represen-
tation have undergone a similar expansive development. Western liberal
democracies have generally abolished previous restrictions on political
activity by foreign nationals, and fourteen European states currently
grant local voting rights to all long-term residents (Shaw 2007). At the
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same time, a much larger number of states has recently introduced ab-
sentee voting in national elections for their citizens residing abroad
(IDEA & IFE 2007).
These reforms have made citizenship not only internally more acces-
sible and inclusive for immigrants, but also less clearly bounded exter-
nally. The legal statuses and rights of denizens and dual nationals are
jointly produced by receiving and sending states. Responding to
Hammar’s (1990) influential discussion of denizenship and dual citi-
zenship as alternative solutions for the legal and political integration of
immigrant, I have suggested that what these two statuses had in com-
mon was their transnational character (Bauböck 1994). While Hammar
had analysed them primarily from an immigrant integration perspec-
tive, they should be seen instead as a legal expression and recognition
of overlapping circles of membership between two states. Transnational
citizenship in this sense refers to an institutional transformation of
membership and legal rights.1 This transformation is not the result of
international migration itself, but of changing normative conceptions of
political community that respond to perceived challenges and opportu-
nities created by migration.
Such an institutionalist perspective contributes also to the dispute
over whether migrant transnationalism is really a historically novel and
numerically significant phenomenon. Transnationalism has often been
associated with migration patterns involving frequent movement be-
tween two states (see Dahinden in this volume) or with homeland-
related attachments and activities among settled immigrants. These
phenomena have been facilitated by new technologies of transportation
and communication, but they were also strongly present in earlier mi-
gration waves, including the great transatlantic exodus from Europe to
America around 1900 (Morawska 2001). By contrast, the proliferation
of local voting rights for denizens,2 of external voting rights for expatri-
ates and of tolerated dual citizenship constitute, by any standards, both
a historically novel and quantitatively significant trend (Bauböck 2003).
Describing and explaining this trend does not yet answer the norma-
tive question of how citizenship status and rights ought to be allocated
in contexts of overlapping affiliations. In response to this question, I re-
cently proposed a stakeholder principle (Bauböck 2007b). This idea de-
viates to a certain extent from Carens’ (1989, 2002) earlier suggestion
that citizenship ought to be derived from societal membership. If we re-
gard societies as bounded by the territories of nation-states, then it be-
comes natural to associate societal membership with long-term resi-
dence, ignoring thereby the transnational aspects of migrants’ lives.
Once we accept, however, critique of this perspective as methodological
nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002), then there seems to be
no way of determining stable boundaries of societies. At some level of
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analysis, societies merge into a global human society. The geographic
scope of transnational citizenship lies somewhere between a notion of
society as a resident population inside a state territory and society as a
global network of human communication and interaction. Several
authors in our volume therefore use terms such as ‘transnational social
fields’ or ‘networks’. But fields and networks are not political entities
that can serve as addressees of claims to membership status and rights.
Societal membership is then too vague a criterion for determining not
only the claims immigrants have towards a host state, but also those of
emigrants towards countries of origins. In contrast with societies, net-
works and fields, political jurisdictions and political communities are
demarcated by territorial and membership boundaries, even when these
overlap. I propose therefore individual stakeholding in the future of a
political community as an explicitly political criterion for membership
claims. Such a reference to bounded political units is indispensable for
a normative critique of exclusionary as well as over-inclusive citizenship
regimes.
Citizenship is a multifaceted concept whose many meanings are not
exhausted by legal status, rights and duties allocated to individuals by
states. The institutional perspective on transnational citizenship ‘from
above’ must therefore be matched by studying the same set of phenom-
ena ‘from below’. Transnational citizenship should then also be re-
garded as a political opportunity structure that enables or constrains in-
dividual choices about membership status and identities as well as col-
lective claims about rights. This perspective on transnational citizenship
from below opens up a broad research agenda ranging from naturalisa-
tion motives to diaspora involvement in homeland conflicts.
Finally, a third aspect should be added to the study of institutions
and practices: discourses. As pointed out by Rogers Smith (2003), poli-
tical legitimacy in every polity is generated through ‘stories of people-
hood’ that include not only narratives about economic advantage and
political power, but also ‘ethically constitutive stories’ about collective
identities and belonging. This is true not only for independent states,
but also for various types of non-state polities.3 We therefore need to
trace as well the public discourses that construct transnational citizen-
ship not merely as legal statuses and rights, but also as a significant
way of belonging to a political community.
Bringing practice and discourse dimensions into the analysis of
transnational citizenship creates a bridge to the study of diaspora. As I
suggest in the fourth section of this chapter, diaspora should be under-
stood as a politically mobilised claim about transnational citizenship,
which can be pursued either by governmental actors from above or by
non-governmental actors from below. In either case, diasporas are
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created through discourses about transnational belonging to a political
community.
Before further elaborating this interpretation of diaspora, I will sketch a
broader framework for studying citizenship constellations that avoids, on
the one hand, the statist biases to have plagued most political theory ap-
proaches and allows, on the other hand, to fill the normative gaps left wide
open by sociological and anthropological accounts of transnationalism.
15.2 Citizenship constellations
Citizenship has generally been interpreted as a relation between an in-
dividual and a single polity. But, as discussion in the previous section
has shown, this is clearly inadequate in contexts of migration. In order
to understand the motives that migrants have for choosing a particular
legal status or exercising a particular citizenship right, we need to look
at the citizenship opportunity structure that is jointly produced by their
countries of origin and settlement. The same broader framework is re-
quired for studying the impact of a change in citizenship status on mi-
grants’ socioeconomic position or political participation (Jones-Correa
2001, 2005; DeVoretz 2008; DeVoretz & Bevelander 2009). Instead of
considering, as usual, only the effect naturalisation has in a country of
settlement, we need to take into account also how it impacts migrants’
opportunities in relation to countries of origin or even third countries.
And these effects are sometimes not what one would expect: namely,
that citizenship acquisition consolidates settlement in a destination
country. Consider, for example, immigrants of Chinese origin naturalis-
ing in the United States and Canada in order to facilitate return to their
country of origin with what they consider a privileged status (Ong
1999).
We need to understand more clearly that citizenship is not only a sta-
tus of internal equality and entitlements within a polity, but also enables
mobility across international borders (Bauböck 2009). The core of exter-
nal citizenship is an unconditional right to be readmitted to one’s coun-
try of nationality. This is not only the main reason why most migrants
are reluctant to renounce their citizenship of origin when they apply for
naturalisation; it is also a reason why individuals may be interested in
activating an inherited external citizenship or in becoming citizens of a
country that offers them easy naturalisation on grounds of ancestry or
ethnic affinity. Dual citizens enjoy free movement rights between two
countries and, for European Union citizens, this privilege extends to a
much larger geographic area. In the EU, states that provide easy access
to their citizenship for co-ethnic populations living abroad create EU ci-
tizens with admission rights in all other member states. Transnational
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and supranational citizenships thus affect the opportunities of indivi-
duals in relation to several states, and also impact these states through
the associated mobility privileges these statuses entail.
Alongside the study of individual choices of citizenship status and of
collective effects of citizenship arrangements, citizenship policy forma-
tion is a third object of research for which a constellation perspective
generates new research questions and insights. We need to take into ac-
count how states linked to each other through large-scale migration
flows react to policy changes in the other country. The sequence of re-
forms of citizenship policies in Turkey and Germany since the 1990s
provides a good illustration of what I suggest calling ‘interactive citizen-
ship regimes’ (Bauböck 2006). In the early 1990s, arson attacks in the
German towns of Mölln and Solingen killed eight Turkish women and
girls. Convinced that Turks in Germany would be fully protected only if
they had German citizenship, the Turkish government reacted by chan-
ging its previous policy of discouraging naturalisation in Germany. But
at the same time, Turkey wanted to strengthen its links to its largest ex-
patriate community. In 1995 a ‘pink card’ was introduced that facilitated
renunciation of Turkish citizenship by guaranteeing former Turkish citi-
zens most of the rights they had prior enjoyed apart from the franchise.
Yet, Turkish migrants apparently did not trust the value of this external
quasi-citizenship and bided their time waiting for reforms that would
allow for dual citizenship (Caglar 2004). In 1999, the red-green coali-
tion government promised to introduce such reforms, but had to retract
this crucial element of its citizenship reform proposal when the conser-
vative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) mobilised against it in a re-
ferendum in the province of Hesse. Turkish authorities reacted to this
setback by exploiting a legal loophole that, prior to 2000, had not per-
mitted German authorities to deprive German citizens of their national-
ity while they resided in the German state territory. A substantial num-
ber of Turkish migrants therefore renounced their citizenship of origin
only temporarily in order to naturalise, but then reacquired it through
the Turkish consulates. The new citizenship law that came into force in
2000 closed off this opportunity. Shortly before regional and federal
elections in 2005, German authorities became active and deprived
about 20,000 immigrants of Turkish origin of their German citizenship
and franchise. This episode illustrates how states whose citizenship re-
gimes have become entangled with each other through large-scale mi-
gration may act independently of each other to pursue their own politi-
cal goals, but still become exposed to the other state’s policy choices
and may respond in kind.
Empirical research on citizenship should therefore move beyond
single-country case studies and even beyond comparative approaches to-
wards an analysis of citizenship constellations that involve several
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states. A constellation framework is also relevant for addressing norma-
tive questions concerning how states ought to allocate membership sta-
tus, rights and duties, how they should coordinate their policies
amongst one another and how they may legitimately constrain indivi-
dual choices and practices. In the previous section, I briefly introduced
a stakeholder principle for answering the basic question of who has a
moral claim to membership status in which polity. Introducing a trans-
national constellation perspective means that we need to go beyond this
initial question. First, we have to develop principles for citizenship poli-
cies that do not only respond to moral claims of individuals, but that
can also guide political decisions of different polities in such a way that
they do not conflict with each other or produce unjustifiable burdens
for another country. Second, we must not only reconcile the individual
equality of citizens with the recognition of relevant group differences
inside a single polity, but we also need to consider how a principle of
equality applies between individuals who are positioned differently
within a citizenship constellation.
Before addressing these normative questions, we need to further dif-
ferentiate citizenship constellations. There are two basic types that have
very different structural properties but are often connected to each other
in ways that complicate both their empirical and normative analyses. So
far, I have focused on transnational constellations formed by indepen-
dent states with non-overlapping territories but partially overlapping
memberships. The second basic type is a federal structure in which the
territories and members of several polities are nested within a larger en-
compassing polity so that, in principle, every citizen of a lower level po-
lity is also a citizen of the higher level one and vice versa. Both constel-
lations produce multiple citizenship relations; in the first one, they are
horizontally overlapping, while in the second, they are vertically nested
(Bauböck 2001). Within nested constellations, we no longer consider
only independent states but, rather, polities of different kinds. These in-
clude self-governing municipalities, federal provinces or autonomous
territories within unitary states and at least one supranational polity,
which is the EU. Not all these polities have a formally established status
of citizenship that is called by this name and, in those that have it, such
as the EU, there may be doubts about its substance (Wiener 1998;
Weiler 1999). Yet, these are not justifications for the statist bias in citi-
zenship studies that simply ignores the structure of rights, duties and
membership in self-governing polities below or above the state.
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15.3 Normative puzzles in complex constellations
The first normative question raised above concerned principles for coor-
dinating membership decisions and the allocation of rights and duties
between polities entangled in a common citizenship constellation. In a
horizontally overlapping constellation formed by independent states,
this need for coordination is obviously less pressing than in a federally
nested one. We can, however, assume that the need will become stron-
ger the greater the extent of overlap.4 In a horizontal constellation, each
state will have equal powers to determine its own citizens. The question
is whether states can do so unilaterally without taking into account the
other states’ concerns. In its landmark 1955 decision in the Nottebohm
case, the International Court of Justice endorsed a principle of ‘genuine
and effective links’, in the absence of which states may not confer their
nationality to another state’s nationals.5 This negative version of the sta-
keholder principle does not yet imply a positive duty to accept dual citi-
zenship in cases of dual stakeholding. As pointed out in the first sec-
tion of this chapter, although the number of states that do so has shar-
ply increased, most do not recognise the transnational character of this
status. Some maintain instead that their own citizenship takes priority
wherever their citizens reside, which is obviously a principle that cannot
be generalised without creating conflicts between states involved in a ci-
tizenship constellation. The alternative solution is to regard external citi-
zenships as dormant and only the residential citizenship as active. But
this solution fails to take into account justified claims of external stake-
holdership, which may include voting rights and diplomatic protection.
This problem is even more obvious for denizens whose only formal citi-
zenship status is an extraterritorial one. The upshot of these considera-
tions is that there is a case for stronger norms in international law in
order to coordinate citizenship policies between states.6
In contrast with horizontally overlapping constellations, vertically
nested ones need not only coordination between levels of government,
but a constitutional settlement that regulates their decision-making
powers. As mentioned above, the basic principle regulating multilevel
citizenship is that each citizen of a nested polity is also a citizen of the
encompassing one and vice versa. This two-way linkage between levels
of citizenship is characteristic of all federal arrangements. The linkage
does not yet tell us which level of government has the power to deter-
mine citizenship for all other levels of the federation. In contemporary
federal states this is now nearly always the federal level. Switzerland is
the only current exception, since its federal law regulates only Swiss
citizenship acquired by birth and certain minimum conditions for
naturalisation, but leaves to the cantons and municipalities the power to
determine under their own laws who will become a Swiss citizen.
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Historically, we can also find a similar upward derivation from the con-
stitutive unit to the federal level in the early US and German federa-
tions (Schönberger 2005). The same principle is applied to citizenship
in the EU, with the important difference being that the EU does not
even have the competencies to provide a regulatory framework for its
member states’ nationality laws. It would be tempting to go into more
detail here and discuss whether the present lack of even purely coordi-
nating powers at the supranational level is appropriate and sustainable.
Since our main concern here is transnationalism, I want to consider
instead how principles applying to nested and overlapping constella-
tions respectively interfere with each other where such constellations
are combined. In the first section of this chapter, I described how states
react to the growing incongruence between territorial residence and
membership status by strengthening citizenship relations with emi-
grants and by granting denizenship to long-term resident immigrants.
In a nested constellation, this horizontal differentiation of citizenship
has the effect of creating an additional incongruence between citizen-
ships at different levels by partially breaking the linkage between them.
The first break is that external citizens will generally not simulta-
neously be citizens of a province or municipality in their country of ori-
gin. This is so not only due to a monopoly of state governments in in-
ternational relations, but also because, in democratic states, local and
provincial citizenship is determined by ius domicilii instead of the com-
bination of ius sanguinis, ius soli and naturalisation that regulates access
to state-level citizenship. After some time of residence, citizens who
have migrated inside the national territory automatically lose their local
citizenship status and rights in their previous place of residence and ac-
quire that of the place where they have settled without having to natura-
lise.7 The same principle of automatic ius domicilii implies that emi-
grants who have left the state territory will no longer be counted as local
citizens, but only as citizens of the state. Even this implication is, how-
ever, not without exceptions. A minority of states with external voting
rights also extend them to sub-state elections, sometimes, as in Norway
and Finland, with more restrictive absentee clauses for these compared
to national elections (IDEA & IFE 2007: 4, 17, 234-245).
While external citizenship is generally disconnected from member-
ship in sub-state polities, the latter can also expand their own residential
citizenships beyond the membership criteria used at the state level. The
local (and, in a few cases, also regional) franchise for third-country na-
tionals can be interpreted as an assertion of a distinct conception of citi-
zenship at a sub-state level. This is, once again, the outcome of an inter-
action between the transnational and nested features of citizenship con-
stellations. In the absence of international migration, ius domicilii at the
local level would apply only to native citizens of the larger state and
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serve to maintain stability in a nested federation through complemen-
tary and mutually compatible principles for citizenship determination.
If both states and municipalities had the capacity to determine local citi-
zenship and voting rights through independent naturalisation proce-
dures, this could lead to depriving members of the national demos resid-
ing in the territory of any local political representation. It is only with
immigration from other countries that ius domicilii and naturalisation
can be seen as alternative, rather than complementary, principles for ci-
tizenship attribution. Many local governments realise then that their
conception of citizenship as automatically derived from residence is not
compatible with excluding foreign residents who have not obtained citi-
zenship at the state level. By turning them into fully enfranchised citi-
zens at the local level, they partially break the link between local and
state-level citizenship. Not all European constitutions, however, allow
for this inclusive solution to the tension between transnational and fed-
eral constellations. The German and Austrian Constitutional Courts
have struck down provincial legislation in Hamburg, Schleswig-
Holstein and Vienna that would have introduced a franchise for third-
country nationals at the local level (Shaw 2007). The two courts argued
that the federal demos must be homogenous so that the electorate is
the same at all levels of government.8 This interpretation of the
German and Austrian constitutions rejects the accommodation of trans-
national citizenship and asserts a conception of the federal demos that
is more unitary than the one we find in unitary states such as Ireland,
Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden.9
As these two illustrations have shown, the partial delinking of citizen-
ship between levels is not an automatic consequence of international
migration. Some states have opted for extending extraterritorial citizen-
ship to provincial and local levels, while others have rejected applying
the ius domicilii principle of local citizenship to third-country nationals.
In liberal polities exposed to immigration and emigration, we see never-
theless a significant trend towards the double incongruence between ci-
tizenships at state and sub-state levels. This trend emerges as a largely
unintended by-product of applying pre-existing principles of member-
ship to the new migratory challenges. It adds another layer of complex-
ity to the transnational expansion of state-level citizenship that gener-
ates increasing overlaps with the membership boundaries of other
states.
The question of how to determine citizenship statuses in complex
constellations is connected with a second normative problem of equal-
ity. In contrast with the subjects of empires, who had been divided into
multiple ascriptive categories that were assigned different group privi-
leges or duties, democratic citizenship is normatively understood as a
status of equal membership in a self-governing polity. Certainly, even
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for a traditional state-centred view, rights and duties are also not exactly
the same for every citizen. Citizens below the age of majority cannot
vote, women are rarely drafted for military service, poor citizens are ex-
empted from paying income tax, social insurance benefits and welfare
rights are differentiated according to contributions and needs.
Moreover, women, disabled persons, racial, ethnic and religious minori-
ties have obtained special protection against discrimination and some
exemptions from general legislation that applies to other citizens. All
these and other forms of differentiated citizenship can still be seen as
emerging from a principle of equal respect and concern for all who are
citizens of a single polity (Dworkin 1977). By taking into account indivi-
dual affiliations to a plurality of polities, a constellation perspective
transcends, however, the single state as the basic reference unit for
equality. And it does so without replacing state-based citizenship with a
similarly homogeneous conception of universal human rights grounded
in the moral equality of human beings.
While there is a broad feminist and multiculturalist literature on dif-
ferentiated citizenship, political theorists have so far hardly ever at-
tempted to specify and contextualise how norms of equal citizenship ap-
ply beyond a single polity framework. I will illustrate this problem by
outlining merely two of its many different applications: one that refers
only to transnational constellations and a second that pertains also to
multilevel citizenship.
Consider, first, external voting rights exercised by citizens residing
permanently abroad. I have proposed elsewhere that a stakeholder prin-
ciple may provide justification for such a transnational franchise, but
that it also generally limits its application to a first generation of emi-
grants (Bauböck 2007b). In some countries that have introduced absen-
tee ballots, this was done with explicit reference to a norm of political
equality among all citizens independently of their country of resi-
dence.10 In Belgium, external voting has even been made mandatory
since it is also mandatory for citizens residing in Belgium (Lafleur
2008). But such an interpretation of equal citizenship is difficult to
maintain since states cannot protect their citizens’ civil rights outside
their own territory nor provide them with social citizenship rights to
public education, health care or poverty relief. Why should they then
have an obligation to secure exactly the same rights to vote for external
citizens as for those who live in the territory? Moreover, equality of elec-
toral representation between domestic and external citizens is nearly
impossible to achieve. In most systems, the electorate is subdivided into
territorial constituencies on the basis of enfranchised voters (not of re-
gistered voters or actual votes cast). Do expatriates then have a claim to
a number of representatives in a national legislature that is proportional
to their numerical strength? Given the often very large numbers but
306 RAINER BAUBÖCK
generally low electoral turnout of expatriates, such an interpretation of
equality would lead to a huge over-representation of absentee voters.
This is one reason most states do not create separate constituencies for
external voters, but count their votes in the domestic constituency
where they resided last.11 I have argued that such a merging of external
and domestic votes is also better justified than special representation,
since expatriates should be seen as external stakeholders in the com-
mon good of the polity to which they are linked through biographic ties,
rather than as an external minority with special interests that need to be
represented in the legislative process (Bauböck 2007b: 2432-2435).12
External stakeholders will also be self-selected. Not all persons who re-
tain a citizenship of origin can be expected to engage actively with the
domestic politics in their country of origin. Mandatory voting, which
may be justified in order to enhance equality of representation among
different classes of citizens (Lijphart 1997), clearly should not be im-
posed on expatriates. We could add further considerations about gov-
ernments’ duty to provide citizens with equal access to voting rights,
which, again, do not apply in the same way to domestic and external vo-
ters. The conclusion is that even if one accepts the basic argument for
introducing voting rights for expatriates, the principles of equal repre-
sentation will have to be relaxed and differentiated in transnational
elections.
The second illustration for problems of citizenship equality concerns
local voting rights in the EU. There are three different rationales for ex-
tending the franchise to non-citizen residents. The first justification is
that member states have agreed to grant each other’s citizens a local
franchise as a matter of reciprocity. The underlying idea here is not an
individual claim of EU citizens to local political participation. Rather it
is, first, a general commitment of liberal states to secure their citizens’
rights when they reside in other states and to be willing to grant the
same rights to citizens of other states in their own territory. And, sec-
ond, it is a specific commitment to promote the political integration of
the EU through special privileges attached to EU citizenship.
The second justification is derived from freedom of movement as the
core right of EU citizenship. The EU is committed to preventing the
discrimination on grounds of nationality of EU citizens who make use
of their right to take up residence in other member states. The institu-
tions of the EU, and specifically the European Court of Justice, have in-
terpreted this commitment very broadly as entailing general equality
both in comparison with the rights of citizens of the member states
where an EU migrant takes up residence and with the rights EU mi-
grants have enjoyed previously in their member states of origin. This ar-
gument has also been invoked for justifying the privilege of EU citizens
to vote in local elections in other member states. The dual rationale is
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that making use of their mobility rights should not entail loss of the lo-
cal representation they previously enjoyed and that they should not be
discriminated compared to citizens of their host country (Shaw 2007).
A third justification builds on the ideas of stakeholder citizenship
and differentiated membership criteria for local and state polities that I
have outlined above. In this view, local citizenship is derived from resi-
dence, and municipalities should therefore give access to political parti-
cipation and representation to all migrants who settle within their
boundaries, independently of whether they are citizens of the encom-
passing state.
All three justifications converge in supporting the introduction of lo-
cal voting rights for EU citizens by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. They
lead to quite different conclusions, however, regarding how the underly-
ing norm of equality applies to third-country nationals. The first inter-
pretation does not provide any reason for a general inclusion of third-
country nationals, but would justify extending local voting rights to citi-
zens of certain non-EU states that have introduced a residence-based lo-
cal franchise. For example, Portugal and Spain, whose constitutions em-
phasise a principle of reciprocity in international relations, have granted
the local franchise to Norwegian citizens. The problem with this norm
is that its consistent application would create a proliferation of special
rights for immigrants depending on what rights their country of origin
grants to citizens of the host state. Moreover, this differentiation of pri-
vileges would not be related in any plausible way to questions of immi-
grant integration and citizenship in the context of the receiving polity.
Is it really plausible that the very few Norwegians in Lisbon and Madrid
have a stronger claim to local representation than the many more
Moroccans who live there? In the second interpretation, EU citizenship
is primarily a bundle of transnational rights attached to free movement.
Third-country nationals could then be included if they also enjoyed ex-
tensive free-movement rights and were covered by a principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality. In the EU, however, this is
clearly still a utopian idea. Third-country nationals are subjected to ex-
tensive immigration control when entering the EU. The 2003 EU direc-
tive on long-term resident third-country nationals (EC 2003/109) has
introduced limited mobility rights across internal EU borders for deni-
zens, and the European Commission had for a while promoted the idea
of a ‘civic citizenship’ for these third-country nationals that would have
included local voting rights.13 So this second rationale for local voting
rights could, in principle, be extended to third-country nationals.
Deriving such rights from the exercise of free movement, however, cre-
ates distinct justifications for the political representation of mobile and
sedentary populations and raises the hurdles for the inclusion of third-
country nationals.
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The third justification appears to me more consistent and inclusive
than the other two. It proposes that equality among members of a local
polity should be interpreted in relation to local self-government, instead
of being derived from a principle of reciprocity that pertains to interna-
tional relations between states, or from a privilege of free movement
granted to the citizens of a supranational union. In this view, local poli-
tical communities should include all long-term residents, without dis-
tinction between native-born residents, citizens of the member state
who have moved there from other parts of the country, EU citizens
from other member states and third-country immigrants. Local citizen-
ship would then have to be disconnected from both state citizenship
and EU citizenship for the sake of ensuring equality in the local polity.
Note that this argument for residential citizenship need not apply to
state and EU levels, if we accept that citizenship acquisition in states
should be derived from birth or consent and that in the EU, as in all
federal polities with multi-level citizenship, citizenship at the federal le-
vel is not independent of citizenship in one of the provinces or states.
15.4 Where is the nationalism in transnationalism?
The theoretical questions that I addressed in the previous section
emerge from an institutional perspective on transnationalism. Political
institutions are ensembles of entrenched norms that structure the activ-
ities of governments and other political actors. Political theorists consid-
er how these norms change, or ought to change, in response to trans-
formations of contemporary societies. This perspective attributes agency
to individuals as bearers of rights and duties allocated to them by politi-
cal institutions, and it takes into account individuals’ interests and iden-
tities in relation to the political institutions that constrain or enable
their actions. But this view does not focus on collective action by non-
institutionalised actors, which has been a core element in definitions of
transnationalism in other disciplines. So how can we bring in the prac-
tice and discourse dimensions without neglecting institutional change?
A fresh look at the terminology can serve as a point of departure. The
word ‘transnationalism’ ends with ‘-ism’, suggesting thus that it refers
to an ideology. The question is whether this ideology is to be under-
stood as a variety of nationalism projected across borders or, rather, as
transcending nationalism by widening the reference framework for poli-
tical membership to the constellations described above.14
Reflecting in this way on the terminological appropriateness of the
concept could lead to abandoning it altogether. There are two reasons
for regarding transnationalism as a misnomer. First, the ‘-ism’ sends a
wrong signal. Inferring the meaning of transnationalism from its actual
COLD CONSTELLATIONS AND HOT IDENTITIES 309
use, we will find that it is mostly employed as an analytic concept in
academic discourses and only rarely comes up in political discourses.15
Transnationalism is, as Faist explains in the introductory chapter, an op-
tic, but it need not be associated with any particular ideology. The prop-
er answer to the posed question is that, as an analytical perspective,
transnationalism has to account for both trans-border nationalism and
nation-transcending conceptions of political community without being
committed to either of the two. If transnationalism refers to constella-
tions composed of a plurality of polities, then it must imply a rejection
of methodological and normative nationalism. But this does not mean
that it is necessarily allied to an alternative normative vision, such as
cosmopolitanism or multiculturalism.
A second objection applies to the adjective ‘transnational’, which does
not suggest an ideological stance but a structural quality. The problem
here is that in most uses of the term, the political unit that is trans-
cended by institutions, actions, discourses or flows is not the nation,
but the state. It is certainly very common to regard nation and state as
synonyms, but this stance reflects, again, a statist bias that privileges
claims to nationhood by entities established as sovereign states over
those of stateless nations and national minorities, and it ignores the
nested constellations of pluri-national democracies, such as Belgium,
Canada, India, Spain and the United Kingdom (Keating 2001; Gagnon
& Tully 2001). If we want to avoid this implication, we could use the
term ‘trans-state’ rather than ‘trans-national’ (Fox 2005: 172). This solu-
tion would create some additional confusion, however, in India or the
US where the constituent units of the federation are called ‘states’ and
the encompassing one is referred to as ‘country’ or ‘nation’.
At the most abstract level of analysis, we might need a term referring
generally to institutions, actions and processes that transcend the
boundaries of political units while, at the same time, linking specific
units together into a bounded constellation. One could then introduce
an entirely new term by calling these ‘trans-polity’ phenomena.16 They
would not only include constellations of independent states, but also
horizontal ones between the constituent units of pluri-national democ-
racies as well as relations between stateless nations and their diasporas.
Refining the vocabulary of academic research in these ways can be a
useful exercise when it becomes necessary to highlight distinctions be-
tween the various kinds of trans-polity relations. One should also avoid,
however, introducing too many new terms into a well-established field
of study, especially if referring to phenomena commonly described by a
widely accepted terminology. Terminological battles tend to be tedious
and unproductive, and an attempt to purge the literature on transna-
tionalism of its core concept would be a waste of energy. A more pro-
mising strategy is to enrich its meanings through analysing the
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different contexts in which it applies and to introduce new terms only
as needed for further specifications.
Instead of casting aside transnationalism for reasons of terminologi-
cal purity, we could make more productive use of its ambiguities by tak-
ing seriously this question: where is the nationalism in transnational-
ism? This is now no longer a conceptual question but an empirical one.
Although transnationalism does not conceptually entail nationalism,
nationalist claims are frequently articulated and mobilised within trans-
national constellations. Contrary to a widespread assumption, national-
ism is not always aiming for congruence between national-cultural
boundaries and state borders. Nation-building may be confined to sub-
state territories (without ever crossing the threshold to secessionism),
and it may extend beyond state borders by attempting to bind together
populations in a homeland territory and abroad (without trying to re-
move the borders between them or to bring external kin populations
back into the homeland).
We also need to consider how transnational citizenship is not merely
a bundle of rights, but may be invoked and involved in nation-building
projects. In this respect, the early literature on migrant transnational-
ism has often assumed that any process that transcends state borders
will thereby also promote transition towards an age of post-nationalism
(e.g. Basch et al. 1994; Soysal 1994). As a focus on sending-country
governments makes immediately clear, from their perspective, the pro-
motion of transnational ties is rather linked to an ideology of nation-
building beyond borders. The terminological problem becomes then
quite obvious since, in this view, emigrants have crossed the state bor-
der but remain inside the national community.
What has been largely missing so far is an effort to synthesise the lit-
erature on migrant political transnationalism with that on territorial na-
tionalism and the relations of homeland minorities with external kin
states (see Waterbury in this volume). Brubaker’s pioneering work in
this field has described a triangular constellation involving nationalising
states, national minorities and their external homelands, which is fre-
quently found in Central and Eastern Europe (Brubaker 1996).17 This
triangle is structurally isomorphic with the one between host countries,
immigrants and sending states that characterises migrant transnational-
ism. It should then not be difficult to compare the two constellations
and to consider also possible interferences and combinations between
them.
The first lesson to be learned from bringing together two separate
fields of study is that migration is not a necessary condition for transna-
tional political ties, which can be generated in both constellations. Yet,
it is also important to distinguish them, since it makes a big difference
whether the relation to an external homeland has come about through
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the movement of people across borders or of borders across people,
and whether their situation in the ‘hostland’ is one of recent arrivals
and territorially dispersed immigrants or of a settled minority that has
lived continuously in a particular territory over many generations. How
relevant are these distinctions for explaining phenomenologies of na-
tionalism in both contexts and for normatively evaluating claims to
transnational citizenship?
In both constellations, governments and political parties in external
kin states or countries of origin have frequently used nationalist rheto-
ric, but host country governments have reacted to these quite differ-
ently. The crucial question is whether trans-state nationalism can poten-
tially raise claims that could threaten the territorial integrity of the state,
which is much more likely in the case of homeland minorities than of
territorially dispersed immigrants.18
This makes the normative question of legitimacy of claims raised by,
or on behalf of, homeland minorities with external kin states more
complex than that about analogous demands by migrants. I have sug-
gested elsewhere that there is a normative trade-off between territorial
autonomy and transnational citizenship (Bauböck 2007a). If a nationa-
lising state transforms itself into a pluri-national democracy that grants
its homeland minorities territorial autonomy and power-sharing in in-
stitutions of central government, then such arrangements pre-empt or
weaken simultaneous claims by nationalist minority elites to represent
a diaspora in need of protection by a neighbouring kin state.19 Yet, as
political debates within the Hungarian minority in Romania illustrate
(Brubaker, Feischmidt, Fox & Grancea 2006), it is not always a foregone
conclusion that territorial autonomy is the solution preferred by most
members of such minorities. There are several possible orientations for
minorities separated from a homeland state through a new or restored
international border. They can opt for short-term emigration to the kin
state, they can decide to stay but conceive of themselves as a diaspora
linked to that state, they may abandon their external ties and re-imagine
themselves as a domestic ethnolinguistic minority or they may finally
decide that their best option is to assimilate into a dominant national
identity of their country of residence. Ideally, alternative projects of cul-
tural identity and political affiliation should be able to compete with
each other for democratic support under the condition that they respect
the rules of the game, including legitimate concerns about territorial in-
tegrity of, and friendly relations, between states.
Analytical distinctions between the two transnational political constel-
lations are thus important for explanatory and normative purposes, but
they are frequently blurred in real world cases. Moving borders may
trigger migration flows of those who do not want to end up as minori-
ties in a nationalising state. And ethnic cleansing may have effects
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similar to those of moving borders. More than 300,000 ethnic Turks
who were pushed out of Bulgaria in 1989 have established themselves
in western Turkey. After becoming Turkish citizens, large numbers have
reclaimed their Bulgarian citizenship and today, from outside the coun-
try, provide electoral support for the political party representing the
Turkish minority in their former homeland (Özgür-Baklacioglu 2006).
Here the Brubakerian triangle is expanded into a quadrangle. The
fourth corner is a migrant origin group settling in the previously exter-
nal kin state, but still using its transnational citizenship in order to sus-
tain links with the co-ethnic minority in their previous homeland.
Mexican migration into the border regions of the US illustrates yet
another mixed case where recent flows of labour migrants replenish or
recreate an originally autochthonous native minority. Mexican rhetoric
about building a global nation through emigration (Smith 2003) has in-
voked the annexation of Mexican territory by the US in the mid-nine-
teenth century and the presence of a native Chicano population in the
American South-West. Taking such rhetoric all too seriously,
Huntington conjures up a scenario in which Hispanic immigration into
this area could eventually transform it into a US Quebec (Huntington
2004), which, for him, seems to be a quite horrible prospect. This prog-
nosis can be easily dismissed since there appears to be a persistent lan-
guage shift towards English-only among third-generation descendants
of Hispanic immigrants, and there is little credibility or political sup-
port for territorial claims that would revise the 1848 Treaty of Hidalgo.
But there are harder cases, too, such as the Russian-speaking popula-
tions in Estonia and Latvia. Should they be seen as immigrants, as colo-
nial settlers or as national minorities separated from their homeland
through secession (Kymlicka 2001: 76-79)? Such different ways of con-
structing minorities create or undermine legitimacy for claims to exter-
nal as well as domestic citizenship raised by representatives of these
minorities.
15.5 The proliferation of ‘diasporas’
Bringing back nationalism into the expanding academic field of trans-
nationalism studies creates a bridge between an institutionalist ap-
proach to transnationalism and a focus on practices, movements and
discourses. This move makes it also possible to create an analytical
space for the notoriously vague and overstretched concept of ‘diaspora’.
Classic definitions of diaspora discussed in this book by Faist,
Bruneau, Paerregaard, Weinar, Waterbury, Koinova, King and Christou
and others include several elements that apply just as much to transna-
tional migrant communities (Vertovec, Van Hear & Pieke 2004: 3). So
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let me consider which among these elements may provide criteria that
could distinguish the two phenomena. I suggest that there are only
four, and that three among them fail in the end to draw a clear enough
distinction.
First, diaspora has been associated (also etymologically) with trau-
matic dispersal of a group from a common territorial origin towards
multiple destinations. Second, diasporic communities resist full assimi-
lation into the host society and maintain collective group identities
across multiple generations. Third, diasporic communities create and
maintain lateral ties across political borders between the various loca-
tions of settlement. Fourth, diaspora groups strongly orient themselves
towards an external homeland and can be mobilised for political pro-
jects relating to the future of this homeland.
The first criterion is clearly not a sufficient one, since many refugee
populations whose origin lies in coerced migration and who have been
dispersed across various receiving states have blended into their host
societies and no longer conceive of themselves as diasporas. The his-
toric fact of traumatic dispersal will certainly shape personal identities
among all first generations of coerced migrants, but this does not mean
that they will always regard it as a public and collective identity asso-
ciated with political claims. For their descendants, who have not experi-
enced these events in their own lives, it all depends on the parental stor-
ies they grow up with and on their identification as a distinct group of
origin in the society where they have been born. The first criterion is
not even strictly necessary, since groups whose migration was not trau-
matic and coerced may eventually mobilise as diasporas in response to
trouble in the homeland. During the Kosovo War of 1998-1999, many
migrants who had left the country as Yugoslav guest workers in the
1960s and 1970s raised funds for financing resistance against the
Serbian forces, and quite a number of their sons volunteered to fight in
this conflict. Finally, the criterion of territorial dispersal does not apply
at all to ‘diasporas’ that live in their traditional regional homeland but
have been separated from an external kin state through shifting interna-
tional borders.
The second criterion, the persistence of diasporic identity across mul-
tiple generations, is therefore the most obvious candidate for distin-
guishing diasporic identity groups from the more ephemeral phenom-
enon of migrant transnationalism. For the latter, in order to remain
alive over multiple generations, the groups involved in transnational
networks need to be constantly replenished through new first-genera-
tion migrants. When source countries are no longer sources of new
flows, or when these flows are cut off by immigration control in the re-
ceiving country, then migrant transnationalism is likely to fade away, as
it did in the US between World War I and the 1960s. Diasporic
314 RAINER BAUBÖCK
identities are then phenomenologically distinguished from transna-
tional ones through their capacity to be passed on to subsequent gen-
erations in the absence of new immigration from the same origin (see
King & Christou in this volume). This is, however, merely a description
that begs the question of how to explain such intergenerational resis-
tance to full assimilation.
A similar point applies to the third criterion of lateral links across
multiple places of diaspora settlement. Migrant transnationalism is gen-
erally structured as a relation between singular countries of origin and
of destination. Even if migrants from the same origin settle in many
different destinations, their transnational activities are primarily direc-
ted towards a country of origin where they have family ties, where they
send remittances, in whose politics they take an interest and to which
they may plan to return for retirement. Except in cases where their fa-
mily networks are spread over several host countries, lateral ties to co-
nationals in other countries of destination are of little interest to ordin-
ary migrants. It is members of political, economic and religious elites
claiming to represent these groups who may have interests in, and the
necessary resources for, forging such links (see Paerregaard in this vo-
lume). As research on transnational claims-making and mobilisation of
migrants in Europe has shown, their networks across borders are usual-
ly quite weak even in the politically integrated EU, and the primary ad-
dressees of claims remain member state governments (Guiraudon
2001; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni & Passy 2005). So the question is,
again, why do diasporic efforts to forge strong lateral ties succeed in
certain cases? What explains their emergence and persistence against
background conditions for migrant transnationalism in liberal demo-
cratic societies that are not conducive to the stabilisation of diasporic
identities?
The fourth criterion does not provide an answer, but raises the right
kind of questions that could provide one. If we consider diaspora as a
political project, then we have to explain it not so much in terms of his-
toric origins of the group, but of elite interests and ideologies. An expla-
natory theory of diaspora will, in this respect, be no different from the-
ories of nationalism. Diasporas have to be invented and mobilised in or-
der to come into existence. What we need to look for are current
conditions that provide incentives for elites to mobilise a constituency
around a diasporic identity and that explain success in terms of inde-
pendent motives of these constituencies to support such projects.
In analytic terms, the second and third criteria are explananda rather
than explanantia. We can use them to identify diasporas in a descriptive
manner, but they need to be explained, and the first criterion of trau-
matic dispersal is insufficient as an explanation. The second and third
criteria will once again come up within the fourth as goals rather than
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conditions. Diaspora as a political project must strive for intergenera-
tional continuity and build lateral links. These two political goals have
to be achieved to make good on the claim of coherent group identity
and to mobilise group members for a transformation of the homeland
through external influence or return. Explanations for the second and
third features will have to combine external causes, such as persistent
segregation in the country of settlement, with internal characteristics of
the group, including economic resources or an ethno-religious tradition
that supports endogamy and a strong sense of shared identity and pro-
vides elites with symbolic resources for mobilisation. The fourth feature
of diaspora adds to these structural explanations a crucial element of
agency. The emergence of diaspora is merely facilitated, but not deter-
mined, by any of the structural factors listed above, and is thus a contin-
gent outcome of collective agency. Analysing diaspora from an agency
perspective requires examining not only the group’s elites and their pro-
jects, but also their opportunity structures shaped by other agents, in-
cluding governments in the country of settlement and the external
homeland.
These external homelands not only provide a reference point for dia-
sporic projects pursued abroad, but also often host the primary agents
supporting such projects. Diasporas are not merely created by minority
elites in countries of settlement but also by homeland country govern-
ments.20 The latter may, as Israel does, promote the ingathering of a
pre-existing diaspora and strengthen a sense of diasporic condition
among those who decide to stay as a means of mobilising political sup-
port abroad. Other homeland countries also use the language of dia-
spora to extract economic resources from a reference population of emi-
grant origin established abroad, as many South and East Asian states
do (Skrennty, Chan, Fox & Kim 2007). For homeland governments and
political parties, the building of diaspora abroad is often instrumental
for mobilising domestic political support through posing as defenders
of a larger national community (see Waterbury in this volume). Where
external groups are granted citizenship and voting rights, these consti-
tuencies outside the homeland may even determine the outcome of do-
mestic elections (Bauböck 2007b; Kovács 2008).
Next to ethnic entrepreneurs in emigration contexts and homeland
political actors, international organisations and EU institutions have
emerged as a third, and most unlikely, type of collective actor using the
terminology of diaspora for instrumental purposes. In their case, the
goal is to promote contributions by groups of migrant background to
the economic development of countries of origin, often with a view to
reducing emigration pressure there (see Weinar in this volume).
This proliferation of actors promoting different meanings attributed
to the concept show that, from a sociological perspective, Brubaker
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(2005: 12) is right: ‘We should think of diaspora not in substantialist
terms as a bounded entity, but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim.’
Comparative political scientists and political theorists will, however, be
more interested in conditions for mobilisation and the impact of suc-
cessful claims than merely deconstructing the discursive uses of
‘diaspora’.
While the other three criteria highlight empirical contrasts between
transnational and diasporic phenomena that can often be blurred, the
fourth one shows that the two concepts also work in qualitatively differ-
ent ways. Diaspora is an evocative political term, whereas transnational-
ism is primarily an academic concept that refers to a set of empirical
phenomena and a perspective that groups them together and suggests a
framework for studying them.
With all these caveats, we may interpret the four criteria considered
here as differentia specifica that distinguish the phenomenology of dia-
spora from that of migrant transnationalism. From this perspective, dia-
spora emerges as a special case of transnationalism whose deviation
from the more common patterns of migrant transnationalism and incor-
poration is in need of explanation. Yet, as I have argued, if the fourth cri-
terion provides the crucial key for an explanatory account, then diaspora
can also be used as a much broader concept that encompasses not only
migrant transnationalism, but applies to many other phenomena, too.
Let me explain. Under some conditions a claim that is made using
the language of diaspora may succeed even in the absence of one, two
or all three of the other criteria. If diaspora is essentially understood as
a political project, then we cannot rule out in advance that political en-
trepreneurs using the language of diaspora in a widely overstretched
and metaphoric way may eventually succeed in forging and mobilising
a corresponding collective identity among a sufficiently large group.
And if they do succeed, then their using the language of ‘diaspora’ will
have created a socially significant phenomenon that will be called by
that name (King 1998: 8-11).
Understanding the performative quality of the term ‘diaspora’
(Ragazzi 2008) should lead neither to dismissing it as pure fiction nor
to accepting at face value all claims made on behalf of diasporas.
Instead, we should regard this necessary deconstruction as merely a
first step towards analysing conditions under which the image of dia-
spora catches the imagination of a target audience and prompts indivi-
duals to sacrifice many of their other interests in order to bring about a
social formation that mirrors the image.
I have already mentioned conditions that may bring about a diasporic
transformation of a group of migrant origin that does not share an ex-
perience of traumatic dispersal. We need to relax the second criterion of
intergenerational continuity as well, since diasporas may recruit active
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members who have no common ancestral roots with the core group
(e.g. through intermarriage or religious and political conversion). There
may even be conditions under which the reference to a territorial home-
land, which can be demarcated on a geographic map, is replaced with a
virtual homeland that exists as a mythological realm in the narratives of
elites and in their adherents’ minds. Consider the case of politically mo-
bilised orthodox Muslims, among whom there may be a substantial
number of converts, who develop a primary identity as members of a
global Islamic community. In their minds, this umma is characterised
by horizontal solidarity among its members across many different
places of settlement, and membership entails an obligation to work to-
wards creating a future ‘House of Islam’, an Islamic polity whose terri-
torial borders are as yet unspecified (Mandaville 2001).21 If all these fea-
tures resemble the self-description of other diasporic projects, on what
grounds could one reject using the term when analysing such claims?
There are good reasons for reluctance (or at least for putting ‘diaspora’
in inverted commas) as long as such claims are merely fantasy projects
without sufficient social and political support. But if and when they are
successfully mobilised, then it is perfectly appropriate to apply the cate-
gory of diaspora also as an analytic one. Refusing to do so would indir-
ectly strengthen an essentialist conception and the reification of other
groups who are then accepted as ‘real’ diasporas because of their his-
toric origin and orientation towards a precisely defined territory as con-
trasted with the merely ‘imagined’ diasporas.
This leads me to a somewhat paradoxical conclusion. We should, on
the one hand, avoid overstretching the concept by sticking the ‘diaspora’
label onto all transnational political or religious networks and activities.
Doing so would single out one particular strategic project of collective
identity formation from a broad range of possible ones and would
wrongly assume that all individuals involved in transnational forma-
tions will naturally conceive of themselves as members of intergenera-
tional communities whose primary identity refers to origins in an exter-
nal homeland. Only a small subset of transnational political formations
fits this description of diaspora. On the other hand, diaspora as a politi-
cal project may succeed in mobilising individuals in a variety of con-
texts and none of the three descriptive characteristics of traumatic dis-
persal, lateral links across destinations and intergenerational continuity
is a strictly necessary condition for such a project to succeed. The term
‘diaspora’ should then also be used to analyse groups politically mobi-
lised for a diasporic claim independently of whether any of the general
descriptive characteristics are present.
This dual use of diaspora as a category of research still allows for
reigning in conceptual overstretch. ‘If everything is constructed, then
anything goes’ is a bad motto for serious academic research. Scholars
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must not confuse their task with that of political entrepreneurs. They
should not issue academic licences to invent diasporas by stretching the
concept to those phenomena that neither match the descriptive charac-
teristics nor refer to sufficiently supported political projects.
15.6 Conclusion: The hot transnationalism of diaspora
The political theory perspective on transnationalism that I have
sketched in this chapter emphasises the structural transformation of po-
litical membership and boundaries often neglected in accounts of trans-
national citizenship that focus on political practices, mobilisations and
discourses. The challenge of transnationalism to the core institutions
and boundaries of democratic polities has not yet been fully under-
stood. Abandoning methodological and normative nationalism is only a
first step. The more difficult task ahead is to work out how democratic
norms of inclusion and equality apply within constellations with a plur-
ality of polities that are no longer fully separate. When doing so, we will
have to accept strongly differentiated citizenship statuses and rights as
well as highly asymmetric relations between political units and levels.
This unfinished agenda for an institutionalist political theory of trans-
nationalism should not detract from the second task, which is to under-
stand transnational constellations not merely as an opportunity struc-
ture for individual choices, but also for collective action. This is where
the study of diasporas becomes important. Instead of artificially separat-
ing diasporas from transnational networks and communities through
definitions that reify particular group identities, we need to understand
diaspora as the contingent outcome of political mobilisations within
transnational constellations.
The political theory perspective on transnationalism may be called a
‘cold view’ for the two reasons spelled out in the fourth section of this
chapter. It focuses on institutional change and the top-down allocation
of status, rights and duties by established political authorities rather
than on individual agency and social movements. And, moreover, it
uses the concept as an analytical tool for describing a complex social
reality rather than, in a normative sense, as a value or goal that ought to
guide political decisions and actions. Diaspora differs from transnation-
alism on both counts. It is a ‘hot’ concept that refers more often to col-
lective identities and actions of non-state actors than to established in-
stitutions (even when it is promoted by the latter), and it has prolifer-
ated through political mobilisation more than through academic
discourse. Within the broader academic field of transnationalism, dia-
spora adds thus a focus on the politics of passion (Walzer 2004;
Mouffe 2005).
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We may therefore conclude that the study of diaspora fills the gap left
open by institutionalist perspectives that fail to capture the discursive
and practice dimensions of transnationalism. Yet, the study of diasporic
mobilisations also takes us beyond the sociology and anthropology of or-
dinary transnational practices that sustain economic, cultural and family
networks across borders. Moreover, hot diasporic politics differ from
the ‘banal transnationalism’22 of migrant-sending states that regard
their expatriates as an asset for their economic and political goals.
Originally referring to victim groups of nation-building projects, the
concept of diaspora is today often invoked in contestations of state-
based collective identities and existing political boundaries.
Understood in this way, the study of transnational citizenship and
diasporic identities can be seen as complementing each other, rather
than as providing alternative interpretations for the same phenomena.
Consensus on this point will be hard to achieve, but it would help avoid
confusion in the conversation across disciplines.
Notes
1 In a thoughtful review of the literature, Fox warns against stretching the concept of
transnational citizenship too far beyond this core towards thin and civil society based
conceptions.
Only a high-intensity, rights-based definition of transnational citizenship holds
up well. By this definition the term refers to dual or multiple citizenships that
are grounded both in enforceable rights and in clearly bounded membership(s).
(2005: 194)
2 One could object that, from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, many
US states had even granted foreign nationals voting rights in federal elections
(Raskin 1993; Hayduk 2005). As pointed out by Spiro (2008: 92), however, these
were generally not conceived as rights derived from residence, but as privileges for
‘declarant aliens’ who had formally declared their intention to become citizens.
3 Smith (2003: 19-31) applies his notion of peoplehood to a wide variety of entities that
includes states, regional unions, provinces and even NGOs and religious commu-
nities, but does not explicitly consider transnational formations.
4 Consider, for example, the Romanian-Moldovan constellation. According to a 2003
estimate, about 40 per cent of the Moldovan population also possess Romanian,
Russian or Israeli nationality (Iordachi 2004: 257), with the lion’s share going to
Romanian-Moldovan dual nationality.
5 Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 1995 I.C.J. 4, 1955 WL 1; 315-324.
6 The most comprehensive treaty so far is the 1997 Convention on Nationality of the
Council of Europe, which, as of 13 August 2009, has been signed by 28 states and ra-
tified by nineteen.
7 Switzerland is again an exceptional case where even long-term settlement in another
canton does not automatically lead to a change of cantonal citizenship.
8 For Germany see BVerfGE 63, 37 (Schleswig-Holstein) and BVerfGE 63, 60
(Hamburg), 31 October 1990; for Austria see VfGH G218/03, 30 June 2004.
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9 Unsurprisingly, Germany and Austria are also among the few remaining states in
Western Europe that resist the trend towards tolerating dual citizenship in cases of
naturalisation.
10 This was the principal argument used by the Austrian Constitutional Court for striking
down a law that had required ordinary residence in Austria as a precondition for voting
in federal parliamentary and presidential elections (VfGH G218/88, 16 March 1989).
11 External voters elect their own representatives in eleven out of 115 countries that have
some provisions for external voting. The European cases are Croatia, France, Italy
and Portugal (IDEA & IFE 2007: 28).
12 For a different view see Spiro (2006).
13 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a
Community Immigration Policy, COM (2000) 757 final (22 November 2000);
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on
Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM (2003) 336 final (3 June 2003).
14 According to Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004: 1177):
what immigration scholars describe as transnationalism is usually its opposite:
highly particularistic attachments antithetical to those by-products of globaliza-
tion denoted by the concept of “transnational civil society” and its related mani-
festations.
I think that this assessment is based on a superficial reading. The use of the concept
in migration studies differs from that in social movement studies exactly by combin-
ing universalistic and particularistic interpretations without, however, always spelling
out the tension between them.
15 This is broadly confirmed by Weinar’s analysis in this volume of discursive uses of
‘transnationalism’ and ‘diaspora’ in international organisation documents, with the
important exception of UN documents that use the former rather than the latter
terminology.
16 I have not found any prior use of the term ‘trans-polity’ in this broad sense, although
it has been occasionally used by historians when referring to polities in eras before
the emergence of the modern state. It seems that the political philosopher David
Owen and I have developed this idea independently of each other (personal commu-
nication 12 February 2009).
17 The best-known examples are relations between Romania and Slovakia, their
Hungarian-speaking minorities and Hungary and between the Baltic states, their
Russian origin populations and the Russian Federation.
18 Even in the case of irredentist minority nationalism supported by an external kin
state, the reaction of the state into which the minority is at present incorporated is
not always to defend territorial integrity at any price. As the British Northern Ireland
policy illustrates, the attitude of a centre’s elite towards the spectre of territorial
shrinkage depends very much on the dominant conception of nationhood at the cen-
tre and the degree of incorporation of the minority’s homeland into a hegemonic
conception of the political community (Lustick 1993; Lustick 2001).
19 Laitin (1998) calls such groups ‘beached diasporas’.
20 The relationship between diasporas and external homelands is not only often charac-
terised by political tensions, but may also undergo what Safran (2009) calls ‘role re-
versals’, with returnees still perceiving themselves as diasporas and external countries
of settlement assuming the role of homelands where diasporic authenticity can be
better preserved.
21 This is one illustration of a broader phenomenon that Cohen (2009) aptly calls ‘li-
quid homelands’.
22 The reference is to Billig’s (1995) concept of ‘banal nationalism’.
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